# Manning

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · August 21, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423433

## Case

- **Full name:** De’Amontae Manning v. Joshua Mulinix
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** August 21, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

DE’AMONTAE MANNING, CASE NO. 3:24 CV 1171

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

JOSHUA MULINIX,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Defendant. ORDER

INTRODUCTION
Currently pending before the Court in this civil rights case is Defendant Joshua Mulinix’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 27). Pro se Plaintiff De’Amontae Manning opposes.
(Doc. 35).1 Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court grants Defendant’s Motion.
BACKGROUND
This suit arises out of Defendant’s use of a chemical agent against Plaintiff in his cell on
April 21, 2023, while he was housed at Toledo Correctional Institution.
Leading up to the incident at issue, while Plaintiff was in the shower, he “made numerous
requests for [his] Ramadan meal.” (Doc. 1, at 6).2 The “unit correctional officers” ignored him
and requested he exit the shower before they would contact a supervisor. Id. At that point, the

1. Defendant did not file a Reply brief and the time in which to do so has expired. See Loc. Civ.
R. 7.1(e).
2. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is verified, see Doc. 1, at 25, it serves as an Affidavit for
purposes of summary judgment. El Bel v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2008). The Court
has modified the capitalization in quotations from Plaintiff’s filings for ease of readability.
“negotiating officers” arrived; Plaintiff also informed them he did not receive his Ramadan
meals. Id.
Due to Plaintiff’s refusal to exit the shower despite orders to do so, a procedure called
“Planned Use of Force” was triggered. (Doc. 27-2, at 1). This is a “supervisor-led procedure”
used in an attempt to deescalate when a prisoner refuses to move or threatens staff. Id. It involves

beginning with negotiation and verbal warnings—including an explanation of consequence—and
escalating to non-lethal options to gain compliance, including the use of chemical agents. Id. at
1-2. If unsuccessful, the supervisor then directs a physical extraction of the prisoner. Id. at 2.
This process is designed to gain compliance with the least force possible. Id.
Defendant and another officer entered the shower area and requested Plaintiff “to cuff
up.” (Doc. 1, at 7). Plaintiff “made repeated attempts to proclaim that [he] did not receive [his]
religious meals before [he] allowed” Defendant to handcuff him. Id.; see also UOF Video 7:44-
8:16.3
Plaintiff states that “in a non-aggressive manner, for peaceful protest, [he] attempted to

sit on the floor” and again request the meals. (Doc. 1, at 7). On the walk from the shower to
Plaintiff’s cell, at “several times he stopped walking willingly” and, at other times, “he refused to
hold up his bodyweight.” (Doc. 27-2, at 2). This is depicted on videos submitted by Defendant
that show Plaintiff turning, twisting, kneeling, and resisting the escort. See UOF Video 8:35-
9:50; Butts Video 2:36-3:46.
Plaintiff states that when he arrived at his cell, he “walked inside . . . and allowed [his]
cell door to be secured.” (Doc. 1, at 7). This is directly contradicted by the submitted videos,

3. Defendant submitted multiple video exhibits depicting the incident. The Court herein refers to
two of these videos which are entitled PLANNED_UOF_CAMERA.mp4 (“UOF Video”), and
BUTTS,_OJAY.mp4 (“Butts Video”).
which depict the officers struggling for over a minute to get Plaintiff inside his cell and to fully
close Plaintiff’s cell door. (UOF Video 9:30-10:44; Butts Video 3:26-4:35).4 Officer O’Jay Butts
accompanied Defendant to the cell and controlled the pepper ball gun. (Doc. 27-2, at 2); see also
generally Butts Video.
Shortly after the door is closed, Defendant directs Plaintiff to “uncuff” and Plaintiff

responds, “I ain’t uncuffing shit.” (UOF Video 10:43-:49).5 Defendant responds with, “Final
directive, uncuff,” and repeatedly instructs Plaintiff to uncuff for the next approximately thirty
seconds. (UOF Video 10:49-11:24). During this time, Plaintiff repeatedly requests to see
medical, complaining that his foot is bleeding from being shut in the door. Defendant tells
Plaintiff he will get him medical attention, but needs him to uncuff first. See id. When Plaintiff
does not follow the instruction to uncuff, Defendant orders Officer Butts to deploy a pepper ball.
(UOF Video 11:24-:25).6 Defendant continues to give Plaintiff repeated instructions to uncuff,
including stating “final directive” multiple times. (UOF Video 11:36-12:57). After another
statement of “final directive, uncuff,” Defendant directs Butts to “saturate the area” and Butts

