# Opinion

> District Court, W.D. Texas · July 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11424029

## Case

- **Full name:** Rockstim Consulting, LLC v. Workrise Technologies, LLC, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Texas
- **Decided:** July 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION

Rockstim Consulting, LLC, §
Plaintiff §
§
v. § No. 1:25-CV-01844-RP
§
Workrise Technologies, LLC, et al.,
§
Defendants

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

TO: THE HONORABLE ROBERT PITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are Defendant SM Energy Company and Nathan Moore’s Amended Motion
to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6), filed January 30, 2026 (Dkt. 31); Plaintiff’s Response to
Defendants’ SM Energy Company and Nathan Moore’s Amended Motion to Dismiss, filed
February 13, 2026 (Dkt. 34); and SM Energy Company and Nathan Moore’s Reply in Support of
Their Amended Motion to Dismiss, filed February 20, 2026 (Dkt. 58).1
I. Background
Plaintiff Rockstim Consulting, LLC, a Texas-based oil and gas engineering consulting and
staffing company, brings this breach of contract and tort action against Defendants SM Energy
Company; Workrise Technologies, LLC; Rusco Operating, LLC; SDS Petroleum Consultants,
LLC; Precision Petroleum Solutions, LLC; SM employee Nathan Moore; Workrise employee
James David Rappattnoi; and SDS employee Geno Hill.

1 By Text Order issued April 28, 2026, the Honorable Robert Pitman referred the motion to this Magistrate
Judge for a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72, and Rule 1(d) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas.
A. Rockstim’s Allegations
Rockstim offers skilled engineering consulting and quality control services to clients in the oil
and gas industry in Texas. First Amended Complaint, Dkt. 26 ¶ 14. SM is an oil and gas exploration
company that operates in Texas. Id. ¶ 15. SDS, Workrise, and PPS also are skilled engineering and
consulting firms that operate in Texas and are competitors of Rockstim. Id. Rusco appears to be

an affiliate of Workrise. Id. ¶ 3.
On December 23, 2016, Rockstim entered into a Master Work Agreement with SM in which
Rockstim agreed to provide “services to SM through Plaintiff’s employees and contractors” to
perform oil and gas work for SM in Texas in exchange for monthly payments. Id. ¶ 14. The Terms
of Payment provision required SM to pay properly submitted invoices for work performed within
thirty days of receipt provided all work was performed, “SM Energy has been furnished all data
that may have been requested by it relating to the Work,” and all conditions precedent have been
fulfilled. Dkt. 31-1 at 4.
Rockstim and SM worked amicably together for several years. But in August 2023, SM began
to conspire with Rockstim’s competitors Workrise and SDS by putting Rappattoni and Hill “in

charge of approving their competitor-Plaintiff’s invoices” and directed Rockstim to hand over its
scheduling duties to them. Dkt. 26 ¶¶ 16-17. Rockstim alleges that immediately after Workrise and
SDS were placed in charge of approving invoices, “SM stopped timely paying Plaintiff’s invoices,
in breach of the Master Work Agreement and SM protocols.” Id. ¶ 16. Rockstim also alleges that
“vesting authority over scheduling and invoicing with Rockstim’s competitors” violated the
Master Work Agreement. Id.
Rockstim also alleges that SM conspired with its competitors to poach all Rockstim’s
employees and contractors, causing “a complete collapse of Plaintiff’s business,” that Defendants
misappropriated its proprietary information. Id. ¶¶ 28, 35. SM stopped using Rockstim as a
consulting firm in December 2023. Id. ¶ 23.
B. Litigation
In its First Amended Complaint, Rockstim asserts the following claims: (1) federal and Texas
state antitrust violations against SDS, Workrise, Hill, and Rappatttoni; (2) federal and state

misappropriation of trade secrets claims against all Defendants; (3) breach of contract against only
SM; (4) tortious interference with contractual relations against all Defendants; (5) tortious
interference with prospective business relationships against all Defendants; (6) fraud;
(7) negligence/negligent misrepresentation against all Defendants; (8) money had and received
against SDS, Workrise, and PPS; (9) civil conspiracy; and (10) vicarious liability. Rockstim
invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28
U.S.C. § 1337(a) (commerce and antitrust actions), and 18 U.S.C. § 1836(c) (misappropriation of
trade secrets). Rockstim asserts that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over its state claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because they are related to the federal claims.
SM and Moore move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Rockstim fails to state any

