# ANDERSON

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · August 19, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423191

## Case

- **Full name:** Vaughn Anderson v. Capt. Prifti, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 19, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VAUGHN ANDERSON, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-1228
:
CAPT. PRIFTI, et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
HENRY, J. AUGUST 1 8 , 2026
Pro se Plaintiff Vaughn Anderson commenced this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 by filing a Complaint naming numerous individual Defendants and asserting claims
related to his pretrial detention within the city of Philadelphia Department of Prisons. In a prior
Memorandum and Order, the Court granted Anderson leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
partially dismissed his original Complaint on statutory screening, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
with leave to amend the dismissed claims. See Anderson v. Prifti, No. 26-1228, 2026 WL
1079849 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2026). Currently before the Court are Anderson’s Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 12) and Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 13). For the following
reasons, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint in part, allow other claims to proceed to
service, and deny the Motion to Appoint Counsel without prejudice to renewal.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
In dismissing Anderson’s original Complaint, the Court explained that some of his claims
were sufficiently pleaded to proceed to service, but others were not supported with enough facts.

1 The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Anderson’s Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 12 (“Am. Compl.”)). The Court adopts the pagination assigned to the Complaint by the
See generally Anderson, 2026 WL 1079849, at *4-12. The original Complaint named sixteen
individual Defendants and asserted seventeen discrete claims. (See ECF No. 1 at 2-3, 7-8.) The
Amended Complaint names seventy-four individual Defendants, some as John or Jane Does, and
asserts thirty-six discrete claims. (See Am. Compl. at 8-15, 34-41.)

A. Excessive Force Incidents and Medical Diet
Anderson alleges that at Riverside Correctional Facility (“Riverside”) on March 8, 2025,
he had a dispute with a nurse about his medication, and afterwards, C.O. Bolden directed insults
at him, then walked up to a tier above him, continued insulting him, “made threatening gestures
with pepper spray and threatening to spray [Anderson] and call somebody to harm [him],” then
“reared back” and spit on him “multiple times.” (Id. at 16.) Bolden then called an emergency
response and claimed that Anderson had spit on her. (Id.) Sergeant Foster Jr., C.O. Mendez, and
C.O. John Doe 1 responded to Bolden’s call, handcuffed Anderson, and escorted him towards the
medical department and the restricted housing unit (“RHU”). (Id.) As they entered the medical
area, Foster punched Anderson in the face repeatedly, caused his head to collide with the door

frame, and pushed him to the floor, resulting in a head wound and an injury to Anderson’s
tailbone. (Id.) Mendez and Doe 1 did not intervene to stop Foster. (Id.)
Anderson was treated by a nurse for the head wound while C.O. Jones and C.O. Sellers
asked him what happened; Foster, “standing nearby,” denied the assault. (Id. at 17.) After Jones
took pictures, Anderson was sent to two different hospitals, “one to staple his head shut and one
to wire his mouth shut.” (Id.) A misconduct report was prepared by Collins and Rose Jr., then

CM/ECF docketing system. Grammar, spelling, and punctuation errors are cleaned up where
necessary. Additionally, the Court includes facts reflected in publicly available state court
records, of which this Court may take judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452
F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).
Anderson was found not guilty of misconduct at a disciplinary hearing, based on video evidence
of the incidents with Bolden and Foster. (Id.)
From March 15 to April 2, 2025, Anderson was housed in the infirmary on the Prison
Health Services Wing (“PHSW”), where he “was not allowed more that [one] hour [of]

recreation and was not allowed to attend [the] law library.” (Id.) Lieutenants Thomas and Cook
“explained this as policy and C.O. Smith enforced said policy.” (Id.) Smith told Anderson that
she had heard about his misconduct proceedings from Collins, who is her sister, and that Smith
“kept [him] locked in unlike other inmates in [the] infirmary,” that she was “reluctant to provide
hygiene and clean clothing,” and that she threatened to have him “transferred out early from [the]
hospital despite [his] medical needs.” (Id.)
Anderson returned to Riverside on April 2, 2025, and was placed in protective custody,
where Foster harassed and threatened him and boasted to staff and other inmates about having
broken Anderson’s jaw. (Id.) Anderson alleges that he requested wax for the screws in his
mouth and a medicated mouthwash that had been prescribed to prevent infection, but he received

neither. (Id. at 18-19.) Anderson also started having problems with the special soft food diet
that had been prescribed for him. (Id. at 17, 23.) He asserts that C.O. Jones was the kitchen
officer in charge of special diets and regularly failed to provide Anderson’s soft food diet. (Id. at
18.) When Anderson asked for assistance in getting his diet from Jones, “no successful measures
were taken” by C.O. Polliver, Rogers, or Johnson. (Id.) Anderson alleges that “many times staff
allowed inmates to steal diets before block workers handed them out,” and other times items in
his special diet arrived smashed or leaking. (Id.) He asked C.O. Allen for help, but she told him
that “there was not much missing,” and that the kitchen “provides what they choose to provide
and rarely replaces what’s missing.” (Id.)
Anderson alleges that medical staff, specifically Nurse Brown, began ignoring his sick
call requests. (Id. at 19.) He wrote to the medical department multiple times about what he
believed was “a bone protruding from his gums[,] swelling in [his] mouth and face[,] and strange
wounds appearing on [his] skin.” (Id.) He reported his “diet and sick call issues” to Lieutenant

Conn, who “was not able to do anything specific to help.” (Id.) He then reported his problems
with his medical needs and with Foster’s “continuing threats and harassment” to a “federal
monitor” who “did a tour” of the unit where Anderson was housed. (Id.)
Eventually, Anderson was seen by Nurse Gonzalez, who told him that she thought the
“bone” was just a sore tooth. (Id.) When Anderson asked for a second opinion, he was seen by
Dr. John Doe, who believed “the color and texture is consistent with a bone,” stated he would
prescribe antibiotics and pain medication, and referred Anderson to the dental department. (Id.)
Anderson asserts that he did not receive any medication for a week, then went to see the dentist,
and was immediately taken to the hospital. (Id.) He received emergency surgery to remove an
abscess, flush his system with antibiotics, and insert a new plate into his neck. (Id.)

