# Wallace

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · August 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423027

## Case

- **Full name:** Gerry L. Moore, Sr. v. Jessica Wallace, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** August 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

GERRY L. MOORE, SR., CASE NO. 3:26 CV 1294

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

JESSICA WALLACE, et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants. AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Gerry L. Moore, Sr., currently incarcerated at Richland Correctional
Institution (“RiCI”), filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the following
Defendants: Jessica Wallace, Marion County Clerk of Courts; Judge Matthew P. Frericks, Marion
County Court of Common Pleas; Paulette J. Lilly, Erie County Prosecutor; Thomas Gjostein,
court-appointed attorney; Judge William R. Zimmerman, Third District Court of Appeals; Judge
John R. Willamowski, Third District Court of Appeals; Gregory B. Miller, Third District Court of
Appeals Court Administrator and Magistrate; Judge Juergen A. Waldick, Third District Court of
Appeals; Karin L. Coble, court-appointed attorney; Michael J. Hendershot; Steven L. Taylor; and
Kristin R. Palmer. See Doc. 1.
Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. p2). The Court grants
that application. Upon review, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s 214-page complaint is a disjointed narrative consisting of vague, rambling, and
conclusory allegations, various lists of legal terms and purported causes of actions, and 209 pages
of exhibits, including: portions of a trial transcript; several pages of the Marion County Court of
Common Pleas docket, Case No. 2022-CR-0380, with handwritten notations; an apparent copy of

Plaintiff’s Petition to Vacate his judgment and other documents filed in his state criminal
proceedings; Marion County itemized court costs statement; Affidavit of Indigency and Prisoner
Account Statement; several copies of cash withdrawal slips from RiCI; documents from Plaintiff’s
habeas petition filed in this district court (Moore v. Stuff, No. 3:25-cv-2260 (N.D. Ohio); Marion
County Court Order to Pay a Stated Obligation; and a letter from Marion County Clerk of Courts
to Richland Correctional Institution requesting funds from Plaintiff’s prisoner account be applied
to Marion County court costs. See Doc. 1-3.
The Complaint appears to concern Defendants’ purported conduct in Plaintiff’s criminal
conviction and appeal. See Doc. 1, at 3-4. His allegations generally refer to “these parties” and

Jessica Wallace. Plaintiff alleges without any factual support “garnishment by force,” fraud,
misfeasance, malfeasance, various alleged torts, discrimination, retaliation, tampering with
evidence, perjury, interfering with civil rights, ethnic intimidation, coercion, sham legal process,
extortion, dereliction of duty, malicious prosecution, malpractice of law, libel, slander, and
negligence. See Doc. 1-2. Throughout the Complaint, and in an apparent attempt to create a claim
from his exhibits, Plaintiff repeatedly directs the Court to “please see attachments.” Id.
Plaintiff requests monetary relief, and he asks that the defendants be “indicted and
convicted for [their] felony crimes committed against him.” (Doc. 1, at 4).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)
(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The district court, however, is required
to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990). A claim lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when
the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she
must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
DISCUSSION
Basic Pleading Requirements
The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the
“lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d

413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading
requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The complaint must give the
defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest to
satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. Bassett v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426,
437 (6th Cir. 2008).
Here, the Complaint, even liberally construed, fails to meet the most basic pleading
standard, as the complaint fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim showing
that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Complaint is almost completely
devoid of any factual allegations, and it fails coherently to identify how each Defendant has harmed

Plaintiff. Rather, Plaintiff’s Complaint includes vague and conclusory assertions, various lists of
purported violations, and references to the Complaint’s numerous attachments, apparently relying
on the Court to sort through Plaintiff’s voluminous exhibits to identify a claim under which he can
recover. The Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against
defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985); see also Laster v. Pramstaller, 2008 WL 1901250, (E.D. Mich.) (citing Windsor
v. Colo. Dep’t. of Corr., 9 F. App’x 967, 968 (10th Cir.2001) (“Neither the Court nor Defendants
are obligated to search through the Complaint and its voluminous exhibits in order to glean a clear
and succinct statement of each claim for relief.”) (quotation marks omitted). To do so would
“transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate
seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett, 775 F.
2d at 1278. Plaintiff’s pleading, at best, is nothing more than a mere “unadorned, the defendant
unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint therefore fails to meet
the minimum pleading requirements of Federal Civil Rule 8, and it must be dismissed on this basis.

