# Wallis

> District Court, N.D. California · July 29, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11424687

## Case

- **Full name:** Marcia Wallis, et al. v. The Holcomb Corporation, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** July 29, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 MARCIA WALLIS, et al., Case No. 25-cv-07098-HSG

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR
9 v. JUDICIAL NOTICE

10 THE HOLCOMB CORPORATION, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 25, 26
11 Defendants.

12 Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint,
13 Dkt. No. 25 (“Mot.”); Dkt. No. 29 (“Opp.”); Dkt. No. 30 (“Reply”), and Defendants’ request for
14 judicial notice. Dkt. No. 26. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral
15 argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons discussed
16 below, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 25, GRANTS Defendants’ request for
17 judicial notice, Dkt. No. 26, and EXPUNGES Plaintiffs’ notice of lis pendens, Dkt. No. 2.
18 I. BACKGROUND
19 Plaintiffs Marcia and Daniel Wallis, Dominic and Maureen Caloiaro, and Marcia and
20 Adam Capron are condominium owners at Seascape Resort. Dkt. No. 10 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 7.
21 At issue in this case are representations Defendants made about condominium owners’ access to
22 amenities, which are owned by the homeowners association, and a requirement that owners
23 participate in Defendants’ rental management program to use some of those amenities. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
24 Defendant Holcomb Corporation is a real estate brokerage licensed in California and the
25 developer of Seascape Resort. Id. ¶ 32. Defendant Seascape Resort Ltd. (“SRL”) is a California
26 limited partnership that operates a resort and management company and asserts control over
27 common areas at the Seascape Resort, such as the pool, putting greens, and fire pits. Id. ¶¶ 23, 36.
1 30–37. Defendant Kyla Holcomb Piramoon is a licensed real estate managing director of The
2 Holcomb Corporation and member of SRL. Id. ¶ 33. Kay Holcomb is the CEO of SRL. Id. ¶ 34.
3 Lois Holcomb is a representative for several Holcomb entities and owns several of its properties.
4 Id. ¶ 35.
5 Although the Holcomb entities developed the Seascape Resort, the Seascape Resort
6 Owners Association (the HOA) owns the common areas of the resort, except for the commercial
7 units (including the main lobby, registration desk, conference rooms, and restaurant facilities),
8 which are owned and operated by SRL. Id. ¶ 18. In addition to managing those facilities,
9 Defendants provide rental management services through which unit owners may contract with
10 SRL to lease their units for short-term rentals. Defendants manage the units as a “pool,” which
11 includes 198 of the 280 units at Seascape Resort. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93, 116.
12 The development is encumbered by Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions of Seascape
13 Resort, which were recorded in 1992 and 1994. Dkt. No. 10-3 at 2–68 (“CC&R”) (attachment to
14 amended complaint). The CC&R indicates that certain portions of the resort common areas are set
15 aside for the exclusive use of certain units. Id. § 3.03. Unit 85 was given exclusive use of several
16 parking spots and “all Deck and Patio areas adjacent to the Conference Center, Unit 85, and the
17 Pool, including the right to conduct general commercial activities including food and beverage
18 service within the Exclusive Use Common Areas.” Id. § 3.03(c). Separately, Section 3.05 permits
19 the annexation of property to become subject to the CC&R, so long as the annexation does “not
20 result in an unreasonable diminution of benefits to, or an unreasonable increase in the burdens
21 upon existing Owners . . . .” Id. § 3.05(a)(2). In 1996, SRL submitted annexation documents
22 adding residential units and one commercial unit (Unit 534). Am. Compl. ¶ 72. SRL owns Unit
23 85 and Unit 534, which together have exclusive rights over portions of the Common Areas, id.
24 § 3.02, and SRL claims that only those units may house 24-hour on-site centralized management.
25 Am. Compl. ¶ 55. The CC&R separately grants condominium owners the “sole discretion” to
26 choose which rental agency to use, if they choose to rent their unit. Am Compl. ¶ 8; CC&R
27 § 4.08.
1 Resort. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. Following their purchase, Plaintiffs paid for use of the Common Area
2 amenities. Id. ¶ 21. Until 2022, the Wallis plaintiffs participated in the rental management
3 program, but were “kicked out of the program” after they refused to agree to use Defendants’
4 chosen contractor for a remodel. Id. ¶¶ 22, 158, 180. Thereafter, they began self-renting through
5 AirBnB. Id. ¶¶ 22, 165–66. In 2025, Defendants changed the locks on the pool facilities and
6 began excluding unit owners who did not participate in their rental management program. Id.
