# Opinion

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · August 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11425468

## Case

- **Full name:** Lauren Miller v. City of Aurora
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
)
LAUREN MILLER, )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 22 C 2964
v. )
) Chief Judge Virginia M. Kendall
CITY OF AURORA, )
)
Defendant. )
)

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lauren Miller sued her employer, the City of Aurora (the “City”), for wage
discrimination and retaliatory constructive discharge. After a five-day trial, a jury returned a
verdict in Miller’s favor on the wage discrimination claim and in the City’s favor on the retaliation
claim, awarding Miller $150,000 in damages. The City now moves to alter or amend the judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the
City’s Motion [141].
BACKGROUND
Miller began working for the City in December 2012 as a Help Desk Technician in the
Information Technology (“IT”) Department. In January 2017, after briefly working as an Aurora
Police Officer, she was rehired into the IT Department as a temporary employee. Following
negotiations over the position and salary, the City transferred her into the position of System I
Analyst in March 2018. In this role, Miller worked on various projects with her colleague Jeff
Hughes. As a System Analyst II, Hughes received a higher salary than Miller.
In September 2020, Miller filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that she was not being paid the same as Hughes in violation of
the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”). Beginning in April
2021, Miller was reprimanded and written up several times for various alleged infractions. In
December 2021, Miller quit her job as a System Analyst I. She accepted a lower-paying position
as a Digital Evidence Custodian with the police department, where she currently works.

Miller sued the City in 2022, alleging the City violated the EPA and Title VII by paying
her less than her male colleagues when she was in the System Analyst I position. (Dkt. 1). She also
asserted a retaliation claim under the EPA, claiming the City retaliated against her after she filed
her EEOC charge by giving her unwarranted reprimands and poor reviews, forcing her to leave
her job for the lower-paying Digital Evidence Custodian position. (Id.). Following the Court’s
partial grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, Miller v. City of Aurora, 2025 WL 947908
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2025), Miller’s EPA claims proceeded to trial. On February 3, 2026, the jury
returned a verdict finding in favor of Miller on the wage discrimination claim and in favor of the
City on the retaliation claim. (Dkt. 131). It also found that the City’s violation as to the wage
discrimination claim was not willful. (Id. at 1). The jury awarded Miller $150,000 in damages for

her wage discrimination claim. (Id. at 2). The City now moves to alter or amend the jury’s verdict
under Rule 59(e), seeking a reduced damages award of $28,108.17. (Dkt. 141).
DISCUSSION
The parties’ disputes begin with the correct legal standard to apply. The City seeks
remittitur—a reduction of the jury’s verdict—under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to
correct what it believes to be a manifest error of law in the jury’s damages award. (Dkt. 141).
Miller argues that this case concerns inconsistent verdicts and, therefore, the City waived its
challenge by failing to object to any perceived errors before the jury was discharged. (Dkt. 150 at
4-5). Alternatively, she contends that the only remedy for the alleged error is a new trial, not
remittitur. (Id. at 8).
Miller mischaracterizes the City’s Motion as an untimely challenge to an inconsistent jury
verdict, relying on a series of Seventh Circuit cases involving alleged inconsistencies between a

general verdict and answers to written questions on a verdict form under Rule 49(b). (Dkt. 150 at
5). These cases stand for the principle that a party waives an objection to internal inconsistencies
in a Rule 49(b) verdict if they fail to raise the issue before the jury is discharged. See Cont’l
Vineyard, LLC v. Vinifera Wine Co., LLC, 973 F.3d 747, 754 (7th Cir. 2020); Cundiff v. Washburn,
393 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1968); Barnes v. Brown, 430 F.2d 578, 579 (7th Cir. 1970); Strauss v.
Stratojac Corp., 810 F.2d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1987).
Miller’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. Here, the City does not argue that the jury’s
general verdict finding it liable for wage discrimination is inconsistent with its decision to award
Miller damages for that claim. Instead, it argues that the award includes damages covering a period
beyond what is legally permissible for a wage discrimination claim under the EPA. (Dkt. 141-1 at

