# Jones

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · July 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422645

## Case

- **Full name:** Antwon Cornelius Jones v. Officer Lyssed Pacheco
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** July 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE

ANTWON CORNELIUS JONES )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00863
)
OFFICER LYSSED PACHECO )

TO: Honorable Eli Richardson, United States District Judge

R E P O R T A N D R E C O M E N D A T I O N
By Order entered February 5, 2026 (Docket Entry No. 12), this pro se civil rights action
was referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule
72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Court.
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No.
4). Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the reasons set out below, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED and that this action be DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND
Antwon Jones (“Plaintiff) is a resident of Clarksville, Tennessee. On June 8, 2024, he
filed a pro se lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Tennessee, against
Clarksville Police Department Officer Lyssed Pacheco (“Defendant”). See Docket Entry No.
1-1. Plaintiff seeks 2.5 million dollars in damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on claims that
his civil rights were violated by Defendant. Defendant timely removed the lawsuit to federal
court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, see Notice of Removal (Docket Entry No. 1),
and thereafter filed the pending motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer.
Plaintiff’s handwritten complaint sets out a narrative of events and he further attaches to
as well as copies of two handwritten motions that appear to have been filed in state criminal
court. Although the underlying facts of the case are not clearly set out, Plaintiff’s lawsuit is
based upon his interactions with Defendant that occurred when he was arrested by Defendant
after traffic stops in Clarksville on March 8, 2023, and May 20, 2023, respectively. On both
occasions, Plaintiff was stopped by Defendant for having either a broken taillight or an improper

taillight. On the first occasion, Plaintiff was arrested after the stop and was taken into custody
for driving on a suspended/revoked license. On the second occasion, Plaintiff refused to exit the
vehicle after being stopped. After other officers arrived on the scene, Plaintiff was ultimately
removed from the vehicle and a canine search around the vehicle occurred. The canine alerted
to the presence of drugs in the vehicle and drug paraphernalia was discovered in the vehicle
console after a search of the vehicle. Plaintiff was then arrested for improper vehicle lights,
resisting arrest, and possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia. Plaintiff was again taken into
custody. Although somewhat unclear, it appears that Plaintiff was taken into custody and
booked/processed at the local jail after each arrest and released on bond. There are no

allegations that Plaintiff was in custody other than the time periods between his arrests and his
release on bond after being processed/booked in the charges.
Plaintiff disputes the legitimacy of the two traffic stops, contending that he had red “lens
tape” covering his broken taillight, which he asserts that he used after having been stopped by
another officer on a previous occasion three days earlier and told by the officer to use the “lens
tape” to cover the taillight. He contends that Defendant’s reason for stopping him was “made
up,” and he further disputes that his license was suspended, contending that it was actually a
restricted license but that Defendant ignored the paperwork. He further contends that Defendant

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changed her arrest report on the first occasion to justify the stop. Plaintiff contends that
Defendant “stalked” him on the second occasion and that it was a conflict of interest for
Defendant to stop him and ask him to exit his vehicle given what had occurred during the prior
traffic stop. He asserts that he demanded to call his lawyer and that he was not required to exit
his vehicle, but that other officers were called to the scene and that he was pulled out of his

vehicle without being asked any questions. Plaintiff contends that body-cam footage from the
officers would verify his account of what occurred.
Again, although somewhat unclear from the complaint, it appears that the charge from
the first arrest was dismissed on June 6, 2023, and that the charges from the second arrest were
“bound over” in May 2023 after a court appearance. See Docket Entry 1-1 at 11.1 Plaintiff also
makes allegations directed at the state court proceedings, alleging that that documents in the state
proceedings were forged, that he did not agree to waive a preliminary hearing, that he has had to
represent himself, and that he has been denied body-cam footage from the officers.
Based upon these events, Plaintiff asserts that following claims against Defendant under

Section 1983: 1) false imprisonment (twice); 2) false arrest; 3) excessive force/assault; 4)
unlawful search; 5) “conspiracy against rights;” 6) stalking; and, 7) “Fourth Amendment
Constitutional Right of the Valley State Officials.” Id. at 3.2
II. MOTION TO DISMISS, RESPONSE, AND REPLY

1 The state court records provided by Defendant with her motion to dismiss indicate that the
charges arising out of the second arrest were ultimately dismissed in April 2025. See Docket Entry
No. 5-4 at 4.

