# Benson

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · July 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423028

## Case

- **Full name:** Paul Benson v. Yolanda Pryce, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PAUL BENSON, : 3:26-CV-01472
:
Plaintiff, : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)
:
v. :
:
YOLANDA PRYCE, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction.
Plaintiff Paul Benson complains about events in connection with state child
support proceedings. He filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Because Benson has not shown that he has a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits, he is not entitled to a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction. Thus, we recommend that the court deny his
motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Also, because
some of Benson’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, we recommend
that the court dismiss those claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Finally,
we recommend that the court remand this case to the undersigned for further
proceedings.
II. Background and Procedural History.
On June 1, 2026, Benson began this action by filing a complaint. See doc. 1.

He names three defendants in his complaint: (1) Yolanda Pryce, an enforcement
specialist with the Monroe County Domestic Relations Section; (2) the Honorable
C. Daniel Higgins, Jr., a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County;

and (3) the Monroe County Domestic Relations Section. Id. at 1 (caption), ¶¶ 9–11.
Benson names Pryce and Higgins in both their individual capacities and their
official capacities. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. Benson’s claims stem from child support
proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County. He alleges the

following facts in his complaint.
Benson is a disabled veteran. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8. He has a support case run by
Monroe County Domestic Relations. Id. ¶ 12. On February 27, 2026, Pryce sent
him an enforcement email. Id. ¶ 13.1 On March 2, 2026, Benson responded with

an informal email asking for verification of the legal basis for the support
obligation (“Verification Request”). Id.2 He asked whether the support obligation
was a loan or a debt and whether he consented to such, and he questioned the

1 Benson attached a copy of this email as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-2 at 8.
2 Benson attached a copy of this email as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-2 at 2–7.
constitutional basis for forcing payment without consent. Id. ¶ 14. Pryce did not
respond. Id. ¶ 15.

Benson alleges that a “Congressional Research Service report, Child Support
Enforcement: Program Basics (Jan. 12, 2026), shows that Defendants and their
agency have direct financial interests in collecting support.” Doc. 1 ¶ 33.3 In this

3 Benson attached a copy of this report as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-11. In a section titled “Child Support Enforcement: Program Basics,” the
report contains an overview that provides, in pertinent part:
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in
1975 as a federal-state program (established in Title IV-D of the
Social Security Act). The primary purpose of this program was
to reduce public expenditures for recipients of cash assistance
by obtaining ongoing support from noncustodial parents that
could be used to reimburse the state and federal governments
for part of that assistance. (This purpose often is referred to as
public assistance cost-recovery.) Relatedly, the program also
sought to strengthen families by securing financial support for
children from their noncustodial parents on a consistent and
continuing basis to enable some of those families to remain off
public assistance. Over the years, CSE has evolved into a
multifaceted program. While public assistance cost-recovery
still remains an important function of the program, its other
aspects include service delivery and promotion of self-
sufficiency and parental responsibility. The CSE program has
different rules for assistance families (e.g., those receiving cash
benefits under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
program; TANF) and non-assistance families.
. . .
The CSE program has a vast array of enforcement methods at
its disposal. Most child support payments are collected from
noncustodial parents through income withholding. Other
methods of enforcement include intercepting federal and state
regard, he asserts that “[s]upport rights are assigned to the state for TANF families,
and collections reimburse state and federal governments,” “[d]efendants get 66%

federal matching funds for every dollar they spend on enforcement,” and “[t]hey
also get federal incentive payment and block grant funding (about $532 million
nationally in FY2023).” Id. According to Benson, “[t]his financial interest gives

them a reason to push hard for collections and to ignore verification requests.” Id.
¶ 34.

income tax refunds; intercepting unemployment compensation;
filing liens against property; sending insurance settlement
information to CSE agencies; intercepting lottery winnings,
judgments, or settlements; seizing debtor parent assets held by
public or private retirement funds and financial institutions;
withholding, suspending, or restricting driver’s licenses,
professional or occupational licenses, and recreational or
sporting licenses; and denying, revoking, or restricting
passports.
The CSE program is funded via a number of sources. The
program is a federal-state matching grant program under which
states must spend money in order to receive federal funding.
For every dollar a state spends on CSE expenditures, it
generally is reimbursed 66 cents from the federal government.
This reimbursement requirement is “open ended,” in that there
is no upper limit or ceiling on the federal government’s match
of those expenditures. In addition to matching funds, states
receive CSE incentive payments from the federal government.
States also collect child support on behalf of families receiving
TANF assistance to reimburse themselves (and the federal
government) for the cost of that assistance to the families. Fees
and costs recovered also help finance the CSE program.

Doc. 1-11 at 3.
On March 2, 2026, Benson received a notice dated February 27, 2026, titled
“Notice of Reporting to the Pennsylvania State Tax Refund Offset Program.” Id.

¶ 16; Doc. 1-3 at 2.4 Benson refers to this notice as a STROP notice. Id. ¶ 16. The
STROP notice claimed that Benson owed overdue support payments in the amount
of $332.68, and the notice threatened to intercept state tax refunds. Id.

