# Brown

> District Court, W.D. New York · August 19, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422592

## Case

- **Full name:** Germaine Vester Brown v. Niagara Falls Police Department; Shanley; Proietti; Miles; Peter Wydysh; Tarnowski; and Wildt
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 19, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

SINIES DISTRICFS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ED FILED CS
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK S
AUG 1 9 2026
AY Ew
GERMAINE VESTER BROWN, LESS woe is SEL
ERN DISTRIC\
Plaintiff,
v. 25-CV-421 (JLS)
NIAGARA FALLS POLICE
DEPARTMENT; SHANLEY;
PROIETTI; MILES; PETER WYDYSH;
TARNOWSKI; and WILDT,!
Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Germaine Vester Brown is a prisoner confined at the Elmira
Correctional Facility and has filed this action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
arising from a January 15, 2025 arrest by officers of the Niagara Falls Police
Department. Dkt. 1. Brown also seeks permission to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) and has filed the required authorization. Dkt. 4.
Because Brown meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), he is granted
permission to proceed IFP. The Court therefore screens his complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a)-(b).
For the below reasons, Brown’s claims against Wydysh in his official capacity
for monetary damages, the Niagara Falls Police Department, and his Fourteenth

! The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as it appears above.

Amendment claim arising from his inability to participate in a diversion program
are dismissed without leave to amend. His remaining claims are dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) with leave to amend as
directed below.
DISCUSSION
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Review Under the IFP Statutes
A court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity, or an officer or employee of a governmental
entity, if the court determines the action “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); see 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (setting forth the same criteria for dismissal).
B. Pleading Standards
In evaluating a complaint, the court must “accept all of the facts alleged in
the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Larkin v.
Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003). Although “a court is obliged to construe
[pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations,”
McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even a pro se complaint
must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a
complaint to make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint states a claim for

relief if the claim is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007).
A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In other
words, although a pro se complaint need not provide every last detail in support of a
claim, it must contain sufficient factual allegations to nudge the claim “across the
line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. See Komatsu v.
Cubesmart, Daniels Norelli Cecere & Tavel PC, No. 20-3676-CV, 2021 WL 6060603,
at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2021) (Summary order) (to avoid sua sponte dismissal under
the IFP statute, “a complaint must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)); Scott Phillip Lewis v.
R.L. Vallee, Inc., d.b.a. Maplefield’s, No. 24-1438, 2025 WL 1077412, at *1 (2d Cir.
Apr. 10, 2025) (summary order) (same).
The Court’s liberal pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
A complaint fails to state a claim if it supplies only “labels and conclusions,”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action,” id., or “naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Although a court is “obligated
to draw the most favorable inferences that [a plaintiff]’s complaint supports, [it]

cannot invent factual allegations that he [or she] has not pled.” Chavis v. Chappius,
618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010).
C. Section 1983 Claims
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege that the
challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law,
and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d
400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it
provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established
elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)).
To establish liability against an official under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that individual’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation;
it is not enough to assert that the defendant is a link in the chain of command. See
McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004). Moreover, the theory of
respondeat superior is not available in a Section 1983 action. See Hernandez v.
Keane, 341 F.3d 187, 144 (2d Cir. 2008). There is “no special rule for supervisory
liability.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020). Rather, “a
plaintiff must plead and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through
the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).

D. Leave to Amend
Generally, a court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to
be heard prior to dismissal, unless it “can rule out any possibility, however
unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.”
Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Federal
Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)). But a court may deny leave to
amend pleadings when any amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu,
222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131
(2d Cir. 1998) (“Where it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be
productive ... it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.”).
TI. ALLEGATIONS?
Defendants Shanley, Proietti, Miles, Tarnowski, and Wildt are officers with
the Niagara Falls Police Department. Dkt. 1 at 8. On January 15, 2025, Brown
“was in [his] wife’s car when [he] was approached by a Niagara Falls City Police
officer.” Jd. at 14. Brown was having a diabetic reaction, which the officer mistook
for him being intoxicated. Jd. at 5. After Brown told the officer that he was not
under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances, a field sobriety test was
performed. Id. at 14. Brown was also given a breathalyzer test, and the reading