shoots four pepper balls into Plaintiff’s cell. (UOF Video 12:14-:15; Butts Video 6:20-:23); see
also Doc. 27-2, at 2 (Officer Butts’s statement that he deployed the pepper ball system at
Defendant’s request). Plaintiff can be heard saying “now I can’t breathe.” (UOF Video 12:27-
:29). Defendant continues to give Plaintiff instructions and “final directive[s]” to uncuff. (UOF

4. “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the
facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
380 (2007). Regardless, any dispute about how Plaintiff got into his cell is not dispositive of the
claims decided herein, which are based solely on actions taken once Plaintiff was inside the cell.
5. For a prisoner to “uncuff”, he must back up toward his cell door and place his hands through
the cuff port so they can be removed by a correctional officer. See Doc. 27-2, at 2.
6. It is not entirely clear from the video, but it appears this first attempt to deploy pepper balls
was unsuccessful.
Video 12:29-:46). He then instructs Butts to direct a pepper ball near Plaintiff’s legs and Butts
does so. (UOF Video 12:45-:52; Butts Video 6:55-:59); see also Doc. 27-2, at 2. Following this,
Plaintiff put his hands through the cuff port and permitted Defendant to uncuff him. (UOF
Video, 12:57-13:09; Butts Video 7:00-7:15).
Officer Butts avers that the amount of chemical agent used “was a typical amount for the

circumstance.” (Doc. 27-2, at 2). He further states that permitting Plaintiff to retain the handcuffs
would have presented a danger to other prisoners. Id.
After he was uncuffed, Plaintiff “attempted to request for [his] cell to be
decontaminated.” (Doc. 1, at 12). Defendant “intentionally and deliberately, [and] blatantly ran
away with the assisting officer.” Id. The videos depict Defendant and other officers walking
away from Plaintiff’s cell after he is uncuffed. (UOF Video 13:26-13:46; Butts Video 7:33-53).
Plaintiff says he remained inside the same cell until April 25, 2023, and suffered
suffocation, migraines, dizziness, blurry vision, and runny nose. (Doc. 1, at 8).
Less than 30 minutes after the chemical agent was used, Michael Mathews, R.N.,

examined Plaintiff from the front of his cell. (Doc. 27-3, at 1) (stating he “verbally addressed and
examined Manning from his cell front”).7 Mathews observed Plaintiff “showed no signs of
trauma or injury, his respiration was even and not labored, he was speaking in complete
sentences without difficulty, and he showed no acute medical distress of any kind.” Id.; see also
Doc. 27-1, at 19-21 (medical examination report). Mathews therefore determined Plaintiff was
“safe to remain [in] his restrictive housing.” (Doc. 27-3).

7. The videos depict the pepper ball system was used at approximately 9:47 p.m. Nurse
Mathews’s examination report was completed at 10:17 p.m. and he states he examined Plaintiff
“some time before 10:17 p.m.” (Doc. 27-3, at 1).
Plaintiff’s cell “was equipped with air ventilation . . . and running water” and officers
ensured the “ventilation system in [Plaintiff’s] cell was functioning and would decontaminate the
area.” (Doc. 27-2, at 2-3). The “proper method for decontaminating a cell that ha[s] been
saturated with the pepper ball agent is to allow the area to naturally be ventilated” and “[i]f there
is a residue, then [prisoners] can also use water to clean up the area.” Id. at 2.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff lists a single legal claim, which he describes as: “Forcing me
to remain inside a ma[c]e contaminated cell is inhumane and violates Plaintiff[’s] . . rights and
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.” (Doc. 1, at 8). Elsewhere he describes his claim as “[Defendant] enforced for me
to be ma[c]ed while inside my cell and intentionally and deliberately left me inside a ma[c]e
contaminated cell without allowing me to decontaminate and have my cell decontaminated.” Id.
at 4, 10.8
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When
considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences from the record
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or determine
the truth of any factual matter in dispute; the Court determines only whether the case contains
sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).

