# Alkhulaqi

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · August 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422945

## Case

- **Full name:** Hesham Alkhulaqi v. Madison County, Illinois, and John Does 1-10
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

HESHAM ALKHULAQI,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-CV-02054-NJR

MADISON COUNTY, ILLINOIS, and
JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff Hesham Alkhulaqi initiated this civil action against Defendants Madison
County, Illinois (“Madison County”) and John Does 1-10. Madison County has moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 12). For the reasons set forth below, the Court
grants in part and denies in part Madison County’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Alkhulaqi is a hemp distributor who operates a business that purchases
hemp products wholesale and supplies them to retail stores throughout the Midwest.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 7). He does so pursuant to the 2018 Agriculture Improvement Act, which
classified products containing a maximum of 0.3% of THC as legal hemp. (Id. ¶ 11). Any
products containing more THC are treated as illegal marijuana. (Id. ¶ 32). Defendant
Madison County is a governmental entity that trains, supervises, and enacts policies for
local police officers. (Id. ¶ 10).

On July 11, 2024, while driving on Interstate 55 from St. Louis to Chicago with
legal hemp inventory, Alkhulaqi claims that he was pulled over by law enforcement
officers in Madison County. (Id. ¶ 19). The officers searched his vehicle with the assistance
of drug detection dogs and discovered the various hemp products. (Id. ¶ 20). After
Alkhulaqi presented paperwork documenting that his products were legally compliant,
the officers allowed him to leave without seizing any property or detaining him further.

(Id. ¶¶ 21-23).
On July 15, 2024, while returning to Missouri from Chicago and carrying his hemp
products, Alkhulaqi was again pulled over in Madison County. (Id. ¶ 24). He claims that
he was handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle while officers searched his car using
drug detection dogs who allegedly alerted to the presence of narcotics. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 29).

Upon discovering the hemp inventory, the officers conducted a Nark II field test on a
hemp sample and allegedly discovered that it tested above legal limits. (Id. ¶ 32). The
officers then seized his entire inventory, dismissing Alkhulaqi’s asserted attempts to
show his documentation. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 36). They have not returned his property since.
(Id. ¶ 38).

Alkhulaqi claims that it is “widely known in law enforcement” that Nark II tests
“cannot reliably distinguish legal hemp from illegal marijuana.” (Id. ¶¶ 33-34). He also
claims that drug detection dogs cannot distinguish between these products, “making
their alerts meaningless” in this context. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35).
Based on these allegations, Alkhulaqi asserts that Madison County maintained
policies that wrongfully treat legal hemp as contraband and failed to train its officers to

distinguish between the two. (Id. ¶ 88). Alkhulaqi also alleges a conversion claim against
the County for its continued withholding of his hemp inventory and a tortious
interference with business relations claim for interfering with his relationship with
customers. (Id. ¶¶ 91, 102). He seeks compensatory damages, injunctive relief requiring
the return of his inventory, prospective injunctive relief preventing further interference
with his business, and declaratory relief establishing his right to continue distributing

hemp. (Id. ¶¶ 105-109). Alkhulaqi also alleges claims against unknown John Doe officers
for violating his constitutional rights, conversion, false imprisonment, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and interference with business relations. (Id. ¶¶ 61-103).
Madison County has moved to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that Alkhulaqi has
failed to state a claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the County is

immune to his various tort claims under the Illinois Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Tort Immunity Act”), and that he does
not have standing to seek injunctive relief.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests whether the complaint states a

claim on which relief may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir.
2012). The Court accepts as true the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations and
draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture,
LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2013). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff only
needs to allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff need not plead detailed

factual allegations, but must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements.” Id.
DISCUSSION
I. Municipal Liability
In Count VI, Alkhulaqi brings a Monell claim against Madison County under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for maintaining a policy that improperly treats legal hemp as contraband
and for failing to train officers to adequately distinguish between the two. The Court
agrees in part.
For a plaintiff to establish municipal liability under § 1983, he must demonstrate
that the municipality itself caused the constitutional violation through an established

policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 707-708 (1978). Neither
respondeat superior nor any other principle of vicarious liability will apply. Id. A Monell
claim has four elements: (1) an underlying constitutional deprivation; (2) a “municipal
action” (i.e., a policy or custom) to which the deprivation can be traced; (3) municipal
culpability, demonstrating at a minimum “deliberate indifference;” and (4) causation,
meaning the municipal action was the “moving force” behind the constitutional injury.

Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing to Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691-94).
Even where there is no municipal action, a municipality’s failure “to train certain
employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may [still] rise to the
level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983… if the plaintiff shows that
the municipality was deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights.” Milbeck v.

George, 171 F.4th 930, 938 (7th Cir. 2026) (citations omitted) (citing Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)).
A. Constitutional Violation
The Fourth Amendment protects a person’s right to their personal property.
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136 (2009). To determine

whether an officer’s seizure of such property amounts to a constitutional violation, “the
ultimate touchstone . . . is reasonableness.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014)
(internal quotations omitted).
However, reasonableness does not demand perfection. Id. The Fourth Amendment
leaves room for government officials to make mistakes of fact or law—but such mistakes
“must be objectively reasonable.” Id. at 61, 66. A court does “not examine the subjective

understanding of the particular officer involved . . . Thus, an officer can gain no Fourth
Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty bound to enforce.”
Id. at 66-67; see also id. at 69 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[A]n officer’s reliance on an incorrect
memo or training program from the police department makes no difference to the
analysis [of reasonableness] . . . Those considerations pertain to the officer’s subjective

understanding of the law and thus cannot help to justify a seizure.”) (citations omitted)
(internal quotations omitted).
Here, Alkhulaqi alleges that the seizure of his legal hemp inventory was a Fourth
Amendment violation. (Doc. 1 ¶ 44). The officers who seized his hemp mistakenly
believed it to be illegal marijuana. The key inquiry as to whether this mistaken seizure
constituted a Fourth Amendment violation is its objective reasonableness. Accepting

Alkhulaqi’s well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his
favor, he has sufficiently pleaded that the mistake was not reasonable.
First, Alkhulaqi alleges that it is “widely known” that neither Nark II tests nor
drug detection dogs can distinguish legal hemp from illegal marijuana. If the officers
knew of this deficiency—and the well-known nature of the flaw suggests they did or
should have—their continued reliance on these tools to judge legality undermines the

objective reasonableness of their mistake. Nor can they escape this conclusion by pointing
to an “incorrect . . . training program from the police department” or a “sloppy”
understanding of the law. Heien, 574 U.S. at 69 (Kagan, J., concurring) (first quotation); id.
at 67 (majority opinion) (second quotation).
Second, Alkhulaqi alleges that during the second stop he repeatedly attempted to

show the officers documentation proving his inventory’s compliance with federal law.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 31). This alone may not sway a reasonableness analysis. However, those same
documents were allegedly enough to convince officers of the legality of Alkhulaqi’s
products during the previous stop—a fact that again raises plausible questions about the
objective reasonableness of the officer’s later seizure.

Thus, Alkhulaqi has pleaded sufficient facts to support a conclusion that the
seizure of his hemp was unreasonable and constituted a Fourth Amendment violation.
B. Policy or Custom
Municipal action may be established in three ways: “(1) an express policy that
causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so

permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an allegation
that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority.”
Thomas, 74 F.4th at 524 (citations omitted).
Because Alkhulaqi neither argues that there is an express policy nor that his
injuries were caused by someone with final policymaking authority, the Court’s analysis

will focus on practices that are so widespread that they plausibly constitute municipal
action.
“[T]he word ‘widespread’ must be taken seriously.” Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d
773, 790 (7th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff must show that “the unlawful practice was so
pervasive that acquiescence on the part of policymakers was apparent and amounted to

a policy decision.” Id. Allegations of just “a few sporadic examples of an improper
behavior” do not suffice. Flores v. City of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2021)
(concluding that a complaint offering three examples of one officer speeding did not
plausibly suggest that a city had a widespread practice of allowing officers to speed);
see Thomas, 74 F.4th at 524 (holding that allegations of two incidents of a school

excessively punishing students with behavioral disabilities failed to plausibly allege a
widespread pattern or practice of Fourth Amendment violations); Estate of Moreland v.
Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 760 (7th Cir. 2005) (deciding that allegations of three instances where
prison guards improperly sprayed prisoners with pepper spray did not amount to a
widespread practice of Eighth Amendment violations).

