# Precious Holloway v Aer Lingus Limited et al

> District Court, C.D. California · July 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11424725

## Case

- **Full name:** Precious Holloway v Aer Lingus Limited et al
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** July 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No.: 2:26-cv-03862-AB-PVC Date: July 27, 2026

Title: Precious Holloway v Aer Lingus Limited et al

Present: The Honorable ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR., United States District Judge
Evelyn Chun N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):
None Appearing None Appearing

Proceedings: [In Chambers] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
REMAND [Dkt. No. 18]

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Precious Holloway’s (“Plaintiff”)
Motion to Remand (“Mot.,” Dkt. No. 18). Defendant Aer Lingus Limited
(“Defendant”) filed an Opposition (“Opp’n,” Dkt. No. 20), and Plaintiff filed a
Reply (“Reply,” Dkt. No. 1-2). Plaintiff also filed a Request for Judicial Notice in
Support of Motion to Remand (“RJN,” Dkt. No. 18-2). Finding the matter suitable
for decision without oral argument, the Court took the Motion under submission.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. For the following reasons, the Request for
Judicial Notice is DENIED and the Motion to Remand is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from allegations that Defendant failed to properly handle
and timely return Plaintiff’s power wheelchair and failed to provide required
disability assistance during international travel. See generally Complaint
(“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1-1.1 Plaintiff brings five causes of action: (1) violations of
Articles 17 and 19 of the Montreal Convention; (2) negligence; (3) violation of the
California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–52; (4) negligent
infliction of emotional distress; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See id. at 6–9.

Plaintiff commenced this action on March 6, 2026, in the Superior Court of
California, County of Los Angeles. See id at 1. On April 9, 2026, Defendant filed a
General Denial and Affirmative Defenses. Dkt. No. 1-2. On April 10, 2026,
Defendant removed the action to this Court, asserting federal-question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See
Notice of Removal (“NOR”), Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 5–21.

On May 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand, arguing that
Defendant has not established federal jurisdiction because the Montreal
Convention does not completely preempt her state-law claims, the amount in
controversy does not exceed $75,000, and the state court retains concurrent
jurisdiction. See Mot. at 5–8. Defendant opposes the Motion, arguing that
Plaintiff’s Montreal Convention claim supports federal-question jurisdiction and
that diversity jurisdiction independently exists. See Opp’n at 2–8. Plaintiff did not
file a reply.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have subject-matter
jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the
federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a). Federal courts have original jurisdiction where a plaintiff’s well-pleaded
complaint presents a federal question or where each plaintiff’s citizenship is
diverse from each defendant’s citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. Id. §§ 1331, 1332(a).

There is a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, so it “must be

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint restarts its paragraph numbering following each
section heading, resulting in multiple paragraphs bearing the same numerical designation. To
avoid confusion, the Court cites to the page numbers of the Complaint rather than paragraph
numbers when referring to allegations in the pleading.
rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”
Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107
(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).
The removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Gaus v.
Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case
shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, courts may take judicial notice of facts
that are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). In connection
with the Motion to Remand.

Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of the Complaint, the Notice
of Removal and Defendant’s General Denial and Affirmative Defenses See
generally RJN. A court may consider ‘documents attached to the complaint;
documents incorporated by reference in the complaint or matters of judicial
notice.” United States v Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903,908 (9th Cir 2003). Additionally,
when ruling on a motion to remand, the court necessarily considers the complaint
and the notice of removal. Emeldi v Univ. of Or., 698 F.3d 715,731 (9th Cir. 2012).
Because the Court may consider these documents without taking judicial notice of
them, Plaintiff's request for judicial notice is DENIED

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that removal was improper because the Montreal Convention
does not completely preempt her state-law claims and because Defendant has not
established diversity jurisdiction. See Mot. The Court first considers whether
federal-question jurisdiction exists before addressing Defendant’s alternative
argument that diversity jurisdiction independently supports removal.

A. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction for “all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
“Federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 arises in two
situations.” Cummings v. Cenergy Int’l Servs., LLC, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1106
(E.D. Cal. 2017). “First, a court may exercise federal-question jurisdiction where a
federal right or immunity is ‘an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s
cause of action.’ ” Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 11 (1983)). “Second, federal-question jurisdiction
arises where a state-law claim ‘necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing
any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.’
” Id. (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S.
308, 314 (2005)).

“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the
‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only
when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded
complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “A defense is
not a part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim.”
Cummings, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 1106 (quoting Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470,
475 (1998)); see also Silverstein v. Delta Airlines Inc., No. 2:11 -CV-00236-JHN-
JCx, 2011 WL 13218046, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2011) (quoting Caterpillar, 480
U.S. at 392) (stating “removal to federal court cannot be based on a federal
‘defense, including the defense of pre-emption”). Plaintiff is the “master of the
complaint” and “may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state
law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.

i. Plaintiff’s Montreal Claim

The Montreal Convention, which replaced the Warsaw Convention,
establishes a uniform framework governing airline liability and “applies to all
international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft.” See
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air
(“Montreal Convention”), art. 1(1), May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45
(2000). The Convention addresses liability arising from passenger injury or death,
damage to or loss of baggage or cargo, and damages resulting from delays in
transportation. See id. arts. 17–19. Article 29 further provides that any action for
damages arising from the carriage of passengers, baggage, or cargo—“whether
under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise”—is subject to the
conditions and limitations of liability established by the Convention:

“In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages,
however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or
otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of
liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to the question as
to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their
respective rights.”

