# Bargo

> District Court, N.D. California · June 29, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11424171

## Case

- **Full name:** Julian Bargo, Lamar Prater, and Rebecca Pratt, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated v. Apple, Inc., Apple Payments Inc., Google LLC, and Google Payment Corp.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** June 29, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Not for Publication

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JULIAN BARGO, LAMAR PRATER, and
REBECCA PRATT, on behalf of themselves and
others similarly situated, Civil Action No.: 25-2025 (ES) (LDW)

Plaintiffs, OPINION

v.

APPLE, INC., APPLE PAYMENTS INC.,
GOOGLE LLC, and GOOGLE PAYMENT
CORP.,

Defendants.

SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are two motions to transfer this matter to the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404; one filed by Defendants
Apple, Inc. and Apple Payments Inc. (“Apple”) (D.E. No. 37) and the second filed by Defendants
Google LLC and Google Payment Corp. (collectively “Google”) (D.E. No. 38). The Court has
carefully considered the parties’ submissions, as well as the balance of the record, and decides the
matter without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the following
reasons, the Court GRANTS both motions.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In this putative class action, Plaintiffs allege that they lost money using “patently illegal
gambling software” masquerading as virtual casino applications, or “apps”, available on
Defendants’ respective platforms. (D.E. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1–14). Plaintiffs allege that non-
party “Sweepstakes Casinos” operate apps that “evoke casino enterprises and offer games of
chance that mirror the games typically found in traditional brick-and-mortar casinos, like slot
machines, blackjack, poker, roulette and other forms of lottery wheel.” (Id. ¶ 2). Plaintiffs further
allege that the Sweepstakes Casinos entice people to use those apps “by fraudulently representing
that they provide free games of chance designed purely for fun and entertainment[,]” (id. ¶ 6),
when, in reality, they “are in fact real casinos, where real money can be wagered and lost in

exchange for the chance to win an arbitrary financial award[,]” (id.). More specifically, users can
spend real money to purchase “utility tokens”, which they can then redeem to wager on digital
games of chance, but which have no cash value outside of the app. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8). When purchasing
utility tokens, however, users also receive “a second class of virtual tokens that qualifies [them]
for sweepstakes prizes”. (Id. ¶ 8). Plaintiffs allege that this second type of currency, which they
refer to as “Sweepstakes Coins” or “Sweeps Coins”, “offer[s] users the prospect of an arbitrary
financial windfall—just like a traditional brick-and-mortar casino.” (Id. ¶ 9) (emphasis in
original).
Plaintiffs contend that the Sweepstakes Casinos are, therefore, operating unlawful,

unregulated gambling enterprises, (see, e.g., id. ¶ 26), and that Defendants “assist, promote, and
profit from this illegal scheme” by:
(1) offering users access to the apps designed by the Sweepstakes
Casinos through APPLE's App Store and GOOGLE's Play Store,
thereby helping the Sweepstakes Casinos turn their customer's cell
phones, iPads and tablets into illegal gambling devices and/or slot
machines, as those terms are defined under state law; (2) taking a
substantial percentage of consumer purchases of Game Coins,
Sweeps Coins and other transactions within the apps distributed by
the Sweepstakes Casinos through the App Store or Play Store,
respectively; (3) processing illicit transactions between consumers
and the Sweepstakes Casinos using their proprietary payment
systems . . .; and (4) by using targeted advertising that, inter alia,
employs search algorithms within GOOGLE's Chrome browser and
APPLE's Safari browser to shepherd the most vulnerable customers
to the Sweepstakes Casinos' websites and apps, thereby facilitating
this unlawful gambling enterprise.
(Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiffs Julian Bargo and Lamar Prater allegedly lost money while using Sweepstakes
Casino apps and purchasing virtual currency on Apple’s platform. (Id. ¶¶ 77–85). Plaintiff
Rebecca Pratt allegedly did so via Google’s platform. (Id. ¶¶ 87–90).
Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing their Complaint on March 21, 2025, (see
generally id.), and asserting claims under New Jersey statutory law, New York statutory law, the
common law of both states, and the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
(id. ¶¶ 102–196). On or about May 5, 2025, Defendants filed a motion before the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) seeking to transfer this matter into existing multidistrict
litigation (“MDL”) pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of

California. (D.E. No. 18). The Court stayed proceedings in this matter pending resolution of that
application, (D.E. No. 30), which the JMPL ultimately denied on August 7, 2025, (D.E. No. 34).
By Order dated September 22, 2025, the Hon. Leda D. Wettre, U.S.M.J. set a briefing
schedule for Defendants’ anticipated motions to transfer this matter to the Northern District of
California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (D.E. No. 36). Apple and Google filed their respective
motions on September 29, 2025, (D.E. Nos. 37 & 38), and both applications are fully briefed and
ripe for adjudication. (See D.E. No. 37-1 (“Apple Mov. Br.”), D.E. No. 40 (“Apple Opp. Br.”),
D.E. No. 41 (“Apple Reply Br.”), D.E. No. 38-1 (“Google Mov. Br.”), D.E. No. 39 (“Google Opp.
Br.”) & D.E. No. 42 (“Google Reply Br.”)).

