# Bey

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · July 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423887

## Case

- **Full name:** Chava Nike’ Bey (f/k/a Doris Ann Nettles) v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS); Wilson & Associates, PLLC; Logs Legal Group, LLP; Auction.com, LLC; Josephine Properties, LLC
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** July 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

CHAVA NIKE’ BEY (f/k/a DORIS ANN )
NETTLES), )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )

)

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; )
No. 2:25-cv-03102-BCL-atc
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC )

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. )

(MERS); WILSON & ASSOCIATES, )
PLLC; LOGS LEGAL GROUP, LLP; )
AUCTION.COM, LLC; JOSEPHINE )
PROPERTIES, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT MOTION
TO DISMISS AND FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

On December 4, 2025, Plaintiff Chava Nike’ Bey (formerly known as Doris Ann Nettles)
filed a pro se complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 5.) The Court
granted the motion to proceed in forma pauperis on December 11, 2025. (ECF No. 14.) Pursuant
to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate
Judge for management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and
recommendation as appropriate.
Defendants Wilson & Associates, PLLC (“Wilson”) and Auction.com, LLC
(“Auction.com”) appeared and filed a Motion to Dismiss on January 5, 2026, alleging that Bey’s
claims against them are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (ECF No. 20.) Bey filed a
Response on January 16, 2026 (ECF No. 22), and Wilson and Auction.com filed a Reply on
January 20, 2026 (ECF No. 23).1
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Bey’s claims be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and sua sponte for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Bey alleges various claims arising from the foreclosure of her home located at 1419
Singing Trees Drive, Memphis, Tennessee. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1.) She challenges the outcome of
the foreclosure proceedings themselves, a case filed in Shelby County Chancery Court that
became final in 2021 (the “Foreclosure Proceedings”), and also challenges aspects of an “eviction
action”—presumably, a forcible-entry-and-detainer action—filed in Shelby County General
Sessions Court that she has apparently appealed to Shelby County Circuit Court (the “FED
Proceedings”). (ECF No. 6, at 6‒7; ECF No. 11, at 3‒4.) When the Complaint was filed, the
FED Proceedings were ongoing, but the docket reveals that Bey’s claims have since been

dismissed with prejudice. See Bey v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CT-5905-25, “Order Granting
Defendant Josephine Properties, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Certiorari and
Supersedeas with Prejudice” (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Shelby Cnty. June 9, 2025) (“This Order constitutes a
final and appealable order disposing of all claims against all parties in this proceeding.”).
Bey filed a motion for injunctive relief contemporaneously with the Complaint arising
from her assertion that the Circuit Court has required her to pay “$15,000 by Monday, December

1 Bey filed an additional unauthorized Response on February 3, 2026. (ECF No. 24.) Local
Rule 12.1 permits a nonmoving party to file a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss
and allows the moving party to file a reply. The Rule does not provide for a nonmoving party to
file a surreply or additional response, whether as a matter of right or with leave of court.
Accordingly, the Court declines to consider Bey’s second Response herein.
15, 2025, as a condition for review of Plaintiff’s claims,” after which the “eviction will proceed
immediately under a judgment that Plaintiff asserts is void.” (ECF No. 11, at 4.) She alleged that
eviction would cause her irreparable harm because it would create a “life-threatening medical
emergency” for her “severely disabled minor child” who resides with her in the home. (ECF No.