After being sent back to Riverside and placed in protective custody, on July 24, 2025,
“C.O. Goode pepper sprayed [Anderson] after [a] short dispute and without warning.” (Id. at
20.) Anderson states that he was seated “near [the] medication area waiting to request pain
medication, when Goode ordered him to return to his cell, leading to the “brief dispute,” then
“suddenly pepper spray[ed]” him. (Id.) Anderson asserts that C.O. Rosa witnessed the incident
and that “there was never any . . . need to assault or restrain [him].” (Id.) Goode claimed that
Anderson had “threatened to spit on her,” which Anderson alleges indicates that the incident was
“obvious retaliation for [the] previous issue with C.O. Bolden,” because Goode and Bolden were
the only officers who had ever accused him of spitting or threatening to spit on them. (Id.)
Anderson had ongoing problems receiving his medical diet over a period of months, both
at Riverside and at Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility (“CFCF”). (See generally id. at 20-
31.) In August 2025, his “medical diet was changed without instruction from [his] doctor,” and
he asserts that he complained to corrections staff who “followed up” with kitchen staff members

Littlejohn and Teesa, and he “wrote sick call about health issues to no avail,” but never received
“physical proof or documentation to explain [the] change in [his] medical diet.” (Id. at 21.) He
was escorted to the medical department by Sgt. Rivera-Robinson, “but medical staff also refused
to provide documentation to prove diet.” (Id.) When Anderson asked for “medical staff more
capable of resolving [the] issue[,] Sgt. Rivera-Robinson intervened[,] saying ‘You’re not getting
any change or help with your diet, let it go, you wouldn’t have these problems if you weren’t in
CFCF running your mouth and getting your jaw broke.’” (Id.) In September 2025, Anderson
spoke to CO Brown about his diet, and Brown contacted kitchen staff member Hill, who reported
that Anderson no longer was listed for a special diet. (Id. at 22.) Anderson spoke to Lt. Hill,
who told him that he would not receive a special diet if the kitchen did not have instructions to

provide one. (Id.)
In October 2025, Anderson went to sick call at CFCF on two occasions about his diet.
(Id. at 23.) Anderson asserts that he was “prescribed soft diet by [the] outside hospital doctor,”
but the prison medical staff, specifically Dr. Sobers, placed him on a “soft snack diet.” (Id.
(emphasis added).) Anderson states that “the difference is known,” but he makes only vague
references to the nutritional inadequacy of a “snack” without describing the difference between
“soft diet” and “soft snack diet.” (Id. at 23, 27.) In December 2025, while he was in the RHU,
Anderson again had difficulty receiving his diet, which he attributes to C.O. Jones. (Id. at 27.)
He received responses to his grievances about the issue in early December, but he alleges that
Sgt. Kilson withheld a “written response” from medical staff that he claims would make it
“easier to obtain written diet,” but when he appealed Kilson’s decision, Lt. McKenzie told him
that he “was not supposed to receive the response.” (Id. at 22.) Another response from Deputy
Warden J.S. stated that Anderson was in fact receiving a “soft diet,” but Anderson asserts that

“the tag on [his] diet bag [said] diet soft snack.” (Id. at 27 (emphasis added).) He states that
sometime around December 29, 2025, “the label of the diet was changed and the wrong
prescribed diet at least began to be fully provided.” (Id. at 30.) Even after this change, “C.O.
Brapham would leave [Anderson’s] diet in [the] security booth,” and his “shakes would be hot
and spoil quickly.” (Id.)
B. Access to Law Library, Attorney, and Protective Custody
Anderson also details numerous issues concerning his court proceedings, including
access to the law library and his attorneys, as well as his requests for protective custody to avert
threats based on his criminal charges. (See generally id. at 22-33.) Anderson avers that he was
“sworn in pro se” in state court on April 1, 2025. (Id. at 20.) He also refers to having two “court

appointed lawyers” as “standby counsel” for his criminal case. (Id. at 26.) Publicly available
state court records indicate that Anderson was tried and convicted in December 2025, and
sentenced in February 2026, on charges of unlawful sexual contact with a minor, corruption of
minors, and indecent assault. See Commonwealth v. Anderson, No. CP-51-CR-0000016-2025
(C.P. Phila.) Anderson also states that he “was preparing [a] lawsuit and reaching out to law
firms for representation” in September and October 2025. (Am. Compl. at 22.) The Court notes
that Anderson commenced a separate civil action through counsel in state court in July 2025,
concerning another, earlier assault on him in CFCF; that case was later removed by the
Defendants to this Court and remains pending. See Anderson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 26-
0037 (E.D. Pa.).
Anderson first reports having his legal materials “misplaced by staff” while he was in
PHSW in May and June 2025. (Am. Compl. at 20.) He asserts that during a sick call in October

2025, C.O. Pierce accessed his criminal charges, then shouted insults and threats at him, calling
him “a rapist and a pedophile,” and that someone was likely “gonna kill” him. (Id. at 23.)
Anderson alleges that C.O. Pierce encouraged medical department staff “to deny him medical
care.” (Id.) Later, when he “refused to acknowledge C.O. Pierce[’s] disrespect and authority,”
Sergeants Crawford and Butler “were called in an emergency response to de-escalate issue with
no further incident.” (Id. at 24.) Anderson also alleges that C.O. Allen-Wint disliked and
antagonized him, and that she was involved in a plot to poison him. (Id. at 23-24.) At some
point in November 2025, Anderson “had a blackout and injured his neck,” and Allen-Wint
“refused to call [for a] stretcher,” but emergency staff responded and Sgt. Leca and C.O. Howard
escorted him to medical, where he was treated with a neck brace and muscle relaxer. (Id. at 24.)

Anderson told Leca, Howard, Lieutenant Flippen, and Lieutenant Radtke that, based on a recent
spate of inmate emergencies and what he perceived as threats to his safety by his cellmate,
Allen-Wint, and other inmates because of his status as a charged sex offender, he wanted to
return to protective custody, but he was denied. (Id. at 24-25.) Howard told other inmates that
Anderson was a “snitch,” and made sexual threats to Anderson on two occasions, both of which
Anderson reported to the PREA hotline. (Id. at 25-26.)
On November 21, 2025, inmate Devin Torres approached Anderson, called him a
“snitch” and a “rat,” threatened to beat him up, and snatched a tablet from him. (Id. at 26.) A
fight ensued and Torres “fell down,” then Anderson was handcuffed “without further incident”
and taken to the RHU. (Id.) Anderson asserts that even though his criminal trial was scheduled
to begin in two weeks and he was proceeding pro se with his two appointed attorneys as standby
counsel, Sgt. McManus and C.O. Coley confiscated all his legal documents when he was placed
in the RHU. (Id.) He could not contact standby counsel because those appointed attorneys were

not public defenders and “the law library phone only allowed call to the [Philadelphia] Defenders
Association while [on] punitive status.” (Id.) Counselor DeSoto asserted that his attorneys’
phone numbers were not “in [the] computer which []had [been] confiscated with [Anderson’s]
property.” (Id.) Anderson told Sgt. Kilson that he needed the “legal work in property [because
of his] upcoming trial,” but Kilson responded that he would get his property back when he was
released from the RHU. (Id.) Anderson had a hearing conducted by Captain Prifti on December
1, 2025, where he testified about his issues leading up to the fight with Torres and presented
grievance responses concerning his requests for protective custody, but he was found guilty of
misconduct and sentenced to ten days in the RHU. (Id.)
Anderson asserts that he was scheduled to be released from the RHU on December 5,