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”
The purpose of Section 1404(a) is to “prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to protect
litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Kremer v.
Lysich, No. 18-03676, 2019 WL 3423434, at *3 (D.N.J. July 30, 2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The moving party bears the burden of establishing that the transfer is appropriate and
must establish that the alternate forum is more convenient than the present forum.” Santi v. Nat’l

Bus. Recs. Mgmt., LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (D.N.J. 2010) (citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, when considering a motion to transfer
pursuant to Section 1404(a), a court must determine: (i) whether the proposed forum is one in
which plaintiff could have originally brought suit (or one to which the parties have consented),
and (ii) whether transfer would be in the interest of justice and for the convenience of parties and
witnesses. Id.
In performing this analysis, courts in the Third Circuit consider all “relevant public and
private interests.” Id. (citing Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879). Those private interests typically include (i)
the plaintiff’s forum preference; (ii) the defendant’s preference; (iii) whether the claim arose

elsewhere; (iv) the convenience of the parties; (v) the convenience of the witnesses; and (vi) the
location of books and records. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (citations omitted). The relevant public
interests include (i) the enforceability of the judgment; (ii) practical considerations that could make
the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; (iii) the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora
from court congestion; (iv) the local interest in deciding controversies at home; (v) the public
policies of the fora; and (vi) the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in
diversity cases. Id. at 879–80 (citations omitted). Courts have broad discretion when resolving a
Section 1404(a) motion to transfer and must consider “convenience and fairness on a case-by-case
basis.” Santi, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 606; Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988).
Moreover, “[i]n deciding a § 1404(a) motion, a court is not limited to the pleadings, and may
consider affidavits and other evidence.” Beaumont v. Vanguard Logistics Servs. (USA), Inc., 615
F. Supp. 3d 253, 259 (D.N.J. 2022) (citation omitted).
When the parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection clause, the Court must alter its §
1404(a) analysis in three significant ways. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist.

of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 62 (2013). “Specifically, district courts (1) must give no weight to the forum
preferred by ‘the party defying the forum-selection clause’; (2) must deem the private interests to
‘weigh entirely in favor of the preselected forum’ because the parties agreed to the preselected
forum and thereby waived the right to challenge it as inconvenient; and (3) must proceed to analyze
only public interests.” In re Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 867 F.3d 390, 402 (3d Cir. 2017)
(quoting Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 571 U.S. at 62–65)). “The Supreme Court explained that, with
these modifications to the typical § 1404(a) analysis, district courts should enforce valid forum-
selection clauses ‘[i]n all but the most unusual cases.’” Id. (quoting Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 571
U.S. at 66). Finally, the Court notes that “[a]lthough the party seeking a § 1404(a) transfer usually

bears the burden of persuasion . . . where there is a valid forum selection clause, the party seeking
to avoid the clause bears the burden of showing that public interest factors ‘overwhelmingly
disfavor a transfer.’” Beaumont, 615 F. Supp. 3d at 260 (quoting Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 571
U.S. at 66)).
III. DISCUSSION
While both Apple and Google seek the same relief, their applications involve different
factual situations and, in turn, legal considerations. Specifically, Google contends that its
relationship with Plaintiff Pratt is governed by a forum selection clause, while Apple does not
make a similar argument with regard to Plaintiffs Bargo or Prater. (Compare Google Mov. Br.,
with Apple Mov. Br.). The Court will, therefore, consider those motions separately.
A. Apple’s Motion to Transfer
i. Plaintiffs Could Have Brought This Case in the Northern District of
California
As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether Apple’s proposed forum—the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California—is one in which the case
“might have been brought” originally, or one “to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C.
§1404(a). The Court finds that it is.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the “might have been brought” language of § 1404(a)
as “permit[ting] transfer to any district where venue is also proper.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 571
U.S. at 59. The federal venue statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] civil action may be

brought in . . . (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Here, Plaintiffs’ claims against Apple are based
on allegations that Apple improperly permitted the Sweepstakes Casinos to make their apps (and
associated sales of digital currency) available on its platform, in exchange for a cut of the proceeds.
(Compl. ¶ 11). Apple representatives have sworn, under penalty of perjury, that all of decision-
making and policy-development relevant to this case occurred in Cupertino, Santa Clara County,
California. (See generally D.E. Nos. 37-2 & 37-3). Santa Clara County falls within the Northern
District of California. Jurisdiction Map, United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, https://cand.uscourts.gov/about-court/jurisdiction-map (last visited June 29, 2026).