6, at 5.) The undersigned subsequently entered a Report and Recommendation for Denial of
Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Retraining Order and Preliminary Injunction on
December 11, 2025. (ECF No. 15.) The Report and Recommendation remains pending.
Defendants Wilson and Auction.com subsequently appeared and filed a Motion to Dismiss
on January 5, 2026, alleging that Bey’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (ECF
No. 20.) Bey’s Response argues that “[t]his action arises from continuing and post-dismissal
conduct, not from relitigation of claims previously adjudicated.” (ECF No. 22, at 1–2.) In their
Reply, Wilson and Auction.com point out that “res judicata applies to issues which were or
‘should have been litigated’ in the prior action.” (ECF No. 23, at 1 (quoting ECF No. 21, at 5).)
As outlined in the December 11th Report and Recommendation, two related cases are

worthy of note. The first is a complaint Bey filed on August 23, 2023, in the Shelby County
Chancery Court: Bey v. Scharf, No. CH-23-1113 (“Bey I”). Bey I involved many of the
Defendants (or their representatives) sued here: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”);
Auction.com LLC; and Wilson & Associates, PLLC. (Id.) Similar to Bey’s Complaint here, in
Bey I, she claimed that she was entitled to the invalidation of the Foreclosure Proceedings. (Id.)
The claims in Bey I were dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim on various dates in
March and April of 2024. The final Bey I defendants were dismissed and the case was closed on
April 24, 2024.
The second is a complaint Bey filed on April 17, 2024, in this Court: Nettles v. State of
Tennessee Government, No. 2:24-cv-02241-MSN-atc (“Bey II”). Bey II asserted many of the
same claims and theories against many of the same defendants as in Bey I (and in this case). No.
2:24-cv-02241-MSN-atc, ECF No. 63, at 6 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 2025). The Court entered a

Report and Recommendation on February 4, 2025, recommending that Bey II be dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker‒Feldman doctrine. Id. Judge Norris adopted
that recommendation over Bey’s objections on February 19, 2025, and dismissed Bey II with
prejudice. No. 2:24-cv-02241-MSN-atc, ECF Nos. 66 and 67 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2025).
PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Legal Standards
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
Under Local Rule 4.1(b)(2), the Clerk of the Court will only issue summonses in cases
with non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs who are proceeding in forma pauperis at the Court’s direction
after the Court conducts a screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that provision, the

Court shall dismiss the case at any time of it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” This Report and Recommendation
constitutes the Court’s screening.
B. Failure to State a Claim
To determine whether Bey’s Complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted,
the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as articulated in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the
. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations
and quotations omitted). The Court “construes the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff” and “accepts all factual allegations as true” to determine whether they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief. HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir.

2012).
Pleadings provide facial plausibility when they present “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, “pleadings that . . . are no more than conclusions[] are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to
see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature
of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).

“[A] pleading filed pro se is to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards
than a pleading filed by counsel.” Kondaur Cap. Corp. v. Smith, 802 F. App’x 938, 945 (6th Cir.
2020) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)); see also Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416
F. App’x 560, 562 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding the less stringent standard applies to pro se
complaints, “however inartfully pleaded”). Nevertheless, pro se litigants “are not exempt from
the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Wright v. Penguin Random House,
783 F. App’x 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Fox v. Mich. State Police Dep’t, 173 F. App’x 372,
376 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf
of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the
courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are
properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not
encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”); Brown v.

Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot ‘create a claim which a
plaintiff has not spelled out in his pleading.’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)). “A pro se complaint must still ‘contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Shelby v.
Greystar Mgmt. Servs., L.P., No. 2:17-cv-02650-SHM-cgc, 2018 WL 386647, at *2 (W.D. Tenn.
Jan. 11, 2018) (quoting Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x. 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011)).
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) if the facts, accepted as true and
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction.” Nesselrode v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 17-4206, 2018 WL 6975166, at *2

(6th Cir. June 18, 2018). “Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally construed.” Woodson v. Woodson, No. 2:22-
mc-00003-TLP-tmp, 2022 WL 16985602, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 16963997 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2022) (citing Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)). “Even so, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, . . . and the court cannot create a claim that has not been spelled out in
a pleading.” Id. (citations omitted).
“At any time in a case and of its own volition, a district court may examine whether a
complaint lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Coleman v. Juv. Ct. of Memphis & Shelby Cnty.
TN, No. 2:17-cv-2524-SHL-tmp, 2017 WL 10607262, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2017), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-cv-02524-SHL-tmp, 2018 WL 5298155 (W.D. Tenn.
Oct. 25, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Coleman v. Juv. Ct. of Memphis, No. 18-6245, 2019 WL 2298965
(6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2019); see also Coleman v. Juvenile Court of Memphis, No. 18-6245, 2019