2025, but instead he was held for two more days and then denied protective custody again once
he was released. (Id. at 28.) He states that he “showed both Sgt. Abrahms and Lt. Bishop
documentation proving” his scheduled release date and told them both about his upcoming trial
and need for his legal materials, but they did not release him from the RHU until “on or about”
December 8, 2025. (Id.)
Anderson’s criminal trial took place from December 8-11, 2025. See Anderson, No. CP-
51-CR-000016-2025. He alleges that his “phone account was not turned back on for [the] entire
trial.” (Am. Compl. at 28.) He asserts that he was “ultimately . . . denied [his] right to proceed
pro se,” and that he was “found guilty after a hung jury was forced to continue deliberating by
[the] judge after disagreeing [for two] days straight.” (Id.) He states that he “lost [his] trial
because of efforts to prevent him from preparing [his] defense.” (Id.)
C. Events Following Criminal Trial
Two days after his trial, on December 13, Anderson got in a fight with his cellmate Luis

Martinez “because of sex offense charges.” (Id. at 28-29.) When C.O. Austin and Sgt. John Doe
placed Anderson in the RHU, he complained that he was only given an uncovered sponge
mattress, so they gave him trash bags to sleep on. (Id. at 28.) Austin took Martinez’s word over
Anderson’s regarding the fight. (Id. at 29.) Sgt. Isufi took Anderson to medical, where he
asserts that he “received no medical attention,” other than a nurse creating a report stating that
Anderson sustained “no injury,” but also noting a “left hand abrasion and left side jaw pain.”
(Id.) Eventually he got an x-ray for his face but not for his hands, and Dr. Sobers prescribed him
pain medication. (Id. at 30.) Anderson alleges that while he was in the RHU, he “continued to
receive [the] wrong diet and often no diet at all.” (Id.) C.O. Hawkins, Watson, and Brapham
“denied [Anderson his] medical diet on many occasion[s],” and Watson was “especially

reluctant” to help when Anderson complained about his diet. (Id. at 30-31.)
Anderson had another misconduct hearing for the fight with Martinez on December 15,
again overseen by Captain Prifti, and he was denied the opportunity to call a witness, then
sentenced to thirty days in the RHU. (Id. at 29.) C.O. Harris gave him an appeal form, which he
completed the same day, “but there was never a response.” (Id.) He asserts that on this
occasion, his legal materials were not confiscated when his property was searched in the RHU.
(Id.) At the time, Anderson was preparing for his sentencing in his criminal trial and intended to
seek “extraordinary relief” and “still had hopes of proving [his] innocence.” (Id. at 29-30.) He
was only allowed to attend the law library twice in the month that he was in the RHU, and on
multiple occasions C.O. Brapham specifically intervened to deny his scheduled law library time.
(Id. at 30.) Anderson alleges that in February 2026, his legal mail was tampered with, and he did
not receive “transcripts needed to prove perjury and challenge [his] sentencing.” (Id. at 33.)
Anderson alleges various other deprivations during this period in the RHU, for example,

that “C.O. Hawkins denied showers and recreation a few times.” (Id. at 30.) Anderson also
alleges that on December 23, 2025, his inmate account “was charged $50.00 for no clear reason,
without any process or notice of the reason,” and he never received a response to the grievance
he wrote to Sgt. Delhomme about the charge. (Id. at 31.) He also asserts that an unidentified
nurse treated him for a mouth ulcer, told him it would clear up in two weeks, and would not
provide him with pain medication because he had two days remaining on his current prescription
for pain medication. (Id.)
After his release from the RHU, Anderson went for a mental health screening where he
reported hearing voices. (Id. at 32.) The John Doe mental health doctor told him that hearing
voices was not normal, and that he would either have to consent to taking Risperdal or be

involuntarily committed to the mental health unit within PHSW. (Id.) C.O. Austin and C.O.
John Doe 3 were also present and told him to take the medication or he would be taken to a
“rubber room.” (Id.) When Anderson resisted being taken to PHSW, the doctor called an
emergency response unit that included Sgt. Leca and C.O. Washington. (Id.) Eventually,
Anderson agreed to take the Risperdal, and he was returned to his cell block. (Id.) When he
returned to the block, he had “a brief stare down” with C.O. Glenn, who then “scream[ed]” that
Anderson was a rapist and threatened to “get [someone] to rape [him].” (Id.)
Anderson states that he suffers from many lingering medical issues stemming from the
assault by Foster in March 2025 and the failure to properly treat his subsequent infection. (Id. at
33.) As noted above, he asserts thirty-six claims against seventy-four separate Defendants for,
variously, excessive force, deliberate indifference to his medical needs, failure to intervene and
protect him from violence by guards or inmates, denial of access to courts, and retaliation. (Id. at
34-40.) He seeks declaratory relief and unspecified money damages. (Id. at 43.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because the Court granted Anderson leave to proceed in forma pauperis, so 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint or any portion thereof
that fails to state a claim. The Court applies the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,
240 (3d Cir. 1999), that is, whether a complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At the
screening stage, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se Complaint as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, and “ask only whether that complaint, liberally

construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th
366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v.
Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
As Anderson is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the allegations in the Complaint
liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle
even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, “pro se litigants still must allege
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245). An
unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules that
apply to all other litigants.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Anderson seeks a declaration that his rights were violated. (Am. Compl. at 43.) As
explained in the Court’s Memorandum dismissing the original Complaint, see Anderson, 2026
WL 1079849, at *4, declaratory relief is unavailable to adjudicate past conduct, see Corliss v.
O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is
inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that
one party is liable to another.”); see also Andela v. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 569 F. App’x
80, 83 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgments are meant to define the legal rights
and obligations of the parties in the anticipation of some future conduct.”). A declaratory
judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200
F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz, No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628, at *2

(3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal
rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing
harm.”). Accordingly, Anderson’s request for declaratory judgment is dismissed.
B. Pleading and Joinder of Claims and Parties
The Court’s prior Memorandum described Anderson’s original Complaint “as a ‘kitchen
sink’ or ‘shotgun’ complaint because it essentially seeks to bring ‘every conceivable claim
against every conceivable defendant.’” Anderson, 2026 WL 1079849, at *4-5 (citations
omitted). The Court explained that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20 are “not a
license to join unrelated claims and defendants in one lawsuit,” and that courts “have frowned on
prisoners’ attempts to lump together their multifarious grievances about life in a single prison.”
Id. at *5 (citations omitted). The Court warned Anderson that some of his claims could be
severed if he joined unrelated claims against unrelated parties. Id. In response, he added another
fifty-eight defendants and nineteen claims. For the reasons in this Memorandum, some of those

claims will be dismissed, and Anderson will not be granted leave to amend. As to the remaining
claims, the Court again notes that severance may become necessary, but in the interest of
expedient service of process and responsive pleading, this action will proceed in its current form
at this stage.
C. Constitutional Claims
Anderson asserts violations of his constitutional rights. The vehicle by which federal
constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs” to be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also
Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Each Government
official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677) (emphasis in original)); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir.
2020) (“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)). “Because vicarious liability
is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676. “Although a court can infer that a defendant had contemporaneous knowledge
of wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a case, the knowledge must be actual,
not constructive.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dept. of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing
Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201 n.6).