7 ¶ 87.
8 The HOA previously sued SRL in Santa Cruz County Superior Court. See Dkt. No. 10-4
9 (briefing in support of preliminary injunction in state court suit, attached as an exhibit to the
10 amended complaint). SRL filed a cross-complaint and obtained a preliminary injunction that
11 allowed SRL to “lock out” unit owners who did not participate in the management program from
12 the pool and other common areas. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87, 160; Dkt. No. 10-4 at 383–405 (describing
13 requested injunction); Dkt. No. 26-7 at 5 (describing injunction).1 Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against
14 Defendants in the same court, seeking the same relief they seek here, save for their current federal
15 claims. See Mot. at 10–112; Dkt. No. 26-3. The Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to unwind the
16 preliminary injunction order. Mot. at 10–11; Dkt. No. 26-4 at 14–15. Plaintiffs then dismissed
17 their state court action and brought this suit in federal court. Id.; Dkt. No. 26-5. Defendants move
18 to dismiss the complaint for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for a failure to state a claim.
19 Dkt. No. 25.
20 II. LEGAL STANDARDS
21 A. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim
22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain
23 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A
24 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
25

26
1 The Court grants Defendants’ request for judicial notice, Dkt. No. 26, and takes notice of the
documents as public records reflecting the claims at issue and any court orders in the earlier
27
proceeding, but not for the truth of the contents of the documents.
1 granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the
2 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
3 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule
4 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
5 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible
6 when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
7 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
8 B. Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move to dismiss for lack of
10 subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited
11 jurisdiction,” and “[t]hey possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”
12 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Subject matter
13 jurisdiction can never be forfeited or waived and federal courts have a continuing independent
14 obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.” See Leeson v. Transam.
15 Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975, n.12 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). The party
16 invoking subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists.
17 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
18 III. DISCUSSION
19 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ only basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction is its
20 federal antitrust claims, and that Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege those claims.
21 A. Federal Antitrust Claims
22 Plaintiffs assert two antitrust theories. First, they allege that Defendants engaged in an
23 “unlawful scheme to… restrain trade and monopolize the market for rental management services
24 at Seascape Resort by leveraging their control over [the HOA] amenities, including the pool, fire
25 pits, putting greens, and other common facilities.” Am. Compl. ¶ 275. Plaintiffs allege that
26 Defendants tied access to the HOA-owned amenities to the requirement that unit owners use
27 Defendants’ property and rental management services, instead of using AirBnB and other
1 that Defendants’ conduct also amounted to attempted monopolization in violation of section 2 of
2 the Sherman Act. Id. ¶¶ 279–81.
3 Defendants argue, among other things, that Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead a federal
4 antitrust claim because the claims do not meet the interstate commerce requirement and the market
5 definition is untenable. Mot. at 12–15. Plaintiffs counter that for purposes of federal antitrust law,
6 effect on interstate commerce is broadly interpreted, and that their market definitions are
7 sufficiently pled. Opp. at 7–11.
8 The Court’s overall conclusion is that Plaintiffs’ case at its core is simply a state law
9 dispute, as reflected in the prior long-running state court lawsuits, and that they fall far short of
10 legitimately pleading any antitrust violation under well-established standards, as explained below.
11 i. Plaintiff Fails to Plead Any Effect on Interstate Commerce
12 The federal antitrust laws only apply to “trade or commerce among the several states.” 15
13 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. See also id. §§ 14, 18, 45(a)(1). “To make a federal case, a plaintiff must show
14 that the activities in question, although conducted within a state, have a ‘substantial effect on
15 interstate commerce.’” Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir.
16 2003) (quoting McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980)). It is
17 enough to “demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate commerce generated by [defendants’]
18 infected activity,” and Plaintiffs need not make any “more particularized showing of an effect on
19 interstate commerce caused by. . . activity that is alleged to be unlawful.” Id. While the reach of
20 the Sherman Act is broad, see United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533,
21 558 (1944), Plaintiffs may not identify “a relevant local activity and . . . presume an
22 interrelationship with some unspecific aspect of interstate commerce.” United States v. ORS, Inc.,
23 997 F.2d 628, 630 (9th Cir. 1993).