Id. art. 29. Although the Montreal Convention retains limitations on airline
liability, it was designed to modernize the Warsaw Convention framework by
balancing protections for air carriers with greater recognition of passenger and
shipper rights. See Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361, 365
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 309 F. App’x 483 (2d Cir. 2009).

The Convention defines “international carriage” based on the agreed places
of departure and destination, and a journey may qualify as international carriage
even if it includes domestic segments, so long as the domestic segment constitutes
an agreed stopping place within a broader international journey between two
signatory nations. See Montreal Convention art. 1(2).

Defendant claims that because “Plaintiff chose to plead a claim under the
Montreal Convention, Plaintiff’s Complaint was properly removed to this Court
under § 1331.” Opp’n at 5; see also NOR ¶¶ 13–21. Plaintiff expressly asserts a
claim for violations of Articles 17 and 19 of the Montreal Convention. See Compl.
at 6–7. Accordingly, the Complaint presents a federal claim on its face. Defendant
argues that this claim provides original federal-question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and that Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims fall within the
Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. See Opp’n at 11–13. Plaintiff does not dispute
that she asserts a claim under the Montreal Convention but argues that the presence
of that claim does not render the entire action removable because her remaining
state-law claims are not completely preempted. See Mot. at 4–7.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Montreal Convention claim presents a
federal question. The remaining question is whether Plaintiff’s state-law claims fall
within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction or are independently transformed into
federal claims through complete preemption.

ii. Complete Preemption

“The doctrine of ‘complete preemption’ serves as a narrow exception to the
well-pleaded complaint rule.” Id., at *2 (citing Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000)). Complete preemption exists
where the “preemptive force of [a] statute[ ] is so strong that [it] ‘completely
preempt[s]’ an area of state law.” Balcorta, 208 F.3d at 1107 (citing Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). “In such instances, any claim
purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a
federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd.
of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 24
(1983)).

The complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is
very narrow. See Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agency, 994 F.2d 666, 668 (9th Cir.
1993) (“The [complete preemption] doctrine ... is a narrow exception to the ‘well-
pleaded complaint rule.’ ”). In fact, “only three areas have been deemed areas of
complete preemption by the United States Supreme Court: (1) claims under the
Labor Management Relations Act, (2) claims under the Employment Retirement
and Insurance Security Act (ERISA), and (3) certain Indian land grant rights.”
Zatta v. Societe Air France, No. SA CV 11-0647 DOC, 2011 WL 2472280, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Jun. 21, 2011) (quotation omitted).

Complete preemption is distinct from federal preemption, which regards
whether a plaintiff’s state law claim may proceed. Dizon v. Asiana Airlines, Inc.,
240 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“[C]omplete preemption—i.e.,
whether a plaintiff must bring a claim under the Montreal Convention in federal
court—[is] a different issue than federal preemption—i.e., whether a plaintiff's
state law cause of action may proceed when his Montreal Convention claim
fails.”). Put another way, “[t]he fact that individual claims may be preempted does
not mean the entire field is preempted, and the defense of claim preemption does
not convert a complaint brought under state law into one ‘arising under’ federal
law.” Oganesyan v. Am. Airlines Cargo, No. CV 13-6190 SVW, 2013 WL
6229173, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2013).

Ordinarily, federal preemption is a defense that does not provide a basis for
removal. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1987). Complete
preemption is a narrow exception that applies only where federal law has such
extraordinary preemptive force that it converts a state-law claim into a federal
claim for purposes of federal-question jurisdiction. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63–66 (1987).

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Montreal Convention claim provides a
basis for federal-question jurisdiction because the Convention completely preempts
Plaintiff’s related state-law claims. Defendant argues that the Montreal
Convention, which superseded the Warsaw Convention, should be interpreted
consistently with Warsaw Convention precedent addressing the Convention’s
preemptive effect. See Opp’n at 3–5 (citing Narayanan v. British Airways, 747
F.3d 1125, 1127 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014)). Relying primarily on El Al Israel Airlines,
Ltd. v. Tseng, Defendant argues that, where applicable, the Montreal Convention
provides the exclusive remedy for claims arising from international carriage and
precludes state-law causes of action “whether in contract or tort.” See id. at 4–5
(citing Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 161 (1999)). Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s
negligence, emotional distress, and Unruh Act claims arise from the same
international flight, wheelchair damage, and resulting injuries as her Montreal
Convention claim, and therefore fall within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction.
See id. at 5–6. Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot avoid federal
jurisdiction by characterizing her claims as separate “Convention” and “California”
claims because the Montreal Convention expressly preempts domestic-law claims
that fall within its scope. See id. at 5 (citing Arzu v. American Airlines, Inc., 2026
WL 1346555, at *7 (5th Cir. May 14, 2026)).