WL 2298965, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2019) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine); Squire v. Coughlan, 469
F.3d 551, 555–56 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Younger abstention).
II. Res Judicata2
Res judicata or “claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that could have
been raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually litigated.” Lucky Brand
Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020). Parties may not
“relitigat[e] the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action,’ even if certain issues were not litigated in the
prior action.” Brownback, 592 U.S. at 215 n.3; see also J.Z.G., 84 F.3d at 214 (“Claim

preclusion applies not only to bar the parties from relitigating issues that were actually litigated
but also to bar them from relitigating issues that could have been raised in an earlier action.”).
“Suits involve the same claim or cause of action if the later suit arises from the same transaction

2 The term “res judicata” has become ambiguous due its usage as both a synonym for, and a type
of, preclusion. See, e.g., Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 215 n.3 (2021) (“The terms res
judicata and claim preclusion often are used interchangeably. But res judicata comprises two
distinct doctrines. The first is issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel . . . . The
second doctrine is claim preclusion, sometimes itself called res judicata.” (quotations and
citations omitted)); J.Z.G. Res., Inc. v. Shelby Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1996)
(describing “true res judicata” as one of the two doctrines of res judicata). As used herein, res
judicata refers only to claim preclusion, distinct from the doctrine of issue preclusion/collateral
estoppel.
or involves a common nucleus of operative facts.” Brownback, 592 U.S. at 215 n.3 (internal
quotations omitted).
If a claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, “[t]he weight of authority supports
dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Owens v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:18-cv-

02345-JTF-dkv, 2018 WL 4374238, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Jul. 18, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4179076 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2018) (collecting Sixth
Circuit cases affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on res judicata). Courts are “empowered
to raise res judicata sua sponte . . . in the interests of, inter alia, the promotion of judicial
economy.” Holloway Const. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 891 F.2d 1211, 1212 (6th Cir. 1989)
(citations omitted). Furthermore, res judicata is an appropriate basis to dismiss for failure to
state a claim during the initial screening of a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). See Smith v.
Morgan, 75 F. App’x 505, 506 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal “pursuant to § 1915(e)
because the doctrine of res judicata bars consideration of the instant complaint”); see also Leirer
v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles Compliance Unit, 246 F. App’x 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2007)

(affirming dismissal based on res judicata pursuant to § 1915(e) because the plaintiff “could have
made all of the same allegations and claims he makes in his current lawsuit in that earlier second
lawsuit”). In the Sixth Circuit, claims are barred by res judicata if four elements are satisfied:
(1) a final decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a
subsequent action between the same parties or their privies; (3) an issue in the
subsequent action which was litigated or which should have been litigated in the
prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action.

Trs. of Operating Eng’rs Loc. 324 Pension Fund v. Bourdow Contracting, Inc., 919 F.3d 368,
380 (6th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (June 20, 2019) (quoting Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 771
(6th Cir. 2002)).
Bey’s claims against Wells Fargo,3 Wilson, and Auction.com are barred by res judicata.
The Court takes judicial notice that Bey has filed similar lawsuits against these Defendants in
this Court and the Shelby County Chancery Court asserting claims arising from the same
events.4 See Bey I, No. CH-23-1113; Bey II, No. 2:24-cv-02241-MSN-atc.