Here, Alkhulaqi alleges that Madison County maintained a policy of treating
hemp as illegal contraband by employing drug detection canines and Nark II field tests
that cannot distinguish between lawful hemp and unlawful marijuana. He claims that
this results in the seizure of perfectly legal hemp contra its legalization under the 2018
Agriculture Improvement Act. As evidence, Alkhulaqi points to the two incidents he
experienced. In the first, officers searched his vehicle with drug detection dogs, found his

hemp, but eventually allowed him to leave after he presented his documentation
indicating that the product was federally compliant. In the second, the officers similarly
employed drug detection dogs, found Alkhulaqi’s hemp, tested a sample with a Nark II
field test, and, concluding that it was illegal marijuana, seized his inventory despite his
attempts to show the appropriate paperwork.

While Alkhulaqi attempts to argue that the County has a widespread practice of
illegally seizing hemp, his own factual allegations tell a different story. If this unofficial
policy truly was so “pervasive,” the officers would not have allowed him to drive off with
his hemp once the canines alerted to its presence. Phelan, 463 F.3d at 789-790. The fact
they let him go rebuts his claim that the County has a policy of treating hemp as illegal.

Even assuming that both the above events hinted at such a policy, two “sporadic”
incidents alone cannot demonstrate a “widespread” custom. Flores, 997 F.3d at 733.
As such, Alkhulaqi has failed to plead enough facts to assert a plausible claim for
municipal action. However, his Monell claim may still survive because of Alkhulaqi’s
assertion that Madison County failed to train its officers.

C. Failure to Train
In City of Canton v. Harris, the Supreme Court recognized that a “municipality's
failure to train employees can [] be a basis for § 1983 liability,” when it reflects a
“deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of others. 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
To meet this high bar, plaintiffs must show that the constitutional risks of the training

program are so “known or obvious” that the County has sufficient notice of its
shortcomings. J.K.J. v. Polk Cty., 960 F.3d 367, 379 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Bd. of the Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997)).
Failure to train liability does not require proof of widespread violations. Flores v.
City of S. Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2021). A single violation can suffice where the
“risk of constitutional violations [is] so high and the need for training so obvious that the

municipality’s failure to act can reflect deliberate indifference and allow an inference of
institutional culpability.” Polk Cty, 960 F.3d at 379.
Here, Alkhulaqi points to the officers’ use of drug detection canines and Nark II
in wrongfully seizing his hemp to argue that Madison County has failed to train its
officers to differentiate between legal hemp and illegal marijuana. Acknowledging that

this case is still at the pleading stage, the Court concludes that Alkhulaqi has plausibly
alleged that Madison County was deliberately indifferent.
It has been almost a decade since Congress legalized hemp. Yet during both of
Alkhulaqi’s stops, Madison County officers showed up armed with tests that, Alkhulaqi
alleges, cannot draw the legal line between hemp and contraband. Drawing the
reasonable inference that the officers were trained to use these tools during stops

involving cannabis, the unconstitutional seizure of legal hemp was both obvious and
inevitable. See Kovacic v. Ruechel, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186539, at *48 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 23,
2025) (denying summary judgment for a failure-to-train Monell claim that officers
wrongly seized hemp because they were not trained to distinguish between hemp and
marijuana and explaining that “[a] reasonable jury could also conclude that the failure on
the part of the governmental employers to adopt the policies and provide the training

needed to avoid such mistakes reflected a deliberate indifference to the risk of false arrest
and mistaken seizure of property.”).
Accepting Alkhulaqi’s well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in his favor, the Court finds that he has alleged sufficient facts to state a Monell
claim on a failure-to-train theory.

II. Tort Claims
In Counts VII and X, Alkhulaqi brings a conversion claim and an interference with
business relations claim based on the extended seizure of his hemp. Madison County
argues that both claims are barred by Section 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS
10/2-202.