plausible claim for relief against them.
II. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
court accepts “all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted). A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter “to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up).
“In determining whether a plaintiff’s claims survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
factual information to which the court addresses its inquiry is limited to the (1) the facts set forth
in the complaint, (2) documents attached to the complaint, and (3) matters of which judicial notice
may be taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938
F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019). When a defendant attaches documents to its motion that are referred
to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claims, the court also may consider those
documents. Id.
III. Defend Trade Secrets Act Claim
Rockstim asserts that SM (and all other) Defendants misappropriated its trade secrets in
violation of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1836. The DTSA provides that
an “owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a civil action” in federal court “if the
trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b). To state a plausible claim under DTSA, the plaintiff must allege:
(1) the existence of a trade secret; (2) that the trade secret was misappropriated; (3) that the
misappropriated trade secret was used without authorization; and (4) “that the trade secret related
to a ‘product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.’” El Paso
Disposal, LP v. Ecube Labs Co., 766 F. Supp. 3d 692, 711 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1836(b)(1)). A plaintiff also must show that it took “reasonable measures” to keep the
information secret. Id.
Rockstim alleges that it compiled a proprietary electronic workbook (“Proprietary Workbook”)
for each job it worked on that
contained hundreds, if not thousands, of calculations that allow the
user to properly perform quality control, monitor jobs, and obtain a
holistic picture of treatments (fracturing treatments, fracking,
pumping high pressure and high rate water, sand and chemical
combinations into a well) in order to determine the best approaches
going forward.
Dkt. 26 ¶ 35. Rockstim alleges that it kept the proprietary information confidential and did not
share it with competitors or customers, including SM. Id. ¶ 45. Rockstim alleges: “After
Defendants conspired to destroy Rockstim and misappropriate its staff, Defendants used the
Proprietary Workbook to continue the projects that had been previously performed by Rockstim
and its staff.” Id. ¶ 46. Specific to SM, Rockstim alleges that “SM, under the direction of Regina
Choate, ordered Felix Cantu, formerly of Rockstim, to misappropriate the Proprietary Workbook
on the job after leaving Rockstim. Mr. Cantu subsequently went to work for SDS, performing the
same work for SM that he had previously performed through Rockstim.” Id. Rockstim also alleges
that all Defendants “have misappropriated Rockstim’s trade secrets by engaging in unauthorized
use of its trade secrets to provide Defendants with an unfair advantage and to improperly compete
with Rockstim.” Id. ¶ 47.
Rockstim does not allege that Moore had any involvement in the alleged misappropriation of
trade secrets. Thus, fails to state a plausible claim for relief under the DTSA against Moore. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”).
Rockstim’s claim against SM also fails it does not sufficient plead the element of interstate
commerce. Again, an owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a DTSA suit “if
the trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1). The DTSA “is limited to activity that is actually in, as
opposed to activity that merely affects, interstate commerce.” Providence Title Co. v. Truly Title,

Inc., 547 F. Supp. 3d 585, 597 (E.D. Tex. 2021), aff’d, 2023 WL 316138 (5th Cir. Jan. 19, 2023).
Accordingly, to state a claim under the DTSA, a plaintiff must allege that its purported trade secrets
relate to a product or service within the flow of interstate commerce. Id.
[T]he DTSA does not require that the alleged trade secrets
themselves be used in interstate commerce. Rather, the DTSA
requires that the trade secrets relate to a product or service that is
used in interstate commerce. It is the underlying product or
service—not the trade secret—that must be used in or intended for
use in interstate commerce in order to assert a claim under the
DTSA.
Id.
But Rockstim does not allege that its trade secrets relate to a product or service that was used
in interstate commerce; it does not allege that it ever provided its consulting or engineering services
to customers outside of Texas. Instead, Rockstim alleges that it performed all jobs and services in
this case in Texas and used its proprietary information on jobs in Texas. Dkt. 26 ¶¶ 14, 35-36.
Rockstim also alleges that Defendants misappropriated its trade secrets on jobs in Texas and used
those trade secrets “to seamlessly continue the exact same work that Rockstim had been
undertaking.” Id. ¶ 46. It does not allege that Defendants ever used its trade secrets on services
provided outside of Texas.
Based on these allegations and the failure to plead that the trade secrets were used in a product
or service in interstate commerce, Rockstim does not plead the interstate commerce element of its
DTSA claim. El Paso Disposal, 766 F. Supp. 3d at 716 (dismissing DTSA claim where plaintiffs
failed to plead any allegations indicating that their waste collection services were used by
customers outside of Texas). Rockstim has not pled a plausible claim for misappropriation of trade
secrets under the DTSA, and this Magistrate Judge recommends that Judge Pitman grant the
motion to dismiss as to this claim.
IV. State Claims