Plaintiffs do not challenge Apple’s representations or otherwise contend that venue would have
been inappropriate in the Northern District of California. (See generally Apple Opp. Br.). As the
record reflects that “a substantial part” of the alleged actions underlying Plaintiffs’ claims took
place in that district, the Court finds that venue would have been appropriate there pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
ii. Private Interest Factors
Having determined that Plaintiffs could have filed this suit in the Northern District of
California, the Court must next determine “whether transfer would be in the interest of justice and
for the convenience of the parties and witnesses” after considering the “relevant public and private

interests[.]” Santi, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (citing Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879). As noted above, the
“private” interest factors typically include: (i) the plaintiff’s forum preference; (ii) the defendant’s
preference; (iii) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (iv) the convenience of the parties; (v) the
convenience of the witnesses; and (vi) the location of books and records. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879
(citations omitted).
a. The Parties’ Choice of Fora and Where the Claims Arose
As the first three Jumara private interest factors are somewhat interrelated, the Court
considers them together. Regarding the first factor, Courts typically afford a strong presumption
in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of forum. See, e.g., Windt v. Qwest Comm. Intern., Inc., 529 F.3d
183, 190 (3d Cir. 2008). Within the Third Circuit, “[a] plaintiff's choice of ‘forum is a paramount

consideration in any determination of a transfer request,’ [and] ‘should not be lightly disturbed.’”
Def. Distributed v. Platkin, 617 F. Supp. 3d 213, 233 (D.N.J. 2022) (first quoting Shutte v. Armco
Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970); then quoting Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879). “The choice
of forum is ‘entitled to greater deference’ when a plaintiff chooses his home forum.” Hoffer v.
InfoSpace.com, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 556, 573 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Lawrence v. Xerox Corp.,
56 F. Supp. 2d 442, 452 (D.N.J. 1999)).
“However, the plaintiff's choice ‘is not necessarily decisive,’ particularly where ‘the central
facts of the lawsuit did not occur’ in the plaintiff's chosen forum.” Def. Distributed, 617 Supp. 3d
at 233 (quoting Interlink Prods. Int'l, Inc. v. Crowfoot, No. 20-10566, 2020 WL 6707946, at *7
(D.N.J. Nov. 16, 2020)). Indeed, courts afford a plaintiff's choice substantially less weight when
the central facts of the lawsuit occurred outside of the forum state. Kremer v. Lysich, No. 18-
03676 , 2019 WL 3423434, at *4 (D.N.J. July 30, 2019); Nat'l Prop. Investors VIII v. Shell Oil
Co., 917 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding that a plaintiff's choice of venue is not
“decisive,” and that the choice is accorded less deference “when the central facts of a lawsuit occur

outside of the chosen forum”). “In such circumstances, the defendant's choice may be accorded
greater deference.” Humana Inc. v. Merck & Co., No. 23-23023, 2026 WL 96942, at *9 (D.N.J.
Jan. 14, 2026) (citing Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am., LLC, No. 2015 WL 1469745, 2015
WL 1469745, at *6 (D.N.J. 2015)).
Moreover, a plaintiff’s choice of forum “becomes substantially less important . . . when he
sues representatively on behalf of a class.” Job Haines Home for the Aged v. Young, 936 F. Supp.
223, 228 (D.N.J. 1996) (collecting cases) (quotations omitted); Gallagher v. Ocular Therapeutix,
Inc., No. 17-5011, 2017 WL 4882487, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2017) (collecting cases in this District
that have afforded less deference to plaintiffs’ choice of forum in securities fraud class actions).

“[I]n such actions the participation of the class representative is generally minimal” and “the
potential members of the class will likely be scattered across the United States.” Santomenno v.
Transamerica Life Ins. Co., No. 11-0736, 2012 WL 1113615, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012)
(quotations and citations omitted).
The third private interest factor—where the claims arose—is “most critical to the Court’s
analysis[,]” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank One, N.A., No. 03-1882, 2012 WL 4464026, at *6 (D.N.J.
Sept. 25, 2012), given its potential impact on the first and second factors. Indeed, “[a]s a general
rule, the preferred forum is that which is the center of gravity of the accused activity.” NCR Credit
Corp. v. Ye Seekers Horizon, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 317, 321 (D.N.J. 1998). “The inquiry turns on
‘which forum contains the center of gravity of the dispute, its events, and transactions.’” Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 2012 WL 4464026, at *6 (quoting Park Inn Int’l, L.L.C. v. Mody Enterprises, 105 F.
Supp. 2d 370, 377–78 (D.N.J. 2000)); accord Halpern v. Centroid Sys., Inc., No. 24-07037, 2024
WL 4533370, at *10 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2024).
Mindful of these legal principles, the Court makes the following findings. First, the Court

finds that Cupertino, California, which is in the Northern District of California, is the “center of
gravity of the dispute” regarding Plaintiffs’ claims against Apple. Those claims focus on Apple
allegedly assisting and promoting an illicit gambling scheme by making Sweepstakes Casino apps
available on its platform and processing (and taking a cut from) sales of digital currency in those
apps. (Compl. ¶ 11). Apple representatives have submitted declarations, made under penalty of
perjury, representing that both its “App Store” and payment platform are managed in Cupertino.
(See generally D.E. Nos. 37-2 and 37-3). For instance, Apple’s “Senior Manager, Policy &
Escalations”, who manages teams responsible for “the enforcement of policies applicable to the
review of [apps], compliance with Apple’s App Store guidelines, and communications with third-