On March 6, 2026, Pryce issued a “Notice of Credit Bureau Reporting,”
which claimed that Benson was in arrears as of that date in the amount of
$3,506.68. Id. ¶ 17.5
On March 10, 2026, Pryce filed a petition for contempt. Id. ¶ 19.6 That same

day—March 10, 2026—the Court issued a per curiam order that, among other
things, provided: “Legal proceedings have been brought against you alleging you

4 Benson attached a copy of this notice as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-3 at 2. The same exhibit containing this notice also contains another notice
titled “Notice of Non-Compliance (Financial Only)” dated February 27, 2026,
stating that Benson was in arrears in the amount of $2,448.68. Id. at 3.
5 Benson attached a copy of this notice as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-4.
6 Benson attached a copy of this petition as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-6. In this petition, Pryce asserted that on October 29, 2025, the court
entered an order directing Benson to pay $1,058 per month plus $100 per month in
arrears for support and that Benson has failed to comply with the order by failing
to pay as ordered. Id. Pryce requested that the court issue an order directing
Benson to attend a hearing on the petition and after the hearing, adjudicate Benson
in contempt. Id.
have disobeyed an Order of Court for support.” Id. ¶ 18.7 Benson suggests that he
has never seen that support order. Id. The March 10, 2026 order also scheduled a

hearing for May 26, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in courtroom to be determined. Id. ¶ 22;
Doc. 1-5. And it warned Benson: “IF YOU DO NOT APPEAR, THE COURT
MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST AND YOU MAY BE

COMMITTED TO JAIL.” Doc. 1-5 (all caps and bold in original). It also
warned Benson that “[i]f the Court finds that you have willfully failed to comply
with its order for support, you may be found in contempt of court and committed to
jail, fined, or both.” Id.

Also on March 10, 2026, Pryce issued a notice, which Benson refers to as a
“Consideration notice” asserting that Benson could avoid contempt by making a
lump sum payment of $3,500, which Benson points out is almost the exact amount

of claimed arrears and which, he contends, was designed to be impossible to pay.
Id. ¶¶ 20–21.8
Benson asserts that the “Defendants have sent multiple notices with different
numbers that cannot all be true[.]” Id. ¶ 24. On March 15, 2026, Benson followed

7 Benson attached a copy of this order as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-5.
8 Benson attached a copy of this notice as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-7.
up his Verification Request with a certified letter. Id. ¶ 29. But the defendants
have not “answered the yes/no question (loan or debt?)”; “produced any signed

paper where [Benson] agreed to the debt”; “identified any constitutional provision
allowing this obligation without consent”; “given a consistent, verified and
authenticated accounting”; or “responded to [Benson’s] jurisdictional questions.”

Id. He further asserts that the contempt hearing threatens his liberty based on an
unverified obligation, for which the defendants have refused to provide a
constitutional basis. Id. ¶ 23.
On March 19, 2026, the Monroe County Domestic Relations Section issued

a notice stating that the past due amount of support due was “$1,390.00 (non-
TANF).” Id. ¶ 25.9 Benson suggests that he responded to the March 19, 2026
notice “(including the ADA request),”10 and after he did so, Pryce—on April 6,

2026—left a voicemail for Benson asking him to contact her office. Id. ¶ 35.
Benson responded by email “repeating that he wanted written communication,

9 Benson attached a copy of this notice as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-8.
10 Benson has not attached to his complaint a copy of a written response to
the March 19, 2026 notice, and he does not provide any further allegations
regarding an ADA-accommodation request.
pointing out the contradictory amounts, and demanding verification.” Id. ¶ 36.11
Pryce “has not answered the substance” of that response. Id.

On March 24, 2026, “upon view of Defendant’s contest to the Notice of
Reporting to the Pennsylvania State Tax Refund Offset Program (STROP),” Judge
Higgins scheduled a hearing for June 9, 2026, and stayed the STROP referral

“pending disposition.” Doc. 1-12.
On April 3, 2026, Pryce issued a notice of intent to suspend Benson’s
driver’s license under 23 Pa. C.S. § 4355, claiming he owes overdue support in the
amount of $3,506.68. Doc. 1 ¶ 26.12 The notice further states:

In accordance with Pennsylvania statute, 23 Pa.C.S. § 4355, an
order to suspend, nonrenew, or deny your driver’s licenses
and/or commercial driver’s license will be issued to the
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation thirty (30) days
from the date of this notice if you fail to take one of the
following actions:
(1) Pay the amount of the overdue support in full;
(2) Establish a periodic payment schedule that is
approved by the court;
(3) Provide the court with a source of periodic income
that can be attached; or
(4) Successfully contest this notice.

11 Benson attached as part of an exhibit to his complaint an email exchange
between Pryce and him on April 7, 2026. See doc. 1-2 at 9–10. It is not clear if this
is the email to which he is referring.
12 Benson attached a copy of this notice as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-9.
Doc. 1-9 at 2. The notice also lists the address the Domestic Relations Section,
and it provides: “Contact the DRS listed above for instructions on how to contest

this notice on or before May 3, 2026. Grounds for contesting this notice are
limited to mistakes of fact, i.e., errors in the amount of overdue support owed
and/or mistaken identity.” Id.