Section 2-202 states that “[a] public employee is not liable for his act or omission
in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful
and wanton conduct.” The act defines willful and wanton conduct as “a course of action
which shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional,
shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their
property.” 745 ILCS 10/1-210. It is more than “mere inadvertence, incompetence, or

unskillfulness.” Stiff ex rel. Stiff v. E. Ill. Area of Special Educ., 279 Ill. App. 3d 1076 (4th Dist.
1996).
Here, even treating all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in his favor, Alkhulaqi has failed to plausibly allege that the officers’ conduct
rose above negligence or incompetence into the realm of “willful and wanton.” He has
not pleaded any facts alleging a safety risk or harm to his property that the officers

“consciously disregard[ed].” Nor has he demonstrated that they had an “actual or
deliberate” intention to harm his property. Compare Trover v. Oglesby, 2024 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64965, at *29 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2024) (dismissing the plaintiff’s trespass to chattels
claim under the Tort Immunity Act because the record was “devoid of evidence” that the
plaintiff’s property was “either physically harmed or that [d]efendants ‘actual or

deliberate intention’ was to cause harm.”) with Newsome v. Madison Cty., 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75147, at *14-15 (S.D. Ill. May 3, 2018) (allowing plaintiff’s various tort claims to
proceed from a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff “pled far more than [mere
inadvertence or incompetence]: each of her state-law counts meticulously set[] out a
number of ways in which the defendants may have exhibited utter indifference or

conscious disregard for the safety of [the plaintiff] and other detainees at the jail.”).
As such, Alkhulaqi has failed to plead sufficient facts to defeat Madison County’s
tort immunity. Counts VII and X are dismissed.
III. Standing
Madison County claims that Alkhulaqi lacks Article III standing to seek injunctive
relief for return of his confiscated property and to prevent Defendants from “seizing,

confiscating, or interfering” with his distribution of hemp products again. (Doc. 1 at
¶ 108). Again, the Court agrees in part.
To establish standing for prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that
he faces a “real and immediate threat of future injury as opposed to a threat that is merely
conjectural or hypothetical.” Simic v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017)

(quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, a past injury alone cannot establish standing for injunctive relief
“if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 95-96
(citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)). Standing must be considered
“separately for each form of relief sought.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,

337 (2006) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 185 (2000)).
A. Injunctive Relief for Return of Seized Property
Alkhulaqi seeks injunctive relief requiring the return of his seized property.
Accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his

favor, Alkhulaqi has sufficiently alleged that he suffers “continuing, present adverse
effects” from the extended confiscation of his hemp inventory. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 95-96.
He claims that he has suffered “the destruction of his business relationships, loss of
income, and inability to serve his retail customers,” and that he will continue to suffer so
until his legally owned property is returned. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 55). As such, Alkhulaqi has
standing to seek injunctive relief on this claim.

B. Injunctive Relief to Prevent Interference with Plaintiff’s Hemp Distribution
Alkhulaqi further seeks prospective injunctive relief to prevent further
interference with his transportation and distribution of hemp products. This claim poses
a classic Lyons issue. In Lyons, the Supreme Court denied standing to a plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief to prevent the police from using chokeholds against him and other

similarly situated persons in the future. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97. The Court explained its
reasoning as follows:
[E]ven assuming that Lyons would again be stopped for a traffic or other
violation in the reasonably near future, it is untenable to assert, and the
complaint made no such allegation, that strangleholds are applied by the
Los Angeles police to every citizen who is stopped or arrested regardless of
the conduct of the person stopped. We cannot agree that the “odds,” [Lyons
v. Los Angeles, 615 F.2d 143 at 1246 (9th Cir. 1980)], that Lyons would not
only again be stopped for a traffic violation but would also be subjected to
a chokehold without any provocation whatsoever are sufficient to make out
a federal case for equitable relief.

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108. The Court concluded by noting that “five months elapsed between
October 6, 1976, and the filing of the complaint, yet there was no allegation of further
unfortunate encounters between Lyons and the police.” Id.
In Alkhulaqi’s case, he was stopped twice and his inventory was seized once.
However, even assuming that he might be stopped again, Alkhulaqi does not claim (and
in fact, cannot claim, considering the officers let him go during his first stop) that every
stop results in the confiscation of legal goods. Further, he does not allege that he has been
stopped again in the five months that elapsed between the second stop and the filing of
the Complaint. Without more, Alkhulagi has failed to plead a “real and immediate threat
of future injury as opposed to a threat that is merely conjectural or hypothetical.” Simic,
851 F.3d at 738.
Thus, Alkhulaqi’s request for prospective injunctive relief against interference
with his distribution of hemp products is dismissed for lack of standing.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendant Madison County’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Alkhulagqi shall proceed on his Monell claim in Count VI against Madison County
for failure to train its officers. Counts VII and X are DISMISSED as to Madison County.
A scheduling and discovery conference will be set by separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 20, 2026

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422945. Public record. Not legal advice.