24 Plaintiffs argue that “a significant portion of [SRL’s] renters come from outside of
25 California and book through interstate channels such as Air[BnB] and VRBO; that SRL
26 employees instructed those guests to cancel existing Air[BnB] reservations and rebook exclusively
27 through SRL; that rental transactions process through interstate credit-card networks; and that
1 at 7–8 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23–26, 54–60, 87–94, 139, 161–67). In reply, Defendants argue that
2 none of these paragraphs allege that renters visit Seascape Resort from out-of-state or travel
3 interstate to visit Seascape Resort. Reply at 9 n.1.
4 Defendants are correct. The amended complaint contains no allegation about the interstate
5 effect of renters from outside of California seeking to stay at AirBnBs, credit card networks, or
6 practices directed at interstate travelers. It mentions AirBnB or VRBO only five times: (1) SRL
7 told renters that AirBnBs were impermissible at Seascape Resort, Am. Compl. ¶ 28, (2) SRL
8 stated that they did not believe it was possible for owners to manage their rentals through AirBnB
9 and VRBO, id. ¶ 88, (3) Plaintiffs use AirBnB to rent their unit, id. ¶ 165, (4) Defendant Kyla
10 Piramoon told Plaintiff that it was a misdemeanor to use AirBnB to manage their property, id.
11 ¶ 166, and (5) Defendants tied access to HOA-owned amenities to using their property
12 management services, instead of using AirBnB. Id. ¶ 276. Separately, Plaintiffs allege that SRL
13 allegedly told Plaintiffs’ renters to book through SRL and sought to exert control over local assets.
14 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 163, 276.
15 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not alleged a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
16 The few potentially relevant facts contained in the amended complaint are not obviously
17 connected to interstate commerce, and do not plausibly state the required substantial effect. See
18 McLain, 444 U.S. at 242; Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 661 (9th Cir. 1983) (“There must be a
19 sufficient nexus between the activity and interstate commerce so that it can be said that as a
20 practical matter of economics there is a not insubstantial effect on the line of commerce
21 involved.”). And Plaintiffs’ arguments in the opposition to the motion to dismiss are based on
22 asserted facts simply absent from the amended complaint, which is impermissible. See In re
23 PG&E Corp. Sec. Litig., 806 F. Supp. 3d 962, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citing Schneider v. Cal.
24 Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998)); Foregger v. Redfin Corp., No. 24-CV-
25 05701-HSG, 2025 WL 917103, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2025) (same).
26 The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the federal antitrust claims because
27 they fail on this ground alone. In the interest of providing guidance for any potential amended
1 allegations.
2 ii. Market Definition
3 As noted above, Plaintiffs allege both a Section 1 claim (tying) and a Section 2 claim
4 (monopolization and attempted monopolization). Each of these claims requires Plaintiff, among
5 other things, to plausibly plead a relevant market, and “[t]he ‘relevant market’ . . . requirement[]
6 appl[ies] identically” to both claims. Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Off. Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1044 &
7 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008).
8 The relevant market for antitrust purposes is “the area of effective competition,” which
9 means “the arena within which significant substitution in consumption or production occurs.”
10 Epic Games, 67 F.4th at 975. A relevant market includes both a geographic market and a product
11 market. Id. Generally, “[t]he process of defining the relevant market is a factual inquiry for the
12 jury.” High Tech. Careers v. San Jose Mercury News, 996 F.2d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1993). But
13 “[i]f ‘the alleged market suffers a fatal legal defect,’ the court may dismiss the claim at the
14 pleading stage.” PLS.COM, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 32 F.4th 824, 839 (9th Cir.
15 2022) (quoting Newcal, 513 F.3d at 1045). To determine whether Plaintiffs plausibly allege that
16 Defendants either monopolized or had a dangerous probability of monopolizing the market, the
17 Court must assess the product and geographic markets alleged. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
18 McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
19 Geographic market definitions should encompass where customers go to secure the
20 product. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys. Ltd., 778 F.3d
21 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2015). The market is geographically bounded by “where buyers can turn for
22 alternative sources of supply.” Id. “Consumers do not define the boundaries of the market,
23 products and producers do.” Newcal, 513 F.3d at 1045. Plaintiffs’ personal preferences regarding
24 the product are irrelevant to the scope of geographic market when experience suggests that the
25 relevant geographic market is larger. See Tanaka v. University of Southern California, 252 F.3d
26 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit has observed that defining “the relevant market
27 cannot be performed with mathematical accuracy,” Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1476
1 ground for dismissal of a Sherman Act claim. Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063 (citing Big Bear Lodging