1-3); (Dkt. 151 at 3-4). This is a claim of manifest legal error in the resulting judgment redressable
by Rule 59(e), not an inconsistent-verdict challenge under Rule 49(b). Compare Continental, 973
F.3d at 751 (court construed motion as one governed by Rule 49(b) where the defendants argued
that a general verdict finding them liable for unfair competition was inconsistent with the jury’s
decision not to award the plaintiff damages) with Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 846 (7th Cir. 2010)
(ordering remittitur under Rule 59(e) after holding that the damages awarded by the jury covered
a legally impermissible period for false arrest claims). Accordingly, the Court will analyze the
City’s challenge under Rule 59(e).
I. Rule 59(e)
A party may move the Court under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days
of entry. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). To prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion, the movant must present “newly
discovered evidence that was not available at the time of trial” or point to evidence in the record
that “clearly establishes a manifest error of law or fact.’” Miller v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 683 F.3d

805, 813 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Emerson
v. Dart, 109 F.4th 936, 943 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Altering or amending a judgment under Rule 59(e)
is permissible when there is newly discovered evidence or there has been a manifest error of law
or fact.”) (internal citation omitted). Importantly, Rule 59(e) provides a narrow and extraordinary
remedy, with the moving party bearing a heavy burden. Kap Holdings, LLC v. Mar-Cone
Appliance Parts Co., 55 F.4th 517, 528 (7th Cir. 2022); see also Reilly v. Will Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,
142 F.4th 924, 929 (7th Cir. 2025).
The jury awarded Miller $150,000 on her wage discrimination claim and found that the
City’s violation was not willful. (Dkt. 131.) It did not find the City liable for retaliation. (Id.).
Based on that verdict, the City contends that Miller’s recoverable damages are limited to the wage

disparity she experienced between June 7, 2020—the beginning of the applicable two-year
limitations period—and December 26, 2021, when she began her new position as a Digital
Evidence Custodian. (Dkt. 141-1 at 2). Relying on the damages calculations Miller presented at
trial, the City maintains that the difference in her salary and overtime during that period totals
$28,108.17. (Id. at 3). The City therefore argues that the jury’s $150,000 award exceeds the
maximum amount recoverable as a matter of law and, based on this error, asks the Court to remit
the award to $28,108.17. (Id.).
In reviewing a jury verdict, courts must “accord substantial deference” to the jury’s
assessment of damages. Williams v. Vill. of Dolton, 2026 WL 622407, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5,
2026) (citing Ramsey v. Am. Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303, 1313 (7th Cir. 1985)). “Underlying
this deference to a jury’s assessment of damages is the acknowledgment that the actual measure
of damages is an exercise of factfinding.” Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 847 (7th Cir.
1989). Nonetheless, Rule 59(e) authorizes a district court to grant post-trial relief in the form of a

new trial, an amended judgment, or remittitur when a jury’s damages award is excessive or
otherwise contrary to law. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 383
U.S. 53, 65-66 (1966); Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433
(2001); Sommerfield v. Knasiak, 967 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2020); Duran v. Town of Cicero, Ill.,
653 F.3d 632, 639-43 (7th Cir. 2011).
Damages may be excessive if the amount of the award is not rationally related to the
evidence presented at trial. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 113
F.4th 777, 789 (7th Cir. 2024); Adams v. City of Chicago, 798 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2015).
Alternatively, damages may be excessive or erroneous as a matter of law if the jury’s award goes
beyond what is legally permitted. See Duran, 653 F.3d at 642-43 (amending jury verdict after

holding that the judgment allowing the plaintiff to recover twice for the same injury constituted a
manifest error of law); Fox, 600 F.3d at 846 (ordering remittitur on Rule 59(e) motion where the
damages awarded by the jury exceeded the recoverable period for a false arrest claim); Baier v.
Rohr-Mont Motors, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1007 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (a trial court may award
remittitur where it “finds a damage award erroneous as a matter of law”). The City invokes the
latter principle here.
II. Waiver
As a preliminary matter, Miller argues that the City waived its objection to the damage
award by failing to raise it earlier. (Dkt. 150 at 4-5). In Miller’s view, the City should have, but
did not, raise its arguments about the proper damages period for a wage discrimination claim before
the jury was discharged. (Id.). As discussed above, because the City is not arguing that the jury
returned an inconsistent verdict, it was not required to object to the judgment before the jury was
discharged. Yet, forfeiture is still possible when bringing a Rule 59(e) motion. See Cehovic-