2 Although Plaintiff’s list of claims enumerates eight claims, he actually sets out only seven
claims. Further, although Plaintiff checkmarks a box on his complaint indicating that he is bringing
a claim against federal officials, it is obvious that no federal officials are involved in this case and
this his claims are not brought as Bivens claims but are brought against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. §
3
Defendant seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant first asserts a technical defense, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the
applicable one year statute of limitations because Plaintiff’s lawsuit was filed more than one year
after his claims accrued. Defendant then argues that: 1) Plaintiff’s false arrest and false
imprisonment claim are redundant claims; 2) probable cause existed for Plaintiff’s arrests; 3) the

canine search of Plaintiff’s car was not unlawful; 4) any claim by Plaintiff for emotional distress
is facially inadequate; 5) unlawful force was not used against Plaintiff during his arrest; and, 6)
there are no facts alleges that support a “stalking” or conspiracy claim. Defendant further raises
the defense of qualified immunity. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support (Docket Entry
No. 6). Defendant attaches to her motion the arrest warrants and affidavits for Plaintiff’s two
arrests and copies of the dockets for the state criminal proceedings. See Docket Entry Nos. 5
through 5-4.
Plaintiff’s response is extremely difficult to follow. It is styled as both an opposition to
the request for dismissal, as well as a “motion to stay proceedings.” See Docket Entry No. 7.

However, Plaintiff does not actually request a stay of the current proceedings, let alone present
an argument supporting such a request. Additionally, the response is written in part in the third
person, referring to Plaintiff as “my client,” and parts of the response appear to possibly be
copied from a transcript of some other court proceedings. The response repeatedly emphasizes
the importance of “Code 3739,” but it is not clear what “Code 3739” is or why it is important,
and parts of the response appear to be directed at issues occurring in the state criminal
proceedings or to be part of Plaintiff’s defense to the criminal charges. Although very little of

1983 because she is a state or local official who has acted under color of state law.
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the response is specifically directed to the dismissal arguments raised by Defendant, Plaintiff
does contend that his constitutional rights have been violated and that relief under Section 1983
is warranted. He also presents a brief rebuttal to Defendant’s statute of limitations argument,
appearing to argue that he was not required to file his claims until he was found innocent of the
state criminal charges or the charges were dropped. Id. at 4.

In a reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s response was not timely filed within
fourteen days after the motion to dismiss, as required by Local Rule 7.01(3), and should not be
considered. See Reply (Docket Entry No. 9) at 4. Defendant further reiterates her dismissal
arguments and contends that there are no arguments set out in Plaintiff’s response that rebut the
motion to dismiss.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must take
all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679. A legal conclusion, including one couched as a
factual allegation, need not be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, nor are mere recitations
of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Id. at 678; Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock,
592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010), cited in Abriq v. Hall, 295 F. Supp. 3d 874, 877 (M.D. Tenn.

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2018). Moreover, factual allegations that are merely consistent with the defendant’s liability do
not satisfy the claimant’s burden, as mere consistency does not establish plausibility of
entitlement to relief even if it supports the possibility of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
When determining whether the complaint meets this standard, the Court must accept the
complaint’s factual allegations as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and

“take all of those facts and inferences and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018). Because Plaintiff is a
pro se litigant, the Court is required to view his complaint with some measure of a liberal
construction. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108,
110 (6th Cir. 1991). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt from the pleading requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), and
the Court cannot supply or assume facts that are not pled or create claims that are not actually
raised. See Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F.App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot
create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.”) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted); Bell v. Tennessee, 2012 WL 996560, *9 (E.D. Tenn. March 22, 2012) (a
court is not required to create a plaintiff’s claim for him from fragmentary and conclusory
allegations).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider the complaint and any
exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits
attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss provided they are referred to in the complaint and are
central to the claims. Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.
2008).

