# Davis

> District Court, M.D. Florida · August 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423095

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Paul Davis v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** August 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423095

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

MICHAEL PAUL DAVIS,

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 8:23-cv-2105-CEH-SPF

SECRETARY, Department of Corrections,

Respondent.

/
O R D E R
Michael Paul Davis filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 together with a supporting memorandum of law. (Docs. 1, 2).
Respondent filed a response with supporting exhibits. (Doc. 11). Davis filed a reply
with exhibits. (Doc. 14). Upon consideration, Davis is not entitled to federal habeas
relief.
I. Background and Procedural History
Davis is in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections pursuant to
criminal judgments entered by the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in and
for Pinellas County, Florida. He is serving concurrent twenty-year terms of
imprisonment followed by ten years of sex-offender probation. (Respondent’s Ex. 5).
On March 28, 2016, the State of Florida charged Davis by Information with
three counts of capital sexual battery upon a child under twelve years of age. The
offenses allegedly occurred during a charging period spanning approximately March
2013 through April 2014. (Resp. Ex. 3). Before trial, however, Davis and the State
reached a negotiated resolution under which the State agreed to reduce each count to

attempted capital sexual battery. In exchange, Davis agreed to plead guilty and accept
a negotiated sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment followed by ten years of sex-
offender probation. (Resp. Ex. 4).
At the change-of-plea hearing, defense counsel advised the trial court that he
had discussed the case and the negotiated plea agreement with Davis and that Davis

wished to accept the plea because he believed doing so was in his best interest. (Id. at
4–7). The trial court then conducted a thorough plea colloquy. Davis confirmed under
oath that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation, understood the rights he
would waive by pleading guilty, understood the maximum penalties associated with
the offenses and the negotiated sentence, and was entering the plea freely and

voluntarily. After finding that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
entered and supported by an independent factual basis, the trial court accepted the plea
and imposed the negotiated sentence. (Id. at 7–13.)
Davis appealed his convictions and sentences, and Florida’s Second District

Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed without a written opinion. (Resp. Exs. 6–9).
Following the conclusion of his direct appeal, Davis sought collateral relief in
the state courts. He filed motions to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), which the trial court denied. The Second District
Court of Appeal affirmed. (Resp. Exs. 10–15). Davis subsequently filed an initial and
then an amended motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850, asserting several claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel arising from counsel’s investigation of the case and advice preceding the entry

of his guilty plea. The post-conviction court entered a written order denying relief on
each claim, and the Second District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed without a
written opinion. (Resp. Exs. 17–22).
Davis then filed the present habeas petition under Section 2254, raising four
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the state courts adjudicated each

habeas claim on the merits, this Court reviews Davis’s claims under the deferential
standards prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”).
II. Governing Legal Principles

A. AEDPA
This Court’s review of Davis’s claims is governed by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under AEDPA, a federal court may
not grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies
a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court precedent or reaches a different result
on materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000).

A state court unreasonably applies clearly established federal law only when its
application of Supreme Court precedent is objectively unreasonable, not merely
incorrect. Id. at 409–13.
AEDPA imposes a highly deferential standard of review. Federal habeas relief
functions as “a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice

systems,” not as a substitute for ordinary error correction. Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 102–03 (2011) (quotation omitted). Thus, relief is unavailable unless the state
court’s decision was so lacking in justification that there was no possibility for fair-
minded disagreement. Id. at 103. In evaluating claims previously adjudicated on the

merits, review is generally limited to the record that was before the state court. Cullen
v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Each of Davis’s claims alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel and is
therefore governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail, a

petitioner must establish both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Id. at 687–88. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential. Courts
must avoid the distorting effects of hindsight and indulge a strong presumption that
counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689.
To establish prejudice, a petitioner ordinarily must demonstrate a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Id. at 694. Because both deficient performance and
prejudice are required, a court may reject an ineffective-assistance claim upon
determining that either element has not been established. Id. at 697.

C. Guilty Pleas
Because Davis entered a negotiated guilty plea, the prejudice inquiry is
governed by Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). In that context, a petitioner must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s alleged deficiencies, he
would have rejected the plea agreement and insisted on proceeding to trial. Id. at 59.