Dixneuf v. Wong, 895 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 2018) (A party seeking relief under Rule 59(e) may
forfeit an argument that could have and should have been made before judgment was rendered).
Nonetheless, the Court finds that the City has not waived its arguments.
The City presented their arguments regarding the proper calculation of damages for each
claim several times before the jury returned its verdict, raising them in a motion in limine, at the
final pretrial conference, and at the jury instruction conference. (Dkt. 91-1); (Dkt. 137, Tr. 85:11-
86:20, 87:9-22); (Dkt. 139, Tr. 211:6-212:6). Each time, Miller countered with her position that
any backpay award, regardless of which claim or claims succeeded, should go through the day of
judgment. (Dkt. 137, Tr. 84:1-2, 84:20-85:8); (Dkt. 218:1-6). The dispute was elided by the parties’
concerns about the risk of double recovery should Miller succeed on both claims. (Dkt. 137, Tr.

87:23-90:2); (Dkt. 139, Tr. 212:19-219:21). As such, it was not resolved. That the Court did not
address the City’s arguments when they were raised does not mean they were waived. See Fox,
600 F.3d at 841 (holding that the defendants preserved arguments that they made several times to
the district court before the entry of judgment); Gonzales v. Madigan, 2017 WL 3978703, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2017) (plaintiff did not forfeit arguments made in a Rule 59(e) motion that he
had maintained throughout the litigation).
Furthermore, the City’s motion challenges a legal error in the judgment that did not become
apparent until the jury returned a verdict awarding $150,000 solely on Miller’s wage
discrimination claim. Only then could the City argue that the judgment awarded damages for this
claim beyond those recoverable as a matter of law under the EPA. See, e.g., Duran, 653 F.3d at
642-43 (holding that the defendant’s Rule 59(e) arguments were not waived because the alleged
error of law “surfaced only after judgment was entered”); Geraty v. Vill. of Antioch, 2014 WL
13110694, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2014) (holding that the defendant did not waive its argument

about excessive damages where the defendant would not have known that the damages were
excessive until after the jury returned its verdict). Accordingly, the Court will reach the merits of
the City’s Motion.
III. Manifest Error of Law
The Court must first determine whether there is a manifest error of law in the jury’s
damages award. See Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. One2One Commc’ns, LLC, 529 F. App’x 784, 792
(7th Cir. 2013). The City argues that the jury’s award for the wage discrimination claim constitutes
a manifest error of law because it compensates Miller beyond the period for which she received
unequal pay in violation of the EPA. (Dkt. 141-1 at 4). It explains that Miller should only be
compensated for the difference between her pay and Hughes’s during the period in which she was

subject to a wage disparity. (Id. at 2). Miller, by contrast, contends that there is no error with the
jury’s verdict because backpay is available up to the day of judgment in employment cases. (Dkt.
150 at 6).
A. Backpay for Equal Pay Act Claims
Miller asked the jury to award her backpay if she prevailed—she sought the difference
between her and Hughes’ pay for her wage discrimination claim and the amount she would have
earned had she not been constructively discharged for her retaliation claim. Backpay is an available
remedy for both wage discrimination and retaliation claims under the EPA. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
The measure of damages for each claim differs, however, because they compensate distinct
injuries. For a wage discrimination claim, backpay consists of the plaintiff’s “unpaid wages”—the
difference between the wages she actually received and the wages she would have received had
she been paid the same as a comparator performing substantially equal work. See 29 U.S.C. §
216(b); Hildebrandt v. Illinois Department of Natural Resources, 347 F.3d 1014, 1031 (7th Cir.