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and “possess only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). It is to be presumed that a case lies outside this
limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests on the party asserting
jurisdiction. Id. Courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). “Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction, parties must make
‘clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations’ in their pleadings.” SXSW, 83
F.4th at 407 (quoting Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988)).
Rockstim asserts that this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over its state law claims under

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).2 Dkt. 26 ¶ 11. Section 1367(a) provides that
in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction
over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

2 Rockstim does not assert that diversity of citizenship jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This
Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the parties because complete diversity of citizenship between the
parties is lacking. See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 1-9 (stating that plaintiff and all but one defendant are Texas citizens). “To
properly allege diversity jurisdiction under § 1332, the parties need to allege complete diversity. That means
all persons on one side of the controversy must be citizens of different states than all persons on the other
side.” SXSW, 83 F.4th at 407 (citation and quotations omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
a state law claim if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the
claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Courts also are instructed to consider the “common law factors of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Brookshire Bros. Holding v. Dayco Prods., Inc.,
554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009).
District courts enjoy wide discretion in determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction
over a state claim once all federal claims are dismissed. Heggemeier v. Caldwell Cnty., Texas, 826
F.3d 861, 872 (5th Cir. 2016). The general rule is that “a court should decline to exercise
jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal-law claims are eliminated before
trial.” Id. (quoting Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th
Cir. 2009)). “Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to
promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable
law.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Thus, “if the federal claims
are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims
should be dismissed as well.” Id.
Because Rockstim does not state a plausible claim for relief as to its only federal claim, this
Magistrate Judge recommends that Judge Pitman follow the general rule and decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Rockstim’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Heggemeier, 826 F.3d at 872-73 (affirming dismissal of pendant state-law claims under
§ 1367(c)(3) when federal claim had been dismissed).
This Magistrate Judge also recommends that Judge Pitman decline to exercise jurisdiction over
SM and Moore because the nine Texas state law claims Rockstim asserts against them predominate
over the one federal claim. “[I]f it appears that the state issues substantially predominate, whether
in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy
sought, the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state

tribunals.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
The Court also finds that judicial economy and fairness favor declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The parties will not be unduly prejudiced
because this case is in its early stages and the jury trial is not set to commence until January 2028.
And the statute of limitations on the state law claims remain tolled while the case is pending in
federal court and for 30 days following dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). The parties can use the
same briefing on the state law claims in state court.
For all these reasons, this Magistrate Judge recommends that the Honorable Robert Pitman
decline to exercise jurisdiction over Rockstim’s state law claims.

V. Recommendation
This Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
• GRANT IN PART SM Energy Company and Nathan Moore’s Amended Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. 31) and DISMISS Plaintiff’s misappropriation of trade secret claim
under the Defend Trade Secrets Act against SM Energy Company and Nathan Moore
with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6);
• DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims
against SM Energy Company and Nathan Moore and DISMISS Plaintiff’s state law
claims against SM Energy Company and Nathan Moore without prejudice under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); and
• DISMISS Defendants SM Energy Company and Nathan Moore.
Because Defendants Workrise, RUSCO, SDS, PPS, Rappattoni, and Hill did not move to dismiss
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Rockstim’s claims against those defendants remain pending
if Judge Pitman accepts this recommendation.
The Court ORDERS that this case be removed from this Magistrate Judge’s docket and
returned to the docket of the Honorable Robert Pitman.
VI. Warnings
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections
must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made.
The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v.
United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (Sth Cir. 1987). A party’s failure to file written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen
(14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo
review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and,
except on grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to
proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(c); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc).
SIGNED on July 27, 2026.
He
SUSAN HIGHTOWER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11424029. Public record. Not legal advice.