party app developers[,]” (D.E. No. 37-2 at ¶ 2), represents that:
Apple’s App Store for the United States is managed at Apple’s
headquarters in Cupertino, Santa Clara County, California. As a
result, the primary decision-making regarding the review of apps for
the United States and related processes, the development of relevant
policies, and marketing for the App Store occur in Cupertino,
California.
(Id. ¶ 4). With regard to the sales-related aspects of Plaintiffs’ claims, Apple’s “Senior Director,
Business Operations”, represents that the Apple Pay business is likewise managed in Cupertino
and that, as a result, “the primary decision-making regarding the Apple Pay payment processing
business and development of relevant policies occurs” there. (D.E. No. 37-3 ¶¶ 2, 5). Those Apple
representatives further indicated that none of its relevant decision-makers or records are located in
New Jersey. (D.E. No. 37-2 ¶ 5 & D.E. No. 37-3 ¶ 7).
Plaintiffs do not challenge Apple’s representations, and address the critical third Jumara
factor only in passing: “Finally, the Apple Defendants’ bald assertion that ‘a substantial part of
the events that gave rise to Plaintiffs’ claims against Apple occurred in the Northern District of
California,’ is simply not true. As Plaintiffs have alleged, the misconduct of all the Defendants

(Apple and Google) has occurred throughout the country.” (Apple Opp. Br. at 6). Plaintiffs
support that statement with a citation to Paragraphs 2 through 5 of their Complaint, which discuss
the Sweepstakes Casino apps, generally, and allege that such apps are available on Apple’s
platform. (Compl. ¶¶ 2–5). Plaintiffs do not, however, counter Apple’s argument that the
allegedly wrongful acts (e.g., approval and policing of the Sweepstakes Casino apps, policies
regarding payments) underlying their claims took place in California. Therefore, the only evidence
in the motion record points to the Northern District of California being the locus of Plaintiffs’
claims. Indeed, this case’s only connection to New Jersey appears to be that Plaintiff Julian Bargo
resides here. This Court has previously found, however, that “the location of the alleged injury is

not considered when determining the ‘center of gravity’ or where the claim arose in matters where
no physical injury has occurred.” Santomenno, 2012 WL 1113615, at *5. The third Jumara factor
thus weighs in favor of transfer.
Turning to the first private interest factor, Plaintiffs have elected to litigate in New Jersey,
the home fora of Plaintiff Bargo. (Compl. ¶ 12). While this factor therefore weighs in favor of
transfer, that weight is slight, because (i) Plaintiffs’ claims against Apple are centered in the
Northern District of California; Kremer v. Lysich, 2019 WL 3423434, at *4; and (ii) Plaintiffs
bring their claims on behalf of a putative nationwide class of individuals (as well as on behalf of
New Jersey and New York-specific subclasses). See, e.g., Job Haines Home for the Aged, 936 F.
Supp. at 228.
The second private interest factor, which examines Apple’s forum preference, weighs in
favor of transfer. The Court finds that this weight is somewhat increased here, given that Apple
seeks transfer to Northern District of California, where the “central facts” underlying Plaintiffs’
claims arose. Humana Inc., 2026 WL 96942, at *9.

b. The Parties’ Convenience
When examining the fourth private interest factor, which examines the convenience of the
parties themselves, the Court evaluates “their relative physical and financial condition.” Jumara,
55 F.3d at 879. While the parties do not address this factor in their briefing, (see generally Apple
Mov. Br., Apple Opp. Br. & Apple Reply Br.), the Court will assume that Apple has more financial
means than the individual plaintiffs. Nothing in the record suggests, however, that Plaintiffs’
financial condition would play any role in this putative class action. This factor, therefore, weighs
against transfer, if only slightly.
c. The Convenience of Witnesses

The fifth private interest factor requires the Court to consider the convenience of potential
witnesses. The Third Circuit has stated, however, that witnesses’ convenience should be
considered “only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the
fora.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Here, nothing in the record suggests that potential witnesses would
be completely unavailable to testify in either the District of New Jersey or the Northern District of
California. (see generally Apple Mov. Br., Apple Opp. Br. & Apple Reply Br.); see also Franklin
U.S. Rising Dividends Fund v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., No. 2:13-05805, 2014 WL 1555133, at 82
(D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2014), aff'd, No.13-5805, 2014 WL 3748214 (D.N.J. July 29, 2014) (finding the
witnesses’ convenience neutral because “neither party was able to offer evidence suggesting that
any witness would be unavailable for trial in either forum as opposed to merely being
inconvenienced by the distance”). This factor is therefore neutral to the Court’s analysis.
d. The Availability of Books and Records
The sixth and final Jumara private interest factor involves consideration of the “location
of books and records.” As with the previous factor, however, this one only carries weight if the

documents could not be made available in one of the fora. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Neither party
suggests that this might be the case, (see generally Apple Mov. Br., Apple Opp. Br. & Apple Reply
Br.), so this factor is also neutral to the Court’s analysis.
e. Balancing the Private Interests
The Court finds that, on balance, the private interest factors weigh in favor of transferring
this action to the Northern District of California, the center of gravity for this dispute. Plaintiffs’
choice of forum for this putative class action is entitled to little deference and is, at best, negated
by Apple’s own forum preference. Although most of the remaining factors are neutral (though the
“convenience of the parties” factor weighs slightly against transfer) the conduct underlying

