# Yamini

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · August 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427074

## Case

- **Full name:** Dorian Yamini v. Nurses Robin Bartok, Nanette Ohse, Ashley O’Neal, and Dr. Alfonso David
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DORIAN YAMINI (Y36868), )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:24-cv-659-DWD
)
NURSES ROBIN BARTOK, NANETTE )
OHSE, ASHLEY O’NEAL, AND DR. )
ALFONSO DAVID, )

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
In this matter, Plaintiff Dorian Yamini alleges that Defendants Robin Bartok,
Nanette Ohse, Ashley O’Neal, and Dr. Alfonso David were deliberately indifferent to his
complaint of severe abdominal pain while an inmate of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (herein “IDOC”) currently residing at Shawnee Correctional Center (herein
“Shawnee”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bartok, Ohse, O’Neal (nurses) and Dr.
David, medical staff at Shawnee, delayed access to or denied him adequate medical care
for severe abdominal pain, which ultimately necessitated emergency surgery. (Doc. 1).
As construed by the Court (Doc. 10), Plaintiff’s claim as to the instant Defendants is:
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendants Robin Bartok, Dr. David, Nurse Ohse, and A. O’Neal for
their handling of Plaintiff’s medical situation.
Now before the Court is the motion for summary judgement filed by Defendants
(Doc. 52) and memorandum in support (Doc. 53). Defendants Bartok, Ohse, O’Neal, and
David move for summary judgement arguing that they were not deliberately indifferent
to Plaintiff’s medical needs because they provided him with adequate treatment and
evaluation, which yielded normal findings, and following a subsequent evaluation the

next day, escalated treatment. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot show that
their actions caused him any harm. Plaintiff responded to the motion (Doc. 59) to which
Defendants replied (Doc. 60). As further detailed below, the Court will grant summary
judgement in favor of Defendants.
Background
Defendants attach 40 pages of Plaintiff’s medical records to their memorandum in

support of their motion for summary judgement. (Doc. 53-1). Plaintiff does not dispute
the medical event and diagnosis occurred but does dispute that the finding of normal
vitals ended his need for care. (Doc. 59, pg. 4). Plaintiff asserts a claim against each of the
Defendants that their care fell outside of the accepted professional standards and
amounted to deliberate indifference on each of their parts.

Plaintiff was first evaluated on January 20, 2022, after collapsing as he was headed
back to his cell following dayroom time. (Doc 53-2 at 22:2-21). Following his fall, Shawnee
initiated a Code Three, and four nurses arrived to assess his condition. (Doc. 53-2 at 20:1-
18). Nurse Bartok concluded that Plaintiff’s vital signs were normal and there were no
concerning findings. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 7). She observed no bruising, swelling, masses, or

displacement along his back or abdomen. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 7-8). Nurse Bartok also noted
that upon palpating Plaintiff’s abdominal region, he did not flinch, wince, or pull away.
(Doc. 53-1, pg. 8). The findings were then reported to Dr. David who advised her to
inform Plaintiff that the findings were all normal and that he could remain in his housing
unit. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 8).

Plaintiff was then returned to his cell and claims that around 9:15pm he began
experiencing more symptoms that included worsening pain and vomiting blood, for
which he then sought help from an officer that Plaintiff claims ignored him. (Doc. 53-5,
pg. 5). Plaintiff claims that he was yelling in pain and throwing up blood for the following
two hours. (Doc. 53-5, pg. 5). Around 11:00pm, Plaintiff left his cell and told the new shift
officer, Sgt. Woodard, that he needed to see a doctor. (Doc. 53-2 at 35:6-11). He was told

by the officer to return to his cell and that healthcare would be called. (Doc. 53-2 at 35:6-
11). He then proceeded downstairs to seek attention from other officers, whereafter
Lieutenant Tripp came to him and told him that he would not go to healthcare and that
the nurses had said he was fine and “threw him back in his cell.” (Doc. 53-2 at 35:6-11).
Plaintiff claims that his symptoms continued to worsen after being placed back in