8. Plaintiff attaches extra pages to his Complaint such that this statement of his claim begins on
ECF page 4 and continues on ECF page 10.
The moving party bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986). This burden “may be discharged by ‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district court
– that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. The
nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and “present affirmative evidence in order to
defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Further,

the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the Court’s attention to those specific
portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact. See
Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (noting the court “need consider only the cited materials”).
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends he is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment because
Plaintiff cannot establish a constitutional violation much less a clearly established constitutional
violation. (Doc. 27). For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must identify the deprivation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States and demonstrate such

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but merely provides “a
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979). Plaintiff brings his claims under the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The
Supreme Court has long held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” against the States. See Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). The Court has also long held that this ban does not just
cover the formal “punishment” that a state court metes out to criminal defendants. The Eighth
Amendment thus regulates, inter alia, informal harms that prison officials inflict on convicted
prisoners during their terms of incarceration, including the force that prison guards use on
prisoners, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (holding the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on prisoners”), and the conditions of prisoners’

confinement, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (holding prison officials have a duty
to provide “humane conditions of confinement”).
Plaintiff brings two claims here – one regarding the use of the chemical agent and one
regarding the failure to decontaminate his cell. The first of these is properly analyzed as an
excessive force claim, while the latter is a conditions of confinement claim. The Court addresses
each below.
Use of Chemical Agent
Defendant contends he is entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment because
Plaintiff fails to establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on the use of the pepper ball

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not established a question of fact regarding the subjective
component of his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.
The “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” requirement “has objective and
subjective components, both of which follow from the Eighth Amendment’s text.” Johnson v.
Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2023).
Objectively, harm to a prisoner must rise to a sufficiently serious level because
the Eighth Amendment prohibits only “cruel and unusual” deprivations, not just
uncomfortable or “even harsh” ones. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392; see
Phillips, 14 F.4th at 534. Subjectively, harm to a prisoner must result from a
prison official’s sufficiently volitional actions because the Eighth Amendment
bars only willful conduct that “inflict[s]” “punishment,” not accidental conduct
that causes injury. See Phillips, 14 F.4th at 535 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 300, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)).
Id.
“As a subjective matter . . . prisoners who challenge a correctional officer’s use of force
must prove more than that the officer acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to whether the force
was necessary (the type of intent that prisoners must prove to challenge their conditions of
confinement or medical care).” Id. at 616 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992)).
“The Court has instead described the ‘core judicial inquiry’ in this use-of-force context as
distinguishing between force used in a ‘good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline’ and
force used ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S.
34, 37 (2010) (per curiam)); see also Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 905 (6th Cir. 1992).

“Only the latter kind of force—force exerted maliciously and sadistically to inflict pain—violates
the Eighth Amendment.” Johnson, 79 F.4th at 616. “So even if an officer uses force because of
an ‘unreasonable’ belief that it is necessary to restrain a prisoner, the officer does not violate the
Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 324). The Eighth Amendment
“necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force” so long
as the use of force is not the type of force that would be “repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327). “The negligent use of
force—even the reckless use of force—does not establish an Eighth Amendment claim; [the
plaintiff] must prove the malicious use of force for the exclusive purpose to inflict pain.”
Johnson, 79 F.4th at 621.

To decide whether a jury could find that an officer acted with this malicious
intent, the Supreme Court has identified several factors to consider: What was the
extent of the prisoner’s injury? What was the nature of the threat that justified the
use of force? Was the amount of force proportional to the threat? And did the
officer take any actions designed to reduce the required amount of force?
Id. at 618. Courts also approach such claims with deference to avoid “unreasonable post hoc
judicial second-guessing” of officers’ conduct. Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866, 875 (6th Cir.
2008) (quoting Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also Johnson, 79
F.4th at 618 (“[W]hile judges may review an encounter by slowing down, pausing, and replaying
a video, officers have no such luxury. They must make quick decisions in the heat of the