Plaintiffs’ claims clearly points to the Northern District of California—not New Jersey. See Frato
v. Swing Staging, Inc., No. 10-5198, 2011 WL 3625064, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2011).
iii. Public Interest Factors
The Court must next consider the relevant public interest factors, which include (i) the
enforceability of the judgment; (ii) practical considerations that could make the trial easy,
expeditious, or inexpensive; (iii) the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora from court
congestion; (iv) the local interest in deciding controversies at home; (v) the public policies of the
fora; and (vi) the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases.
Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879–80 (citations omitted). The Court will evaluate each in turn.
a. Enforceability of a Judgment
The Court finds that the first public interest factor is neutral, as Plaintiffs would be able to
register a judgment obtained in either forum in the other jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963.
That statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] judgment so registered shall have the same effect
as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like

manner.”
b. Practical Considerations for Trial
Turning to the second public interest factor, the Court notes that “[p]ractical considerations
are relevant and warrant transfer if they could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive.”
Metro, 2012 WL 4464026, at *7. For the reasons discussed above as to the private interest factors,
the Court finds that the locations of the parties, witnesses, books, and records are largely neutral
to the analysis. However, practical considerations tip slightly in favor of transfer because Apple’s
choice of forum “bear[s] the most substantial connection to the events surrounding this case, [and]
the District of New Jersey has invested few of its resources to this action,” which remains in its

infancy. See Frato, 2011 WL 3625064, at *7. Indeed, there have been no court conferences in
this case, and there have been no judicial decisions issued in this matter. Furthermore, as it relates
to this Court’s congestion, discussed below, expediency favors transfer.
c. Relative Fora Congestion
The third public interest factor, which requires the Court to examine “the relative
administrative difficulty in the two fora from court congestion[,]” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879, weighs
in favor of transfer. According to the most current available data, the District of New Jersey had
93,986 pending cases as of December 31, 2025, whereas the Northern District of California had
16,345. United States Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics, December 2025, U.S. District
Courts—Combined Civil and Criminal, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
document/fcms_na_distprofile1231.2025.pdf (last accessed June 29, 2026). The same data
indicates that New Jersey has a significantly higher caseload per-judge, and a median time “from
filing to trial” in civil cases of 56.9 months, compared to an average of 38.9 in the Northern District
of California. Id.

Plaintiffs suggest that, because the JPML has rejected Defendants’ motion to transfer this
case into an existing MDL in the Northern District of California, the “administrative difficulty”
factor disfavors transfer. (Apple Opp. Br. at 8). That argument is a red herring. The JPML found
that it would be inappropriate to add this matter to the pending MDL, as it involved unique
allegations (i.e., concerning the issuance of “virtual coins that can be redeemed for prizes with
cash value”) and would, therefore, involve “a significant and unwarranted expansion of the
MDLs.” (D.E. No. 34 at 2). The JPML did not evaluate a potential transfer to the Northern District
of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404. (See generally id.). For the same reason, the Court
gives little weight to Apple’s contention that the Northern District of California’s experience in

the related MDL would make a meaningful difference in promoting judicial efficiency. (Apple
Reply Br. at 9). To the extent that district has some general familiarity with casino apps and
Defendants’ respective platforms, that experience would likely provide only a modest benefit
considering the unique facts and claims at issue in this case.
d. Local Interest in Deciding Controversies at Home
“The public interest factor of the local interest in deciding local issues is intertwined with
the private interest factor of where the claim arose.” LG Elecs., Inc. v. First Intern. Computer,
Inc., 138 F. Supp. 2d 574, 592 (D.N.J. 2001). This is so “because local judges and juries are
preferred arbiters of events in their jurisdiction and community.” Id.
For the reasons discussed above with respect to the California-based conduct underlying
Plaintiffs’ claims against Apple, the Court finds that California has a stronger local interest in
adjudicating this action. See Franklin, 2014 WL 1555133, at *8; Metro, 2012 WL 4464026, at *8
(“New York has a compelling interest in adjudicating this controversy and regulating . . . the
activities of corporate officers working for corporations which conduct business in that state.”);

HAB Carriers, Inc. v. Arrow Truck Sales, Inc., No. 07-4390, 2009 WL 2589108, at *4 (D.N.J.
Aug. 21, 2009) (“A state has a compelling interest in regulating its businesses or in litigating
matters that arise from action occurring within its jurisdiction.”).
The Court notes that, in connection with the “local interest” point, Plaintiffs argue that
transfer would ignore the interests of the New Jersey Subclass and Plaintiff Bargo (a New Jersey
resident) in having this litigation resolved in New Jersey. (Apple Opp. Br. at 8). That concern is
not a “public” interest, however. The Court has already addressed Plaintiffs’ forum preference
herein in connection with the first “private” interest factor.
e. Public Policies of the Fora