his cell, including spotting blood in his urine at some point. (Doc. 53-2 at 51:3-12). Plaintiff
then called his father around 10:30am the next morning, who subsequently called the
healthcare unit and spoke with Nurse O’Neal. (Doc. 53-2 at 56:24, 57:1-23). By 11:15 am,
Nurse O’Neal examined Plaintiff. Nurse O’Neal noted that Plaintiff had a pallor
appearance, purple tint to the corners of his mouth, walked with difficulty, guarded his

stomach, and dry heaved. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 9). These findings were reported to Dr. David,
who then had Plaintiff sent to the infirmary for 23-hour observation. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 9).
While Plaintiff was under observation, a nurse noted that he had reported to her
he was in pain. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 11). The nurse reported he was experiencing severe pain
in the mid-torso that radiated to his groin and left leg. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 11). After reporting
these findings to Dr. David, who ordered him to be sent to the emergency room. (Doc.

53-1, pg. 11). Plaintiff was picked up to go to the emergency room at 1:40 pm. (Doc. 53-1,
p. 236)
After arriving at Heartland Regional Medical Center Emergency Room (herein
“Heartland”), near 2:00 pm, the ER nurses noted his blood pressure was mildly elevated
with no other abnormal vital signs. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 21). Plaintiff then received abdominal
and pelvic CT scans wherein he was found to have a perforated ulcer near the lower end

of his stomach. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 24-26). At 6:00 pm, he then underwent a successful surgery
to repair the perforated ulcer. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 21). Following the surgery, three days later,
a doctor noted that he had a fever and elevated white blood cell count, and that he met
the criteria for sepsis. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 20). The cause of the sepsis was not specified and
resolved after Plaintiff received antibiotics. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 20). Plaintiff was then

discharged on the same day on January 26, 2022, and later noted by the hospital in post-
operation visits to be recovering well. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 25-26).
Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgement is “proper only if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures,

and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [Defendants are]
entitled to judgement as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Wragg v. Vill. of Thornton,
604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the initial
responsibility of demonstrating that there is a lack of genuine issue of material fact. Quinn

v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 8 F.4th 557, 567 (7th Cir. 2021). The Court considers the
facts in a light most favorable to the non-movant, here the Plaintiff. Srail v. Vill. Of Lisle,
588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009). “Inferences that are supported only by speculation and
conjecture will not defeat a summary judgement motion.” McDonald v. Vill. Of Winnetka,
371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004); cf. Michael v. St. Joseph Cnty., 259 F.3d 842, 845 (“[t]o
successfully oppose the defendants’ motion for summary judgement, [the plaintiff] must

do more than raise a ‘metaphysical doubt’ as to the material facts . . . and instead must
present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.”).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, and the
deliberate indifference to the “serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the Constitution.” Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). A prisoner
is entitled to “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm,” not
demand the best care possible. Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
To succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, the prisoner must establish that he
had an “objectively serious medical condition” and that a prison official was subjectively

aware of the condition and either “knowingly or recklessly disregarded it.” Hayes v.
Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008); Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir.
2005). A prisoner may likewise establish deliberate indifference by “demonstrating that
the treatment he received was blatantly inappropriate.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409
(7th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). However, this is a high bar to establish, as a medical
professional is “entitled to deference in treatment decisions unless no minimally

competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances.” Sain v.
Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation modified) (overruled on other grounds
by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). Mere dissatisfaction or “disagreement with a
doctor’s course of treatment is generally insufficient” to establish deliberate indifference.
Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006). A nurse is not immune from claims
of deliberate indifference because there is a supervising doctor with decision-making

power; while nurses may generally “defer to instructions given by physicians, they have
an independent duty to ensure that inmates receive constitutionally adequate care.” Perez
v. Fenoglio, 792 F.2d 768, 779 (7th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff must first establish that he has an “objectively serious medical condition.”
Boyce v. Moore, 314 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2002). A medical condition is objectively serious

“if a physician has diagnosed it as requiring treatment, or the need for treatment would
be obvious to a layperson.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (citation modified). A medical condition
need not be life-threatening to be serious, “it could be a condition that would result in
further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated.”
Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010).