Benson asserts that the notices issued on March 19, 2026, and April 3, 2026,
claim different amounts of arrears with no explanation, and this shows that the
defendants do not have a reliable accounting and they are seeking “enforcement
(jail, license suspension) based on unverified and self-contradictory numbers.” Id.

¶¶ 27–28.
In April 2026, the defendants sent a payment ledger, purporting to show
payments and arrears. Id. ¶ 31.13 According to Benson the ledger is not a certified

account, it is deficient, “[i]t does not explain the 66% drop from $3,506.68 to
$1,390”; “[i]t does not account for the federal matching funds or TANF
reimbursement,” “[i]t does not show [his] consent,” “[i]t does not give any
constitutional authority,” and “[i]t fails to show any current distributions to Kristy

Benson or any of the TANF accounting measures.” Id. ¶ 32.

13 Benson attached a copy of this ledger as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-10. Although Benson alleges that the ledger shows payments and arrears
from June 2025 to April 2026, doc. 1 ¶ 31, the ledger starts with the date of
January 27, 2025, and ends with the date of April 1, 2026, doc. 1-10 at 2–3.
On May 5, 2026, Judge Higgins issued an order that provided “it is hereby
Directed that all operating privileges, including but not limited to driver’s license

and/or commercial driver’s license, of PAUL N. BENSON, Defendant, license
#24992646, shall be suspended, not renewed, or denied until further Order of the
Court.” Doc. 1 ¶ 37.14 According to Benson, Judge Higgins’s May 5, 2026 Order

was “in direct contradiction to the spirit of his previous order staying STROP
enforcement.” Id. And Benson alleges that the May 5, 2026 “order was issued
without any meaningful pre-deprivation hearing on the factual basis for the
suspension, without resolving the contradictory arrears figures, and without

addressing [his] outstanding Verification Request.” Id. ¶ 38. He alleges that “[t]he
timing and content of the order show that it is a direct act of retaliation. It came
after [he] had: (a) sent his initial Verification Request; (b) sent a follow-up

certified letter; (c) filed a draft federal complaint and sent it to the Defendants; and
(d) explicitly raised the unconstitutionality of the enforcement actions.” Id. ¶¶ 39,
45. Benson characterizes the May 5, 2026 Order “as the ‘final nail in the coffin’ to
punish [him] for his protected speech and petitioning,” and as “an indefinite,

judicially-imposed barrier to driving—the most severe sanction short of
incarceration.” Id. ¶¶ 39–40.

14 Benson attached a copy of this order as an exhibit to his complaint. See
doc. 1-13.
Benson’s physician recommended medical marijuana “for a qualifying
serious medical condition related to [Benson’s] disability,” Benson is enrolled the

Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Program (“MMP”), and he holds a valid MMP
identification card. Id. ¶ 41. “Under Pennsylvania regulations, a patient must
present ‘a valid photo driver’s license or photo identification card (not expired or

suspended)’ to obtain medication.” Id. ¶ 42. But, according to Benson, “[b]y
suspending [his] driver’s license, the May 5, 2026 order directly impedes his
ability to maintain his registration and physically acquire his physician-
recommended mediation,” which places him “at imminent risk of being unable to

obtain his medication, causing pain, suffering, and deterioration of his medical
condition.” Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
Benson also asserts that the license suspension strips him “of the practical

ability to parent his children, attend their events, or respond to emergencies.” Id.
¶ 47. In this regard, he alleges that “the May 5, 2026 order directly contradicts a
pre-existing custody order issued by the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas,”
which “requires [him] to maintain a valid driver’s license for purposes of

exercising parenting time with his minor children, including transportation for
visitation exchanges, school events, medical appointments, and other parental
responsibilities.” Id. ¶ 46.15 He contends that the May 5, 2026 order “makes
compliance with the custody order impossible.” Id. ¶ 47. And, he asserts, the

“conflict between the support enforcement order and the custody order
demonstrates that the license suspension was not a measured response to non-
payment, but rather a punitive and retaliatory act designed to inflict maximum

harm on [him] and his family without regard to the best interests of the children.”
Id. ¶ 48. Benson also alleges that the license suspension interferes with this right
to travel, his ability to engage in community service, and his right to assemble. Id.
¶¶ 55–57.16 He alleges that “[a]ll of these actions are umbrellaed under the

Domestic Relations Section, therefore all defendants knew or should have known
of the retaliatory effect of this order.” Id. ¶ 49.
The complaint contains six counts all brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Id. ¶¶ 58–91. Count 1 is a First Amendment retaliation claim. Id. ¶¶ 60–65. In this

15 Benson attached a copy of a November 25, 2024 Order from Judge Sibum
that provides that “following a Conciliation Conference conducted pursuant to Pa.
R.C.P. 1915.4–3, the attached recommendation of the Conciliator is adopted as an
Interim Order of Court.” Doc. 1-14 at 2. And he attached what appears to be a
portion of the recommendation from the Conciliator that provides, in pertinent
part: “Anyone transporting the children must possess a valid driver’s license and
use a vehicle with current insurance, inspection, and registration.” Id. at 3.
16 Benson also sets forth what he contends is the law regarding the right to
travel, doc. 1 ¶¶ 50–54, and qualified immunity, id. at 28–29 ¶¶ 76–77. We do not
recount those legal conclusions here.
count, Benson alleges that he engaged in protected activity when he sent his
Verification Request, that the defendants took adverse actions—including

threatening contempt, demanding a $3,500 lump sum payment, credit-bureau
reporting, and suspension of this driver’s license. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. According to
Benson, “[t]he timing shows a connection: all these actions happened within

weeks of [his] request and as preemptive measures before any hearing had
occurred.” Id. ¶ 64. Thus, he contends, “[t]here is a direct causal chain from
protected activity to escalated retaliation.” Id.
Count 2 is a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. Id.