The Court next considers whether transfer would further the relevant public policies of the
potential fora. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879–80. The parties have identified three potential policies for
the Court’s evaluation. First, noting that this action arose in California, Apple argues that courts
have recognized that New Jersey policy favors the conservation of judicial resources, such that the
system (and especially jurors) are not burdened by litigation “‘concerning decisions and/or conduct
which occurred almost exclusively outside the State.’” (Appl Mov. Br. at 22 (quoting In re Exxon
Mobil Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 2:19-16380, 2020 WL 5525537, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2020)).
Considering, however, that Plaintiffs seek to represent a subclass of New Jersey residents allegedly
harmed by Defendants’ activities, and assert claims under New Jersey statutory law, the Court
finds that the case is not so untethered to New Jersey that subjecting its citizens to jury service
would run afoul of public policy.
Second, Plaintiff argues that “New Jersey has adopted a comprehensive gambling
regulatory scheme directly relevant to the misconduct here”, (Apple Opp. Br. at 9), and contends
that transferring this matter to California would “encourage further disregard for the State’s casino

gaming regulations and will allow these Defendants to evade accountability under the gaming
recovery statute with little more than clever litigation tactics.” (Id.). This point is intertwined with
Plaintiffs’ other policy argument: that because the judge presiding over the related MDL in the
Northern District of California recently rejected similar claims under state gambling recovery
statutes, a transfer “would thus guarantee that the New Jersey Subclass loses any chance of
recovery under N.J.S.A. § 2A:40-6” and undermine New Jersey’s interest in regulating “its gaming
industry and prohibit[ing] unlawful gambling.” (Id. at 10). Essentially, Plaintiffs suggest that
because the Northern District of California is likely to rule against them on Count One of the
Complaint, the Court should deny transfer to protect New Jersey’s policy interests. That argument

presumes that New Jersey courts have interpreted N.J.S.A. § 2A:40-6 differently than the Northern
District of California. Plaintiffs have not cited anything suggesting that to be the case.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that New Jersey’s gambling recovery statute “serves as a qui tam
statute in which recovery of gambling losses are shared with the State[,]” and that “[t]ransfer to
California would undermine New Jersey’s sovereign interest in obtaining relief from these
Defendants for gambling losses incurred by its residents because California does not have a
comparable recovery statute.” Plaintiffs do not explain why the differences between California
and New Jersey law matters. Transfer would not transform Plaintiffs’ claims under New Jersey
statutory law into claims under California common law. Any causes of action would remain the
same post-transfer.
As the parties have not identified any compelling public policies linked to either forum,
the Court finds this factor to be neutral to its analysis.
f. Familiarity With Applicable State Law
The final public interest factor requires the Court to consider the familiarity of the trial

judge with the applicable state law. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879–80. Here, Plaintiffs have asserted
claims arising under New Jersey, New York, and federal law. (See generally Compl.). As an
initial matter, this Court is confident that any district judge presiding over this case would ably and
correctly interpret and apply the relevant law, regardless of its source. Moreover, it bears noting
that the parties’ briefing indicates that the Northern District of California has already interpreted
one of the New Jersey statutes at issue in this case. (Apple Opp. Br. at 10). The Court will
nevertheless assume that a New Jersey-based court would be better suited to apply New Jersey
law. This factor therefore weighs somewhat against transfer.
g. Balancing the Public Interests