1. Excessive Force and Failure to Intervene
Anderson alleges claims of excessive force against Defendants Bolden and Foster, Jr.,
related to the events of March 8, 2025, and alleges that Defendants Mendez and C.O. John Doe 1
failed to intervene to stop Foster’s use of force. (See Am. Compl. at 34.) The Court’s prior
Memorandum explained that excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees are analyzed
under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, applying an objective
standard. See Anderson, 2026 WL 1079849, at *6-7 (citing, inter alia, Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
576 U.S. 389, 400-01 (2015); Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir.
2021)). For a pretrial detainee to state an excessive force claim, he must allege plausibly that
“that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”

Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97. The following circumstances “may bear on the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the force used: the relationship between the need for the use of force and the
amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper
or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably
perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. at 397.
As to Defendant Bolden, the Court previously dismissed Anderson’s claims related to her
spitting on him because he had not sufficiently alleged that she “purposely or knowingly” used
force against him in a way that “was objectively unreasonable.” Anderson, 2026 WL 1079849,
at *7 (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97). Given the additional details in Anderson’s factual
allegations in the Amended Complaint concerning the circumstances of Bolden’s acts, the Court
concludes that Anderson has stated a claim to relief, and the claim will proceed. As to
Defendant Foster, Jr., Anderson alleges that Foster punched him in the face repeatedly while he
was handcuffed, caused his head to hit a wall and doorframe, and knocked him to the ground,

which led to injuries to his head and jaw that required emergency medical attention. (See Am.
Compl. at 16-17.) These allegations state a claim to relief and will proceed.
As to Defendants Mendez and Doe 1, Anderson alleges that they were following Foster at
a distance of about three feet and then held open the door to the medical area where Foster
assaulted him, but they “just watched [the] assault.” (Am. Compl. at 16.) In the context of an
arrestee, “a police officer has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect a victim from another
officer’s use of excessive force.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002). The
Supreme Court has held that there is no material difference in the analysis of excessive force
claims for arrestees under the Fourth Amendment and pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 594 U.S. 464, 466 n.2 (2021); see also Jacobs

v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 195 n.6 (3d Cir. 2021) (noting the standards are “almost
identical”); see also Smith, 293 F.3d at 650 (applying same standard to prison officials). Because
“[t]he law does not allow either [police officers or corrections officers] to condone or cover up
the use of excessive force,” the relevant question is whether Mendez “ignored a realistic
opportunity to intervene” in Foster’s assault. Smith, 293 F.3d at 651-52. The Court concludes
that Anderson has sufficiently stated a claim against Defendants Mendez and Doe 1.
Anderson also lodges a claim of excessive force against C.O. Goode for pepper spraying
him “without warning” on July 24, 2025. (Am. Compl. at 20, 36.) Anderson alleges that he was
seated near the medication area and refused Goode’s directive to return to his cell, then she
pepper sprayed him without warning and claimed that he had threatened to spit on her. (Id. at
20.) Accepting Anderson’s allegations as true, the Court concludes that Anderson has stated a
claim to relief as to C.O. Goode. See Drummond v. Angelucci, No. 23-4767, 2024 WL 2136284,
at *8 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2024) (permitting excessive force claim to proceed past screening where

pretrial detainee alleged he was “needlessly sprayed [ ] in the face with pepper spray when he
requested to speak to a superior officer”); Baker v. Crookus, No. 21-4615, 2021 WL 5711830, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2021) (permitting excessive force claim to proceed past screening where
plaintiff alleged correctional officer’s use of pepper spray was “wholly unprompted and that
lesser measures may have been appropriate”).
2. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
Anderson asserts numerous claims for deliberate indifference to his medical needs. As a
pretrial detainee, the Fourteenth Amendment governs his claims. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399
F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). The standard for claims related to a prisoner’s medical needs is
essentially the same under either the Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment for purposes

of the analysis. See Moore v. Luffey, 767 F. App’x 335, 340 n.2 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Natale v.
Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003)); Parkell v. Morgan, 682 F.
App’x 155, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
a. Claims Related to Diet
The bulk of Anderson’s deliberate indifference claims relate to the provision of a “soft
food” diet that he asserts was prescribed from him by an outside doctor after the surgery on his
jaw. Deliberate indifference to medical needs “can include deprivation of medically appropriate
meals.” Walker v. Hensley, No. 08-0685, 2009 WL 5064357, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2009)
(first citing Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1983); then citing Laufgas v. Speziale,
No. 04-1697, 2006 WL 2528009, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2006)). “Whether an inmate has a
legitimate, medically prescribed diet is a question wholly within the province of the prison
administration.” Laufgas, 2006 WL 2528009, at *5 (citation omitted). “There is a cognizable
claim under § 1983 when prison officials are aware of the detainee’s need for a special diet,” but

fail to provide it. Jones v. Artis, No. 13-5734, 2015 WL 3622695, at *3 (D.N.J. June 10, 2015)
(cleaned up) (first quoting Laufgas, 2006 WL 2528009, at *5; then citing Walker, 2009 WL
5064357, at *10). Anderson was also “entitled to a nutritionally adequate diet.” Tapp v. Proto,
718 F. Supp. 2d 598, 621 (E.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d, 404 F. App’x 563 (3d Cir. 2010); see generally
Duran v. Merline, 923 F. Supp. 2d 702, 719-722 (D.N.J. 2013) (discussing claims of
nutritionally inadequate diet in the context of pretrial detainees).
Anderson alleges that C.O. Jones was the “kitchen officer” at Riverside and was
responsible for “special diets and meal delivery,” and failed to provide his prescribed diet “on
many occasion[s]” while he was housed in protective custody in April and May 2025. (Am.
Compl. at 18.) He alleges that he complained about missing or damaged items to Defendants

Polliver, Rogers, Johnson, and Allen, but the problems persisted. (Id.) He asserts that between
August and October 2025, his diet was inexplicably changed, and he was not able to get
“documentation” for the change despite his requests to kitchen staff. (Id. at 21.) At that time, he
alleges that Sgt. Rivera-Robinson specifically interfered with his ability to receive his medically
appropriate diet. (Id.) He explains that there was a discrepancy between the “soft diet”
prescribed by the outside doctor and the “soft snack diet” ordered by Dr. Sobers and
intermittently provided to him, which the Court understands Anderson to allege was nutritionally
inadequate. (Id. at 22-23.) He alleges that while he was in the RHU in December 2025,
Defendants Hawkins, Brapham, and Watson were responsible for delivering his meals and
denied him his prescribed diet. (Id. at 27.) The Court will allow Anderson’s claims against
Defendants Jones, Polliver, Rogers, Johnson, Allen, Rivera-Robinson, Sobers, Hawkins,
Brapham, and Watson related to the provision of a medically necessary and nutritionally
adequate diet to proceed to service.