2 The complaint includes attachments. To the extent that the attachments are
relevant to the incidents described in the complaint, the Court will consider them.
See Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit
or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”). The facts alleged
in the complaint are sparse, and the most detailed account of what transpired is
found in the attachments to the complaint.

was 0.00. Id. The officer, however, told Brown that he had failed the test, and
placed him under arrest. Id.
Brown was transported to the Niagara Falls Memorial Hospital and was
forced to undergo a blood test without his consent. Id. The officer told Brown that
he had given the officer consent to order the blood draw, but Brown denies that he
gave consent. Id.
Brown was then transported to the police station, where “[t]he
officers ...beat[ ] [him] up” while handcuffed, id. at 5, 11, 14, and left him in a cell
for approximately 30 hours without having access to his insulin medication. Id. at
14. No one checked his glucose or provided “any other medical attention to find out
if that [was] why [he] was so incoherent and disoriented.” Jd. Instead, they
assumed that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol despite his request for
insulin and their knowledge from prior encounters that he was diabetic. Id. at 14-
15.
Brown also alleges that the officers and district attorneys tried to stop him
from participating in a diversion program. Id. at 15-16. Specifically, District
Attorney Peter Wydysh (“Wydysh”) “set[ ] [him] up” and officers tampered with
evidence. Id. at 11.
Brown does not indicate what he was charged with; nor does he identify the
disposition of the charges. He requests monetary damages. Id. at 6.

Til. ANALYSIS
A. Eleventh Amendment
“When prosecuting a criminal matter, a district attorney in New York State,
acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, represents the State not the county.” Baez v.
Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988). To the extent that Brown names Wydysh
in his official capacity, Dkt. 1, at 2, it “is, in effect, a suit against the state itself[.]”
Berman Enters., Inc. v. Jorling, 3 F.3d 602, 606 (2d Cir. 1998).
“Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress
has overridden it .. . a State cannot be sued directly in its own name regardless of
the relief sought.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985); see also
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). New York
has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit under Section 1983, see
Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1977),
and state sovereign immunity has not been abrogated by Section 1983, see Will v.
Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989); Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y.,
900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990).
The Eleventh Amendment bar extends to state officials sued in their official
capacities for monetary damages. Graham, 473 U.S. at 169. Accordingly, Brown’s
claims against Wydysh in his official capacity are dismissed.? Because amendment
would be futile, the dismissal is without leave to amend.

3 “Whether Eleventh Amendment immunity ‘constitutes a true issue of subject
matter jurisdiction or is more appropriately viewed as an affirmative defense’ has
not yet been decided by the Supreme Court or [the Second Circuit].” Allco Fin. Lid.

B. Municipal Liability
The Niagara Falls Police Department is an “arm of the City . . . and does not
have a legal identity separate and apart from the City.” Forbes v. City of Rochester,
612 F. Supp. 3d 159, 170 (W.D.N.Y. 2020). Therefore, the Niagara Falls Police
Department is dismissed as a defendant from this action without leave to amend.
Brown has also sued individual Niagara Falls Police Department officers—
Shanley, Proietti, Miles, Tarnowski, and Wildt—in their official capacities,4 which
“is functionally equivalent” to a suit against their employer—the City of Niagara
Falls. Baines v. Masiello, 288 F. Supp. 2d 376, 384 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing, inter
alia, Graham, 473 U.S. at 166).
A municipality such as the City of Niagara Falls cannot be held liable under
Section 1983 unless the challenged action was undertaken pursuant to a municipal
policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 486 U.S. 658, 694
(1978). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plead three elements: “(1) an official
policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a

