# Kumar

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · August 21, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423650

## Case

- **Full name:** Ramesh Kumar v. Angela Hoover, Warden of Clinton County Correctional Facility, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 21, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAMESH KUMAR, A# 241 032 885,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-01704

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

ANGELA HOOVER, Warden of
Clinton County Correctional
Facility, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM
On June 22, 2026, the Court received and filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, signed and mailed by the
pro se petitioner on June 16, 2026. Doc. 1. In this petition, Ramesh
Kumar, a native and citizen of India, challenges the legality of his pre-
removal immigration detention without an individualized bond hearing.
At the time of filing, Kumar was being held in the custody of United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Clinton County
Correctional Facility, located in Clinton County, Pennsylvania.1

1 We note that, although Kumar commenced this action with a pro
se petition, he has since retained counsel to represent him in this matter,
and counsel has filed a reply to the respondent’s answer. The original pro
se petition, however, remains the operative pleading in this matter.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kumar initially entered the United States without inspection at or

near Tecate, California, on or about March 29, 2023. Kumar was
encountered by United States Border Patrol shortly thereafter and
detained briefly. Upon his release from that detention, Kumar was served

with a Notice to Appear, DHS Form I-862, dated March 31, 2023, which
declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or paroled,”2 and which directed him

to appear for a hearing before an immigration judge in New York, New
York, on August 10, 2023. Resp. Ex. 2, Doc. 8-2.

After entering the United States, Kumar established residence in
Richmond Hill, New York. He has no criminal history.
On May 27, 2026, Kumar was arrested by immigration officials

while visiting friends in Pennsylvania. Kumar was a passenger in a
vehicle driven by Jashandeep Singh, the subject of an ICE targeted
enforcement action. ICE officers observed Singh entering the driver’s

seat of a vehicle registered in his name and conducted a vehicle stop.

2 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring her to be an “arriving
alien” was checked. Resp. Ex. 2, Doc. 8-2.
When ICE officers attempted to ascertain the identity of the vehicle’s

occupants, Kumar presented his New York State driver’s license and
admitted his immigration status. Kumar was then detained by ICE and
transported to a local ICE office in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, for

processing.
Kumar was then transported to Clinton County Correctional
Facility, where he was incarcerated at the time when he commenced this

habeas proceeding. He was subsequently transferred to Pike County
Correctional Facility, where he remains in civil immigration detention.
He has been denied any opportunity to post bond or to be released on

other conditions.
II. DISCUSSION
Since the United States began restricting
immigration into this country in the late 19th century,
it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking
entry into the country and those already residing
within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line”
who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do
not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded
to persons inside the United States. But once a
noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal
circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to
due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s
borders, “whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction
between noncitizens who have entered and reside in
the United States and those who have not yet entered
“runs throughout immigration law.”
, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first
quoting , 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting

, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted).
Consistent with this distinction, “[t]wo statutory sections govern
the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225 and 1226.” , 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 2025), , No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law
authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens pending the
outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”
, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).

Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is
present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an
‘applicant for admission.’” , 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal
under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2).
Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who ( ) are arriving in the

United States, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or
have been physically present in the United States for less than two years
without being admitted or paroled, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (the

“designation provision”),3 ( ) are inadmissible either for
misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to
the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based
on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of
documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited

removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien

3 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of
aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of
aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security,
§ 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii), but the current scope of that designation is “the full
scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been
admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been
physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year
period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited
removal under § 1225(b)(1).
, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025);
, 962 F.3d 612, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview
of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii));
, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),
, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).
expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have
such a fear, until removal. § 1225(b)(1)(B).

, 962 F.3d 612, 618–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing
expedited removal provisions); , 811 F.
Supp. 3d 274, 291–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same);

, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),
, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).
Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies

to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the
United States.4 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); , 583 U.S. at 287.
Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary

(not expedited) removal proceedings. § 1225(b)(2)(A);
§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration
judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory

detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.

