# Webb

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · August 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11426553

## Case

- **Full name:** Albert Kelly Webb v. Brian English, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** August 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ALBERT KELLY WEBB,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-1000-CCB-AZ

BRIAN ENGLISH, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Albert Kelly Webb, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended complaint
(ECF 14) after the court screened his original complaint and determined it failed to state
any claims. See ECF 13. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Webb alleges he was playing basketball in the gymnasium at the Miami
Correctional Facility on August 3, 2023, when he “slipped in a puddle of water that
accumulated due to roof leakage in the region of the basketball court.” ECF 14 at 3. He
remained on the floor for ten to thirty minutes “screaming in pain” because there were
no staff members “in sight.” Id. He claims that “someone eventually got in
communication with custody staff,” but no one came to his aid. Id. Another inmate
ended up going to the medical staff building and brought Webb a wheelchair. No one

there questioned why a wheelchair was necessary. Because the wheelchair was broken
and Webb’s patellar tendon was torn, it was “impossible” for him to get into the
wheelchair. Id. at 4. Webb continued to scream and fight with the inmates who were
trying to force him into the wheelchair. Finally, a “yard staff” worker arrived on the
scene. Webb claims this made things worse because the staff worker also tried to force
him into the broken wheelchair and “threatened that they [would] taze and spray me

with there (sic) pepper spray” if he didn’t comply. Id. A medical signal was called, and
“medical staff” came and put him on a stretcher. Id. Webb was then transported by
ambulance to the emergency room where he received treatment for his injuries.
On August 14, 2023, while pushing Webb in his wheelchair upon discharge,
Officer Becker allegedly “ran [him] into a concrete pillar directly in front of the doors of

the hospital.” Id. at 5. This caused Webb’s left leg to fall down and hit the ground at a
slightly bent angle. Officer Becker continued to push the wheelchair “a few more steps”
as Webb “screamed to get him to stop.” Id. This caused Webb “severe pain.” Id. When
he stopped, he “carelessly” lifted Webb’s leg back onto the wheelchair. Id. Webb begged
Officer Becker to take him back inside the hospital to get his leg checked out, but Officer

Becker refused because it was his “day off” and he had “things to do.” Id.
On September 9, 2023, Webb was scheduled for a follow-up visit at the same
outside hospital. Sergeant Lambert was in charge of the transport and utilized a non-
wheelchair accessible vehicle. Webb was handcuffed and chained. Sergeant Lambert
forced Webb to get out of his wheelchair and “limp and climb into the back seat area.”
Id. at 6. Webb claims this violated medical orders which stated he was to have “no

weight bearing to left leg.” Id. Webb remained shackled, with no seatbelt on, during the
transport. His left leg was “barely on the seat,” and he was jostled around “like a ping
pong ball for 20 minutes there and back causing tremendous pain.” Id. When they
arrived back at the prison, Webb asked Medical Staff Megan Reese why a wheelchair
van wasn’t scheduled for the transport, and she replied that Sergeant Lambert had
purposefully switched him with a non-wheelchair bound inmate.

Webb also complains about the general medical care he received in the infirmary
from August 8, 2023, until mid-November 2023. He alleges the “medical staff” would
drop his injured leg onto the ground as he was moved in and out of his bed which
caused “severe pain.” Id. at 8. The medical staff rarely helped him wash his lower leg
area or get in and out of bed despite the doctor’s orders. Webb claims, “It was always

excuses why they couldn’t help and when I would make complaints it would always be
some type of vindictive retaliatory act.” Id. Webb attempted to file grievances, but they
“mysteriously disappeared.” Id. He asserts that all of the issues are “a result on how
Medical Director Lee Ann Ivers allow[s] us to be mistreated.” Id.1
On November 15, 2023, Webb was scheduled to see another outside doctor about

his knee. He was escorted to a room by the “infirmary officer” to be “stripped out and

1 He claims the following nurses “hurt” him while he was in the infirmary: Betty (CNA), Don
(Male Nurse), Jamie, and Dommi African Nurse.” ECF 14 at 8. However, he doesn’t name any of these
individuals as defendants.
patted down to leave the facility,” which had never happened before. Id. at 9. Then,
when Officer Beckner and another officer with a gun arrived, they decided he needed to

be stripped down again. Upon completion of the strip search, Officer Beckner and the
officer with the gun started to put chains and handcuffs on Webb. Webb informed them
his wrist had been injured in the fall. In the past, other officers had communicated
directly with medical staff, and his wrist had been accommodated accordingly. This
time, Officer Beckner said he needed to ask his sergeant first. After discussion with
Sergeant Lambert, Officer Beckner refused the request. Webb believes this was in

retaliation for filing grievances and for “threaten[ing]’” to file a lawsuit against them. Id.
Webb states, “I was not comfortable leaving the grounds of the prison with an armed
mystery man and a careless, overweight, irresponsible officer that done already
severely hurt me once,” so he refused to leave. Id. at 10. Webb assumed his doctor
appointment would be rescheduled, but “they never allowed me to go on another trip.”