¶¶ 66–73. In this count, Benson contends that he has protected interests: “freedom
from jail (liberty), his driver’s license (a protectable property and liberty interest
under Pennsylvania law and the Due Process Clause), his ability to access

prescribed medication (a fundamental liberty interest in bodily integrity and
medical care), his bank accounts, tax refunds, and credit reputation (property). Id.
¶ 68. He asserts that the defendants’ actions “rely on an obligation they refuse to
verify and for which they give no constitutional authority.” Id. And he asserts that

the May 5, 2026 order “was issued without a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing
on the specific issue of whether the suspension is warranted given the
contradictory arrears and the unresolved Verification Request.” Id.
Count 3 is entitled “ULTRA VIRES (Lack of Constitutional Authority).” Id.
¶¶ 74–79. In this count, Benson asserts that the Constitution does not give either

the federal government or the states “any power over compulsory private money
transfers between citizens without consent,” the defendants have refused to identify
a constitutional provision that gives them authority, and they do not have lawful

jurisdiction. Id. ¶¶ 76–78. Thus, according to Benson, their actions are ultra vires.
Id. ¶¶ 75–79.
Count 4 is entitled “STRUCTURAL BIAS (Government’s Financial
Interest).” Id. ¶¶ 80–85. In this count, Benson asserts that due process requires a

neutral decision maker, but, as shown by the Congressional Research Service
report he attached, the defendants have a direct financial and “pecuniary interest in
collecting as much as possible, enforcing aggressively, and resisting verification.”

Id. ¶ ¶81–83. Thus, he suggests, the defendants are biased, and this bias infected
the proceedings in his case. Id. ¶¶ 81, 83–84.
Count 5 is entitled “MUNICIPAL LIABLITY (Monell).” Id. ¶¶ 86–88. In
this count, Benson asserts that the Monroe County Domestic Relations Section

failed to train Pryce and it has policies or customs “of refusing to answer
jurisdiction verification requests”; “of retaliating against people who challenge the
legal basis of an obligation”; “of pursuing contempt and license suspension without

first providing requested verification”; “of sending out contradictory arrears
notices without fixing them”; and “of seeking or acquiescing in judicial orders that
impose severe sanctions, like indefinite license suspension, without any genuine

pre-deprivation review.” Id. ¶ 88. He contends that the Monroe County Domestic
Relations Section is a government entity that can be sued under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

Count 6 is a claim for violation of the right to travel purportedly based on
the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶¶ 89–91. In this count, Benson
contends that the May 5, 2026 Order burdens his right to travel, and the
“Defendants have no compelling governmental interest in suspending the license

of a parent who has consistently challenged the validity of the underlying
obligation and whose arrears figures are demonstrably contradictory and
unreliable.” Id. ¶¶ 90–91.

Benson seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive
damages, costs, and “any other relief the Court finds just.” Id. at 30–32 (Wherefore
Clause). More specifically, as to declaratory relief, Benson seeks a declaration that
the defendants violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and acted ultra vires.

Wherefore Clause ¶¶ C–D. And as to injunctive relief, Benson seeks a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction “[v]acating or staying the May 5, 2026
order of license suspension to allow [him] to maintain valid identification for

medical purposes”; “[e]njoining Defendants from proceeding with the May 26,
2026 contempt hearing”; “[o]rdering Defendants to cease all other enforcement
actions until they have . . . [a]nswered [his] Verification Request in good faith

[and] [g]iven a verified, consistent authenticated accounting that fixes the
contradictory notices[.]” Id. ¶ E; Id. at 29–30, ¶¶ 80–83.17
Because at the time he began this action, Benson had not paid the filing fee

or filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, we ordered him to do one or
the other. See doc. 6. On June 30, 2026, Benson paid the filing fee. We then
ordered Benson to serve the summons and the complaint on the defendants in
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 or obtain a waiver of service from the

defendants, and we ordered that Benson shall file a return of service within 90 days
of the date he filed the complaint. Doc. 8.

III. Discussion.
At the time he filed his complaint, Benson also filed a motion for temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction and a brief in support of that motion.
See docs. 3, 4. Since Benson has recently paid the filing fee for this action, we

17 Benson’s numbering of the paragraphs in his complaint is not consistent.
He has two sets of paragraphs numbered 76–83. The second set of paragraphs
numbered 76–79 are his allegations regarding the law of qualified immunity,
which as noted above, see supra n.16, we do not recount because they are legal
conclusions. The second set of paragraphs numbers 80–83 deal with Benson’s
request for emergency injunctive relief, and it is those paragraphs to which we are
referring above.
now proceed to address his motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. Before we do so, however, we address the issue of the court’s subject-

matter jurisdiction over some of Benson’s claims.