A petitioner’s after-the-fact assertion that he would have insisted on trial is not,
standing alone, sufficient to establish prejudice. Rather, that assertion must be
evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea, including
the strength of the State’s case and the likely consequences of proceeding to trial.
D. Double Deference

When a state court has rejected an ineffective-assistance claim on the merits,
federal habeas review is “doubly deferential.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013);
Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. Accordingly, the question is not whether counsel performed
deficiently. Rather, the question is whether the post-conviction court unreasonably
concluded that Davis failed to satisfy Strickland. The Court applies these principles to
each of Davis’s claims below.

III. Discussion
A. Ground One
In Ground One, Davis contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to investigate and interview Dillon Hartley, the victim’s brother.
Davis alleges Hartley resided in the home during the relevant period, routinely awoke

before Davis on school mornings, accompanied Davis to school, never observed Davis
enter victim N.S.’s bedroom, and could have impeached portions of the victim’s
account. According to Davis, had counsel interviewed Hartley and advised him
concerning the significance of that testimony, he would have rejected the negotiated
plea and proceeded to trial.

The state post-conviction court rejected this claim after concluding that
Hartley’s proposed testimony, even assuming it to be true, did not undermine the
factual basis for the offenses charged. (Resp. Ex. 18 at 9–10). The court explained that
Hartley’s observations were confined primarily to school mornings and therefore did
not account for the broader charging period. (Id.). Because the proposed testimony did

not establish that Davis could not have committed the offenses, the court concluded
Davis failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that additional investigation
would have altered his decision to plead guilty. (Id. at 9–10). That determination was
a reasonable application of Strickland and Hill. Although counsel has a duty to conduct
a reasonable investigation, the Sixth Amendment does not require relief whenever
additional evidence can be imagined after a guilty plea. In the plea context, the
dispositive question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
alleged deficiency, the defendant would have rejected the plea and insisted on trial.

The post-conviction court reasonably concluded that Hartley’s testimony would
not have materially strengthened the defense. Even fully crediting Davis’s allegations,
Hartley’s proposed testimony did not foreclose the possibility that the offenses
occurred during times outside his observations. (Resp. Ex. 18 at 10). Thus, the court
reasonably determined that the testimony did not materially diminish the State’s case

or create a reasonable probability that Davis would have chosen trial instead of
accepting the negotiated disposition.
The plea colloquy reinforces that conclusion. Davis confirmed under oath that
he had sufficient time to consult with counsel, was satisfied with counsel’s
representation, understood the rights he was waiving, and wished to plead guilty.

(Resp. Ex. 4). Such sworn declarations carry a strong presumption of verity and weigh
heavily against his present assertion that he would have rejected the plea had counsel
conducted additional investigation.
Considering the limited value of Hartley’s proposed testimony, the substantial
benefit obtained through the negotiated plea, and the doubly deferential review

required by § 2254(d), the Court cannot conclude that the state court’s rejection of this
claim was objectively unreasonable. Ground One, therefore, affords no basis for
federal habeas relief.
B. Ground Two
In Ground Two, Davis contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
advising him that he could plead guilty, later withdraw his plea if he became
dissatisfied, and then pursue a direct appeal. According to Davis, counsel’s erroneous

advice induced him to accept the negotiated plea when he otherwise would have
insisted on proceeding to trial. Davis, therefore, contends his guilty plea was
involuntary.
The state post-conviction court rejected this claim on the merits. It found
Davis’s allegation unpersuasive because the plea colloquy demonstrated that he

knowingly and voluntarily entered the negotiated plea after being fully advised of the
rights he was relinquishing and the consequences of pleading guilty. The court further
concluded Davis failed to establish prejudice because the record did not support his
assertion that, absent counsel’s alleged advice, he would have rejected the plea and
insisted on proceeding to trial. The court also observed that, to the extent Davis

believed he could no longer afford retained counsel, he could have requested
appointment of counsel rather than entering a plea based upon incorrect legal advice.
(Ex. 18 at 8–9.) That determination was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law.
As discussed above, to establish ineffective assistance in the guilty-plea context,

