# Parvinder Parvinder v. Acting Field Office Director, et al.

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · August 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423170

## Case

- **Full name:** Parvinder Parvinder v. Acting Field Office Director, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** August 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
PARVINDER PARVINDER, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-1477-G
)
ACTING FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, )
et al., )
)
Respondents.1 )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Parvinder Parvinder, a noncitizen2 and Indian national proceeding with
counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), Doc. 1, challenging under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).
United States District Judge Charles B. Goodwin referred this matter to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Doc. 3. The
undersigned set an expedited briefing schedule, Doc. 10, and the Petition is at issue. For
the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant the Petition,
Doc. 1, in part and order Respondents to provide Petitioner a bond hearing pursuant to

1 David J. Venturella was announced as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement in May 2026. He replaces Todd Lyons and is substituted as the proper
respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
2 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days or otherwise to release him if there is no hearing
within that time.

I. Background
Petitioner, a citizen of India, entered the United States on January 17, 2023, without
inspection or admission near Lukeville, Arizona, and was taken into immigration custody.
Pet. at 4-5; Doc. 13-1 at 1 (January 2023 NTA). On January 18, 2023, ICE placed
Petitioner into removal proceedings before the Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a through the issuance of a Notice to Appear and charged him with being

inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States
without inspection. Pet. at 5; Doc. 13-1 at 1. On January 27, 2023, Petitioner was released
on an Order of Release on Recognizance pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Pet. at 5; Doc. 1-2
(Order of Release). On August 15, 2023, Petitioner filed an application for asylum. Pet.
at 5; Doc. 1-3 (Asylum Application).

On November 11, 2025, ICE re-detained Petitioner after taking custody of him
during an operation with the Texas Department of Public Safety at a commercial weigh
station.3 Pet. at 5; Resp. at 2; Doc. 13-4 at 1 (ICE Encounter Summary). Respondents
contend Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Resp. at 3. Petitioner

3 The Petition also alleges Petitioner has been detained since earlier dates of September 24
or 25, 2025, and since a later date of January 1, 2026. Pet. at 14, 16. These alternative
dates appear to have been included in error, considering ICE’s Encounter Summary
confirms Petitioner was re-detained on November 11, 2025. See Doc. 13-4 at 1-2.
Regardless, the undersigned’s analysis is the same whether Petitioner’s current detention
began in September 2025, in November 2025, or in January 2026.
did not allege he previously requested a bond hearing. Such a request, though, would likely
be futile because all Immigration Judges (“IJs”) are subject to the binding precedent of

Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which holds those noncitizens
who entered the country without admission or parole are ineligible for a bond hearing.
On July 14, 2026, an IJ ordered Petitioner removed. See EOIR, Automated Case
Information, at https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (last accessed Aug. 19, 2026). However,
on August 5, 2026, Petitioner appealed the removal order to the Board of Immigration

Appeals, and the appeal currently is pending. Id. Therefore, the removal order is not yet
final under 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1.4
When Petitioner filed his Petition, he was detained at the Diamondback Correctional
Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. Doc. 1-5 (ICE Locator); Pet. at 3; Resp. at 2. He remains
detained there. See ICE Online Detainee Locator System, at

https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last accessed Aug. 19, 2026).