Plaintiff must then establish that the prison official has subjective knowledge of
his medical condition that they then disregard. Snyder, 546 F.3d at 522. Plaintiff must
establish “more than negligence or even malpractice” to prove deliberate indifference.
Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409. A mistake in professional judgement standing alone cannot be
deliberate indifference. Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.
2016). However, “where evidence exists that the defendant knew better than to make the

medical decision that he did, then summary judgement is improper.” Id. (citation
modified).
Analysis
Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants dispute that Plaintiff’s perforated ulcer was an
objectively serious medical condition. Regardless, a reasonable jury could find that this
medical condition was objectively serious. Plaintiff complained of pain over a period of

less than 24 hours before being transferred to Heartland and undergoing treatment.
Plaintiff required two CT scans that showed a perforated ulcer requiring surgery to fix.
As such, the record supports finding that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff can
satisfy the first prong of the deliberate indifference test as to his claim.
With regard to the second prong, Plaintiff contends that the Defendants’ actions

at the outset of his symptoms constituted deliberate indifference. Plaintiff was evaluated
by Nurse Bartok following his initial complaints and the findings reported to Dr. David
found there were no severe symptoms. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 7-8). The abdominal examination
likewise did not result in any indication Plaintiff having a perforated ulcer. Plaintiff does
not dispute Nurse Bartok’s findings nor that he did not exhibit any behavior such as

flinching, wincing, or pulling away, but does contend that a finding of normal vitals
ended his need for care, constituting deliberate indifference. (Doc. 59, pg. 4).
I. Deliberate Indifference Claim against Nurse Bartok
Nurse Bartok had only one interaction with Plaintiff. As previously discussed,
Nurse Bartok conducted the initial assessment on Plaintiff, where she found no abnormal

vitals nor anything remarkable from the abdominal examination. Plaintiff contends that
Nurse Bartok deliberately ignored severe symptoms present in the initial examination,
including internal bleeding (Doc. 59, pg. 2-3). Defendants deny that Nurse Bartok
dismissed severe symptoms and that all of the findings were normal, which is
substantiated by the RN Note on January 20, 2022. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 8). The undisputed facts
in the record indicate that Nurse Bartok evaluated Plaintiff and proceeded accordingly.

Plaintiff disputes that the findings made by Nurse Bartok constituted deliberate
indifference based on his own opinion but provides no evidence to support it. Plaintiff’s
disagreement with the professional judgement of Nurse Bartok does not by itself
establish deliberate indifference. See Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996). A
medical professional’s treatment decision can only rise to the level of deliberate

indifference in the event that such a decision is a “substantial departure from accepted
professional judgement, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible did not base the decision on such a judgement.” Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94
F.3d 254, 261-62 (7th Cir. 1996). If this standard is not met, then there is no showing of
deliberate indifference. The record reflects that Nurse Bartok exercised her professional

judgement in assessing Plaintiff, and as such, lacks the culpable mental state requiring to
establish she was deliberately in different. Thus, because no reasonable juror could
conclude otherwise, Defendant Bartok is entitled to summary judgement on Plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claim.
II. Deliberate Indifference Claim against Nurse Ohse
Nurse Ohse is only briefly mentioned as responding to the Code 3 with Nurse
Bartok. The same standard Nurse Bartok is held to exists here in the claim against Nurse