Id.
Personal Involvement
Moreover, even if the Complaint satisfied federal pleading requirements, Plaintiff fails to
state a claim against any of the Defendants. A plaintiff cannot establish the liability of any
defendant absent a clear showing the defendant was personally involved in the activities that form
the basis of the alleged unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976);
Mullins v. Hainesworth, 1995 WL 559381 (6th Cir.). And where individuals are merely named as
defendants in a civil rights action without supporting allegations of specific conduct in the body
of the complaint, the complaint is subject to dismissal even under the liberal construction afforded

to pro se plaintiffs. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“Merely listing names in the caption of the complaint and alleging constitutional violations in the
body of the complaint is not enough to sustain recovery under §1983"); Frazier v. Michigan, 41
F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of complaint that did not allege with any
degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible
for each alleged violation of federal rights).
Here, Plaintiff does not present any allegations specifically connecting any of the
individual Defendants (with the exception of Jessica Wallace), to the purported misconduct.
Rather, Plaintiff includes Defendants’ names in the caption of the Complaint and generically
references “these parties.” Plaintiff therefore fails to state a plausible civil rights claim against
Judges Frericks, Zimmerman, Willamowski, and Waldick; Prosecutor Lilly; Attorneys Gjostein
and Coble; Court Administrator and Magistrate Miller; Michael J. Hendershot; Steven L. Taylor;
and Kristin R. Palmer.
Court Appointed Attorneys

Also, Plaintiff cannot establish a Section 1983 claim against his former court-appointed
attorneys for an additional reason. To state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Section
1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute has
been violated, and (2) the violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2015). A
public defender or a court-appointed defense counsel, while acting in that capacity, is not a state
actor for purposes of Section 1983. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321, (1981); White v.
Robertson-Deming, 9 F. App’x 418, 419-20 (6th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a civil
rights claim against Attorneys Gjostein and Coble, Plaintiff’s court-appointed attorneys.

Immunity
Finally, most of the defendants are immune from suit. It is well established that judicial
officers are generally entitled to absolute immunity from civil suits for money damages. Mireles
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). They are
accorded this broad protection to ensure that the independent and impartial exercise of their
judgment in a case is not impaired by the exposure to damages by dissatisfied litigants. Barnes,
105 F.3d at 1115. For this reason, absolute immunity is overcome only when (1) the conduct
alleged is performed at a time when the defendant was not acting as a judge; or (2) the conduct
alleged, although judicial in nature, was taken in complete absence of all subject matter jurisdiction
of the court over which he or she presides. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1116.
A judge will not be deprived of immunity even if the action at issue was performed in error, done
maliciously, or exceeded his or her authority. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Sevier
v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 271 (6th Cir. 1984) (merely acting in excess of authority does not preclude
immunity). Here, there is no suggestion in the Complaint that the Defendant judges were acting in

any capacity other than that of judicial officers when the conduct alleged in the Complaint
occurred. Nor is there any suggestion that they acted clearly outside of the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court over which they preside. Judges Frericks, Zimmerman, Willamowski, and
Waldick are therefore absolutely immune from damages in this action.
Judicial immunity may also be extended to non-judicial officers, like a Clerk of Courts or
a court administrator, who perform in a quasi-judicial capacity. See Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842,
847 (6th Cir. 1994). “Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so
integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the
judicial officer who is immune.” Id. The fact that an error is made is immaterial. Foster v. Walsh,

864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988). Court clerks and other court officials and employees have
therefore been accorded absolute immunity from civil rights actions on claims arising from
conduct intrinsically associated with a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., id. (court clerk); Denman v.
Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir. 1973) (municipal court clerk); Bush, 38 F.3d at 847 (court
administrator and referee). Plaintiff does not allege any facts plausibly suggesting that Jessica
Wallace, Marion County Clerk of Courts, or Gregory B. Miller, Third District Court of Appeals
Court Administrator and Magistrate, acted outside the scope of his or her quasi-judicial immunity.
These Defendants are therefore absolutely immune from suit.
Likewise, prosecutors are immune from suit. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from
liability under Section 1983 for their conduct in “‘initiating a prosecution and in presenting the
State’s case.’” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 431 (1976)). So long as the prosecutor was engaged in a prosecutorial function, he or she is
absolutely immune regardless of whether he or she undertook actions maliciously, in bad faith, or

with an improper motive. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 & n.27, 431 & n.34 (prosecutor immune
after knowingly presenting perjured testimony and suppressing exculpatory evidence at trial);
Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor immune after “knowingly
obtaining issuance of criminal complaints and arrest warrants . . . based on false, coerced
statements”); Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1139 (6th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor immune for
deciding to investigate and conspiring to present false charges to the grand jury, allegedly to satisfy
a campaign promise to be tough on child abuse). Here, Plaintiff presents no discernible facts
suggesting Chief Assistant Prosecutor Lilly acted outside the confines of her prosecutorial role.
She is therefore absolutely immune from suit.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be, and the
same hereby is, GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the action be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and it is
FURTHER CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.
s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: August 20, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11423027. Public record. Not legal advice.