The Court finds that the public interest factors tip slightly in favor of transfer. Two factors
(enforceability of a judgment, public policy interests) are neutral, three support transfer to some
extent (practical considerations, local interest, relative congestion), and the last (familiarity with
relevant state law), favors keeping the case in New Jersey.
iv. Transfer is Appropriate Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
Having carefully considered and weighed the relevant private and public interest factors,
the Court finds that it would be appropriate to transfer this matter to the Northern District of
California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court will, therefore, GRANT Apple’s motion.
B. Google’s Motion to Transfer
i. Plaintiff Rebecca Pratt Entered Into a Valid Forum Selection Clause
Of the three named Plaintiffs, only Plaintiff Rebecca Pratt alleges that she accessed a
Sweepstakes Casino app using Google’s platform. (Compl. ¶ 88). Specifically, Plaintiff Pratt:
downloaded the Chumba Casino app to her Android phone from
GOOGLE's Play Store. Plaintiff purchased Gold Coins from Chumba
Casino using Google Pay (owned and operated by Defendant
GOOGLE PAYMENT CORP.) which she then wagered on her
Android-based phone for the chance to earn Sweeps Coins, which
were represented to her and others as redeemable for value.
(Id.). The motion record reflects that “before a user can download any application via Google Play
(whether paid or free), the user will have necessarily agreed to the Play Term. It is impossible to
download an application without having indicated agreement to the Play Terms.” (D.E. No. 38-2
(“Mills Decl.”) ¶ 6). Similarly, “when a user first creates a Google Pay account, which is when
they typically add a payment method such as a credit card to pay using Google Pay, the user must
indicate that she agrees to be bound by the Pay Terms.” (Id. ¶ 7). Thus, “the user must have
already agreed to the Pay Terms prior to making a purchase.” (Id.). A Google representative
stated, under penalty of perjury, that the aforementioned process “was in place between June 2024
and August 2024 when Ms. Pratt alleges she downloaded and made purchases in the Chumba
Casino app, meaning it would have been impossible for Ms. Pratt to take these actions without
agreeing to the Google Terms.” (Id. ¶ 9).
Both the “Play Terms” and the “Pay Terms” in place during the relevant period specified
the use of Google Play/Google Pay was subject to the “Google Terms of Service” (the “Google
TOS”), which were accessible via an embedded hyperlink. (Id. ¶¶ 10—13). The Google TOS in
effect during the relevant period, (id. ¶ 14), featured a section labeled “Settling disputes, governing
law, and courts”, which provided, in relevant part:
California law will govern all disputes arising out of or relating to
these terms, service-specific additional terms, or any related
services, regardless of conflict of laws rules. These disputes will be
resolved exclusively in the federal or state courts of Santa Clara
County, California, USA, and you and Google consent to personal
jurisdiction in those courts.
(D.E. No. 38-2 at 51 (ECF Pagination)).
Plaintiff Pratt does not take issue with Google’s representations regarding the presentation
(i.e., as a condition of use for the Google Play and Google Pay platforms, respectively) or content
of the Play Terms, Pay Terms, or Google TOS. (See generally Google Opp. Br.). While she does
not expressly recall seeing a forum selection clause, she makes no other representations concerning
these agreements (e.g., their content, whether she rejected them, etc.). (Id.). Rather, Plaintiff
argues that any forum selection clause included in those agreements is unenforceable, as it is
overreaching, unconscionable and void under both New Jersey statutory law and public policy.
(Google Opp. Br. at 5–12). Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations in the Complaint (i.e., that Plaintiff Pratt
utilized both the Google Play Store and the Google Pay services), together with the parties’
respective representations in the motion record (i.e., that it would have been impossible for her to
do so without first accepting the aforementioned terms and conditions / Plaintiff herself does not
appear to recall whether she did so), permits only one conclusion: Plaintiff accepted Google’s
proposed terms and conditions before taking the actions alleged in the Complaint. Moreover, those
terms and conditions contained a forum selection clause requiring that disputes arising out of
Plaintiff’s use of the Google Play and Google Pay services “be resolved exclusively in the federal
or state courts of Santa Clara County, California, USA.” (D.E. No. 38-2 at 51 (ECF Pagination)).
Thus, the Court must determine whether that forum selection clause is valid and enforceable.
“‘[F]orum-selection clauses are presumptively valid’ in the Third Circuit.” Peck v. Jayco,
Inc., 665 F. Supp. 3d 607, 613 (D.N.J. 2023) (quoting Cadapult Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Tektronix,
Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 560, 564 (D.N.J. 2000)). “A party may challenge a forum-selection clause's
presumptive validity by ‘making a strong showing that the clause is unreasonable.’” Id. (citing
Cadapult Graphic Sys., 98 F. Supp. 2d at 564) (citation modified). To show unreasonableness,
the party resisting a forum selection clause must establish:
(1) that it is the result of fraud or overreaching, (2) that enforcement
would violate a strong public policy of the forum, or (3) that
enforcement would in the particular circumstances of the case result
in litigation in a jurisdiction so seriously inconvenient as to be
unreasonable.
(Id.). Plaintiffs have not met this burden. The Court will consider their various arguments in turn.
First, Plaintiffs contend that “the forum selection clause at issue is rendered unenforceable
by the plan language of New Jersey’s gambling recovery statute, specifically N.J.S.A. § 2A:40-
3.” (Google Opp. Br. at 5). Plaintiffs also contend that enforcement of the forum selection clause
would contravene[] New Jersey’s strong public policy interest in regulating its legal gaming
industry and prohibiting illicit gambling—the very conduct at the heart of this lawsuit.” (Id. at 10;
see also id. at 10–12). Here, however, the only representative plaintiff who has asserted claims
against Google is Plaintiff Pratt, a New York resident. Plaintiffs do not indicate how she might
have standing to bring claims under New Jersey’s gambling recovery statute, or any other New
Jersey law. Thus, Plaintiffs have not currently asserted any New Jersey-based claims against
Google. See, e.g., Gelis v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, No. 17-07386, 2018
WL 6804506, at *11 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2018) (“Without a class representative, the putative class
cannot be certified and its claims cannot survive.”) (quoting Great Rivers Co-op. of Se. Iowa v.
Farmland Indus., Inc., 120 F.3d 893, 899 (8th Cir. 1997)). Similarly, Plaintiffs have not
established how enforcing a forum selection clause against a New York resident (and involving
claims wholly untethered to New Jersey) might implicate New Jersey’s public policy. See, e.g.,
Hoffer v. InfoSpace.com, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (D.N.J. 2000) (rejecting public policy
arguments against enforcing a forum selection clause, despite the plaintiff’s status as a New Jersey
resident, where the relevant facts happened outside of the state). The Court, therefore, rejects both
arguments.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the forum selection clause is “unconscionable in that it
constitutes a contract of adhesion between parties of vastly disparate bargaining power while

providing no meaningful opportunity for users of Google’s Android operating system (and its
features) to decline.” (Google Opp. Br. at 5). As this Court has previously recognized, however,
“‘[f]orum selection clauses are routinely upheld, even in situations involving adhesion contracts,
unequal bargaining power, and the absence of negotiations over the clause.’” OKLegal.com v.
Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 25-2346, 2026 WL 850812, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2026) (quoting
Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. v. Steves, No. 15-3544, 2015 WL 7737344, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 1,
2015)). Indeed, none of the cases Plaintiffs cite involved a situation where, as here, a plaintiff
expressly indicated his or her assent to be bound by certain terms.1 See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble
Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2014) (“where a website makes its terms of use available

via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users
nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the
hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise to
constructive notice.”); Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002) (“We
conclude that . . . where consumers are urged to download free software at the immediate click of
a button, a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged screen is not sufficient to