However, Anderson names numerous Defendants and includes factual allegations related
to his medical diet that do not state a claim to relief. His allegations against kitchen staff
members Teesa, Littlejohn, Hill, and various Does do not state a claim to relief because his
allegations do not support an inference that they were specifically aware of his need for a
medical diet and denied it. His allegations also do not support the involvement of Nurse Brown,
Lieutenant Conn, Captain Collins, C.O. Smith, C.O. Lewis, Sergeant Louise, C.O. Ross, C.O.
Brown, or Dr. Jane Doe in the deprivation of his diet, because his only allegations against these
Defendants are conclusory or suggest that they attempted to assist him. And, as explained in the
Court’s prior memorandum, he cannot state diet-related claims against Defendants Kilson,
McKenzie, Wilson, and Deputy Warden J.S.—or any other unidentified Defendant—based

solely on their involvement in the grievance process. See Anderson, 2026 WL 1079849, at *8
(citing Curtis v. Wetzel, 763 F. App’x 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)).
b. Mental Health Treatment
Anderson brings claims against the Jane Doe mental health doctor who interviewed him
and gave him a choice between involuntary commitment to the mental health wing or taking
Risperdal after he told her that he was hearing voices. (See Am. Compl. at 32, 40.) He further
claims that the doctor violated his right to medical privacy when he allowed the correctional
officers present at his mental health screening to hear and comment on their discussion. (See id.)
“[A] n individual has a constitutionally protected liberty ‘interest in avoiding involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs’—an interest that only an ‘essential’ or ‘overriding’ state
interest might overcome.” Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178-79 (2003) (quoting Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992)). “[A] prison may compel a prisoner to accept treatment

when prison officials, in the exercise of professional judgment, deem it necessary to carry out
valid medical or penological objectives.” Aruanno v. Glazman, 316 F. App’x 194, 195 (3d Cir.
2009) (quoting White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 1990)). Due process is satisfied
where there is a determination that “treatment with antipsychotic medication [is] medically
appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [a detainee]’s
own safety or the safety of others.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 179 (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135).
“[T]he decision of a medical professional to force medicate a prisoner is presumed valid, ‘unless
it is shown to be such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or
standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such
judgment.’” Aruanno, 316 F. App’x, at 195 (quoting White, 897 F.2d at 113). Also, prisoners

“retain a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to privacy in their medical
information.” Webb v. Dep’t of Justice, 117 F.4th 560, 569 n.13 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Doe v.
Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001)). However, not all disclosures of medical information
will violate a prisoner’s right to privacy in his medical information if the disclosure is reasonably
related to a legitimate penological interest. Delie, 257 F.3d at 317 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
Anderson alleges that he voluntarily signed up for an “emergency mental health” referral,
told the doctor at screening that he was hearing voices, and then was forced to choose between
commitment or medication, while C.O.s were present. (Am. Compl. at 31-32.) He states that the
doctor wanted him to take Risperdal, and he told her that he was willing to take a different
medication, loxapine, which he had previously been prescribed,2 but that “he felt fine and just
was upset and needed to speak to mental health.” (Id. at 32.) After a discussion for which
corrections officers were present, Anderson “reluctantly signed” the authorization to take

Risperdal. (Id.)
The Court concludes that Anderson’s allegations do not state a claim to relief. First,
taking his own allegations as true, he voluntarily sought out emergency mental health treatment,
then was given a choice between two alternative treatments, and chose to accept medication
rather than commitment to the mental health wing. Second, Anderson’s factual allegations
reflect only the exercise of the doctor’s professional medical judgment and reasonable safety
measures, not an attempt to forcibly medicate him for improper purposes. Accordingly, this
claim will be dismissed.
c. Claims Related to Other Medical Treatment
Anderson also brings claims related to the treatment of the injury to his jaw, specifically,

the failure to provide him with a medically prescribed mouthwash and wax for the screws in his
mouth, and the lack of care for his complaints that he had a bone protruding from his gums,
which led to an abscess and infection that required emergency treatment. (See Am. Compl. at
19, 35.) The Court concludes that Anderson states valid claims to relief based on his allegations
that C.O. Allen and Nurse Brown ignored his requests for the prescribed mouthwash and his sick
call slips, and that Dr. John Doe diagnosed his problem but then failed to provide antibiotics and

2 Risperdal, generically known as risperdone, and loxapine are both antipsychotic medications
used to treat schizophrenia, among other uses. See Natl’l Libr. of Med., Risperdone,
https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/a694015.html; Loxapine,
https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/a682311.html (both last visited August 10, 2026).
pain medication and delayed his referral to the dentist. See, e.g., Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217,
230 (3d Cir. 2023) (“[P]rison officials may not ‘deny reasonable requests for medical treatment .
. . when such denial exposes the inmate to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual
injury.’” (citation omitted)).

However, Anderson’s allegation that Nurse Gonzalez misdiagnosed the visible bone in
his mouth as a sore tooth, before he received a second opinion, at most amounts to negligence
and therefore fails to state a claim to relief. See Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 141 (3d Cir.
2025) (“Mere negligence, . . . even if it constitutes medical malpractice[,] falls short of deliberate
indifference. So does mere disagreement between the prisoner and medical personnel over the
proper course of treatment.”). Anderson also does not state a claim as to the nurse who denied
him pain medication after she treated his mouth ulcer. See, e.g., Pearson v. Prison Health Serv.,
850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is well established that as long as a physician exercises
professional judgment [her] behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” (citation
omitted)). Nor does he state a claim based on his disagreement with the treatment he received