A. The Eleventh Amendment bars some of Benson’s claims.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “[T]hey have only the power that
is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress
pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541

(1986). “Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited.” Gonzalez v.
Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). Thus, the court has an obligation to satisfy itself
that it has subject-matter jurisdiction, and the court may raise the issue sua sponte.

Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77–78 (3d Cir. 2003).
The Eleventh Amendment implicates the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
See Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 227 (3d Cir. 2023) (stating that the Eleventh
Amendment “imposes a jurisdictional bar against individuals bringing suit against

a state or its agencies in federal court, or against a state official in his or her official
capacity”); Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Therefore, unless Congress has

‘specifically abrogated’ the states’ sovereign immunity or a state has unequivocally
consented to suit in federal court, we lack jurisdiction to grant relief in such
cases.”); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693, n.2 (3d Cir. 1996)

(noting that “the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction”); but see Lombardo v. Pennsylvania,
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that “the Supreme

Court’s jurisprudence has not been entirely consistent in the view that the Eleventh
Amendment restricts subject matter jurisdiction”).
“Our federalist system of government accords respect for the sovereignty of
the States in a variety of ways, including the Eleventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution, which immunizes States from suits brought in federal court by
both their own citizens and citizens of other States.” Maliandi v. Montclair State
Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 2016). The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Although its text appears to restrict only the Article III
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Eleventh Amendment has been
interpreted ‘“to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . .
which it confirms.”’ Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)
(quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)). That
presupposition is that each state is a sovereign entity in our federal system and it is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty that a sovereign is not amenable to suit unless
it consents. Id.

“Immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment is
designed to preserve the delicate and ‘proper balance between the supremacy of
federal law and the separate sovereignty of the States.’” Karns v. Shanahan, 879

F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999)).
It “serves two fundamental imperatives: safeguarding the dignity of the states and
ensuring their financial solvency.” Id. It serves those interests by barring suits
against nonconsenting states. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73

(2000) (stating that “the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over
suits against nonconsenting States”); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit

in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant
is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
There are two circumstances when the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a
suit against a state or state agency. First, a state may waive its Eleventh

Amendment immunity by consenting to suit. College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). Second,
Congress may abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity when it

unequivocally intends to do so and when it acts pursuant to a valid grant of
constitutional authority. Geness v. Admin. Off. of Pennsylvania Cts., 974 F.3d 263,
269–70 (3d Cir. 2020).

Neither of those circumstances are present here. The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 42 Pa. Stat.
and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b) (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be

construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”);
Downey v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020)
(“Pennsylvania has not waived its sovereign immunity defense in federal court.”).

And 42 U.S.C. §1983, under which Benson brings his claims, does not override a
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).

1. Monroe County Domestic Relations Section.
“The Eleventh Amendment’s protection . . . is not limited to the States alone,
but rather extends to entities that function as ‘arms of the State.’” Maliandi, 845
F.3d at 81. “The Pennsylvania constitution provides for the vesting of the

Commonwealth’s judicial power in a “unified judicial system” which includes all
of the courts in Pennsylvania.” Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672
(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Pa. Const. art. V, § 1.). “Moreover, the constitution

provides that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will exercise ‘general supervisory
and administrative authority’ over the unified judicial system.” Id. (quoting Pa.
Const. art. V, §§ 1, 2, and 10.). Thus, “[a]ll courts and agencies of the unified

judicial system . . . are part of ‘Commonwealth government’ and thus are state
rather than local agencies.” Id. (citing Pa. Const. art. V, § 6(c); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 102; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 301). As such, they are entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 241 (3d
Cir. 2005) (“The Pennsylvania constitution envisions a unified state judicial
system, of which the Judicial District is an integral component. From a holistic
analysis of the Judicial District’s relationship with the state, it is undeniable that

Pennsylvania is the real party in interest in Benn’s suit and would be subjected to
both indignity and an impermissible risk of legal liability if the suit were allowed
to proceed.”).

“Under Pennsylvania law, each court of common pleas must have a
domestic relations section, ‘“which shall consist of such probation officers and
other staff of the court as shall be assigned thereto.”’ Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty.
Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 201 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 42 Pa. Cons.