1 Plaintiffs’ counsel argues that the Google Pay terms “merely allude to the general “Google Terms” without
ever asking the user to manifest assent. (Google Opp. Br. at 6). The record reflects, however, that “when a user first
creates a Google Pay account . . . the user must indicate that she agrees to be bound by the Pay Terms.” (Mills Decl.
¶ 7). Moreover, “the user must have already agreed to the Pay Terms prior to making a purchase.” (Id.).
place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those terms.”); Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc.,
668 F. Supp. 2d 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to enforce
arbitration and forum selection provisions in the context of a website-based purchase, where the
customer would not encounter those provisions unless she happened to scroll to a part of the
website unnecessary to the transaction); Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d

770, 792–93 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (declining to enforce terms and conditions in the context of a website-
based purchase where users would not see those terms unless they happened to click a link labeled
“Customer Service” and then either scrolled “down a lengthy page containing unrelated
information to find the Conditions of Use” or found a “Conditions of Use” link “sandwiched”
between two others); Black v. Kerzner Int'l Holdings, Ltd., No. 12-60301, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
191666, at **6-7 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2012) (declining to enforce a forum selection clause
communicated by email where the plaintiff’s only means of rejection–cancelling a planned trip–
would have resulted in financial penalties). Rather, those cases—all of which come from outside
the Third Circuit—concern whether a user has received sufficient notice of terms and conditions
in a “browsewrap” context.2 None provides the Court with any basis to invalidate the forum

selection clause at issue here.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue, in general and without citation, that the forum selection clause is
invalidly overbroad, “comprehensively sucking in any and all claims that bear any conceivable
relation to [Google’s] services.” (Google Opp. Br. at 5). Plaintiffs’ failure to provide any case
law invalidating a forum selection clause in similar circumstances is significant, considering the

2 “In browsewrap agreements, a company's terms and conditions are generally posted on a website via
hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.” James v. Glob. TelLink Corp., 852 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2017). The idea is
that a user assents to those terms simply by using the website. Lloyd v. Retail Equation, Inc., No. 21-17057, 2022 WL
18024204, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2022). “Unlike online agreements where users must click on an acceptance after
being presented with terms and conditions (known as ‘clickwrap’ agreements), browsewrap agreements do not require
users to expressly manifest assent.” James, 852 F.3d at 267.
presumptive validity of such clauses in the Third Circuit, Peck, 665 F. Supp. 3d at 613, coupled
with the fact that the activities underlying Plaintiffs’ claims—Google’s provision of certain apps
and payment services for those apps—(Compl. ¶ 11), appear to be primary features of the Google
Play and Google Pay services, respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 17–18).
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not made a “‘strong showing’”

that the forum selection clause at issue here is unreasonable. Peck, 665 F. Supp. 3d at 613 (quoting
Cadapult Graphic Sys., 98 F. Supp. 2d at 564).3 In turn, the Court finds that the clause is valid
and enforceable against Plaintiff Pratt.
C. Transfer is Appropriate Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
Having found that Google and Plaintiff Pratt entered into an agreement with a valid forum
selection clause, the Court next considers whether transfer is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a). The Court concludes that transfer is warranted under Atlantic Marine and its progeny.
As previously discussed, when a valid forum selection clause exists, a district court must treat the
private interest factors as weighing in favor of the preselected forum and proceed to analyze only

the public interest factors. In re Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 867 F.3d at 402. Moreover, as noted
herein, the Court must transfer this action in accordance with the parties’ forum selection clause
unless Plaintiffs establish that those “public interest factors ‘overwhelmingly disfavor a transfer.’”
Beaumont, 615 F. Supp. 3d at 260 (quoting Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 571 U.S. at 66)). Plaintiffs
have not done so.
Here, Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning the relevant “public interest factors” are essentially
identical to those they made in connection with Apple’s motion to transfer. (Compare Apple Opp.
Br. at 7–12 with Google Opp. Br. at 12–16). The Court addressed those points above, and found

3 Plaintiffs do not suggest that litigation in California would be “so seriously inconvenient as to be
unreasonable.” Peck, 665 F. Supp. 3d at 613.
that, on balance, the public interest factors weigh somewhat in favor of transfer. (See infra Section
II(A)(iii)(g)). The Court must, therefore, GRANT Google’s motion to transfer. Beaumont, 615
F. Supp. 3d at 260.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant both motions to transfer, and will thus transfer

this matter, in its entirety, to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
An appropriate Order follows this Opinion.

s/ Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.
Date: June 29, 2026

Cc: Hon. Leda D. Wettre, U.S.M.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11424171. Public record. Not legal advice.