v. Roisman, No. 22-2726, 2023 WL 4571965, at *1 (2d Cir. July 18, 2023) (citation
modified). Because “the Second Circuit has routinely affirmed such dismissals
based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,” the Court will treat it as a dismissal
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which must be without prejudice. Canfield v.
New York, No. 6:24-CV-1357 (GTS/TWD), 2025 WL 1288747, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 5,
2025).
4 Where, as here, “a pro se litigant does not specify in what capacity the individual
defendants are being sued, courts generally ‘liberally construe the complaint as
alleging both official and individual capacity claims.” Anderson v. Pedalty, No. 14-
CV-00192, 2015 WL 1785192, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2015) (quoting McCloud v.
Kane, 491 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)).

constitutional right.” Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995)
(quoting Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983)).
An official policy or custom can be established by showing:
a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions or
decisions made by municipal officials with decision-making authority;
(8) a practice so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a custom
of which policymakers must have been aware; or (4) a failure by
policymakers to properly train or supervise their subordinates, such
that the policymakers exercised “deliberate indifference” to the rights of
the plaintiff and others encountering those subordinates.
Kurmangaliyev v. City of New York, 2023 WL 86540238, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14,
2023) (citing cases).
Brown’s claims against Shanley, Proietti, Miles, Tarnowski, and Wildt in
their official capacities are dismissed with leave to amend. If Brown opts to replead
these claims in an amended complaint, he must allege that his constitutional rights
were violated pursuant to a policy or custom of the City of Niagara Falls.
C. Prosecutorial Immunity
The Supreme Court has held that “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in
preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in
the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of
absolute immunity.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1998). “[A]bsolute
immunity protects a prosecutor from § 1983 liability for virtually all acts, regardless
of motivation, associated with his function as an advocate.” Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d
81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994). This extends to even “allegedly conspiring to present false
evidence at a criminal trial.” Id. Absolute immunity applies “even when the result

may be that a wronged plaintiff is left without an immediate remedy.” Anilao v.
Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 863 (2d Cir. 2022) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
427 (1976)).
Nevertheless, “the broad reach of absolute prosecutorial immunity ... does
not extend to ‘those acts a prosecutor performs in administration or investigation
not undertaken in preparation for judicial proceedings.” Stokes v. Wayne County,
No. 6:23-CV-06482 EAW, 2024 WL 4262276, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2024)
(quoting Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Based on the allegations of the complaint, Wydysh’s conduct, even if
improper, was related to his role as an advocate and was within his prosecutorial
function, thereby entitling him to prosecutorial immunity for the claims asserted
against him in his individual capacity. See Anilao, 27 F.Ath at 864 (“[A]bsolute
immunity extends even to a prosecutor who ‘conspir[es] to present false evidence at
a criminal trial. The fact that such a conspiracy is certainly not something that is
properly within the role of a prosecutor is immaterial, because the immunity
attaches to his function, not to the manner in which he performed it.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Dory, 25 F.3d at 83)). The Court, however, will permit Brown an
opportunity to amend the complaint to allege sufficient facts that Wydysh acted
outside the scope of his role as prosecutor and, thus, was not shielded by absolute
immunity. See Morales v. Weiss, 569 F. App’x 36, 37 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order)
(“[T}he district court erred in dismissing... claims against [the] prosecutors...
without affording plaintiff the opportunity to amend his pro se complaint to allege

10

sufficient facts that those defendants acted outside the scope of their roles as
prosecutors and, thus, were not shielded by absolute immunity.”).
D. False Arrest
“A [Section] 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the Fourth Amendment
right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seizures[,] is substantially the
same as a claim for false arrest under New York law.” Alexander v. City of
Syracuse, 132 F.4th 129, 156 (2d Cir. 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Kee v.
City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 158 (2d Cir. 2021)). “Under New York law, to
prevail on a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant
intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement,
(8) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not
otherwise privileged.” Id. (quoting Ashley v. City of New York, 992 F.3d 128, 136
(2d Cir. 2021)). The existence of probable cause renders an arrest privileged. See
Singh v. Petro, No. 21-CV-813-LJV-JJM, 2025 WL 885594, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 21,
2025) (citing Ashley, 992 F.3d at 136). Consequently, “[p]robable cause to arrest is a
complete defense to a false arrest claim.” Alexander, 132 F.4th at 156 (quoting Kee,
12 F.4th at 158).
Generally, “probable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge
or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient
to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be
arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady,
728 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101