from Dr. Sobers and various Does after his December 13, 2025 fight with Luis Martinez. See
Montanez, 154 F.4th at 141. And he fails to state a claim based on his allegation that C.O. Allen-
Wint “refused to call [a] stretcher” after his “blackout,” because he does not plead that this
resulted in any delay in treatment, since the “emergency staff responded” and he was then treated
with a muscle relaxer and neck brace. (Am. Compl. at 24.)
3. Failure to Protect from Inmate Violence
Anderson alleges that at various times he asked to be placed in protective custody
because he feared for his life and safety, but his requests were denied. He alleges that officers
endangered his safety by threatening and harassing him in front of other inmates. And he alleges
that he was attacked by two specific inmates. Detainees have “a Fourteenth Amendment right to
‘security from physical assault by fellow prisoners.’ Thus prisons have a duty to protect inmates
from other inmates’ violence.” Hightower v. City of Philadelphia, 130 F.4th 352, 356 (3d Cir.
2025) (first quoting Davidson v. O’Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 821 (3d Cir. 1984); then citing Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). “A prison violates that duty if it (1) creates conditions that
pose a substantial risk of serious harm and (2) is deliberately indifferent to inmate health or
safety.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The Court previously noted that, in
accordance with the weight of authority, such claims are best analyzed under an objective
standard. See Anderson, 2026 WL 1079849, at *8 n.6 (citations omitted).
However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates
into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834. A prison official demonstrates deliberate indifference to the risk of inmate-on-
inmate violence if, before an attack, the official knows an inmate faces “an excessive risk of
harm” from another prisoner but does nothing to prevent the assault. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d

352, 369 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Hightower, 130 F.4th at
357. Deliberate indifference may also exist if, when an attack occurs, an official has “a realistic
and reasonable opportunity to intervene” but “simply refuse[s] to do so.” Id. at 371 (quoting
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002)).
a. Protective Custody
The Court dismissed the failure-to-protect claims in Anderson’s original Complaint
largely because he only made vague references to fear based on his unspecified criminal charges
and conclusory statements about his requests for protection. See Anderson, 2026 WL 1079849,
at *9. The Court now understands Anderson to allege that because he was charged with crimes
related to the sexual abuse of a minor, and because of events he witnessed involving attacks on
other inmates, he had a fear of harm from other inmates that he communicated directly to C.O.
Leca, C.O. Howard, Lieutenant Flippen, and Lieutenant Radtke and requested they place him in
protective custody, but his requests were denied. (See Am. Compl. at 24-25, 37-38.) These

claims are sufficient to proceed.
Anderson does not plausibly allege the involvement of C.O. Watkins in his failure-to-
protect claims, nor does he allege that any specific Defendant had a realistic opportunity to
intervene in the actual assaults he suffered at the time they occurred and failed to do so.
Anderson states in conclusory fashion that Sgt. Abrahms and Lt. Bishop “did not allow
protective custody” but includes no facts to support that allegation, (see id. at 28), and so fails to
state a claim to relief against them for failure to protect. Similarly, he asserts that Captain Prifti
“failed to protect [him] from inmate assault on [two] occasions,” (see id. at 38), but his only
factual allegations as to Captain Prifti are about Prifti’s conducting his misconduct proceedings
on December 1 and 15, 2025, discussed below. These claims will be dismissed.

b. Verbal Threats and Harassment
Anderson also asserts that Defendants Pierce, Howard, Glenn, Allen-Wint, Flippen, and
Coleman verbally abused or him in front of other inmates about his criminal charges or
“conspired” to do so such that it exposed him to dangerous conditions from other inmates. (See
id. at 37, 40.) Anderson makes specific allegations that, in front of other inmates, Pierce openly
discussed his criminal charges, called him a rapist and a pedophile, and said that someone was
“gonna kill” him. (Id. at 23.) He alleges that Howard called him a snitch in front of other
inmates, and also made sexually harassing comments on two occasions, during one of which
Howard rested his hand on Anderson’s buttocks and threatened to sexually assault him. (Id. at
25.) Anderson then was in fact involved in an altercation with another inmate, Devin Torres,
who called him a snitch and a rat, and then another altercation with cellmate Luis Martinez
“because of [Anderson’s] sex offense.” (Id. at 26, 29.) He also alleges that Glenn called him a
rapist and threatened to get someone to rape him. (Id. at 32.) The Court concludes that these

allegations state a claim to relief. See Dongarra v. Smith, 27 F.4th 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2022) (“It is
obvious that branding Dongarra a sex offender could make him a target of prison violence.”); see
also Hullum v. Adams, 827 F. Supp. 3d 220, 226 (D. Mass. 2026) (collecting cases concerning
“the physical dangers posed by a prison official labeling an inmate a ‘snitch,’ ‘sex offender,’ or
similar derogatory terms” and citing, inter alia, Dongarra, 27 F.4th at 179); Sanchez v. Nassau
County, 662 F. Supp. 3d 369, 406-411 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (denying summary judgment on
defendant corrections officer’s claim of qualified immunity from failure-to-protect claim that he
identified pretrial detainee as a snitch prior to his assault); cf. E. D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 307
(3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that a pretrial detainee has a Fourteenth Amendment right to “not be
sexually assaulted by a state employee while in confinement” (citation omitted)).

His allegation against Allen-Wint is a conclusory statement that she expressed “dislike”
for him for personal reasons, so he fails to state a claim to relief against her. (Am. Compl. at 24).
And his allegations about Flippen and Coleman are conclusory or, at best, raise their
involvement in recording the incident after the fact. (See, e.g., id. at 32.) Accordingly,
Anderson’s claims against them will be denied in this respect, although his claims against
Lieutenant Flippen related to the denial of his requests for protective custody will proceed for the
reasons discussed above.
5. Access to Courts and Attorney
In dismissing Anderson’s original Complaint, the Court concluded that any claims related
to his access to the courts or communication with his attorney was not sufficiently well pleaded
because “his factual detail is limited and confusing.” See Anderson, 2026 WL 1079849, at *10-

11. Anderson now makes more detailed factual allegations that he was “sworn in pro se” in his
criminal case on April 1, 2025, that he was appointed two standby attorneys to advise him who
were not public defenders, and that he was “ultimately . . . denied [his] right to proceed pro se.”
(Am. Compl. at 20, 26, 28.) He alleges that he was both denied access to the law library and
unable to use the phone to contact his standby counsel because their contact information was
among the legal materials confiscated from him, and the phone was only available to contact the
public defenders’ office. (Id. at 28.) Anderson also makes allegations concerning the
curtailment of his access to the law library when he was seeking to prepare arguments for his
sentencing. (Id. at 29-30.) Anderson was housed in the RHU in the days leading up to his
December 2025 trial, and then again after his trial for another month, when he suffered these

alleged deprivations.
The docket in Anderson’s criminal case contains an entry of appearance on his behalf on
April 1, 2025, by John A. Marroletti, another on September 4, 2025, by Jules Norris Szanto, and
then a third during his direct appeal proceedings on March 18, 2026, by Geroge Yacoubian. See
Anderson, No. CP-51-CR-0000016-2025. The docket also does not contain any mention of a
Grazier hearing3 to determine Anderson’s ability to proceed pro se until after his sentencing,
when his appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court included an order on May 19, 2026,