Plaintiff responds that, although her claims concerning damage to and delay
in returning her wheelchair may fall within the Montreal Convention’s scope, her
state-law claims are based on separate allegations of disability discrimination and
accessibility failures that occurred after she had disembarked the aircraft. See Mot.
at 4–7. Plaintiff argues that the Convention does not completely preempt those
claims merely because they arise from the same overall travel experience. See id.
The Court need not resolve the full scope of the Montreal Convention’s preemptive
effect to determine whether removal was proper. Unlike cases in which defendants
rely solely on complete preemption of state-law claims to establish federal
jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Complaint expressly asserts a claim under Articles 17 and
19 of the Montreal Convention. See Compl. That claim arises under federal law
and provides an independent basis for federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.

The remaining question is whether the Court may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. A federal court may exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that are so related to claims within
the court’s original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Claims satisfy this requirement when they derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact and would ordinarily be expected to be tried
together. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).

Here, Plaintiff’s state-law claims arise from the same alleged international
carriage, the same wheelchair damage and delay, and the same alleged resulting
injuries that form the basis of her Montreal Convention claim. See Compl. at 6–9.
Although Plaintiff characterizes her state-law claims as involving additional
disability discrimination and accessibility-related conduct, those allegations remain
intertwined with the same underlying travel incident and alleged harm.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claims fall within the Court’s supplemental
jurisdiction.

Because Plaintiff expressly pleaded a Montreal Convention claim and her
related state-law claims fall within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction,
Defendant was not required to establish that the Montreal Convention completely
preempts those state-law claims to support removal. Plaintiff’s complete-
preemption argument therefore does not provide a basis for remand.

B. Diversity Jurisdiction

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to federal court
when the federal district court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a). “A suit may be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) only
if it could have been brought there originally.” Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc.,
813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987).

A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction. See Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th
Cir. 2015). A federal district court has diversity jurisdiction over a matter where
the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 and there is
complete diversity among opposing parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

Any doubt about the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be
resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980
F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d
1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553
F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The removal statute is strictly construed, and
any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.”
(citation omitted)); Sandoval v. Republic Servs., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01224-
ODW(KSx), 2018 WL 1989528, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2018). A removal’s
propriety “may later be tested in the federal court, either on a motion by a party to
remand, or by the court on its own motion.” Libhart, 529 F.2d at 1065.

i. Complete Diversity

Complete diversity exists only when “each defendant is a citizen of a
different State from each plaintiff.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437
U.S. 365, 373 (1978). For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, individuals’ state
citizenship is “determined by [their] state of domicile”: the place where they
“reside[] with the intention to remain[.]” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d
853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, the parties do not dispute that complete diversity exists. Plaintiff
alleges that she is a citizen of California, while Defendant is an Irish corporation
with its principal place of business in Dublin, Ireland. See NOR ¶¶ 2–3.
Accordingly, Defendant has established complete diversity of citizenship. The
remaining jurisdictional question is whether Defendant has demonstrated, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

ii. Amount in Controversy

Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not established that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000 because the Complaint does not specify a damages
amount and Defendant relies primarily on Plaintiff’s pre-litigation settlement
demand. See Mot. at 6–8. Plaintiff contends that the settlement demand does not
establish the amount in controversy because settlement negotiations often involve
inflated or strategic demands that do not reflect the actual value of a claim. See id.

Defendant responds that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied
because Plaintiff demanded $95,000 before filing suit, and the Complaint seeks
compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and other relief. See
Opp’n at 6–7. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s allegations of physical
injury, emotional distress, damage to her wheelchair, and discriminatory treatment
support a finding that the amount at stake exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. See
id.

The Court agrees with Defendant. Although a settlement demand alone is
not necessarily dispositive of the amount in controversy, it is relevant evidence of
the amount Plaintiff placed at issue before filing suit. See Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc.,
281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a plaintiff’s demand letter may be
considered in determining the amount in controversy where it reflects a reasonable
estimate of the value of the claim). Here, Plaintiff’s $95,000 settlement demand
exceeds the jurisdictional threshold by $20,000. See Bronach O’Connell
Declaration (“O’Connell Decl.”), ¶¶ 5–7, Ex. A. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Complaint
seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and other
available relief, and alleges injuries arising from damage to her wheelchair,
emotional distress, and Defendant’s alleged failure to provide disability-related
accommodations. See Compl. at 9–10. When considered together, these allegations
and the pre-litigation demand provide a reasonable basis to conclude that the
amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds $75,000.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s estimate of damages is speculative. But
Defendant is not required to prove the actual amount of damages Plaintiff will
recover; rather, Defendant must establish only that the amount placed in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. See Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at
88–89. Given Plaintiff’s settlement demand, the types of damages sought, and the
allegations in the Complaint, Defendant has satisfied that burden.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant has established diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is
DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, because the Court has federal-question jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s Montreal Convention claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the
related state-law claims, and because Defendant has also established diversity
jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11424725. Public record. Not legal advice.