4 Petitioner also alleges he was “granted voluntary departure / entered an order of voluntary
departure” by an IJ on January 24, 2026, for which an “appeal remains pending.” Pet. at
14; see also id. at 2, 3, 11, 16 (each referencing a “pending . . . appeal . . . before the Board
of Immigration Appeals”). Respondents appear to agree an order for voluntary departure
was entered by an IJ, but state they lack “any information on an appeal.” Resp. at 2 n.2.
No evidence regarding voluntary departure has been provided to the Court by any party.
See also Doc. 1-4 (EOIR Automated Case Information) (showing, in the then-current
information provided by Petitioner, no information regarding any decision by an IJ and an
indication that no appeal of an IJ decision had been made). Regardless, an appeal of the
July 2026 removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals remains pending. So, no
final removal order exists either way.
II. Petitioner’s Claims
Petitioner asserts three counts in his Petition.
• Count I: Violation of Due Process. Petitioner alleges his continued
detention without an individualized bond redetermination hearing
violates his right to due process and that Respondents revoked his
previous release in an arbitrary manner, which violates his right to
procedural due process. Pet. at 11-14.
• Count II: Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”). Petitioner alleges his continued detention under
§ 1225(b)(2) is unlawful and violates the INA because that provision
does not apply to noncitizens, like him, who previously entered the
country and have been residing in the United States before being
apprehended and placed in removal proceedings. Pet. at 14-15. He
further alleges his detention is governed by § 1226(a), which entitles
him to a bond hearing. Id.
• Count III: Violation of Due Process. Petitioner alleges his
continued detention without an individualized bond redetermination
hearing violates his right to due process due to prolonged detention,
and that Respondents revoked his previous release in an arbitrary
manner, which violates his right to due process. Id. at 16-17.
He asks the Court to “issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241” and to
“order Respondents to immediately and unconditionally release Petitioner from custody
under the same conditions that existed prior to his detention,” or, alternatively, to “order
Respondents to provide Petitioner with a prompt bond hearing before an Immigration
Judge.” Pet. at 18-19 (citation modified). Petitioner also requests an award of attorneys’
fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).5 Id. at 19.

5 To the extent Petitioner may be entitled to EAJA fees and costs as a prevailing party, he
must seek those separately after a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Thus, the
Court need not address this request at this juncture.
III. Standard of Review
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
IV. Analysis6
A. Section 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention.
The two sections of the INA at issue that govern detention of noncitizens pending

removal proceedings are 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1225(a)(1) describes an
“applicant for admission” as “an alien present in the United States who has not been
admitted or who arrives in the United States.” Id. § 1225(a)(1) (citation modified). Under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a

doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.” If Petitioner is detained under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), he is not entitled to a bond hearing. On the other hand, § 1226(a) more
generally authorizes detention of a noncitizen pending removal proceedings and entitles
the noncitizen to a bond hearing. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018)

6 Petitioner claims he was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing the
Petition. Pet. at 6. Respondents do not dispute Petitioner’s assertion. The undersigned
agrees that Petitioner was not required to exhaust before filing the Petition. See Soberanes,
388 F.3d at 1310 (holding exhaustion requirements do not apply to challenges to
immigration detention brought in habeas proceedings).
(“Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings
at the outset of detention.” (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1))).

Petitioner alleges § 1226(a) governs his current detention because he is not a recent
entrant “arriving” or “applying for admission.” Pet. at 10. Respondents maintain Petitioner
is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A), while recognizing precedent in the Tenth
Circuit “compels a different outcome” than that argued for by Respondents. Resp. at 2-3.
The Tenth Circuit recently rejected the statutory interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) urged

by Respondents and applied § 1226(a) to govern detention of noncitizens like Petitioner.
Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1235-49 (10th Cir. 2026). In Santillan Quiroz,
the Tenth Circuit concluded that “those who entered the United States without admission
and who have lived here since are categorically unable to seek admission while they remain
in the country.” Id. at 1239 (citation modified). Accordingly, “noncitizens who entered
the United States and were thereafter detained in the interior of the country are usually

subject to § 1226(a) (and thus eligible for bond), not § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. at 1237.
Therefore, based on Tenth Circuit precedent and this Court’s prior reasoning in Munoz v.
Holt, No. CIV-25-1190-G, 2026 WL 2200433, at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 30, 2026), the
undersigned recommends the Court apply § 1226(a) to govern Petitioner’s current
detention. See He v. Blanche, No. CIV-26-1435-G, 2026 WL 2296120, at *2 (W.D. Okla.
Aug. 10, 2026) (holding in accordance with Santillan Quiroz that a similarly situated
petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a)).7

Further, Petitioner’s application for asylum does not change the analysis or render
him “seeking admission” and thereby subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A). Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.
4th at 1239 (holding a noncitizen “cannot make a present request for permission to enter
the United States, lawfully or otherwise, once he or she has already entered” and “the only
time a noncitizen can be said to be seeking admission is when he is seeking to enter the