moment.”).
On review of the evidence presented in accordance with the above guidance, the Court
finds Plaintiff has not established a genuine issue of material fact regarding the subjective
component of his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Even in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, the evidence shows only the former here. Plaintiff was given repeated orders to present
his hands to be uncuffed and he did not do so. The pepper balls were only deployed after
Plaintiff failed repeatedly to comply with the officers’ orders and officers paused between the
first and second deployments to continue negotiations and allow Plaintiff time to comply.
Again, force “used in a ‘good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline’” does not

violate constitutional principles. Johnson, 79 F.4th at 616 (quoting Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37).
“Only . . . force exerted maliciously and sadistically to inflict pain—violates the Eighth
Amendment.” Id. The use of the pepper balls on the facts presented here does not rise to the level
of the latter. See Jennings v. Mitchell, 93 F. App’x 723, 725 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The defendant
corrections officers did not violate Jennings’s Eighth Amendment rights because the force used
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, not to maliciously cause pain.
The videotape squarely demonstrates that Jennings disobeyed repeated direct orders prior to the
use of pepper spray.”) (citation omitted); Roberson v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“We found no Eighth Amendment violation where a prisoner was sprayed with pepper spray
after repeatedly disobeying orders to exit the shower. Indeed, in numerous other cases we have
likewise concluded that the use of chemical agents against recalcitrant prisoners did not violate
the Eighth Amendment.”) (citation modified).
No reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the use of the pepper ball deployment
system against a defiant and recalcitrant prisoner such as Plaintiff violated the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff has thus not established a constitutional violation, much less a clearly
established constitutional violation.
Failure to Decontaminate Cell
Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s claims regarding the alleged failure to decontaminate
his cell fail for two independent reasons. First, Defendant contends Plaintiff made no specific
claim against him regarding cell decontamination. (Doc. 27, at 8-9). Second, he contends that
even if Plaintiff had brought such a claim, there was no constitutional violation. Id. at 9.
“To establish a § 1983 . . . claim against a public official in his personal capacity, a
plaintiff must show that the official either actively participated in the alleged unconstitutional

conduct or implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct of an offending subordinate.” Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 659
(6th Cir. 2015)) (citation modified); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“[A] plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution”).
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to provide “humane
conditions of confinement.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. “[A] prison official’s deliberate
indifference to conditions that pose a substantial risk to an inmate’s health and safety violates the
Eighth Amendment.” Finley v. Huss, 102 F.4th 789, 805 (6th Cir. 2024). There is both an
objective and subjective component for such a claim. Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949, 953 (6th
Cir. 2010). To satisfy the objective component, a plaintiff “must show that he is incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The
subjective component requires that the prison official act with a “sufficiently culpable state of
mind.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). That is, the officer must “know[]

of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.
Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint states that after he was uncuffed he “attempted to request
for [his] cell to be decontaminated.” (Doc. 1, at 12). This is at least arguably enough to allege
Defendant’s personal involvement in Plaintiff’s prison conditions claim. Nevertheless, as with
his excessive force claim, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to satisfy the subjective component
of such a claim. The evidence before the Court demonstrates Plaintiff’s cell “was equipped with
air ventilation . . . and running water,” officers ensured the “ventilation system in [Plaintiff’s]
cell was functioning and would decontaminate the area,” the “proper method for
decontaminating a cell that ha[s] been saturated with the pepper ball agent is to allow the area to

naturally be ventilated” and “[i]f there is residue, then [prisoners] can also use water to clean up
the area.” (Doc. 27-2, at 2). Plaintiff has identified no evidence to the contrary. The video
evidence shows Defendant stated medical would be called. (Butts Video 7:59-8:03). Plaintiff was
provided with prompt medical attention and Nurse Mathews found Plaintiff was not in distress
and was “safe to remain in his restrictive housing.” (Doc. 27-3, at 1). Moreover, beyond
Plaintiff’s statement that he attempted to request decontamination from Defendant, he has
pointed to no evidence Defendant was involved in any subsequent decisionmaking regarding
where Plaintiff would be housed. Nor does Plaintiff demonstrate Defendant was aware of any
particular injury he had suffered (or would suffer) if not moved.
There is simply no evidence from which a jury could conclude that Defendant was
subjectively aware of, and disregarded, any excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety.
Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim regarding the
conditions in his cell after deployment of the chemical agent.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27) be, and the same
hereby is, GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: August 21, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423433. Public record. Not legal advice.