2003); Rinaldi v. World Book, Inc., 2002 WL 172449, at *1. By contrast, backpay for an EPA
retaliation claim compensates the plaintiff for wages lost because of the employer’s retaliatory
conduct—that is, the wages the plaintiff would have earned absent the retaliation. See 29 U.S.C. §
216(b); Soto v. Adams Elevator Equipment Co., 941 F.2d 543, 552 (7th Cir. 1991).
Because these claims remedy different injuries, they necessarily encompass different
periods of time. The injury underlying an EPA wage discrimination claim is the payment of
unequal wages for substantially equal work. See Terry v. Gary Community School Corp., 910 F.3d
1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 2018) (describing what a plaintiff must prove to establish an EPA wage
disparity violation). Accordingly, backpay for a wage discrimination claim under the EPA is
limited to the period during which the plaintiff was subjected to the alleged wage disparity. See,

e.g., Marcing v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 1994 WL 529821, at *3 (affirming a backpay award based on
the pay differential during the plaintiff’s employment); Davis v. Integrated Systems Solutions
Corp., 2003 WL 1733111, at *2 (upholding an award of EPA backpay through the plaintiff’s
discharge)1. Once the disparity ends, so too does the injury the EPA is designed to remedy. See
Nance v. Rothwell, 2011 WL 1770306, at *11 (explaining that the EPA does not authorize recovery

1 The City relies on Melgoza v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 499 F.Supp.3d 552 (N.D. Ill. 2020) and Karlo v. St. Augustine
Coll., 2021 WL 2156438 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2021) for this principle. (Dkt. 141-1 at 6-7). While neither case speaks to
the proper calculation of damages for a successful EPA wage discrimination claim, both decisions underscore that a
plaintiff bringing this type of claim may recover only for periods during which she performed substantially equal work
as a comparator while receiving unequal wages. See Melgoza, F.Supp.3d at 563-64; Karlo, 2021 WL 2156438, at *4,
n.2.
for post-termination wages because it compensates employees for wages “actually paid for work
an employee performs”).
Miller asserts that “settled law” recognizes that backpay in employment cases accrues
through judgment. (Dkt. 150 at 6) (citing Knutson v. UGS Corp., 526 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2008) and

Stragapede v. City of Evanston, 125 F. Supp. 3d 818 (N.D. Ill. 2015)). Yet neither case Miller
relies on establishes such a rule for EPA wage discrimination claims. In Knutson, while discussing
the applicable statute of limitations for the plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim, the Seventh Circuit
observed that short limitations periods are sensible in certain employment cases because an
employer’s potential backpay liability may “mount up until the judgment if the plaintiff could not
find an equivalent job.” 526 F.3d at 341. The court said nothing about wage discrimination claims
under the EPA, let alone the proper measure of damages for such claims.
Stragapede is likewise inapposite. There, the court awarded backpay stemming from a
discriminatory termination under Title VII, not unequal pay under the EPA. 125 F. Supp. 3d at
823-24. Although both cases recognize that backpay may continue to accrue through judgment

where the plaintiff continues to suffer lost wages because of the defendant’s unlawful conduct,
neither addresses the distinct injury redressed by an EPA wage discrimination claim—the payment
of unequal wages for substantially equal work. See Cullen v. Indiana University Board of Trustees,
338 F.3d 693, 703-04 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that Title VII and the EPA provide distinct
remedies). Accordingly, neither Knutson nor Stragapede undermines the principle that backpay
under the EPA is measured by the wage disparity itself and is therefore limited to the period during
which that disparity existed.
B. Excessive Damages
At trial, the parties stipulated that Miller was paid less than Hughes while she worked as a
System Analyst I and that she left that position and began working as a Digital Evidence Custodian
on December 27, 2021. Because Miller claimed that she was paid unequally while working as a
System Analyst I, with Hughes as a comparator, her recoverable “unpaid wages” under the EPA

are limited to the difference between her and Hughes’s compensation until the disparity ended on
December 26, 2021. As noted, the jury awarded Miller $150,000 for her wage discrimination
claim. This award exceeds what Miller was entitled to recover under the EPA, entitling the City to
relief under Rule 59(e).
1. Admissibility of Evidence
Prior to trial, the City moved in limine to exclude evidence of Miller and Hughes’s pay
disparity after December 26, 2021. (Dkt. 91-1). While disputing this evidentiary issue, the parties
presented their opposing positions on the appropriate damages period for Miller’s wage
discrimination claim—the City believed it should end when Miller began her new position and
was no longer being paid unequally, while Miller asserted it should go up to the date of judgment.

