# CORTES-MEZA

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · August 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422888

## Case

- **Full name:** Sergio Cortes-Meza v. Leonard Oddo, et al
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHNSTOWN

SERGIO CORTES-MEZA,
Petitioner, Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-492
v. Richard A. Lanzillo
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON
LEONARD ODDO, et al, PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
RE: ECF No. 1
Respondents

I. Introduction
Pending before the Court is the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by
Petitioner Sergio Cortes-Meza (“Petitioner”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the
following reasons, Petitioner’s petition will be denied.

II. Background
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, illegally entered the United States
at some point in 2001. ECF No. 1-2 at p. 33. On January 28, 2025, Petitioner was
arrested in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and issued a Notice to Appear charging that
he was subject to removal under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”). ECF No. 8-1 at p. 1.
On March 26, 2025, Petitioner received a bond hearing before an Immigration
Judge (IJ). ECF No. 1 ¶ 28. The judge denied bond after concluding that Petitioner
posed a “‘risk of flight’ due to his only stated relief from removal being a motion to

suppress the illegally obtained evidence of alienage.” Id.
On January 8, 2026, an Immigration Judge entered an order finding that
Petitioner was removable as charged in the Notice to Appear and directing his
removal to Mexico. ECF No. 8-2 at p. 3. Petitioner filed a timely appeal of that
decision which remains pending with the Board of Immigration Appeals. See ECF
No. 8-3. Consequently, his proceeding is not administratively final and Petitioner
remains in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security at the Moshannon

Valley ICE Processing Center in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania. ECF No. 9 at p. 3.
Petitioner, through counsel, filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus on December 8, 2025. ECF No. 1. Respondents filed a Response to the
Petition on February 10, 2026. ECF No. 8. This matter is ripe for adjudication.
III. Discussion
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the merits of the instant case under 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), which allows a court to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner
held “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” See
Bystron v. Hoover, 456 F. Supp. 3d 635, 640 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (citing Demore v. Kim,
538 U.S. 510 (2003) and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)).
Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a bond hearing because he is subject to
discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and not mandatory detention
under § 1225(b)(2). Decisions of this Court uniformly support Petitioner’s position.
See, e.g., Calzado Diaz v. Noem, No. 3:25- cv-458, 2025 WL 3628480, at *3-7 (W.D.
Pa. Dec. 15, 2025) (Haines, J.), vacated as moot, Dkt. No. 22 (Dec. 17, 2025)

(explaining that “the general legal conclusions in the Court’s opinion … remain
unchanged.”); Nunez Ramos v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-00387, 2025 WL 3687335, at *4
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2025) (Brown, M.J.); Vasquez Mejia v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-00333,
2025 WL 3546427, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2025) (Brown, M.J.); Ico Coc v. Warden
Leonard Oddo, No. 3:25-CV-00381, 2025 WL 3753965 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2025)
(Taylor, M.J.); Silva Cova v. Rose, No. 3:26-cv-101 (W.D. Pa.), Feb. 11, 2026, Memo.
Order (Stickman, J.; ECF No. 9); Cifuentes Alvarez v. Noem, 3:26-cv-73 (ECF No. 10)

(W.D. Pa., Feb. 26, 2026) (Ranjan, J.); see also Aguirre-Guevara v. Oddo, No. 3:26-cv-
70 (W.D. Pa.), Feb. 11, 2026, Memo. Order (Stickman, J.; ECF No. 8)
The foregoing cases hold that Section 1226 applies to aliens who are “already
present in the United States[,]” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018),
while the mandatory detention provision of § 1225 governs detention of “applicants
for admission” to the United States. Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, No. 25-CV-16200, 2025

WL 2976572, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025). Consistent with these decisions, the Court
holds that § 1226(a), rather than the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b),
applies to aliens, like Petitioner, who are not seeking admission at a port of entry but
rather are already present in the country. In so holding, the Court rejects the
interpretation adopted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Avila v. Bondi, 170
F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026) (holding that Ҥ 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention of
unadmitted aliens already present inside the United States”) and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026)
(holding that noncitizen’s status as an applicant for admission does not turn on where

or how the noncitizen entered the United States).
Because Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a), he has a statutory
right to a bond hearing. In this case, however, Petitioner concedes that he already
had a bond hearing (and was deemed a flight risk) on March 26, 2025. In Borbot v.
Warden Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2018), the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit considered an argument that, after receiving a bond hearing
that ended unfavorably, a detainee might be entitled to a second bond hearing due to

the ongoing duration of his confinement. Id. at 276. The Court rejected that
challenge, finding no authority “to suggest that duration alone can sustain a due
process challenge by a detainee who has been afforded the process contemplated by §
1226(a) and its implementing regulations.” Id. at 277. The Court acknowledged in
dicta that there might be circumstances under which, “despite an initial bond
hearing, detention under § 1226(a) might become unreasonably prolonged, whether

by virtue of government delay or some other cause.” Id. at 280. However, the Court
declined to decide “when, if ever, the Due Process Clause might entitle an alien
detained under § 1226(a) to a new bond hearing.” Id.
Noting that the detainee in Borbot had been detained for more than two years
at the time the Court issued its decision, courts in this Circuit have generally declined
to order second bond hearings based solely on the duration of a detainee’s
confinement. See, e.g., Viantsko v. Lowe, 2026 WL 963038, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9,
2026) (noting that “the plain holding of Borbot demonstrates ‘that [although
Viantsko’s claim] may be available in an extreme case, even a two year detention

period did not in and of itself warrant relief in light of the procedural mechanisms—
including bond appeals and bond redeterminations in the immigration courts—
available to section 1226(a) detainees.’”) (quoting Onuwa v. Field Office Director, 2026
WL 772435, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2026)); Silva v. Warden, FCI Lewisburg, 2026 WL
1747768, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2026) (ten-month duration of civil immigration
detention did not entitle detainee detained under § 1226(a) to a second opportunity
to apply for release on bond); White v. Lowe, 2026 WL 777425, at *2 n. 1 (M.D. Pa.

Mar. 19, 2026) (detention for sixteen months following first bond hearing “would
appear to be insufficient” to support a claim for habeas relief “based on unreasonably
prolonged detention after a first bond hearing”).1 The Court reaches the same
conclusion here. The only argument offered in support of Petitioner’s request for a
second hearing is the overall duration of his detainment. See ECF No. 9. As noted
above, duration alone is insufficient to trigger habeas relief under Borbot.

Petitioner’s petition must be denied.

1 In Fadel v. Warden of Moshannon Valley ICE Processing Center, 2026 WL 1649901 (W.D. Pa. June
8, 2026), the court utilized the German Santos factors applicable to prolonged detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c) to determine that a detention period of nine months following an initial bond
hearing was sufficient to warrant a second bond hearing. Id. at *5. The Court relied, in part, on the
fact that the detainee in Fadel had been granted asylum by an Immigration Judge but remained in
detention pending the government’s appeal of that decision. Id. at *4 (noting that “Petitioner should
not be penalized for the fact that he prevailed before the IJ and now remains detained while the
Government pursues appellate review”). This circumstance is not present in the instant case.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1)
will be DENIED. An appropriate order will follow.
DATED this 20 day of August, 2026.

BY THE COURT:
So
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422888. Public record. Not legal advice.