# Ditona

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11424172

## Case

- **Full name:** Darren Ditona v. Roger Nutt
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

DARREN DITONA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:26-cv-1916-WFJ-SPF

ROGER NUTT,

Defendant.
/

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Darren Ditona’s amended civil-
rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 8). Mr. Ditona alleges that his rights were
violated when a prison official confiscated a sigil he was using for a “moon ritual.” (Id. at
5). Upon initial screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court concludes that Mr. Ditona
states a plausible claim under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. Mr. Ditona
fails, however, to state an actionable claim under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).
Mr. Ditona is a Florida prisoner confined at Polk Correctional Institution. (Doc. 8
at 2). He practices a “monotheistic form of Folk Magic that . . . may be labeled Wicca.”
(Doc. 8-1 at 1). As part of his Wiccan beliefs, Mr. Ditona performs a “bi-monthly” “moon
ritual” in which he uses a “sigil”—a consecrated sheet of paper—as a “focal point” to “store
energy.” (Id.) On December 12, 2025, Mr. Ditona was twelve days into a fourteen-day
moon ritual. (Doc. 8-2 at 10). That morning, Colonel Roger Nutt allegedly confiscated Mr.
Ditona’s sigil during a “routine” cell inspection. (Id.) Mr. Ditona informed Mr. Nutt that
the sigil “was a religious item.” (Id.) Mr. Nutt responded, “I don’t give a F*CK.” (Id.) After

inspecting the sigil, Mr. Nutt said, “This looks like some gang sh*t.” (Id. at 11). He then
left the cell with the sigil, which was “never returned” to Mr. Ditona. (Id.) The confiscation
of the sigil “desecrated” it and prematurely terminated the moon ritual. (Id. at 10-11). Based
on these allegations, Mr. Ditona sues Mr. Nutt in his individual capacity for violating the
Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA. (Doc. 8 at 2-3). As relief, Mr. Ditona seeks $98,000 in
damages and asks that “administrative punitive actions [be] taken against” Mr. Nutt. (Id.

at 5).
First, Mr. Ditona states a plausible free exercise claim against Mr. Nutt. “To plead
a valid free exercise claim, [a plaintiff] must allege that the government has impermissibly
burdened one of his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d
1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007). “Although prison inmates retain protections afforded by the

First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, prison officials may impose limitations on an
inmate’s exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs if the limitations are ‘reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.’” Johnson v. Brown, 581 F. App’x 777, 780
(11th Cir. 2014) (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
Mr. Ditona alleges that his Wiccan beliefs require him to perform a “bi-monthly”

“moon ritual” with a “sigil”—a consecrated sheet of paper. (Doc. 8-1 at 1). On December
12, 2025, Mr. Nutt allegedly confiscated Mr. Ditona’s sigil despite being told of its
religious significance, thus prematurely ending a time-sensitive, fourteen-day moon ritual.
(Doc. 8-2 at 10-11). Taken as true, these allegations are sufficient to plead that Mr. Nutt
“impermissibly burdened one of [Mr. Ditona’s] ‘sincerely held religious beliefs.’” Watts,
495 F.3d at 1294. The question becomes whether the confiscation of the sigil was

“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Johnson, 581 F. App’x at 780. This
case is still at the “preliminary-screening stage,” and Mr. Nutt has not had an opportunity
to “respond[] to [Mr. Ditona’s] allegations.” Id. at 781. As a result, it is unclear “what
justifications [he] may provide for these alleged actions.” Id. Thus, “the facts surrounding
[Mr. Nutt’s] justification for [his] alleged interference with [Mr. Ditona’s] religious
practices must [] be developed before a determination can be made as to whether [Mr. Nutt]

acted reasonably.” Id. At this early stage of the proceedings, the free exercise claim may
proceed against Mr. Nutt in his individual capacity.
Mr. Ditona fails, however, to state an actionable RLUIPA claim against Mr. Nutt.
Under RLUIPA, “[o]nce a plaintiff proves that a challenged practice substantially burdens
his religious exercise, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the policy is the least

restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.” Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 532 (11th Cir. 2013). But unlike the Free Exercise Clause, RLUIPA
does not permit claims for monetary damages against prison officials sued in their
individual capacities. See Landor v. Louisiana Dep’t of Corr. & Pub. Safety, 146 S. Ct.
1931, 1942 (2026); Robbins v. Robertson, 782 F. App’x 794, 801 n.4 (11th Cir. 2019)

(“[T]he district court correctly concluded that RLUIPA does not create a cause of action
against state officials in their individual capacities . . . .” (citation omitted)). Here, Mr.
Ditona sues Mr. Nutt solely in his individual capacity and seeks $98,000 in damages. (Doc.
8 at 2, 5). Mr. Ditona “may not bring a claim for monetary damages against [Mr. Nutt] in
[his] individual capacit[y].” Hathcock v. Cohen, 287 F. App’x 793, 798 (11th Cir. 2008).

To be sure, Mr. Ditona also requests that “administrative punitive actions [be] taken
against” Mr. Nutt. (Doc. 8 at 5). But “[f]ederal courts do not have the power to order
officials to take certain disciplinary actions against their employees.” McKinnon v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:24-cv-478-MMH-LLL, 2024 WL 5125464, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 16,
2024) (citing LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1543 (11th Cir. 1993)); see also Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977) (“We all understand, of course, that federal

courts have no authority to address state officials out of office or to fire state employees or
to take over the performance of their functions.”), rev’d in part on other grounds by
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). In short, the only cognizable form of relief Mr.
Ditona seeks is monetary damages, but RLUIPA does not permit an individual-capacity
damages claim against a prison official. Because Mr. Ditona cannot proceed under

RLUIPA against Mr. Nutt in his individual capacity, the RLUIPA claim must be dismissed
without prejudice.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
1. The RLUIPA claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. The free exercise claim against Mr. Nutt in his individual capacity may

PROCEED.
3. Within TWENTY-ONE DAYS of the date of this order, Mr. Ditona must
either (1) file a second amended complaint that includes all the claims that
he wishes the Court to consider, or (2) file a notice informing the Court that
he wishes to proceed only on the free exercise claim against Mr. Nutt.
a. If Mr. Ditona chooses to proceed only on the free exercise claim, the
Court will direct service of process on Mr. Nutt by separate order.
b. If Mr. Ditona chooses to amend, he must complete a new civil rights
complaint form, titling it “Second Amended Complaint.” The second
amended complaint must include all of Mr. Ditona’s claims and may not
refer back to, or incorporate, the amended complaint. Any amended
pleading will be subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
4. Failure to timely comply with this order will result in the dismissal of
this action without further notice.
5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail to Mr. Ditona a copy of the standard
prisoner civil rights complaint form.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on August 18, 2026.
won ey
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11424172. Public record. Not legal advice.