(Dkt. 137, Tr. 84:1-87:6). The parties’ focus shifted, however, to whether admitting the requested
evidence would permit double recovery if Miller won on both claims. (Id. at 87:23-90:2). The
Court determined that it would not, since that risk could be reduced through the verdict form and
jury instructions. (Id. at 88:11-89:19). It subsequently denied the City’s motion, finding the
evidence to be admissible. (Id. at 90:2); (Dkt. 115 at 3). It did not reach the question of how to
calculate damages should Miller win only her wage discrimination claim.
The City views this decision as the source of the error with the jury’s damages award,
arguing that Miller should not have been permitted to introduce any evidence of damages on her
wage disparity claim beyond December 26, 2021. (Dkt. 141-1 at 8). But this evidence would have
been relevant if the jury determined that Miller received unequal pay and was constructively
discharged because, in that scenario, she would have been entitled to recover the wages she lost
after leaving the System Analyst I position. See, e.g., Marcing, 1994 WL 529821, at *3 (holding
that plaintiff was entitled to damages on her EPA claim—equal to the pay differential between her

and her male colleagues—and to damages arising out of her constructive discharge, consisting of
the difference between the salary of the job she left and the salary she could have gotten if she was
promoted); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 772 F. Supp. 407, 412 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(holding that, if successful on both claims, the plaintiff would be entitled to backpay of her unpaid
wages prior to her termination and the wages she would have earned up to the date of judgment
absent the harassment). Accordingly, the Court did not err in denying the motion in limine.
2. Trial Testimony, Jury Instructions, and Verdict Form
The error here was not the admission of evidence concerning salary differences after
December 26, 2021. Rather, the error was that the jury instructions and verdict form did not explain
how to use that evidence if the jury found only for Miller on her wage discrimination claim.

Although the parties disagreed before trial about the proper period for awarding backpay on
Miller’s wage discrimination claim, the Court was never asked to decide that legal issue. Instead,
the parties litigated only whether evidence of salary differences after December 2021 was
admissible. As a result, the parties’ unresolved disagreement carried forward into the presentation
of damages, the jury instructions, and the verdict form, ultimately producing a damages award that
exceeds the amount recoverable as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit has recognized that post-
trial relief may be warranted to correct a judgment that is legally erroneous because of flaws or
ambiguities in jury instructions and verdict forms. See Duran, 653 F.3d at 643-45; Happel v.
Walmart Stores, Inc., 602 F.3d 820, 825-28 (7th Cir. 2010) (granting new trial on damages where
flawed verdict form and jury instructions lead to erroneous damages award that prevented court
from calculating required set-off amount).
At trial, despite acknowledging on cross-examination that she no longer worked alongside
Hughes or performed substantially equal work after assuming her new position, Miller testified

that she sought backpay on her wage discrimination claim through January 2026. She asked the
jury to award her $188,870.13, consisting of a $174,379.19 salary differential and a $14,490.94
overtime differential between her compensation and Hughes’s from June 2019 through January
2026. Miller further testified that she calculated the salary differential by subtracting her annual
salary from Hughes’s annual salary for each year and totaling the differences. She calculated the
overtime differential for 2019 through 2021 using the overtime hours she worked and Hughes’s
overtime rate. For 2022 through 2026, after she left her System Analyst I position and no longer
worked overtime, Miller estimated the overtime she would have earned had she remained in that
position by multiplying Hughes’s overtime rate by the average number of overtime hours she
worked annually from 2019 through 2021. During her testimony, Miller’s counsel displayed a

