# Coxaj-Garcia

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · August 21, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423652

## Case

- **Full name:** Carlos Eugenio Coxaj-Garcia v. Craig A. Lowe, Warden of Pike County Correctional Facility, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 21, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CARLOS EUGENIO COXAJ-
GARCIA, A# 220 891 379,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-01814

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

CRAIG A. LOWE, Warden of Pike
County Correctional Facility, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM
On June 30, 2026, the petitioner, appearing through counsel, filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc.
1. In this petition, Carlos Eugenio Coxaj-Garcia, a 19-year-old native and
citizen of Guatemala, challenges the legality of his pre-removal
immigration detention without an individualized bond hearing. At the
time of filing, Coxaj-Garcia was being held in the custody of United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Pike County
Correctional Facility, located in Pike County, Pennsylvania.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Coxaj-Garcia initially entered the United States without inspection
at an unknown location on or about December 20, 2021. Resp. Ex. 1, Doc.
3-2. Shortly after he arrived in the United States as an unaccompanied

minor, he was encountered and briefly detained by border patrol officials,
who turned him over to the agency’s Office of Refugee Resettlement,
which in turn released him into the custody of his sponsor, who is not

identified in the record before the court.
After entering the United States, Coxaj-Garcia resided with his
family in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. He has no criminal history. Prior

to his detention, immigration officials had never initiated removal
proceedings against Coxaj-Garcia. He is included as a derivative asylee
on his mother’s asylum application, which remains pending.

On June 29, 2026, Coxaj-Garcia was traveling in the back seat of a
car with his father and brother when ICE officers initiated a traffic stop
based on the immigration status of the vehicle’s registered owner. After

the three occupants refused to open their doors, ICE officers broke the
car windows, removed the occupants, and placed them in restraints.
Resp. Ex. 1.

Coxaj-Garcia was initially transported to and detained at a Pike
County suboffice of ICE’s Philadelphia Field Office. He was subsequently
transferred to Pike County Correctional Facility, where he remains in
civil immigration detention. While detained there, Coxaj-Garcia was

served with a Notice to Appear, DHS Form I-862, dated June 29, 2026,
which declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or paroled,”1 and which

directed him to appear for a video hearing before an immigration judge
presiding from Elizabeth, New Jersey, on July 10, 2026. Resp. Ex. 2, Doc.
3-3. Coxaj-Garcia has been denied any opportunity to post bond or to be

released on other conditions.
II. DISCUSSION
Since the United States began restricting
immigration into this country in the late 19th century,
it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking
entry into the country and those already residing
within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line”
who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do
not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded
to persons inside the United States. But once a
noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal
circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to
due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s
borders, “whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction
between noncitizens who have entered and reside in
the United States and those who have not yet entered
“runs throughout immigration law.”

1 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring her to be an “arriving
alien” was checked. Resp. Ex. 2, Doc. 3-3.
, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first

quoting , 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting
, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted).
Consistent with this distinction, “[t]wo statutory sections govern

the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225 and 1226.” , 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 2025), , No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law
authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens pending the
outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”
, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).

Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is
present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an
‘applicant for admission.’” , 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal
under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2).
Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who ( ) are arriving in the
United States, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or

have been physically present in the United States for less than two years
without being admitted or paroled, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (the
“designation provision”),2 ( ) are inadmissible either for

misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to
the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based

on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of
documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited
removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien

expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

2 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of
aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of
aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security,
§ 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii), but the current scope of that designation is “the full
scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been
admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been
physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year
period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited
removal under § 1225(b)(1).
, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025);
, 962 F.3d 612, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview
of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii));
, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),
, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).
case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have
such a fear, until removal. § 1225(b)(1)(B).
, 962 F.3d 612, 618–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing

expedited removal provisions); , 811 F.
Supp. 3d 274, 291–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same);
, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),

, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).
Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies
to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the

United States.3 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); , 583 U.S. at 287.
Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary
(not expedited) removal proceedings. § 1225(b)(2)(A);

§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration
judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of

3 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to
those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not
relevant here. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).
Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting

removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on
land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be
returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather

than be detained); , 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (“Section
1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow
humanitarian parole.”).

Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to
detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings.” , 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are

already present in the United States may be detained pending removal
under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).
Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for

these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a
warrant issued by the Attorney General,[4] an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

4 This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has
been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in
the applicable regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2);
§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).
the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that

such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain
pending. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide
that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that

such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the
alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8),
1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities5 are tasked with an initial bond or

custody determination, §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the
alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration
judge, §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); § 1003.19 (setting out

procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges).
, 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (“If the alien is
detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the

Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge
(both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may
secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that

he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations

5 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue
arrest warrants. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).
omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can

be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3).
, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a)

bond procedures).
Finally, “Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of
aliens who may be released under § 1226(a).” , 583 U.S. at

289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require
mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond
hearing under § 1226(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may

only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a
determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is
necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a

flight risk or a danger to the community. § 1226(c)(4);
, 583 U.S. at 289.
The petitioner in this case, Carlos Eugenio Coxaj-Garcia, has been

detained by immigration authorities without a bond determination
pending disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.6 In his

petition, Coxaj-Garcia argues that, because he was detained within the
interior of the United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory pre-
removal-order detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that he

may only be properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that he
be given an opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Coxaj-Garcia
further asserts a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”),

based on the agency’s failure to follow its own bond regulations and
arguing that his detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) is arbitrary and
contrary to law.7 In addition to these statutory arguments, Coxaj-Garcia

argues that his pre-removal detention without an opportunity to be
considered for release on bond violates his Fifth Amendment due process
rights.8

6 The parties do not dispute that the petitioner has been putatively
detained without an opportunity for release on bond pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2).
7 Having granted relief on the basis of the petitioner’s primary
statutory claim—that his detention is pursuant to § 1226(a) rather than
§ 1225(b)(2)—we decline to reach the petitioner’s alternative argument
that his detention violates the APA.
8 Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach the
constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for
relief. , 485
The respondent raises multiple arguments in opposition to the

petition. First, the respondent argues that the petitioner lacks standing
to bring his APA claims, which expressly provides that it is available only
for final agency action “for which there is no other adequate remedy in

court,” 5 U.S.C. § 704.9 Second, the respondent argues that § 1225(b)(2)
does properly apply to the petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory
detention. Finally, the respondent argues that applying § 1225(b)(2) here

comports with due process.10
The respondent purports to have detained Coxaj-Garcia pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides for mandatory detention without

the opportunity for release on bond. The petitioner, however, contends
that he could only be properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and
under that statute, he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.

“[F]or section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be
met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine
that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking

U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of
judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”).
9 note 7.
10 note 8.
admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

admitted.’” , 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)), , No. 25-1902 (1st Cir.
Dec. 23, 2025); , No. 2:25-cv-05555, 2025

WL 3188399, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (citing );
, No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 22, 2025) (citing and ); ,

No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing
). Significantly, “Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to
an alien who is an applicant for admission and ‘seeking admission.’”

, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (emphasis in original);
, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (citing and
, 807 F. Supp. 3d 397, 406 (D.N.J. 2025));

, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting ).
Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives

in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase
“seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit
have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe
“active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come into the

United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.” , 2025
WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045, at *4
(citing ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (citing

). “This reading preserves the distinction between
‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’
ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.” ,

2025 WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045,
at *4 (quoting ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4
(quoting ). It also comports with the Supreme Court’s

finding in that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking
entry into the United States.” , 583 U.S. at 297;
, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting ); ,

2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting and ). “In
sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it applies to
individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those

already within the country.” , 2026 WL 296215, at *4;
, 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory
context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates
inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”).