Id. He states, “I don’t believe my knee healed properly and I now walk with a horrible
limp.” Id. His leg buckles when he ambulates, and he remains in pain.
Finally, Webb complains about his physical therapist, Nathan W. Bates. Webb
says he “begged” Therapist Bates to order him another knee brace in April 2025, but he
refused based on documentation in his medical file from November 2024—including a

document indicating Webb himself said he didn’t need the brace. Id. at 11. Webb alleges
“he or other staff” forged that document and lied about other incidents. Webb states,
“Nathan has dealt with me several times over the years and he has done nothing to ever
help me with any injury I sustained while being at Miami Correctional Facility other
than cop a feel and have a 10-15 minute conversation about sports.” Id. Because of this,
Webb has refused his assistance “since he started lying.” Id. Webb has sued Warden

Brian English, Supervisor Leann Ivers, Sergeant Lambert, Officer Becker, and Physical
Therapist Nathan Bates for monetary damages. He also seeks injunctive relief “[t]o
allow plaintiff to go back to original Dr and figure out why I’m in pain.” Id. at 12.
I. Deliberate Indifference - Conditions
Webb believes the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of his
confinement before, during, and after his fall. The Eighth Amendment prohibits

conditions of confinement that deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). An
officer can violate the Constitution if he or she exhibits deliberate indifference to
hazardous conditions that may seriously harm an inmate. Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716,
719 (7th Cir. 2021). Deliberate indifference encompasses both objective and subjective

components:
A prisoner challenging conditions of confinement must first show that the
conditions were sufficiently serious as an objective matter, meaning that
they denied the inmate the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,
creating an excessive risk to the inmate’s health and safety. Second, in
covering the subjective component of the inquiry, the inmate must prove
that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference—that they knew of
and disregarded this excessive risk of harm to the inmate.

Id. at 719–20 (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). Put another
way, an inmate can state a viable claim for deliberate indifference if he alleges the
defendant “deliberately ignored a prison condition that presented an objectively,
sufficiently serious risk of harm.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference occupies a space slightly below intent and
poses a ‘high hurdle and an exacting standard’ requiring ‘something approaching a

total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.’” Stockton v.
Milwaukee Cty., 44 F.4th 605, 615 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Donald v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020)); see also Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710
(7th Cir. 2022) (stating that deliberate-indifference claims will fail absent evidence of
“callous disregard” for inmate wellbeing). “[N]egligence, gross negligence, or even
recklessness as the term is used in tort cases is not enough” to state a constitutional

claim. Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Stockton, 44 F.4th at
615.
Webb alleges a leaky roof in the gymnasium caused him to slip and fall.
However, as explained in the court’s prior screening order, a fall caused by exposure to
wet floors generally does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Pyles, 771

F.3d at 410 (“slippery surfaces . . . without more, cannot constitute a hazardous
condition of confinement”); Perkins v. Atrisco, No. 3:22-CV-1052-DRL-JEM, 2023 WL
2346275, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 2023) (“[F]ederal courts are consistent in holding that
slip-and-fall incidents, whether on ice, water, or slippery floors, do not meet the
deliberate indifference standard of Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement

claims.”). Sometimes there are extenuating circumstances that transform a slip and fall
into an Eighth Amendment violation, but Webb hasn’t described any such
circumstances here. See Anderson v. Morrison, 835 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2016); Balle v.
Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545 (7th Cir. 2023). Although he alleges the Warden kept the
recreation building open “knowing the possible dangers of a leaky roof” in general, this
isn’t sufficient to subject the Warden to individual liability for Webb’s fall, especially

since the amended complaint doesn’t allege facts plausibly suggesting the Warden had
knowledge of any prior incidents or a specific risk to Webb.2 See Sinn v. Lemmon, 911
F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2018) (“judged subjectively, the prison official must have actual,
and not merely constructive, knowledge of the risk”). This claim will be dismissed.
Webb claims he remained on the floor for ten to thirty minutes after the fall.
However, he doesn’t plausibly allege any of the named defendants played a part in that

delay or even witnessed the incident. See Moderson v. City of Neenah, 137 F.4th 611, 617
(7th Cir. 2025) (“A defendant cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation if she
did not cause or participate in the alleged violation.”) (citation omitted)); George v.
Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Only persons who cause or participate in the
violations are responsible.”); see also Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir.