United States at the border” (citation modified)).
B. The proper remedy is a bond hearing.
Petitioner seeks his “immediate[] and unconditional[] release” from custody or,
alternatively, asks that the Court to “order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a prompt
bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.” Pet. at 18-19. The undersigned concludes a
bond hearing is the proper remedy for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(a). See Santillan

7 This conclusion is also in accord with persuasive authority in the First, Second, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which rejected Respondents’ statutory
interpretation of § 1225(b)(2). See Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, Nos. 25-2152, 26-1094, -
-- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 2352042, at *11 (1st Cir. Aug. 13, 2026); Rodriguez Vazquez v.
Bostock, No. 25-6842, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 2196424, at *26 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026);
Cirrus Rojas v. Olson, No. 25-3127, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 2198315, at *2 (7th Cir. July
30, 2026); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1285 (11th
Cir. 2026); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713, 722 (6th Cir. 2026); Barbosa da
Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2026). In contrast, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
recently applied § 1225 to similar habeas challenges, agreeing with Respondents’ position.
Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128, 1134-38 (8th Cir. 2026); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166
F.4th 494, 498, 502-08 (5th Cir. 2026). Respondents have filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court. See Cert. Pet., Raycraft v. Lopez-Campos, No. 25-1415
(filed June 22, 2026); Cert. Pet., Cunha v. Freden, No. 26-104 (filed July 23, 2026).
Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1251 n.13; see also Munoz, 2026 WL 2200433, at *3 (concluding
because § 1226(a) governs petitioner’s detention, “he is entitled to a bond hearing”).

Further, Judges in this District, including this Court, consistently have declined to order
burden shifting. Pet. at 17 (requesting an Order for Respondents to “bear the burden of
justifying continued detention by clear and convincing evidence” (quotation modified));
see, e.g., Sow v. Cerna, No. CIV-26-1376-G, 2026 WL 2302462, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Aug.
10, 2026) (declining to address a petitioner’s burden-shifting claim). Therefore, the Court

should grant the Petition in part and order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond
hearing under § 1226(a) before a neutral IJ within seven days or otherwise release him if
he does not have a lawful bond hearing within that period.8
C. The Court should decline to address Petitioner’s remaining claims.
Petitioner also argues his continued detention without a bond hearing violates his
rights to due process. Pet. at 11-14, 16-17. If the Court grants habeas relief to Petitioner

with a bond hearing under § 1226(a), the undersigned recommends the Court decline to

8 While Judges in this District have ordered release for noncitizens whose earlier release
was improperly revoked, Petitioner has not alleged or provided evidence that the
circumstances of his detention entitle him to release rather than a bond hearing. See Singh
v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-471-SLP, 2026 WL 1255801, at *2 (W.D. Okla. May 7, 2026)
(ordering a bond hearing but not release because petitioner had not provided the Court with
sufficient evidence to establish entitlement to release); accord Singh v. Cerna, No. CIV-
26-1194-J, 2026 WL 2364443, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 14, 2026) (ordering release where
ICE improperly revoked petitioner’s prior bond ordered by an immigration judge); Singh
v. Grant, No. CIV-26-289-R, 2026 WL 1483557, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2026) (same);
Skutar v. Mullin, CIV-26-0036-HE, Doc. 15, at 2-3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 24, 2026) (ordering
petitioner’s release where no changed circumstances existed from when an immigration
judge previously ordered bond).
decide the merits of Petitioner’s due process claims based on his continued detention. See,
e.g., He, 2026 WL 2296120, at *2 (declining to decide a petitioner’s additional due process
claim when adopting the recommended relief of a bond hearing under § 1226(a)).
V. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the Court GRANT in part
the Petition for habeas relief by ordering Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond
hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days or otherwise release Petitioner if he
has not received a lawful bond hearing within that period.
The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed not later than August 27, 2026. See id.
§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Ifa party wishes to respond to the other party’s
objections, such response must be filed not later than September 1, 2026. See Fed. R. Civ.
72(b)(2). Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the factual and
legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. See Moore v. United States,
950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 20® day of August, 2026.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423170. Public record. Not legal advice.