By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized,
“§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” ,
583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by
permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants
for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it

“permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” ,
583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting
); , 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (“Unlike

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[U]nder Section 1226(a) and its implementing
regulations, [an alien discretionarily detained pending removal

proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge
at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he poses a danger to the community[] or . . . that he is a flight risk,

if it seeks to continue detaining him.” , 804 F. Supp. 3d
265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);11 , 812 F. Supp. 3d 459, 462–

63 (D.N.J. 2025) (“Noncitizens who are arrested after having lived in the
United States for a while do not generally have to be detained. They are
instead entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration court.” (citing

) (citations and footnote omitted)). ,
2026 WL 296215, at *4 (“[I]f an individual is detained attempting to enter
the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for

inspection and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant
to § 1225. If they are arrested after having already entered the country,
they are subject to detention under § 1226 and are entitled to a bond

11 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the court
stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the
community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by
the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. , 804 F.
Supp. 3d at 277 (citing , 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir.
2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must
prove either dangerousness flight risk by clear and convincing
evidence. , 965 F.3d 203, 213–14 (3d Cir.
2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from
a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher
than a preponderance of the evidence.”);
, 12 F.4th 321, 333 n.9 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[I]t is
a ‘settled rule that when a party stands to lose his liberty, even
temporarily, we hold the Government’ to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’
standard in the context of civil detention . . . .”) (quoting );
, 547 F. Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021)
(quoting ).
hearing.”).

Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to the detention of
Coxaj-Garcia. We find that Coxaj-Garcia is no longer seeking admission
into the United States—at the time of his arrest and detention, he was

not actively attempting to come into the United States at a border or port
of entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the United
States for an extended period of time. , 2025 WL 3188399,

at *1 (finding that petitioner who lived in the United States for almost
two years was not “seeking admission” but “already here”);
, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (citing ). Thus, Coxaj-

Garcia may only be properly detained pursuant to § 1226(a), and
therefore he is entitled to a bond hearing. , 2026 WL
296215, at *5. , No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL

3516865, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (“The overwhelming majority of
federal district courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the
INA to find that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens

who previously entered the United States and are currently residing in
the United States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision
of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary
detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to

a bond hearing.”); at *4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court
cases).12

12 , 175 F.4th 61, 73, 75 (2d Cir.
2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who
are present in the United States, but charged as inadmissible for entering
the country without inspection and admission. . . . Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies to those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for
admission, or who cross the physical border into the United States but
are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.’”);
, 175 F.4th 828, 856 (7th Cir. 2026) (“[T]he
text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing Executive
practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants for
admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry
and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”);
, 175 F.4th 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2026)
(“The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long
history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional
purpose in passing IIRIRA, yield the conclusion that no-bond detention
generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country,
and not to aliens who are simply present here.”);
, 175 F.4th 713, 732 (6th Cir. 2026) (holding that noncitizens
without lawful status who had lived in the United States for years were
not “seeking admission” and thus were not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s
mandatory detention scheme); , 180 F.4th 1226,
1239 (10th Cir. 2026) (“The only time a noncitizen can be said to be
seeking admission is when he is seeking to enter the United States at the
border. Since § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those seeking admission,
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is likewise limited to the border.” (footnote omitted));
at 1248 (“§ 1225(b)(2)(A) applies at the border while § 1226(a) applies to
the interior.”); , ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL
2196424, at *10 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026) (“[Section] 1225(b)(2)(A), based
on its text and context, is best construed as applying to aliens entering
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is

currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.
Accordingly, the petition will be granted, and the government will be

ordered to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing
within twenty-one days or to release him from custody.
An appropriate order follows.

Dated: August 21, 2026
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge

the United States at the border. Section 1226, by contrast, is best
understood as governing inadmissible and deportable aliens present in
the interior of the United States.”); , ___ F.4th ____,
2026 WL 2198315, at *17 (7th Cir. July 30, 2026) (holding that, “based on
the INA’s text, structure, and history,” a noncitizen, who entered the
United States without inspection and was detained after living there for
several years, “is present in the United States without admission and is
not ‘seeking admission,’” and he “is therefore not subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is eligible for a bond hearing
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)”); , ___ F.4th ____,
2026 WL 2352042, at *11 (1st Cir. Aug. 13, 2026) (“In sum, our careful
study of the disputed statutory texts leads us to join the Second, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that
noncitizens . . . who are present in the United States without admission
are not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision, but
rather, are governed by § 1226.”).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423652. Public record. Not legal advice.