The first element of res judicata is satisfied because final decisions on the merits were
entered in the prior cases. Bey I was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and Bey II was
dismissed both for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See ECF
No. 21, at 9–13.) Both dismissals therefore operate as adjudications on the merits.
The second element is satisfied because Bey named Wells Fargo, Wilson, and
Auction.com in Bey I and II. Bey I, No. CH-23-1113, “Complaint” (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Shelby Cnty.
Aug. 23, 2023); Bey II, No. 2:24-cv-02241-MSN-atc, ECF No. 1 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 17, 2024).
The third and fourth elements are satisfied because the previous cases involved the same
issues and factual allegations as those raised in this case, at least in regard to the claims against
Wells Fargo, Wilson, and Auction.com. In determining whether an identity of causes of action

exists, courts in the Sixth Circuit evaluate whether “the claims arose out of the same transaction
or series of transactions, or if the claims arose out of the same core of operative facts.” Id. at 383
(quoting Winget, 537 F.3d at 580). This element is also satisfied if there is an affinity between
“the facts creating the right of action and . . . the evidence necessary to sustain each action,” with
“the evidentiary component looking to whether the same underlying factual evidence could

3 Though only Wilson and Auction.com have moved to dismiss, res judicata likewise precludes
Bey’s claims against Wells Fargo. Accordingly, dismissal of Bey’s claims against Wells Fargo
is also appropriate pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
4 “A court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings.” Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley L.
Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d
565, 576 (6th Cir. 2008)).
support and establish both claims.” Id. at 383–84 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
“[T]he critical consideration is operative ‘factual overlap’ between the claims.” Id. at 384 (citing
Heike v. Cent. Mich. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 573 F. App’x 476, 483 (6th Cir. 2014)).
Here, all of the claims against Wells Fargo, Wilson, and Auction.com arose from the

same core of operative facts as and were, or could have been, asserted in the prior cases. As
Wilson and Auction.com correctly argue, Bey’s claims against them seemingly arise solely from
issues and factual allegations which “were litigated, or which should have been previously
litigated” in either Bey I or Bey II, which sought to challenge the Foreclosure Proceeding. (ECF
No. 21, at 5.) From the Court’s independent review of the filings in Bey I, Bey II, and this case,
the same is true of the claims against Wells Fargo. Those cases thus share identity with this
cause of action, and all issues raised in this case were or should have been raised in those cases.
Because each element of res judicata is satisfied, it is recommended that Wilson and
Auction.com’s Motion to Dismiss be granted. The Court also extends the same analysis to Bey’s
claims against Wells Fargo as part of its screening pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) and recommends that

all claims against Wells Fargo be dismissed as well.
III. Rooker‒Feldman Doctrine
“The [Rooker–Feldman] doctrine—coming from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923) and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)—restricts federal courts
from hearing claims seeking ‘relief from injury caused by the state court judgment.’” Robinson v.
Tansley, No. 2:23-cv-02589-SHL-atc, 2024 WL 4151160, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2024)
(quoting In re Hamilton, 540 F.3d 367, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2008)). “The Rooker‒Feldman doctrine
prohibits federal district courts from ‘consider[ing] cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments.’” Harvison v. Little, No.: 1:22-cv-
01103-JDB-jay, 2023 WL 3147905, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 28, 2023) (quoting Larry E. Parrish,
P.C. v. Bennett, 989 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 2021)). “The doctrine is derived from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257, which ‘vests sole jurisdiction to conduct[] appellate review of final state-court judgments
in the Supreme Court.’” Id. (quoting Bennett, 989 F.3d at 456).

“To ascertain whether the doctrine applies, the Court ‘look[s] to the source of the injury
the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.’” Harvison, 2023 WL 3147905, at *2 (quoting
VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020)). “Other than the
Supreme Court of the United States, federal courts are barred from exercising appellate
jurisdiction over state courts’ decisions and proceedings, ‘including claims that are “inextricably
intertwined” with issues decided in state court proceedings.’” Robinson, 2024 WL 4151160, at *7
(quoting Exec. Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 391 F.3d 783, 793 (6th Cir. 2004)). In
making this determination, “Plaintiffs’ subjective characterization of their claims is not
determinative. The court must determine whether Rooker‒Feldman bars a claim ‘by looking to
the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.’” Penn v. Ogg, No. 1:14-cv-