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Although a statute-of-limitations defense, as an affirmative defense, is more properly
raised in a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, rather than Rule 12(b)(6), see Busler v.
Nissan N. Am., Inc., 688 F.Supp.3d 668, 686 (M.D. Tenn. 2023), such a defense is nonetheless
appropriate for review in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when it is apparent from the face
of the complaint and from appropriate, related filings that a plaintiff’s claims are time-barred.

See Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012).
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendant’s statute of limitations defense has merit. Section 1983 provides a plaintiff
with a right to seek damages from any person who has acted under color of state law to deprive
the plaintiff of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Like any civil claim, a claim under Section 1983 is subject to a statute of limitations
that requires the claim to be brought within a certain time period. Although Section 1983 lacks
its own statute of limitations, courts look to state law to determine the appropriate filing period.
See Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 879 (6th Cir. 2024).

It is beyond dispute that the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims that arise in
Tennessee is the one year limitations period set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B).
See Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005); Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215
F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2000); Merriweather v. City of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir.
1997); Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff’s argument that this
limitations period does not apply to his claims is simply incorrect.
Although the duration of the applicable filing limitations period is governed by state law,
the question of when the time period begins to run is determined by federal law. Wallace v.

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Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Eidson v. State of Tennessee Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510
F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007). Generally, the filing period begins to run when a plaintiff knows
or should have known of the injury or basic facts that form the basis of the claim. Eidson, 510
F.3d at 635; Ruff v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001). Alternatively, the Sixth Circuit
has suggested that the filing period for a Section 1983 claim beings to run when the plaintiff has

a complete and present cause of action that can be raised in court. Dibrell v. City of Knoxville,
Tennessee, 984 F.3d 1156, 1162 (6th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims for illegal searches incident to his arrests and for
the use of excessive force during his second arrest are claims that are premised upon the events
that occurred when he was arrested on March 8, 2023, and May 20, 2023. These claims clearly
accrued on the dates of the arrests because Plaintiff was aware at that time of the searches of his
vehicle and of the alleged use of force against him. Accordingly, he knew or should have
known of the injuries and basic facts that formed the basis of the claims or, alternatively, had
complete and present causes of action that he could pursue. However, Plaintiff’s lawsuit was

not filed until June 8, 2024, more than one year after the claims accrued. The claim are thus
barred by the statute of limitations. See Harper v. Jackson, 293 F.App'x 389, 392 n.1 (6th Cir.
2008) (Fourth Amendment claim for illegal search accrues on the date of the alleged illegal
search); Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007) (Fourth Amendment claim for
excessive use of force during arrest accrues at the time of the arrest); Abbey v. Metro. Gov't of
Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Case No. 3:23-CV-00300, 2025 WL 1901344, at **2-4 (M.D.
Tenn. July 9, 2025) (Crenshaw, J.) (claims for unlawful seizure/false arrests, unreasonable
search, and excessive force each accrued at the time of the plaintiff’s arrest and were required to

8
have been filed within one year of the arrest) aff’d in pertinent part __ F.4th ___, 2026 WL
2070292, at *3-5 (6th Cir. July 17, 2026).
Plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims are likewise barred by the statute of
limitations. These distinct but related claims3 accrued at the time Plaintiff was held pursuant to
the legal process after his arrest. See Wallace, 549 U.S at 389; Codrington v. Dolak, 142 F.4th

884, 892 (6th Cir. 2025); Dibrell, 984 F.3d at 1162. Generally, an arrestee is “held pursuant to
legal process” when certain actions occur pertaining to the charges for which he was arrested,
such as being bound over by a magistrate, formally charged, or arraigned on charges. See
Wallace, supra; Codrington, supra; Dibrell, supra.
In this case, the arrest warrants and the related state court criminal dockets show that
Plaintiff was released on bond after being brought before a judicial commissioner in the hours
after his arrests. These records further show that the charges arising from the second arrest were
bound over to the grand jury after a hearing on May 31, 2023, and Plaintiff’s own complaint
states that the charge from the first arrest was dismissed on June 6, 2023. Accordingly, even the

latest of these events occurred more than one year prior to Plaintiff’s filing of his lawsuit on June
8, 2024. The claims were not timely raised and are barred by the statute of limitations. See
Dibrell, 984 F.3d at 1162 (finding that Section 1983 claims based on arrest and initial detention
accrued when “detention ended,” upon plaintiff's appearance before magistrate and release on
bond); Green v. Robles, No. 3:25-CV-01069, 2026 WL 1452440, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May 22, 2026)