spreadsheet summarizing her claimed salary and overtime damages for each year and the total
damages sought.
At closing, Miller’s counsel told the jury to award Miller $188,870.13 if they found for her
on the wage discrimination claim, reiterating that this number represented the difference between
her and Hughes’s pay from June 2019 to January 2026. However, later in their closing argument,
Miller’s counsel told the jury to award this amount of they found for Miller on both the wage
discrimination and retaliation claims. They urged the jury to award Miller $142,650.38 if they
found for her only on the retaliation claim, explaining that this number equaled the difference
between her lower-paying salary in her new job and Hughes’s salary. Finally, Miller’s counsel
asked the jury to award Miller an additional $250,000 in emotional distress damages if they found
for her on the retaliation claim. The City did not present any arguments in their closing about the
appropriate amount of damages the jury should award Miller on either claim, instead focusing on
their position that she had not proved the claims at all.

As established above, a plaintiff may only recover backpay damages for an EPA wage
discrimination claim for the period during which she was subjected to the wage disparity. Yet,
because the focus throughout the pretrial and mid-trial discussions was on avoiding double
recovery should Miller win both claims, this principle was not adequately reflected in the jury
instructions or verdict form. (Dkt. 128); (Dkt. 131). The liability instructions properly
distinguished the two claims. To prevail on her wage discrimination claim, the jury was instructed
that Miller was required to prove that she and Hughes performed substantially equal work under
similar working conditions and that the City paid her less than Hughes for that work. (Dkt. 128 at
20). The instructions for the retaliation claim stated that Miller was required to prove that the City
constructively discharged her from her System Analyst I position because she filed an EEOC

charge alleging unequal pay. (Id. at 31).
The damages instructions, however, did not make the same distinction. The jury was
instructed that it should award Miller damages if it found for her on any of her claims. (Dkt. 128
at 30). The jury was further instructed that, if it awarded damages, those damages should begin on
June 7, 2019 if it found the City’s violation willful, or June 7, 2020 if it found the violation not
willful, and in either event continue through the date of the verdict. (Id.). The jury was separately
instructed that, if it found for Miller on her retaliation claim, it could award lost wages and benefits
resulting from her constructive discharge, as well as damages for emotional distress. (Id. at 33.)
Although these instructions identified the damages potentially recoverable for retaliation, they
never informed the jury what constituted backpay damages for the wage discrimination claim or
that those damages were limited to the period of wage disparity.
The verdict form likewise distinguished among the possible liability outcomes but not the
corresponding damages periods. (Dkt. 131). It first required the jury to determine liability on each

claim and identified December 27, 2021 as the date Miller’s retaliation claim began. (Id. at 1.) It
then asked the jury to state the amount of damages it would award if it found for Miller on both
claims, only the wage discrimination claim, or only the retaliation claim. (Id.). The verdict form,
however, did not instruct the jury that, if it found only for Miller on her wage discrimination
claim—as it ultimately did, backpay was limited to the period during which Miller allegedly
received unequal pay as a System Analyst I.
Duran is instructive here. There, a jury returned verdicts in favor of 23 plaintiffs against
six police officers and the Town of Cicero on several federal civil rights and state-law claims. 653
F.3d at 635-36. The Town had stipulated that its liability on the state-law claims was purely
vicarious, making it jointly liable with the individual officers for a single damages award on each

claim. Id at 637. Nevertheless, the jury instructions and verdict form directed the jury to award
damages separately against both the officers and the Town, and the jury returned verdicts that
permitted recovery against each. Id. at 638. After judgment was entered, the Town moved under
Rule 59(e) to amend the judgment, arguing that it erroneously allowed double recovery. Id. at 639.
The Seventh Circuit agreed, holding that the confusing jury instructions and verdict form produced
a judgment containing a manifest error of law because it permitted plaintiffs to recover twice for
the same injury. Id. at 639-42. The court remanded with instructions to amend the judgment to
reflect the Town’s joint liability for a single damages award on each state-law claim. Id. at 643.
The same principle applies here. The jury instructions and verdict form did not contain
adequate guidance on how to allocate damages to Miller once the jury decided that she proved
only her wage discrimination claim. Instead, when viewed together with Miller’s trial
presentation—which sought wage discrimination damages through January 2026—the instructions