3 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (1998).
remanding to the trial court to conduct such a hearing after Attorney Yacoubian moved to
withdraw. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Anderson, 525 EDA 2026 (Pa. Super. Ct.)
“Under the Sixth Amendment, a pretrial detainee has a right to utilize counsel to defend
against a criminal case that the state has brought against him.” Prater v. City of Philadelphia,

No. 11-1618, 2015 WL 3456659, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 2015) (on remand) (citing Benjamin v.
Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 186 (2d Cir. 2001)). With respect to restrictions on attorney contact with
clients, “the Supreme Court has held that inmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek and
receive the assistance of attorneys and that prison regulations and practices that unjustifiably
obstruct the availability of professional representation are invalid.” Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 184
(cleaned up) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974)). Thus, where an
institutional restriction impedes a pretrial detainee’s access to criminal counsel, “the practice
must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison administration, safeguarding
institutional security.” Id. at 187 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). A prison
regulation restricting a pretrial detainee’s contact with his attorney will be unconstitutional where

it “unreasonably burden[s] the inmate’s opportunity to consult with his attorney and to prepare
his defense.” Id. (quoting Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 133 (2d Cir. 1978)).
A claim of unreasonable interference with Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
require a showing of actual injury. See Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 185 (pretrial detainee has standing
to assert unreasonable interference with Sixth Amendment right even if the interference did not
result in “actual injury”). Although the Third Circuit has not ruled on this issue in a published
opinion, the court in Prater noted that district court had failed to address prisoner’s Sixth
Amendment interference with right to counsel claim and disagreed with district court’s implicit
conclusion that the claim required a showing of actual injury. Prater, 542 F. App’x at 139, n.5
(affirming in part on alternate basis) (citing Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 185). Generally speaking, a
pretrial detainee’s right to access the courts to defend against pending criminal charges is
satisfied by providing access to either a law library or the assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Diaz v.
Holder, 532 F. App’x 61, 63 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (first citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.

817, 831 (1977); then citing Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1042 (3d Cir.1988); and then
citing Degrate v. Godwin, 84 F.3d 768, 768-69 (5th Cir.1996)).
Taking Anderson’s allegations as true, the Court concludes that, because he alleges that
he was denied both access to the law library and access to his court-appointed counsel, he has
stated a claim to relief. Specifically, he alleges the personal involvement of Defendants Coley,
McManus, Kilson, Abrahms, Bishop, and Brapham in these claims, and they will proceed.
However, he does not state a claim for deprivation of his access to the law library by Defendants
Thomas, Cook, and Smith during his time in the PHSW in March 2025, because that occurred
before he alleges that he was “sworn in pro se” in his criminal case.4

4 As noted above and in the Court’s prior Memorandum, Anderson commenced a separate civil
action through counsel in state court in July 2025, concerning another, earlier assault on him in
CFCF; that case was later removed by the Defendants to this Court and remains pending. See
Anderson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 26-0037 (E.D. Pa.). Although he does not directly
reference that case or any other civil cases in the Amended Complaint, to the extent that his
claims about access to the courts or his lawyer concern civil claims stemming from purported
injuries he sustained while in detention or other conditions of confinement—as opposed to his
criminal proceedings—such claims fall outside the scope of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. “Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners [and pretrial detainees] retain
a right of access to the courts.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).
“A prisoner making an access-to-the-courts claim [under the First and Fourteenth Amendments]
is required to show that the denial of access caused actual injury,” Jackson v. Whalen, 568 F.
App’x 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996)),
and that the injury is traceable to the conditions of which he complains, see Diaz v. Holder, 532
F. App’x 61, 63 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of denial of access claims
where plaintiff failed to tie alleged deficiencies in library to harm in underlying action). So, such
access-to-courts claims arise “in two types of cases, challenges (direct or collateral) to . . .
sentences and conditions of confinement.” Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205; Shane v. Fauver, 209 F.
App’x 87, 89 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[T]he actual injury requirement is not met by every
6. Misconduct Reports and Misconduct Proceedings
Anderson lodges claims against numerous Defendants related to his misconduct
proceedings that were based on purportedly false misconduct reports. “Generally, prisons may
sanction a pretrial detainee for misconduct that he commits while awaiting trial, as long as it is

not a punishment for the ‘underlying crime of which he stands accused.’” Kanu v. Lindsey, 739
F. App’x 111, 116 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1003-06 (7th Cir.
1999)). “[T]he imposition of disciplinary segregation [on pretrial detainees] for violation of
prison rules and regulations cannot be imposed without providing the due process protections set
forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).” Kanu, 739 F. App’x at 116. Such
protections “include the right to receive written notice of the charges at least 24 hours before the
hearing, the opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and a written statement
of the reasons for the disciplinary action taken and the supporting evidence.” Id. (citing Wolff,
418 U.S. at 563-66); see also Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 70 (3d Cir. 2007). “[T]he filing
of a fraudulent misconduct report and related disciplinary sanctions do not without more violate

due process,” Seville v. Martinez, 130 F. App’x 549, 551 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam), and “[d]ue
process is satisfied where an inmate is afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend against

type of frustrated legal claim; constitutional protections are applied only to a prisoner’s direct or
collateral attack on his or her sentence, or challenges to prison conditions”). In general, an actual
injury occurs when a prisoner demonstrates that a “nonfrivolous” and “arguable” claim was lost
because of the denial of access to the courts. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).
“[T]he underlying cause of action, . . . is an element that must be described in the complaint.”
Id. Furthermore, the right to access the courts may be satisfied if the plaintiff has an attorney.
Diaz, 532 F. App’x at 63 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 831 (1977) and Peterkin v.
Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1042 (3d Cir. 1988)); see also Prater v. City of Philadelphia, 542 F.
App’x 135, 137 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Anderson does not describe any civil claim that
he was unable to bring, and he is represented by counsel in case number 26-0037 in this Court.
So, as was true of his original Complaint, Anderson fails to describe any actual injury resulting
from alleged interference with his ability to bring a civil case, so he has failed to state a claim.
the allegedly false misconduct reports,” Thomas v. McCoy, 467 F. App’x 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2012)
(per curiam); see also Smith, 293 F.3d at 654 (“[S]o long as certain procedural requirements are
satisfied, mere allegations of falsified evidence or misconduct reports, without more, are not
enough to state a due process claim.”).