4 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to
those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not
relevant here. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).
§ 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of

Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting
removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on
land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be

returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather
than be detained); , 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (“Section
1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow

humanitarian parole.”).
Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to
detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of

removal proceedings.” , 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are
already present in the United States may be detained pending removal
under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).

Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for
these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a
warrant issued by the Attorney General,[5] an alien may be arrested and

5 This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has
been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in
the applicable regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2);
§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that
such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain
pending. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide

that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that
such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the
alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8),

1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities6 are tasked with an initial bond or
custody determination, §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the
alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration

judge, §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); § 1003.19 (setting out
procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges).
, 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (“If the alien is

detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the
Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge
(both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may

secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that

6 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue
arrest warrants. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).
he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations

omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can
be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3).

, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a)
bond procedures).
Finally, “Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of

aliens who may be released under § 1226(a).” , 583 U.S. at
289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require
mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond

hearing under § 1226(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may
only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a
determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is

necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a
flight risk or a danger to the community. § 1226(c)(4);
, 583 U.S. at 289.

The petitioner in this case, Ramesh Kumar, has been detained by
immigration authorities without a bond determination pending
disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.7 In his petition,

Kumar argues that, because he was detained within the interior of the
United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory pre-removal-order
detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that he may only be

properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that he be given an
opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Kumar further asserts a
claim under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) based on the

agency’s failure to follow its own regulations.8 In addition to these
statutory arguments, Kumar argues that his pre-removal detention
without an opportunity to be considered for release on bond violates his

Fifth Amendment due process rights.9
The respondent, on the other hand, argues that § 1225(b)(2) does

7 The parties do not dispute that the petitioner has been putatively
detained without an opportunity for release on bond pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2).
8 Having granted relief on the basis of the petitioner’s primary
statutory claim—that his detention is pursuant to § 1226(a) rather than
§ 1225(b)(2)—we decline to reach the petitioner’s alternative argument
that his detention violates the APA.
9 Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach the
constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for
relief. , 485
U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of
judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”).
properly apply to the petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory

detention.10 The respondent further argues that applying § 1225(b)(2)
here comports with due process.11
The respondent purports to have detained Kumar pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides for mandatory detention without the
opportunity for release on bond. The petitioner, however, contends that
he could only be properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and under

that statute, he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.
“[F]or section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be
met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine

that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking
admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.’” , 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)), , No. 25-1902 (1st Cir.
Dec. 23, 2025); , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (citing
); , No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL

3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (citing and );

10 We note that the respondent’s answer does not engage with the
petitioner’s APA claim at all. In any event, see note 8.
11 note 9.
, No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing ). Significantly, “Section
1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an alien who is an applicant for
admission and ‘seeking admission.’” , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6

(emphasis in original); , 2025 WL 3709045, at
*4 (citing and , 807 F. Supp. 3d 397,
406 (D.N.J. 2025)); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

).
Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives

in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase
“seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit
have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe

“active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come into the
United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.” , 2025
WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045, at *4

(citing ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (citing
). “This reading preserves the distinction between
‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’
ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.” ,

2025 WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045,
at *4 (quoting ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4
(quoting ). It also comports with the Supreme Court’s

finding in that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking
entry into the United States.” , 583 U.S. at 297;
, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting ); ,

2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting and ). “In
sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it applies to
individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those

already within the country.” , 2026 WL 296215, at *4;
, 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory
context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates

inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”).
By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized,
“§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” ,

583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting
). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by
permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants
for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it

“permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” ,
583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting
); , 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (“Unlike

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[U]nder Section 1226(a) and its implementing
regulations, [an alien discretionarily detained pending removal

proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge
at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he poses a danger to the community[] or . . . that he is a flight risk,

if it seeks to continue detaining him.” , 804 F. Supp. 3d
265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);12 , 812 F. Supp. 3d 459, 462–