Stat. § 961 (2008)). Thus, “[c]ounty domestic relations sections are part of the
unified judicial system.” Siluk v. Merwin, 783 F.3d 421, 423 n.5 (3d Cir. 2015),
abrogated on other grounds by Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016). And

they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Bryant v. Cherna, 520 F.
App’x 55, 57 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that “the state courts of Pennsylvania,
including their domestic relations sections, are entitled to immunity from suit in

federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment”); Green v. Domestic Rels.
Section Ct. of Common Pleas Compliance Unit Montgomery Cnty., 649 F. App’x
178, 180 (3d Cir. 2016) (concluding that because “the Domestic Relations Section

of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, is a sub-unit of
Pennsylvania’s unified judicial system,” the claims against it were properly
dismissed pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment).
Because the Monroe County Domestic Relations Section is a division of the

Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, which is a part of the state, it is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Thus, we will recommend that the
court dismiss Benson’s claims against the Monroe County Domestic Relations

Section without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

2. Defendants Higgins and Pryce in their Official Capacities.
Benson’s claims for damages against defendant Higgins and Pryce in their
official capacities are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Official-capacity
suits are “only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55. In an official-capacity suit, the
entity of which the officer is an agent is the real party in interest. Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As such, claims against state officials in their
official capacities for damages are treated as suits against the state and are barred

by the Eleventh Amendment. Christ the King Manor, Inc., 730 F.3d at 318. Thus,
Benson’s claims for damages against defendants Higgins and Pryce in their official
capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As such, we will recommend

that the court dismiss those claims without prejudice for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Although claims against state officials in their official capacities for
damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, under Ex parte Young, generally

claims against state officials in their official capacities for prospective declaratory
and injunctive relief are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Here, in addition to damages, Benson is seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief.
In determining if Ex parte Young applies, the court “must look to the

substance rather than the form of the relief requested to determine whether [the]
claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Blanciak, 77 F.3d at 698. And
“[t]he type of prospective relief permitted under Young is relief intended to prevent
a continuing violation of federal law.” Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148, 166 (3d

Cir. 1998); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277–78 (1986) (observing
that “Young has been focused on cases in which a violation of federal law by a
state official is ongoing”). “In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young
avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a

‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation
of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Verizon
Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)

(quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997)
(concurring opinion)).
Here, it is unclear what, if any proceedings, remain ongoing in the state
court. Thus, it is not clear whether Benson’s requests for declaratory and

injunctive relief are requests for prospective relief with the scope of Ex parte
Young.
In any event, the Ex parte Young exception does not apply to the claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief as against Judge Higgins. As the Supreme Court
has explained, Ex parte Young does not permit federal courts to issue injunctions
against state-court judges and clerks:
Generally, States are immune from suit under the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240,
144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). To be sure, in Ex parte Young, this
Court recognized a narrow exception grounded in traditional
equity practice—one that allows certain private parties to seek
judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive
officials from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal
law. 209 U.S. 123, 159–160, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
But as Ex parte Young explained, this traditional exception does
not normally permit federal courts to issue injunctions against
state-court judges or clerks. Usually, those individuals do not
enforce state laws as executive officials might; instead, they
work to resolve disputes between parties. If a state court errs in
its rulings, too, the traditional remedy has been some form of
appeal, including to this Court, not the entry of an ex ante
injunction preventing the state court from hearing cases. As Ex
parte Young put it, “an injunction against a state court” or its
“machinery” “would be a violation of the whole scheme of our
Government.” Id., at 163, 28 S.Ct. 441.

Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021). Thus, Ex parte Young
does not save the claims against Judge Higgins in his official capacity. See
Oyelakin v. Clerk of Philadelphia Fam. Ct., No. CV 25-3748, 2025 WL 3633211,
at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2025) (concluding that “Ex parte Young does not apply to
the relief [the plaintiff] seeks here[:] prospective injunctive relief against the
Judicial Defendants in an effort to void decisions of the Philadelphia Family Court
he does not like”). Accordingly, we will recommend that the court dismiss the
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Judge Higgins in his official
capacity. Because it is not initially clear if the claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief against defendant Pryce in her official capacity should be
dismissed for the same reason, the court may benefit from briefing on that issue
from the parties. Thus, we do not at this time, recommend that the claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Pryce in her official capacity be
dismissed.
In sum, we recommend that the court dismiss the claims against the Monroe
County Domestic Relations Section, the claims for damages against defendants

Higgins and Pryce in their official capacities, and the claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief against defendant Higgins in his official capacity because such
claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. And because the Eleventh

Amendment implicates the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, we recommend that
the court dismiss those claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment without
prejudice. See Mohn v. United States, No. 23-1023, 2023 WL 4311609, at *2 (3d
Cir. July 3, 2023) (observing that “when a district dismisses claims for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, the dismissal should be without prejudice”); Merritts v.
Richards, 62 F.4th 764, 772 n.4 (3d Cir. 2023) (concluding that claims barred by
the Eleventh Amendment should have been dismissed without prejudice and noting

that “a dismissal with prejudice on a threshold ground [such as the Eleventh
Amendment] should ordinarily be vacated and remanded with instructions for the
claim to be dismissed without prejudice”).18

18 Dismissal “without prejudice” is often used to indicate that the plaintiff
may amend his complaint. But in the context of a dismissal for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, a dismissal “without prejudice” indicates that the claim was not
decided on the merits. ‘“A dismissal with prejudice operates as an adjudication on
the merits’ and typically prevents the plaintiff from subsequently litigating his
claims in either the original court or any other forum.” Aldossari on Behalf of
Aldossari v. Ripp, 49 F.4th 236, 262 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Papera v.
Pennsylvania Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2020)).
B. Benson’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction should be denied.
Benson is seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction. He seeks an order stopping the defendants from going forward with the
contempt hearing on May 26, 2026. He also seeks an order staying and vacating

the May 5, 2026 order that suspended his driver’s license. And he seeks an order
enjoining the defendants from taking any further enforcement actions regarding his
support case.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions. The standard for deciding motions for temporary
restraining orders and motions for preliminary injunctions are generally the same.
“The difference is that a [temporary restraining order] may be issued with little or