762014, 2014 WL 4450038, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2014) (quoting Evans v. Cordray, 424 F.
App’x 537, 538 (6th Cir. 2001)) (citations omitted) (finding that the Rooker‒Feldman doctrine
applied, even though the plaintiffs couched their federal case in terms of fraud and constitutional
violations, because it is the state-court proceeding and “corresponding judgment entry against
Plaintiffs that is the source of the injury alleged in the federal complaint . . . . This is precisely the
type of claim that is barred by Rooker–Feldman.”); see also Hicks-Bey v. Goodstein, 2:23-cv-
10771-TGB-eas, 2023 WL 3186945, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 1, 2023) (dismissing under Rooker‒
Feldman, even though the plaintiff made fraud and § 1983 claims, because the claims all
challenged state-court foreclosure proceedings).
When the claims in a subsequent federal case essentially seek to set aside a state-court
judgment and are “the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court judgment,” the
Rooker‒Feldman doctrine applies, and the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Untied
v. CIT Grp. Consumer Fin., Inc., 23 F. App’x 233, 234–35 (6th. Cir. 2001) (“The district court

appropriately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Untied’s complaint because the claims
challenged the adequacy and result of state court proceedings that resolved the foreclosure sale of
the subject property.”); see also Givens v. Homecomings Fin., 278 F. App’x 607, 609 (6th Cir.
2008) (affirming dismissal of federal claims because the plaintiff was “effectively attempting to
appeal from the state order granting possession to [the mortgagee], [and thus] his suit was
properly dismissed under Rooker‒Feldman”); Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, L.P.A., 161
F. App’x 487, 489–90 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal because, “[b]esides being utterly
frivolous, the plaintiffs’ claims are predicated on their conviction that the state courts were wrong
and, therefore, satisfy the very definition of a case requiring Rooker‒Feldman abstention”
(quotation omitted)); T. M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1753 (2026)

(“Federalism principles are thus best served by continuing to apply Rooker-Feldman to federal
cases in which plaintiffs seek review of state-court judgments, regardless of whether those
judgments are final trial-court judgments or those of a State’s highest court.”). “A federal
plaintiff may not sidestep this jurisdictional rule simply by casting the complaint in the form of a
federal civil rights action.” Shea v. State of Ohio, 110 F.3d 64, at *2 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished
table opinion).
The Court takes judicial notice of the FED Proceedings, which have been dismissed with
prejudice. See Bey, No. CT-5905-25, “Order Granting Defendant Josephine Properties, LLC’s
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Supersedeas with Prejudice” (“This Order
constitutes a final and appealable order disposing of all claims against all parties in this
proceeding.”). Accordingly, Bey’s claims are barred by the Rooker‒Feldman doctrine. At its
core, this lawsuit is the functional equivalent of an appeal from the Foreclosure Proceedings that
gave rise to the subsequent FED Proceedings. This lawsuit also sought to interfere with the FED

Proceedings, which were ongoing when Bey filed the Complaint. Now that the FED
Proceedings have also been dismissed with prejudice, however, this case is nothing more than an
attempt to collaterally attack issues that have already been determined by the Shelby County
General Sessions Court and Circuit Court, first in the Foreclosure Proceedings, second in Bey I,
and again in the FED Proceedings. Any injury alleged by Bey flowed directly from the
outcomes of those proceedings and the consequences imposed as a result. Because the Rooker‒
Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from “consider[ing] cases brought by state-
court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments,” Bennett, 989 F.3d at 455,
it is recommended that this case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Wilson and Auction.com’s Motion to
Dismiss be granted. As part of its screening pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the Court also
recommends that all claims against Wells Fargo be dismissed. Further, it is recommended that
the Complaint be dismissed sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of July, 2026.
s/Annie T. Christoff
ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation
disposition, a party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14)
days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file objections within
fourteen (14) days may constitute waiver/forfeiture of objections, exceptions, and further
appeal.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423887. Public record. Not legal advice.