# Opinion > District Court, N.D. Oklahoma · August 24, 2026 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11425404 ## Case - **Full name:** Great Lakes Insurance, SE v. Doerner, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, LLP; Michael S. Linscott - **Court:** District Court, N.D. Oklahoma - **Decided:** August 24, 2026 - **Opinion:** 100trialcourt - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11425404 ## Opinion text Anited States District Court for the #Rorthern District of @klahoma Case No. 26-cv-208-JDR-MTS GREAT LAKES INSURANCE, SE, Plaintiff, YETSUS DOERNER, SAUNDERS, DANIEL & ANDERSON, LLP; MICHAEL S. LINSCOTT, Defendants. OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Great Lakes Insurance sued its former attorney, Defendant Michael Linscott, and his law firm, Defendant Doerner, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, LLP, for negligent representation during a trial that ended with a $92 million jury verdict against Great Lakes. Mr. Linscott and Doerner Saun- ders moved to dismiss Great Lakes’s complaint, arguing that the lawsuit chal- lenges Defendants’ strategic litigation tactics and that the judgmental im- munity doctrine precludes relief for those claims. Dkt. 7. The Court con- cludes that the judgmental immunity doctrine does not bar Great Lakes’s claims and denies the motion to dismiss. [i Great Lakes insured an apartment complex owned by Harold Gage. Dkt. 1 at 2. When the complex was damaged by a fire, Mr. Gage filed a claim The statements in this section are drawn from Great Lakes’s allegations, which the Court accepts as true. See Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010). No. 26-cv-208 for $27,000, which Great Lakes denied. Jd. at 2-3. Mr. Gage sued Great Lakes, and Great Lakes retained Mr. Linscott and his firm, Doerner Saun- ders, to defend it at trial. Jd. The jury returned a verdict of over $92 million in damages against Great Lakes. Jd. at 12. Great Lakes settled the dispute while post-trial motions were pending. Great Lakes alleges here that Mr. Linscott and Doerner Saunders were negligent in a variety of ways. Specifically, it claims Defendants failed to ob- ject to (1) inappropriate voir dire, (2) misstatements and mischaracterizations of the case, and (3) inappropriate and inflammatory statements during closing argument, including a request for the jury to “hit [Great Lakes] where it hurts” when issuing its verdict. Jd. at 9-12. Mr. Linscott and Doerner Saunders moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that they are im- mune from Great Lakes’s claims and that, as a result, Great Lakes cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dkt. 7. II To survive a motion to dismiss, Great Lakes’s complaint must set forth sufficient factual allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The allega- tions must be enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly (not just speculatively) has a claim for relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008). In other words, the Court must determine whether, taking all well-pleaded allegations as true, the complaint provides a “reason to believe that [Great Lakes] has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for [its] claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. »v. Schnieder, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff asserting a claim for professional negligence must allege “(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship, (2) breach of a lawyer’s duty to the client, (3) facts constituting the alleged negligence, (4) a causal No. 26-cv-208 nexus between the lawyer’s negligence and the resulting injury (or damage) and (5) but for the lawyer’s conduct, the client would have succeeded in the action.” Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79, J 8, 989 P.2d 448, 452 (emphasis re- moved). Defendants suggest that, even if these elements are established, a professional negligence claim cannot proceed if the doctrine of judgmental immunity would bar the claim. In general, the doctrine of judgmental immunity precludes claims against attorneys for reasonable, professional decisions about which reasona- ble attorneys could disagree. Wabaunsee v. Harris, 1980 OK 52, J 8, 610 P.2d 782, 784. “An attorney who acts in good faith and in an honest belief that his advice and acts are well founded and in the best interest of his client is not answerable for a mere error of judgment or for a mistake in a point of law which has not been settled.” Collins ». Wanner, 1963 OK 127, J 23, 382 P.2d 105, 109 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Defendants argue that the judgmental immunity rule applies in cases such as this one that involve an attorney’s failure to object during voir dire and on other occasions during trial. Dkt. 7 at 10-12. Great Lakes responds that Defendants’ conduct at trial fell far outside the scope of permissible representation and that, as a result, the immunity afforded under Harris and Warner does not apply. Dkt. 21 at 7, 10. After reviewing the complaint and the parties’ briefs, the Court con- cludes that the question of immunity is, in this case, a fact-dependent one. Great Lakes alleges that Defendants failed to object under circumstances that would have merited an objection from any well-informed lawyer. See Dkt. 1 at 9-14. Defendants argue, in response, that their decisions were within the scope of permissible discretion. But Defendants’ argument depends on facts not before the Court. If, as Defendants claim, their actions were intentional, strategic decisions, then perhaps they would be entitled to immunity. But the same could not be said if Defendants failed to object because they were simply not paying attention or were otherwise behaving negligently at the time the No. 26-cv-208 objectionable statements were made. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants’ conduct was the result of negligence, not strategy [Dkt. 1 at 13], and Defend- ants’ arguments to the contrary depend on factual assertions outside the pleadings that cannot be considered in the context of a motion to dismiss. Assuming the facts stated in the complaint are true and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a factfinder could determine that Defend- ants were negligent in their representation of Great Lakes. The judgmental immunity doctrine thus does not bar this case from proceeding. Defendants also argue that Great Lakes cannot prove that it was dam- aged by any purported negligence. They assert that, to prove damages, the Court will be required to conduct a “case within a case,” determining first whether Defendants would have prevailed at trial absent the alleged miscon- duct before turning to the question of whether Defendants mishandled the representation. Dkt. 7 at 12. Defendants are correct that this case will raise unique and complicated questions regarding the scope of discovery, the ad- missibility of evidence, and the format of the trial. But that is a problem for another day. These concerns do not affect the question now before the Court: whether Great Lakes’s complaint states a claim for relief. The Court con- cludes that Great Lakes has stated a claim, and the fact that Great Lakes might have difficulty proving its claim is not a basis for dismissal. See Bell Atl. Corp. vy. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (noting that “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Ill Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. The parties are directed to attend a scheduling conference at 4:00 p.m. on September 10, 2026. DATED this 24th day of August 2026. No. ee JOHN D. RUSSELL United States District Judge --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11425404. Public record. Not legal advice.