3 The Sixth Circuit has recognized that, although false arrest and false imprisonment claims
are distinct claims, the claims are functionally the same and can be referred to as a single claim when
a false imprisonment claim arises out of an alleged false arrest, See Weser v. Goodson, 965 F.3d
507, 513 (6th Cir. 2020). Because the Court finds that the statute of limitations bars the Plaintiff’s
false arrest and false imprisonment claims, the Court sees no purpose in parsing out the claims and
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(dismissing false arrest and false imprisonment claims as untimely); Jordan v. City of Murfreesboro,
Tennessee, No. 3:26-CV-00013, 2026 WL 1419048, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. May 20, 2026) (dismissing
Fourth Amendment claims related to arrest as untimely because claims were brought more than one
year after the plaintiff was released on bond after his arrest); Abbey, supra.
Plaintiff appears to argue that he was not required to bring his claims until the criminal

proceedings against him had concluded in his favor and that his claims should thus be viewed as
timely raised.4 This argument is mistaken. See Abbey, 2026 WL 2070292, at *5; Smith v.
Tennessee, No. 3:14-CV-02003, 2015 WL 5330479, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2015)
(Campbell, J.) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that he could not file suit on false arrest claims
until resolution of the criminal charges arising out of his arrest and finding that the claim was not
timely brought); Hight v. Cox, No. 3:13-CV-00367, 2013 WL 6096784, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Nov.
20, 2013) (Trauger, J.) (same).
Plaintiff’s remaining claims are for “conspiracy against right,” stalking, and “Fourth
Amendment Constitutional Right of the Valley State Officials.” The latter two claims simply

fail to assert cognizable legal claims. The Court is unable to discern what Plaintiff means by
“Fourth Amendment Constitutional Right of the Valley State Officials,” and there is no federal,
private right of action for stalking. Murray v. Williams, 2016 WL 1122050, at *10 (E.D. Tenn.
Mar. 22, 2016) (“because federal stalking does not contain a private right of action, plaintiffs'
claims of federal stalking will be dismissed.). Only the claim for a civil conspiracy asserts an actual,
cognizable claim. However, this claim is likewise subject to the one year statute of limitations and is

striking one of them as redundant as requested by Defendant in her motion.
4 Although Defendant is correct that Plaintiff’s response is not timely under the Local Rules
and that the motion to dismiss could thus be viewed as unopposed, the Court has exercised its
10
barred since the claim is based upon the events of March 8, 2023, and May 20, 2023, which occurred
more than one year prior to the filing of this lawsuit. Even if timely asserted, however, there are no
facts alleged in the complaint that would even remotely support such a claim, which must be pled
with some degree of specificity. See Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003).
Because the Court finds that dismissal of this entire case is warranted for the reasons set

out supra, the Court finds it unnecessary to address any of Defendant’s alternative arguments for
dismissal. Additionally, Plaintiff’s arguments concerning the merits of his claims and his belief
that probable cause did not exist for his arrests are simply not pertinent given the Courts finding
that his claims were not timely brought and are barred by the statute of limitations. See Abbey,
2026 WL 2070292, at *5; Hall v. City of Williamsburg, Kentucky, 2017 WL 11708230, at *1
(E.D. Ky. June 1, 2017) (the plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are subject
to dismissal as untimely despite his assertion that probable cause did not exist).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss

(Docket Entry No. 4) filed by Defendant Lyssed Pacheco be GRANTED and that this case be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen
(14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation and must state with particularity the
specific portions of this Report and Recommendation to which objection is made. See Rule
72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 72.02(a). Three (3) additional days
are added to this time for service by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). Service is complete upon mailing.

discretion to consider Plaintiff’s response in light of his pro se status.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). Failure to file written objections within the specified time can be deemed
a waiver of the right to appeal the District Court's Order regarding the Report and Recommendation.
See Thomas vy. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.
1981). Any response to the objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after service of
objections. See Federal Rule 72(b)(2).
Respectfully submitted,

\
(‘> ¢ i
A RBARA D. HOLMES
nited States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422645. Public record. Not legal advice.