Ohse for deliberate indifference. Plaintiff contends that Nurse Ohse, like Nurse Bartok,
exhibited deliberate indifference as to his condition at the time of the initial assessment.
Defendants likewise contend that Nurse Ohse was not deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s condition.
Just as the case with Nurse Bartok arose from Plaintiff’s disagreement with her

professional judgement, so too was his disagreement with Nurse Ohse. To reiterate, a
disagreement with the professional judgement of a medical professional’s assessment
does not establish deliberate indifference. Snipes, 95 F.3d at 592. Inferring deliberate
indifference from the treatment decision of the medical professional must show that the
decision was so far afield of accepted professional standards to raise “the inference that

it was not actually based on a medical judgment.” Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396
(7th Cir. 2006) (citing Estate of Cole, 94 F.3d at 262). Here, the record reflects that Nurse
Ohse acted in accordance with her professional judgement just as Nurse Bartok had done.
There is no indication that she disregarded her professional training, professional
standards or judgment or otherwise acted with the requisite mental state required to

establish deliberate indifference. Because no reasonable juror could conclude otherwise,
Defendant Ohse is entitled to summary judgement on Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate
indifference.
III. Deliberate Indifference Claim against Nurse O’Neal
Nurse O’Neal interacted with Plaintiff on the morning of January 21, 2022, for the
first and only time after she allegedly received a call from his father informing her that

his son needed medical attention. (Doc. 59, pg. 6). She conducted her assessment of
Plaintiff and reported her findings to Dr. David, who ordered him to be placed under
observation. (Doc. 53-1, pg. 9).
In order for Plaintiff to show that Nurse O’Neal acted with deliberate indifference,
he would have to show that her care deviated from the professional standard. The
“Where evidence exists that the defendant knew better than to make the medical decision

that he did, then summary judgement is improper.” Whiting, 839 F.3d at 662 (citation
modified.) Here, while Nurse O’Neal was clearly aware from her examination of and
symptoms exhibited byPlaintiff that he faced some risk of harm to his health, there is no
evidence that ignored or disregarded it. Once she had been called to examine Plaintiff,
she found that he was exhibiting concerning symptoms, which she then relayed to Doctor

David. He undertook care of Plaintiff. She then followed the instructions given by Dr.
David to place Plaintiff under observation. The record does not support any reasonable
finding that Nurse O’Neal did not conduct herself in accordance with her professional
judgement. Thus, as no reasonable juror could conclude otherwise, Nurse O’Neal is
entitled to summary judgement on Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference.

IV. Deliberate Indifference Claim against Dr. David
Dr. David had no direct interactions with Plaintiff and only had contact through
the interactions he had with the other defendants. Based on Nurse Bartok and Ohse’s
assessment of Plaintiff on the evening of January 20, 2026, Dr. David ordered Plaintiff be
sent back to his cell as there were no visible signs of a medical event. Plaintiff contends
that Dr. David was not available at any point during the night before he was assessed

again by Nurse O’Neal the following morning but does not present any such evidence.
(Doc. 59, pg. 6). Dr. David’s next interaction was when he was contacted regarding
Plaintiff’s symptoms the following morning where he then had him placed under medical
observation. The final interaction was when he had Plaintiff transferred to Heartland for
further treatment.
The record reflects that Dr. David provided Plaintiff with medical treatment based

on his professional judgement and the findings of each assessment done by the nurses.
Plaintiff nevertheless asserts that Dr. David failed to treat him properly and that it
amounted to deliberate indifference. However, a medical professional’s treatment
decision can only rise to the level of deliberate indifference in the event that such a
decision is a “substantial departure from accepted professional judgement, practice, or

standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision on such
a judgement.” Estate of Cole, 94 F.3d at 261-62. Plaintiff at no point presents any evidence
to show that Dr. David acted in a way that could be a substantial departure from
professional standards. Instead, the record reflects that Dr. David acted in accordance
with his professional judgement and when new symptoms began to appear, he

immediately addressed them. Thus, as no reasonable juror could conclude otherwise,
Defendant David is entitled to summary judgement on Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate
indifference.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants Bartok, Ohse, O’Neal, and David's
motion for summary judgement (Doc. 52) is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgement
in favor of Defendants Bartok, Ohse, O’Neal, and David against Plaintiff Dorian Yamini.
SO ORDERED. Digitally signed
J U d e by Judge
Dated: August 26, 2026 g Dugan
Date:
Du QA 2026.08.26
12:52:08 -05'00'
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427074. Public record. Not legal advice.