2017) (“[T]he division of labor is critical to the efficient functioning of the [prison]
organization.”); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009) (There is no general
respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.). This claim will be dismissed.
Webb asserts that, following the initial care he received at the hospital, Officer
Becker pushed his wheelchair into a pillar on August 14, 2023, dragged his injured leg

along the ground for several steps which caused severe pain, and then refused to let
Webb be reevaluated by medical professionals at the hospital because he had other

2 In fact, Webb stated in his original complaint that “no work orders had been either submitted
nor completed by the maintenance staff concerning the leaky roof . . ..” ECF 1-3 at 6.
things to do. While mere negligence does not violate the Constitution, the court will
give Webb the benefit of all reasonable inferences at this early stage and allow him to

proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against Officer Becker for being deliberately
indifferent to his needs. Similarly, he claims Sergeant Lambert deliberately switched his
mode of hospital transport to a non-wheelchair accessible vehicle on September 9, 2023,
which caused Webb extreme pain to his injured leg both when loading into the van and
during the ride to the hospital. He claims Sergeant Lambert knew this violated medical
orders yet did it anyway. These allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim for

deliberate indifference against Sergeant Lambert as well.
II. Deliberate Indifference - Medical Claims
Webb asserts several defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs following his initial injury. Inmates are entitled to constitutionally adequate
medical care for serious medical conditions. Thomas, 2 F.4th at 722. To establish liability

under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show: (1) his medical need was
objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that
need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “Deliberate indifference occupies a
space slightly below intent and poses a ‘high hurdle and an exacting standard’
requiring ‘something approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the

face of serious risks.’” Stockton, 44 F.4th at 615 (quoting Donald v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020)); see also Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710 (7th Cir.
2022) (stating that deliberate-indifference claims will fail absent evidence of “callous
disregard” for inmate wellbeing).
For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to an
inmate’s medical needs, he or she must make a decision that represents “such a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). Inmates are “not entitled
to demand specific care,” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th
Cir. 2019), nor are they entitled to “the best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262,
267 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The

Eighth Amendment does not require that prisoners receive unqualified access to health
care.”). Rather, they are entitled to “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Forbes, 112 F.3d at 267.
Accordingly, deference must be given “to medical professionals’ treatment
decisions unless there is evidence that no minimally competent professional would

have so responded under those circumstances.” Walker, 940 F.3d at 965 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). This standard “reflects the reality that there is no single
‘proper’ way to practice medicine in a prison, but rather a range of acceptable courses
based on prevailing standards in the field.” Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1024 (7th
Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, it is not enough

that a medical professional be mistaken in his or her judgment. As noted above, the
deliberate indifference standard requires something “akin to criminal recklessness,”
Thomas, 2 F.4th at 722, rather than “negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness.”
Hildreth, 960 F.3d at 425–26.
Webb complains generally about the care he received from the “medical staff” in
the infirmary from August 8, 2023, until mid-November 2023. But he doesn’t attribute

any specific actions to any of the named defendants, and his assertion that Medical
Director Ivers “allow[s]” inmates to be mistreated isn’t sufficient to subject her to
liability. See Moderson, 137 F.4th at 617 (“A defendant cannot be held liable for a
constitutional violation if she did not cause or participate in the alleged violation.”)
(citation omitted)); Burks, 555 F.3d at 594 (there is no general respondeat superior
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Taha v. Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, Loc. 781, 947 F.3d

464, 469 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[A] complaint must plead more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (internal quotations marks
and citations omitted)); Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020) (“A plaintiff
must include adequate factual detail to lift his claims from mere speculative possibility

to plausibility.”) (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678) (“A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”)). These claims will be
dismissed.3

3 Webb seeks injunctive relief to “go back” to the original doctor to determine why he is in pain.
As described in the facts section above, he alleges only that he received deficient care while in the
infirmary from August to November of 2023, that he was not rescheduled to see the outside doctor after
he refused to go to his appointment with Officer Becker on November 15, 2023, and that he had issues
with his physical therapist in November 2024 and April 2025. He says he has a limp and that his leg
buckles when he walks. However, he doesn’t provide sufficient details about the medical care he has
received (or failed to receive) since then, including whether he has made additional requests to be seen
and treated. The bulk of his allegations focus on events that occurred in 2023—the facts regarding his
current medical care are simply too sparse and too remote from his earlier allegations to state a plausible
claim for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Taha, 947 F.3d at 469; Schillinger, 954 F.3d at 994.
Next, Webb claims his physical therapist, Nathan W. Bates, declined to order him
another knee brace in April of 2025 because Webb had allegedly refused one in late