and verdict form permitted the jury to award damages through judgment, which is beyond the
recoverable period for wage disparity claims. The verdict confirms that this is precisely what
occurred. Miller’s own damages calculations showed that, if recovery were limited to the legally
permissible period ending in December 2021, her unpaid wages totaled only $28,108.17. Yet the
jury awarded $150,000 on her wage discrimination claim. That award cannot be reconciled with
the legally permissible damages period. Rather, it reflects compensation for a period extending
beyond the alleged wage disparity—the very result the instructions and verdict form allowed.
Thus, as in Duran, a flawed and ambiguous set of jury instructions and verdict form produced a
judgment that exceeds what the law permits.
IV. Remedy

Having concluded that the jury’s damages award reflects a manifest error of law, the Court
must determine the appropriate remedy. The City asks the Court to remit the damages to
$28,108.17, and argues that a new trial is not necessary. (Dkt. 141 at 2); (Dkt. 151 at 5-6). When
a court finds that a damages award is excessive, remittitur is ordinarily the proper remedy. See
Bedford v. Dewitt, 2024 WL 3070046, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2024) (citing Davis v. Consolidated
Rail Co., 788 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir. 1986)). Remittitur is appropriate where there is no legal
error affecting, or dispute regarding, the jury’s liability determination. See, e.g., Fox, 600 F.3d at
846; Heard v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 2012 WL 5199616, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2012). Likewise,
a new trial is unnecessary when there is an adequate basis in the record to determine how the jury
calculated damages and what the appropriate amount should be. See Bailey v. Andrews, 811 F.2d
366, 376-77 (7th Cir. 1987); Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 602 F.3d 820, 827 (7th Cir. 2010).
In Fox, the Seventh Circuit held that the jury award of $1.6 million for the plaintiff’s false
arrest claim was excessive because it overcompensated the plaintiff for the period in which he was

unlawfully detained. 600 F.3d at 846. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the award
properly covered the 84 days between the plaintiff’s arrest and arraignment, noting that damages
on a false arrest claim may cover only the period of detention from a plaintiff’s arrest until the first
issuance of process. Id. The Court determined that the proper damages period was only
approximately 36 hours. Id. Because the Court could identify the error, determine the appropriate
amount of damages from the record, and correct the issue without disturbing the jury’s findings as
to liability, it remitted the damages for the false arrest claim to an amount correlated with the
proper damages period. Id.
Similarly, here, neither party is contesting the jury’s findings as to the City’s liability for
wage discrimination. And, as discussed above, it is “reasonably clear what the jury did—or at least

what it was trying to do.” Duran, 653 F.3d at 643. Additionally, the Court can determine the
amount of backpay Miller is entitled to on her wage discrimination claim using information in the
record. During trial, Miller provided the jury with a precise breakdown of the pay differential
between her and Hughes for each year between 2019 and 2026. The Court can calculate the proper
damages award using this information. Accordingly, remittitur is appropriate here.
Using the information Miller presented at trial, the City asserts that Miller’s backpay
damages from June 7, 2020 to December 26, 2021 equal $28,108.17. (Dkt. 141-1 at 3). To verify
the accuracy of the City’s requested remittitur, the parties are ordered to submit to the Court
Miller’s Trial Exhibit 5. The Court will enter a subsequent order specifying the amount of the
remittitur. Miller will then have the option of accepting the remittitur or request a new trial on
damages. See Adams, 798 F.3d at 541 (“A true remittitur order gives the winning party a choice:
[s]he may either accept a specific reduced monetary award or [s]he may opt for a new trial.”).
Once this issue is resolved, the Court will turn to Miller’s pending motion for liquidated damages.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the City’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment [141] is granted
in part. Upon submission of Trial Exhibit 5, the Court will enter an order reducing Miller’s
damages for her wage discrimination claim and giving her the option of accepting remittitur or
requesting a new trial limited solely to the issue of damages on this claim.

cD la”

ginia M. Kendall
UniteY States District Judge
Date: August 24, 2026

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11425468. Public record. Not legal advice.