a petitioner must demonstrate both constitutionally deficient performance and a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, he would have rejected the
plea and insisted on proceeding to trial. The post-conviction court reasonably
concluded that Davis failed to satisfy this standard in light of his sworn colloquy and
the absence of objective evidence supporting his present allegations. Although Davis
now alleges counsel advised him that he could withdraw his plea after sentencing if he
became dissatisfied, the contemporaneous plea proceedings substantially undermine

that assertion. During the plea colloquy, Davis confirmed under oath that he had
discussed the case with counsel, understood the negotiated plea agreement and the
rights he was waiving, was satisfied with counsel’s representation, and was entering
the plea knowingly and voluntarily. He further confirmed that no one had forced,
threatened, or improperly induced him to plead guilty. (Resp. Ex. 4.) Such solemn

declarations “carry a strong presumption of verity” and constitute a formidable barrier
to subsequent collateral attacks based upon contrary allegations. Blackledge v. Allison,
431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
The post-conviction court likewise reasonably determined that Davis failed to
establish prejudice. Davis received the benefit of a negotiated disposition that

substantially reduced his sentencing exposure. Nothing in the record compelled the
state court to conclude there was a reasonable probability Davis would have rejected
that agreement and insisted on proceeding to trial had counsel not allegedly advised
him concerning withdrawal of the plea. Davis also has not shown that the state court
acted unreasonably in observing that, if financial concerns truly affected his ability to

continue with retained counsel, he could have sought appointment of counsel rather
than entering an involuntary plea. (Ex. 18 at 8–9.)
Under AEDPA’s doubly deferential standard, fair-minded jurists could agree
with the post-conviction court’s rejection of this ineffective-assistance claim. Davis has
not demonstrated that the state court’s adjudication was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of Strickland and Hill, or rested on an unreasonable
determination of the facts. Ground Two, therefore, warrants no federal habeas relief.

C. Ground Three
In Ground Three, Davis argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to investigate and develop a defense based on his theory that the victim
previously had been abused by another individual, known as “Peanut,” and

psychologically transferred those memories to Davis. He contends counsel should
have investigated the prior abuse, interviewed additional witnesses, retained a
psychological expert, and presented expert testimony concerning psychological
transference. Davis maintains that, had counsel done so, he would have rejected the
plea agreement and proceeded to trial.

The post-conviction court reasonably rejected the claim, finding it rested on
speculation rather than competent evidence. Davis identified no qualified expert who
would have supported the proposed theory, alleged no facts demonstrating that such
testimony actually existed, and failed to establish that the proposed evidence would
have been admissible under Florida law. The court further concluded that Davis had

not shown a reasonable probability that additional investigation would have altered
his decision to plead guilty. (Resp. Ex. 18 at 6–8). That determination survives review
under AEDPA. Strickland does not require counsel to pursue speculative defenses
unsupported by competent evidence, nor does it require a court to assume that
unidentified experts would have supplied favorable testimony. Allegations that an
expert might have supported a defense are insufficient to establish deficient
performance or prejudice.
The post-conviction court also reasonably considered the limits imposed by

Florida evidentiary law in evaluating the viability of Davis’s proposed defense.
Whether evidence concerning the victim’s prior abuse would have been admissible is
principally a matter of state law. A federal habeas court does not reexamine a state
court’s determination of state-law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68
(1991). The relevant federal question is whether the resulting application of Strickland

was objectively unreasonable. Davis has not made that showing.
Davis also has not demonstrated Hill prejudice. Even assuming counsel had
pursued the additional investigation Davis proposes, the post-conviction court
reasonably concluded that he failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would

have rejected the negotiated plea and insisted on trial. The plea colloquy reflects that
Davis knowingly accepted a negotiated disposition after consulting with counsel, and
nothing in the record renders the state court’s contrary conclusion unreasonable.
Because fair-minded jurists could agree with the post-conviction court’s resolution of
this ineffective-assistance claim, Section 2254(d) precludes relief. Ground Three is,

therefore, denied.
D. Ground Four
In Ground Four, Davis contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to investigate and advise him concerning the five additional
charges the State intended to file if he rejected the negotiated plea offer. He alleges
counsel failed to explain the nature of those charges, including their elements, dates,
locations, and factual circumstances, and improperly relied on the State’s intention to
pursue those charges to induce him to plead guilty. According to Davis, had counsel