11

F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996)). A finding of probable cause is not defeated simply
because “it is based upon mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer was
reasonable in relying on that information.” Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98,
103 (2d Cir. 1994).
Brown sufficiently alleges the elements of a false arrest claim at this stage.
He indicates that he was arrested for unspecified crimes appearing to relate to
driving while intoxicated, when, in fact, he was suffering from a diabetic episode,
and that the arresting officers were aware of his condition. Dkt. 1 at 5, 14. He also
alleges that he was subjected to a breathalyzer test, which revealed no alcohol in his
system. Jd. at 14. These allegations call into question a determination that there
was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
Lacking, however, is any indication who, among the five officers named as
defendants, was personally involved in Brown’s arrest. While Brown alleges that
“all’ defendants are responsible for the false arrest, Dkt. 1 at 5, his allegations point
to only one officer participating in his arrest. Jd. at 14.5 The false arrest claim is
therefore dismissed with leave to amend. Any amended complaint should identify
each defendant who participated in Brown’s arrest and identify their role.
Additionally, any amended complaint should identify what Brown was
arrested for and the status of the criminal charge(s). These added factual

5 A letter from the Niagara Falls Police Department attached to complaint suggests
that Shanley was the arresting officer, but it is not conclusive. Dkt. 1 at 8. If
Shanley was in fact the arresting officer, this may be clarified in the amended
complaint.
12

allegations are necessary because damages in § 1983 cases are barred if a judgment
in the plaintiffs favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence
has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).
EK. Excessive Force
Brown alleges that the “officers also use[d] excessive force when [he] was
arrested[,| [and was] beat[ ] up at the station.” Dkt. 1 at 5. At the time, he alleges
that he was handcuffed and “no threat to officers.” Jd. at 11.
Because the use of force appears to have occurred after Brown’s arrest but
before his arraignment, it is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. See Powell v.
Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment standard
probably should be applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person
arrested is arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or joint)
of the arresting officer.”); Cornelius v. Luna, No. 3:20-CV-01047 (JCH), 2024 WL
6859647, at *4 (D. Conn. June 13, 2024) (“[M]ost courts in this Circuit have
analyzed claims of excessive force arising after arrest but prior to arraignment
under the Fourth Amendment.” (citing cases)), reconsideration denied, 2024 WL
4116564 (D. Conn. Sept. 9, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-1859-CV, 2025 WL
2753718 (2d Cir. Sept. 29, 2025).
“The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from the government’s use of
excessive force when detaining or arresting individuals.” Jones v. Parmley, 465
F.3d 46, 61 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir.

13

1999)). As a result, these claims are subject to the Fourth Amendment’s objective
“reasonableness” standard. Cugini v. City of New York, 941 F.3d 604, 612 (2d Cir.
2019).
“TA] government officer may not intrude on a person’s Fourth Amendment
rights by employing a degree of force beyond that which is warranted by the
objective circumstances of an arrest” or a detention. Jd. In making this
determination, courts look to the following factors, which include
(1) the nature and severity of the crime leading to the arrest, (2) whether
the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or
others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight., (4) the need for the application of
force, (5) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that
was used, (6) the extent of the injury inflicted, and (7) whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Linton v. Zorn, 185 F.4th 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
Brown’s allegations that he was assaulted while handcuffed and compliant
raise a colorable claim of excessive force. Although the complaint attributes the use
of excessive force, as well as a variety of other claims, to “all” defendants, Dkt. 1 at
5, some identification of the conduct allegedly attributable to each defendant is
necessary to state a claim against a particular defendant.®
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “does not demand that a complaint be a
model of clarity or exhaustively present the facts alleged, it requires, at a minimum,