2 Ass'n v. Snow Summit, Inc., 182 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir.1999)).
3 For purposes of explaining some of the fatal defects in the complaint, the Court focuses on
4 the following geographic and product market definition, which sets out Plaintiffs’ rationale for the
5 definition:
The relevant market is the provision of property management and
6 short-term rental services at Seascape Resort and its surrounding
resort area. Because of HOA restrictions and geographic uniqueness,
7 unit owners and renters cannot reasonably turn to alternative markets
for the tied product.
8
Am. Compl. ¶ 280.3 In that relevant market, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants “possessed and
9
exercised monopoly power,” id. ¶ 279, by managing 198 of 280 units (approximately 70%). Id.
10
¶ 93.
11
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations do not plausibly plead the proposed geographic market. The
12
unit owners are the relevant “customers” or “purchasers” of rental management services. While
13
the rental units are located at Seascape Resort, the rental management service providers (or the
14
“sellers”) are not required to be located on site. See Am. Compl. ¶ 55 (SLR owns the only units
15
that can house on-site management services). Plaintiffs allege that the relevant sellers are SRL,
16
AirBnB, and VRBO and that Plaintiffs use AirBnB, and there are no allegations which would
17
support the inference that AirBnB and VRBO are themselves located at the Seascape Resort. See
18
id. ¶¶ 55, 88, 165, 276 (“competing rental managers such as Airbnb”). Even taking the facts
19
alleged as true, as the Court must at this stage, the complaint fails to support Plaintiffs’ geographic
20
market definition as a matter of law, which is a fatal legal defect warranting dismissal.
21
None of Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary is persuasive. Plaintiffs argue that they
22
“identif[ied] a narrow, economically distinct relevant market: the rental-management market for
23

24
3 The Court notes that the amended complaint contains somewhat inconsistent allegations
25 regarding the market definition. See Am. Compl. ¶ 275 (defining the relevant market as “rental
management services at Seascape Resort”); id. ¶ 279(a) (defining the relevant market as “property
26 management and rental services within the Seascape Resort”); id. ¶ 280 (defining relevant market
as “property management and short-term rental services at Seascape Resort and its surrounding
27 resort area”). This inconsistency in itself suggests a problem with Plaintiffs’ claims. See MLM
1 units at Seascape Resort,” Opp. at 9 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 107–10, 165–67, 274–83), and assert
2 that “[c]ourts repeatedly find single-facility markets cognizable.” Id. (citing only Hecht v. Pro-
3 Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Hecht is irrelevant for multiple reasons.
4 First, one citation to a nearly forty-year-old out-of-circuit case obviously does not establish what
5 courts “repeatedly” do. Second, in Hecht, the geographic market was not a single facility but “the
6 area of metropolitan Washington, D.C.” Hecht, 570 F.2d at 989. And third, the part of Hecht
7 Plaintiffs cite applied the “essential facility” doctrine, which by its terms applies under narrowly
8 limited circumstances to inputs owned by a monopolist whose use is necessary to enable
9 competitors to compete in the market. See 570 F.2d at 992–93 (finding RFK Stadium to be an
10 essential facility with respect to plaintiff who sought to stage competing professional football
11 games); AliveCor v. Apple, Inc., 163 F.4th 1259, 1271 (9th Cir. 2026) (explaining that the
12 essential facility doctrine “solely imposes on the owner of a facility that cannot reasonably be
13 duplicated and which is essential to competition in a given market a duty to make that facility
14 available to its competitors on a nondiscriminatory basis”) (cleaned up). So nothing in Hecht
15 supports Plaintiffs’ “single-facility market” claim (to the extent the Court can understand it), nor
16 does there appear to be any plausible basis for application of the essential facility doctrine on the
17 facts pled here.