“Conversely, a [d]ismissal . . . without prejudice is a dismissal that does not
operat[e] as an adjudication upon the merits, . . . and thus does not have a [claim-
preclusive] effect.” Papera, 948 F.3d at 611 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). And “[i]f a court . . . determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction,
it cannot decide the case on the merits.” In re Orthopedic “Bone Screw” Prod.
Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1997). “It has no authority to do so.” Id.
Thus, a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction “must be without
prejudice.” Aldossari, 49 F.4th at 262. “Even when a district court determines that
granting leave to amend would be futile,” “a dismissal for lack of [subject-matter
jurisdiction] must be ‘without prejudice[.]’” Cook v. GameStop, Inc., 148 F.3d 153,
163 (3d Cir. 2025) (quoting Barclift v. Keystone Credit Servs., LLC, 93 F.4th 136,
148 (3d Cir. 2024)). Although we recommend that the claims that are barred by
the Eleventh Amendment be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, we recommend that the court not grant Benson leave to amend as to
such claims because leave to amend would be futile.
no notice and may dissolve on its own accord.” Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc. v.
Koenig, No. CIV.A. 11-6140-NLH, 2012 WL 379940, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2012);

Fed. R. Civ .P. 65(b) (providing that the court may issue a temporary restraining
order “without written or oral notice to the adverse party” if certain conditions are
met).

A motion for a preliminary injunction is judged against exacting legal
standards. “A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary’ equitable remedy that is
‘never awarded as of right.’” Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 345–46
(2024) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)). A

motion for such is properly granted only if such relief is the “only way of
protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight,
Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). “It has been well stated that upon an

application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square
Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937).
When evaluating a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the court
considers four factors: ‘“(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that [the

plaintiff] will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting
preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to [the defendant]; and
(4) that the public interest favors such relief.’” Smith v. City of Atl. City, 138 F.4th

759, 779 (3d Cir. 2025) (quoting Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700,
708 (3d Cir. 2004)). “The first two factors are the ‘most critical,’ and only if the
moving party has made the requisite showing for both must the district court reach

the remainder.” Johnson & Johnson v. Samsung Bioepis Co., 173 F.4th 454, 460
(3d Cir. 2026) (quoting Delaware State Sportsmen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Delaware Dep’t
of Safety & Homeland Sec., 108 F.4th 194, 202 (3d Cir. 2024)). “In a case

involving a government defendant, the last two factors may be combined.” Smith,
138 F.4th at 779. “Because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy, the movant bears the burden of making a clear showing.” Delaware State
Sportsmen’s Ass’n, 108 F.4th at 202 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted;

italics in original).
Benson seeks an order stopping the defendants from going forward with the
contempt hearing on May 26, 2026. But Benson did not file this action or his

motion for temporary restraining order until June 1, 2026. And since May 26,
2026, has already passed, Benson’s request in this regard is moot.
Benson also seeks an order staying and vacating the May 5, 2026 order that
suspended his driver’s license and an order enjoining the defendants from taking

any further enforcement actions regarding his support case. But Benson has not
shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims such that he is entitled to
injunctive relief.19

As to the claims against defendant Higgins in his individual capacity it is
likely that defendant Higgins is entitled to judicial immunity from such claims—
both the claims for damages and the claims for injunctive relief.

“The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are immune from suit
under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.” Gallas
v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court
has described the reasons for recognizing judicial immunity as follows:

[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge
frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and
ungovernable desires that people can have . . . . [T]his is the
principal characteristic that adjudication has in common with
legislation and with criminal prosecution, which are the two
other areas in which absolute immunity has most generously
been provided. If judges were personally liable for erroneous
decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them
frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for
judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits.

19 Here, although we conclude that Benson does not have a reasonable
probability of success on the merits of his claims for purposes of preliminary
injunctive relief, we do not determine whether he has stated any claims upon which
relief can be granted. And because Benson is not a prisoner and he is not
proceeding in forma pauperis, we are not sua sponte screening the complaint to
determine whether it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As
discussed earlier, we sua sponte recommended that the court dismiss the claims
barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the Eleventh Amendment implicates
the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Where subject-matter jurisdiction is not
implicated, we do not recommend, at this stage of the proceedings, dismissal of
claims.
The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it
would manifestly detract from independent and impartial
adjudication.
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226–27 (1988) (citations omitted).
We engage in a two-part inquiry to determine whether judicial immunity is
applicable. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768. First, because immunity applies only to
actions taken in a judge’s judicial capacity, we must determine whether the

challenged actions of the judge were taken in his or her judicial capacity. Id. The
relevant factors “relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function
normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether

they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.’” Id. at 768–69 (quoting Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). “Our task is to ‘draw the line between truly
judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to
have been done by judges,’ such as administrative acts.” Id. at 769 (quoting

Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227).
“Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken
in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 768. In this regard, “we must

distinguish between acts in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction,’ which do not
enjoy the protection of absolute immunity, and acts that are merely in ‘excess of
jurisdiction,’ which do enjoy that protection.” Id. at 769 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S.
at 356 n.6). Judicial immunity shields a judge from liability for judicial acts even
if those acts were taken in error, if they were done maliciously, if they were in
excess of the judge’s authority, if the judge committed grave procedural errors, or

if the judge’s actions were unfair or controversial. Id. A judge will be subject to
liability only when he or she has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Id.
“In sum, our analysis must focus on the general nature of the challenged action,

without inquiry into such ‘specifics’ as the judge’s motive or the correctness of his
or her decision.” Id.
Here, Benson’s allegations regarding defendant Higgins relate to actions
taken by Higgins in his capacity as a judge overseeing a child-support case in the

Court of Common Pleas. And his actions were not taken in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction. See Gittens v. Pavlack, 838 F. App'x 717, 718 (3d Cir. 2021)
(concluding that judge’s order that the plaintiff’s “bank assets be frozen pursuant

to state law governing the enforcement of child support obligations” was “a
judicial act that was made in accordance with state law” and thus the judge was
immune from damages liability). Accordingly, defendant Higgins is entitled to
judicial immunity from Benson’s § 1983 claim for damages against him.

Turning to injunctive relief, such relief also appears improper as to
defendant Higgins. “Except in very limited circumstances, judges are immune
from personal-capacity suits for injunctive relief.” Wilson v. United States, Civ.

No. 21-10004 (JXN) (JBC), 2022 WL 180326, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2022). In
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984), the Supreme Court held that
“judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial

officer acting in her judicial capacity.” Later, however, as part of the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1996, “Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide
that ‘injunctive relief shall not be granted’ in an action brought against ‘a judicial

officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.’” Azubuko v.
Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Here,
Benson does not allege that defendant Higgins violated a declaratory decree or that

declaratory relief was unavailable. Thus, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1996 bars Benson’s claims for injunctive relief as to defendant Higgins.
Concluding that Benson does not have a reasonable probability of success on

his claims against defendant Higgins, we turn to Benson’s claims against defendant
Pryce. Because Benson is suing Pryce for her role in initiating and prosecuting the
child support case against him, Pryce is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as to
the claims for damages against her in her individual capacity. County Domestic

Relation Section “employees enjoy the benefits of absolute quasi[-]judicial
immunity because (1) their functions in proceedings are closely analogous to the
functions performed by prosecutors in criminal proceedings; (2) ‘the public policy

considerations that countenance immunity for prosecutors are applicable to
Domestic Relations Section employees performing these functions; and (3) support
proceedings incorporate important safeguards that protect citizens from

unconstitutional actions by such employees.” Dustin of the Family Patrick v.
Brown, No. 5:25-CV-1847, 2026 WL 1747215, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2026)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, Pryce in her individual

capacity is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from damages for such actions in
prosecuting Benson’s support proceedings. See Bryant v. Cherna, 520 F. App’x 55,
58 (3d Cir. Mar. 28, 2013) (“Any claims against the[ ] employees [of a county’s
Domestic Relations Section] in their individual capacities for their roles in

initiating and prosecuting child support proceedings would be barred by the
doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.”); Lepre v. Tolerico, 156 F. App'x 522, 525
(3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that the defendants, who were “officers of the Domestic

Relations Section of the Family Court of Lackawanna County, are entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity for their actions in filing the Petition enforcing the Family
Court’s support order in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
1910.25”).

Benson asserts that he is seeking an order enjoining the defendants from
taking any new enforcement actions. But he has not reasonably shown what new
enforcement actions Pryce is likely to take in this case. Rather, although he asserts

that he is seeking an injunction regarding new enforcement actions, he actually
refers to actions that have already been taken. See doc. 3-4 ¶ 3 (Proposed Order—
seeking an order providing that “Defendants are preliminarily enjoined from taking

any new enforcement actions, including but not limited to driver’s license
suspension, contempt proceedings, credit reporting, or tax refund interception,
arising from the arrears claimed in Monroe County Support Case #195303101,

until this Court resolves the merits of Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint.”). In sum,
Benson has not shown that Pryce is reasonably likely to take additional
enforcement actions in the near future.
For the reasons set forth above, Benson does not have a reasonable

probability of success on the merits of his claims.

IV. Recommendations.
Because Benson’s claims against the Monroe County Domestic Relations

Section, the claims against Judge Higgins in his official capacity, and the claims
for damages against Pryce in her official capacity are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, we recommend that the court dismiss those claims without prejudice

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We further recommend that the court deny
Benson’s motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (doc.
3). Finally, we recommend that the court remand the case to undersigned for
further proceedings.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to
which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The
briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A
judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record
developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own
determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive
further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.

Submitted this 20th day of July, 2026

S/Susan E. Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423028. Public record. Not legal advice.