12 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the court
stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the
community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by
the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. , 804 F.
Supp. 3d at 277 (citing , 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir.
2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must
prove either dangerousness flight risk by clear and convincing
evidence. , 965 F.3d 203, 213–14 (3d Cir.
2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from
a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher
than a preponderance of the evidence.”);
, 12 F.4th 321, 333 n.9 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[I]t is
63 (D.N.J. 2025) (“Noncitizens who are arrested after having lived in the

United States for a while do not generally have to be detained. They are
instead entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration court.” (citing
) (citations and footnote omitted)). ,

2026 WL 296215, at *4 (“[I]f an individual is detained attempting to enter
the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for
inspection and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant

to § 1225. If they are arrested after having already entered the country,
they are subject to detention under § 1226 and are entitled to a bond
hearing.”).

Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to the detention of
Kumar. We find that Kumar is no longer seeking admission into the
United States—at the time of his arrest and detention, he was not

actively attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of
entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the United States
for an extended period of time. , 2025 WL 3188399, at *1

a ‘settled rule that when a party stands to lose his liberty, even
temporarily, we hold the Government’ to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’
standard in the context of civil detention . . . .”) (quoting );
, 547 F. Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021)
(quoting ).
(finding that petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two

years was not “seeking admission” but “already here”);
, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (citing ). Thus, Kumar may
only be properly detained pursuant to § 1226(a), and therefore he is

entitled to a bond hearing. , 2026 WL 296215, at *5.
, No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (“The overwhelming majority of federal district

courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find
that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously
entered the United States and are currently residing in the United

States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary detention
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond

hearing.”); at *4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court cases). 13

13 , 175 F.4th 61, 73, 75 (2d Cir.
2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who
are present in the United States, but charged as inadmissible for entering
the country without inspection and admission. . . . Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies to those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for
admission, or who cross the physical border into the United States but
are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.’”);
, 175 F.4th 828, 856 (7th Cir. 2026) (“[T]he
text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing Executive
practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants for
admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry
and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”);
, 175 F.4th 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2026)
(“The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long
history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional
purpose in passing IIRIRA, yield the conclusion that no-bond detention
generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country,
and not to aliens who are simply present here.”);
, 175 F.4th 713, 732 (6th Cir. 2026) (holding that noncitizens
without lawful status who had lived in the United States for years were
not “seeking admission” and thus were not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s
mandatory detention scheme); , 180 F.4th 1226,
1239 (10th Cir. 2026) (“The only time a noncitizen can be said to be
seeking admission is when he is seeking to enter the United States at the
border. Since § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those seeking admission,
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is likewise limited to the border.” (footnote omitted));
at 1248 (“§ 1225(b)(2)(A) applies at the border while § 1226(a) applies to
the interior.”); , ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL
2196424, at *10 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026) (“[Section] 1225(b)(2)(A), based
on its text and context, is best construed as applying to aliens entering
the United States at the border. Section 1226, by contrast, is best
understood as governing inadmissible and deportable aliens present in
the interior of the United States.”); , ___ F.4th ____,
2026 WL 2198315, at *17 (7th Cir. July 30, 2026) (holding that, “based on
the INA’s text, structure, and history,” a noncitizen, who entered the
United States without inspection and was detained after living there for
several years, “is present in the United States without admission and is
not ‘seeking admission,’” and he “is therefore not subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and is eligible for a bond hearing
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)”); , ___ F.4th ____,
2026 WL 2352042, at *11 (1st Cir. Aug. 13, 2026) (“In sum, our careful
study of the disputed statutory texts leads us to join the Second, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that
noncitizens . . . who are present in the United States without admission
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is

currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.
Accordingly, the petition will be granted, and the government will be

ordered to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing
within twenty-one days or to release him from custody.
An appropriate order follows.

Dated: August 21, 2026
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge

are not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision, but
rather, are governed by § 1226.”).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423650. Public record. Not legal advice.