Anderson alleges that Captain Prifti conducted both of his misconduct hearings.
Anderson makes no allegations of procedural improprieties at the December 1, 2025 hearing.
(See Am. Compl. at 8.) At the second hearing, on December 15, 2025, Prifti denied Anderson
the opportunity to present a witness from the neighboring cell who heard the entire altercation
between Anderson and his cellmate Luis Martinez. (Id. at 29.) The Court understands Anderson
to assert that the witness could have been able to rebut C.O. Austin’s alleged fabrication in the
misconduct report that Anderson attacked Martinez while he was sleeping. (See id.) Prifti found
Anderson guilty of misconduct and told Anderson he had also found Martinez not guilty. (Id.)
Given the allegation that Austin fabricated the misconduct report and Prifti denied Anderson the
opportunity to call a rebuttal witness, thus denying him the opportunity to be heard, the Court

will allow the due process claims against these two Defendants to proceed. All other claims
related to misconduct reports or proceedings will be dismissed.
7. SHOWERS AND RECREATION.
Anderson alleges that at times when he was in the PHSW, protective custody, or the
RHU, he was occasionally denied showers or recreation. The denial of showers and exercise for
short periods does not constitute the type of serious deprivation that amounts to a constitutional
violation. See, e.g., Fortune v. Hamberger, 379 F. App’x 116, 122 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Fortune
complained of his inability to adequately shower and exercise for a period of fifteen days.
Although it is not clear how many times Fortune believes that he should have been permitted to
engage in those activities in addition to the time he was already given to do so, he does not allege
that he suffered any harm as a result of the denial of additional showers and exercise.”); Coleman
v. Hodges, No. 18-1152, 2018 WL 6618459, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 6618408 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2018) (“[B]eing denied

a shower for four days does not constitute a serious enough deprivation of sufficient duration to
establish a constitutional violation”) (citing cases); Barndt v. Wenerowicz, No. 15-2729, 2016
WL 6612441, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2016), aff’d, 698 F. App’x 673 (3d Cir. 2017) (denial of
showers and out of cell exercise for twenty-eight days did not violate Eighth Amendment when
plaintiff did not suffer ill effects and had access to running water in his cell); Barnes v. County of
Monroe, 85 F. Supp. 3d 696, 738 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (“To the extent Plaintiff alleges that his
inability to shower over the course of four days constitutes a constitutional deprivation, his claim
must fail. Even a two-week suspension of shower privileges does not constitute a denial of
‘basic hygienic needs.’” (quoting McCoy v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 233, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also has acknowledged that

when considering whether a deprivation of outdoor exercise amounts to a substantial deprivation,
courts should consider the totality of the circumstances, including, but not limited to, the length
of the deprivation, the availability of recreation within the cell, and whether the inmate suffered
any ill health effects as a result of the deprivation. Barndt, 698 F. App’x at 677 (citing Wishon v.
Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992); Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1086 (6th Cir.
1995); Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1983)).
Anderson’s allegations of occasional deprivations of recreation and showers, with no
connection to any resulting harm, fail to state a claim to relief.
8. Retaliation
Finally, Anderson repeatedly alleges that, since he filed voluminous grievances based on
the Defendants’ conduct, any and all of their actions constitute retaliation for protected conduct.
(See generally Am. Compl. at 34-40.) “Absent supporting facts that make it reasonable to draw

an inference of retaliation, . . . conclusory assertions of a cause-and-effect relationship between
specific protected activities and a later adverse action are insufficient to plead causation.” Oliver
v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 195 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted); see also Wallace v. Pa. Dep’t of
Corr., No. 24-152, 2025 WL 1568665, at *7 (W.D. Pa. June 3, 2025) (“Where every defendants’
action can obviously be explained without supposition of a retaliatory motive, some concrete
basis for retaliation must be alleged to state a plausible claim. . . . Wallace makes a classic
circular argument: there must have been a retaliatory motive behind any actions by the
defendants because a retaliatory motive would explain any actions by the defendants. Using the
word ‘retaliation’ or some form thereof does not allege retaliation.”). The Court concludes that
Anderson’s boilerplate, conclusory repetition that the Defendants retaliated against him for

protected conduct because he is a prolific filer of grievances fails to state a claim to relief.
9. Official Capacity Claims
Anderson alleges that he is suing all Defendants in their official and individual capacities.
Claims against City officials named in their official capacity are indistinguishable from claims
against the City. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits
. . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55
(1978)). “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit
against the entity.” Id.
To state a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s
policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575,
583-84 (3d Cir. 2003). The plaintiff “must identify [the] custom or policy, and specify what
exactly that custom or policy was” to satisfy the pleading standard. McTernan v. City of York,
564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). “It is well-settled that, if there is no violation in the first place,
there can be no derivative municipal claim.” See Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706
F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (if a
municipal employee “inflicted no constitutional injury . . ., it is inconceivable that [the
municipality] could be liable”)).
For the claims determined not to be plausible, any associated Monell is also not plausible.
Among the claims that the Court has determined above will proceed to service, none appear to be

based on the enforcement of a policy or custom. Accordingly, his official capacity claims
against the Defendants are not plausible and will be dismissed without prejudice. The Court will
entertain a future request by Anderson to amend his pleading to reassert an official capacity
claim/Monell claim against the City of Philadelphia, should he be able to cure this defect, but
will not delay service of process at this time.5

5 Anderson’s passing references to various other incidents, such as being given trash bags to
cover his mattress one night and a single purportedly unauthorized withdrawal from his inmate
account, are insufficient to bring a plausible claim before the Court. See Higgins v. Bayada
Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755, 763 (3d Cir. 2023) (“A passing reference to an issue will
not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”) (cleaned up) (quoting Laborers’ Int’l Union of
N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the following claims will proceed:
• Excessive force by Bolden and Foster, and failure to intervene by Mendez and C.O.
John Doe 1;
• Deliberate indifference to medical needs related to the provision of a medically
necessary and nutritionally adequate diet against Jones, Polliver, Rogers, Johnson,
Allen, Rivera-Robinson, Sobers, Hawkins, Brapham, and Watson;
• Deliberate indifference to medical needs based on lack of after-care for mouth
wounds against Allen, Nurse Brown, and Dr. John Doe (identified in Am. Compl. at
10, 19, 35);
• Failure to protect from inmate violence related to the denial of protective custody by
Leca, Howard, Flippen, and Radtke;
• Deliberate indifference to safety through verbal threats and harassment by Pierce,
Howard, and Glenn;
• Denial of access to courts and counsel by Coley, McManus, Kilson, Abrahms,
Bishop, and Brapham; and
• Due process violations related to misconduct proceedings by Prifti and Austin.
The remainder of the claims in Anderson’s Amended Complaint are dismissed on statutory
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for failure to state a claim. Anderson is not granted leave
to amend at this time, and the case will proceed to service. An appropriate order follows.6

6 Anderson’s Motions to Appoint Counsel (ECF Nos. 4 and 13) will be denied without prejudice
to renewal after service is complete and the Defendants have filed responsive pleadings.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423191. Public record. Not legal advice.