November of 2024, more than a year after his injury and the events that initiated this
lawsuit occurred. Webb says the refusal, which was documented in contemporaneous
medical records, was fabricated. Therapist Bates was not named as a defendant or
mentioned in Webb’s original complaint, and Webb doesn’t explain how these
allegations are related to his current claims. “A prisoner may join defendants in the
same action only if the claims against each ‘aris[e] out of the same transaction,

occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences.’” Thompson v. Bukowski, 812 Fed.
Appx. 360, 363 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)). “Unrelated claims
against different defendants belong in different suits.” George, 507 F.3d at 607. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly urged district courts to “be alert” to
the issue of unrelated claims. Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2017). In

Owens, the court “warned that district courts should not allow inmates to flout the rules
for joining claims and defendants, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 18, 20, or to circumvent the Prison
Litigation Reform Act’s fee requirements by combining multiple lawsuits into a single
complaint.” Id. The fact that Webb suffered a slip and fall in August of 2023 and had
issues with the defendants being deliberately indifferent to his needs in the subsequent

several months isn’t sufficiently related to his allegations against a different defendant
about the denial of a brace and the lack of physical therapy a year later. The claims
against Therapist Bates will be dismissed.4
III. First Amendment - Retaliation

Finally, Webb alleges Officer Becker and Sergeant Lambert retaliated against him
before one of his initial follow-up visits in November 2023. Under the First
Amendment, an inmate can’t be punished for engaging in certain kinds of speech. “To
establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) he engaged
in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would

likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment
activity was at least a motivating factor in the Defendants’ decision to take the
retaliatory action.” Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). While these basic elements remain the same whether the
plaintiff is a prisoner or a non-prisoner, the details of each element may depend on the

context. Id. In the prison context, written requests for interviews and/or grievances
clearly constitute First Amendment protected activity. Id.; see also Gomez v. Randle, 680
F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A prisoner has a First Amendment right to make
grievances about conditions of confinement.”). That said, “it seems implausible that a
threat to file a grievance would itself constitute a First Amendment-protected

grievance.” Clark v. Reed, 772 Fed. Appx. 353, 355 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bridges v.
Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 555 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original)). Additionally, not all

4 If Webb believes he has a separate claim against Therapist Bates about the lack of physical
therapy and/or the denial of a brace, nothing prevents him from filing a new lawsuit subject to the fees
and other requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
actions alleged to be retaliatory are “actionable in and of themselves . . ..” Bridges, 557
F.3d at 552. Rather, only “if the acts were taken in retaliation for the exercise of a

constitutionally protected right, then they are actionable under § 1983.” Id.
Webb claims he was unnecessarily strip-searched twice in preparation for a
follow-up doctor visit on November 15, 2023. He also says Officer Becker and Sergeant
Lambert refused to adjust his restraints on his injured wrist, which caused him pain. He
believes they did this in coordination and because he had filed grievances against
them.5 Although these allegations are sparse, the court will give Webb the benefit of all

reasonable inferences at this early stage and allow him to proceed against these
defendants on First Amendment retaliation claims.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Albert Kelly Webb leave to proceed against Officer Becker in his
individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for being deliberately

indifferent to his needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment when Webb was leaving
the hospital on August 14, 2023;
(2) GRANTS Albert Kelly Webb leave to proceed against Sergeant Lambert in
his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for being deliberately
indifferent to his needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he deliberately

switched Webb’s mode of hospital transport to a non-wheelchair accessible vehicle on
September 9, 2023, which caused Webb pain;

5 To the extent he believes this was because he had “threatened’” to file a lawsuit, these
allegations don’t state a claim. See Clark v. Reed, 772 Fed. Appx. at 355.
(3) GRANTS Albert Kelly Webb leave to proceed against Officer Becker and
Sergeant Lambert in their individual capacities for retaliating against him in violation of

the First Amendment when they subjected him to unnecessary strip searches and/or
refused to allow accommodations for his injured wrist on November 15, 2023;
(4) DISMISSES all other claims;
(5) DISMISSES Brian English, Leann Ivers, and Nathan Bates;
(6) DIRECTS the clerk, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to request Waiver of Service
from (and if necessary, the United States Marshals Service to use any lawful means to

locate and serve process on) Officer Becker and Sergeant Lambert at the Indiana
Department of Correction, with a copy of this order and the amended complaint (ECF
14);
(7) ORDERS the Indiana Department of Correction to provide the full name,
date of birth, and last known home address of any defendant who does not waive

service if it has such information; and
(8) ORDERS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), Officer Becker and Sergeant Lambert
to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R.
10-1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in
this screening order.

SO ORDERED on August 24, 2026.

/s/Cristal C. Brisco
CRISTAL C. BRISCO, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11426553. Public record. Not legal advice.