18 It is also unclear what Plaintiffs are getting at from an antitrust standpoint in alleging that
19 “Because of HOA restrictions and geographic uniqueness, unit owners and renters cannot
20 reasonably turn to alternative markets.” Am. Compl. ¶ 280. It is not clear whether this allegation
21 is intended to support a geographic or product market definition. Facts regarding HOA
22 restrictions and geographic uniqueness are irrelevant to the geographic market, which is defined
23 based on where sellers operate. See Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr., 778 F.3d at 784. Nothing in
24 paragraph 280 supports narrowing the geographic market to “Seascape Resort and its surrounding
25 area.” See Tanaka, 252 F.3d at 1063. If the references to HOA restrictions and geographic
26 uniqueness are intended to support a product submarket, that definition is separately defective. It
27 is not clear what “HOA restrictions” refers to other than the CC&R. But in any event, the
1 market power, because Plaintiffs agreed to those restrictions when they purchased their units. See
2 Newcal, 513 F.3d at 1048 (“[T]he law prohibits an antitrust claimant from resting on market
3 power that arises solely from contractual rights that consumers knowingly and voluntarily gave to
4 the defendant.”) (discussing Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 438 (3d
5 Cir. 1997) and Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1476).
6 The same is true regarding the “geographic uniqueness” allegation. First, Plaintiffs have
7 not pled how geographic uniqueness changes the characteristics or provision of rental management
8 services at Seascape Resort, compared to rental management services generally. See Brown Shoe
9 v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 67 F.4th 946, 976 (9th
10 Cir. 2023) (citing Brown). Plausible allegations to that effect would be required to define a
11 narrower relevant product submarket. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325. And “geographic
12 uniqueness” does not justify an overly narrow market definition that fails to consider
13 interchangeable substitute products. See, e.g., Concord Associates, L.P. v. Entertainment
14 Properties Trust, 817 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[m]erely asserting that a commodity is in some
15 way unique is insufficient to plead a relevant market”).
16 For all of these reasons, the federal antitrust claims are DISMISSED.
17 B. Supplemental Jurisdiction
18 Because the only asserted basis for jurisdiction is the existence of a federal question,
19 having dismissed all the federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
20 over the remaining state law claims unless and until Plaintiffs state a viable federal claim. Ove v.
21 Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may decline to exercise supplemental
22 jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has ‘dismissed all claims over which it has
23 original jurisdiction.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3))).
24 C. Lis Pendens
25 Because the operative complaint has been dismissed, there is no action pending, and the
26 Court thus EXPUNGES Plaintiffs’ notice of lis pendens. Dkt. No. 2. See 118 Ava, LLC v.
27 Hunter, No. 22-56115, 2025 WL 484614, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2025) (affirming dismissal of
1 || McDavid v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV 11-05596-ODW (AJW), 2011 WL 4062509, at *2
2 ||} (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2011) (expunging notice of lis pendens since underlying case dismissed for
3 lack of subject matter jurisdiction). The Court declines in its discretion to impose attorneys’ fees
4 || and costs because it is granting leave to amend, though it will consider revisiting this issue
5 depending on the contents of any amended complaint.
6 || IV. CONCLUSION
7 The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 25, and GRANTS
8 || Defendants’ notice for judicial notice. Although the Court is skeptical that Plaintiffs can assert a
9 || viable federal antitrust claim for the reasons laid out above, Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend
10 || within 21 days of this order. Any amended complaint may not add any new claims or defendants.
11 The Court EXPUNGES Plaintiffs’ notice of lis pendens. Dkt. No. 2.
12 In deciding whether to amend the complaint, Plaintiffs’ counsel should carefully consider
13 || their obligations under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and California Rule of
14 || Professional Conduct 1.1(c). Plaintiffs are advised that they must plead their very best case,
3 15 adequately supported under antitrust authority (as discussed above and otherwise), and they should
a 16 || understand that the Court is very unlikely to grant further leave to amend. Plaintiffs should also
17 || consider whether they would simply prefer to pursue their state-law claims in state court.
Zz 18 The Court further SETS case a case management conference on September 1, 2026, at
19 || 2:00 p.m. The hearing will be held by Public Zoom Webinar. All counsel, members of the public,
20 || and media may access the webinar information at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/hsg. All
21 attorneys and pro se litigants appearing for the case management conference are required to join at
22 || least 15 minutes before the hearing to check in with the courtroom deputy and test internet, video,
23 and audio capabilities. The parties are further DIRECTED to file a joint case management
24 || statement by August 25, 2026.
25 IT IS SO ORDERED.
26 || Dated: 7/29/2026
27 Abeyyerd & bbl)
28 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11424687. Public record. Not legal advice.