adequately investigated and advised him concerning the additional charges, he would
have rejected the negotiated plea and proceeded to trial.
The state post-conviction court rejected this claim on the merits. It concluded
that the record refuted Davis’s allegation that counsel failed to explain the additional
charges or improperly coerced him into pleading guilty. The court noted that, during

the plea colloquy, Davis confirmed that no one was forcing or coercing him to enter
the plea, although he acknowledged that the State’s intention to pursue additional
charges influenced his decision. The court further found that counsel accurately
advised Davis that the State intended to file five additional charges if he rejected the
plea offer. It also relied on Davis’s contemporaneous motion to withdraw his plea, in

which he acknowledged that he knew the State intended to charge three additional
counts of capital sexual battery and two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation.
Finally, the court concluded that counsel could not have advised Davis on the specific
factual details of those offenses because the State had no obligation to provide
discovery regarding charges that had not yet been filed. (Ex. 18 at 5.)

That determination was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of
Strickland and Hill. The post-conviction court reasonably concluded that Davis’s own
contemporaneous filings substantially undermined his present allegations. Although
Davis now asserts that counsel failed to explain the nature of the proposed charges,
his motion to withdraw the plea demonstrates that he understood the State intended
to pursue three additional counts of capital sexual battery and two counts of lewd or
lascivious molestation if plea negotiations failed. (Resp. Ex. 18 at 5). The state court

reasonably relied upon that contemporaneous filing in concluding that Davis’s present
assertions were unsupported by the record.
The post-conviction court likewise reasonably rejected Davis’s contention that
counsel performed deficiently by failing to explain the specific dates, locations, and
circumstances of the uncharged offenses. As the state court observed, the State was

not required to provide discovery concerning offenses that had not yet been charged.
(Resp. Ex. 18 at 5). Counsel, therefore, could not reasonably be expected to advise
Davis regarding factual details the State was not yet obligated to disclose. Counsel also
does not render ineffective assistance by accurately advising a defendant of the risks
attendant to rejecting a negotiated plea offer, including the possibility that the State

will pursue additional supported charges. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–
65 (1978). On this record, the post-conviction court reasonably concluded Davis failed
to establish deficient performance.
Nor did the post-conviction court unreasonably reject Davis’s claim of
prejudice. The plea colloquy reflects that Davis knowingly and voluntarily accepted

the negotiated plea after consulting with counsel and understanding the consequences
of his decision. The post-conviction court further noted that the victim had reported
more than fifty incidents of sexual abuse, while Davis was charged with only three
counts of capital sexual battery before the plea agreement. (Resp. Ex. 18 at 6). Thus,
the record supported counsel’s advice that the State intended to pursue additional
charges if negotiations proved unsuccessful. Under these circumstances, the post-
conviction court reasonably concluded that Davis failed to demonstrate a reasonable

probability that, absent counsel’s alleged deficiencies, he would have rejected the
negotiated plea and insisted on proceeding to trial.
Under AEDPA’s doubly deferential standard, fair-minded jurists could agree
with the post-conviction court’s rejection of this ineffective-assistance claim.
Accordingly, Davis has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of Strickland and Hill, or rested
on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Ground Four, therefore, does not
warrant federal habeas relief.
IV. Conclusion

1. Davis’s petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) is
DENIED. The CLERK is directed to enter judgment against Davis and to CLOSE
this case.
2. Davis is not entitled to a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Under Section
2253(c)(1), a prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to

appeal a district court’s denial of his application. Instead, a district court must first
issue a COA. Section 2253(c)(2) permits issuing a COA “only if the applicant has made
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” To merit a COA, Davis
must show that reasonable jurists would find debatable both the merits of the
underlying claims and the procedural issues he seeks to raise. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d
926, 935 (11th Cir. 2001). Davis has not made the requisite showing. Finally, because
Davis is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he has no right to appeal in forma
pauperts.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on August 11, 2026.

Charlene Edwards Honeywell
United States District Judge

Copies to:
Pro se Petitioner
Counsel of record

15

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423095. Public record. Not legal advice.