6 A letter from the Niagara Falls Police Department suggests that Prioietti, Miles,
Tarnowski, and Wild were alleged to have been involved in the use of force and/or
deliberate indifference incidents. Dkt. 1 at 8. Plaintiff may clarify this in an
amended complaint.
14

that a complaint give each defendant ‘fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and
the ground upon which it rests.” Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34
(2d Cir. 2001) (Summary order) (quoting Ferro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d
847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961)). A complaint that “lump[s] all the defendants together in
each claim and provid[es] no factual basis to distinguish their conduct . . . fail[s] to
satisfy this minimum standard[.]”’ Id. Therefore, this claim is dismissed with leave
to file an amended complaint identifying the alleged conduct attributable to each
defendant.
F. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
Brown’s deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim is analyzed
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bruno v. City of
Schenectady, 727 F. App’x 717, 720 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (addressing a
deliberate indifference to medical need claim under the Fourteenth Amendment). A
Fourteenth Amendment medical indifference claim requires a plaintiff to plausibly
allege two elements: an objective prong demonstrating the existence of a “serious
medical need”, and a “mens rea” prong, that defendants “acted with deliberate
indifference to such needs.” Charles v. Orange County, 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir.
2019) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d
17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).
The serious medical need element “contemplates a condition of urgency such
as one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Id. Under the
mens rea prong, “something more than mere negligence” is necessary. Id. at 87

15

(quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996)). Deliberate indifference
must be “shown by something akin to recklessness” but “does not require proof of a
malicious or callous state of mind.” Jd. Thus, a plaintiff can “allege either that the
defendants knew that failing to provide the complained of medical treatment would
pose a substantial risk to his health or that the defendants should have known that
failing to provide the omitted medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to
the detainee’s health.” Id.
“[D]iabetes is a sufficiently serious medical condition to meet the objective
prong.” Beatty v. Davidson, 713 F. Supp. 2d 167, 174 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing cases).
Brown’s allegations that officers failed to test his blood sugar and denied him
insulin for 30 hours—despite their awareness that he was a diabetic and suffering
adverse consequences from the lack of insulin—is also sufficient to meet the
subjective prong. Dkt. 1 at 13-14.
Again, however, Brown fails to identify what role, if any, each defendant
played in the alleged deliberate indifference to his medical condition. This claim is
therefore dismissed with leave to amend.
G. Malicious Prosecution
To state a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege “(1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the
defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the
accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding, (4) actual
malice, [and] (5) a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the

16

plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights.” Alexander, 182 F.4th at 158 (citation
modified). “[U]nlike Fourth Amendment claims of false arrest, in the Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution context, probable cause must support each
charge brought by the prosecution.” Id. (citing Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602
U.S. 556, 562 (2024)). A grand jury indictment creates a rebuttable presumption
that probable cause exists to prosecute. See McClellan v. Smith, 489 F.3d 137, 145
(2d Cir. 2006).
Brown fails to identify what he was charged with or the disposition of the
charges. Without satisfying the favorable termination element, Brown has failed to
state a malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, the claim is dismissed, but with
leave to amend. Any amended complaint should also include allegations identifying
the personal involvement of each defendant against whom Plaintiff brings the
claim.
H. Due Process Claim: Diversion Program
Brown alleges that he was not permitted to participate in a diversion
program due to the false allegations against him. Dkt. 1 at 18, 15-16. To the extent
that Brown claims that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were
violated because he was not permitted to participate in the diversion program, that
is not a cognizable claim under Section 1983. See Ruffin v. New York State Parole,
22-CV-185-LJV, 2023 WL 2480584, at *3 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2023) (quoting
Bonano v. Staniszewski, 12 CV 5879 (DLI)(LB), 2016 WL 112638168, at *8 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 2, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 4220402 (W.D.N.Y.

17

2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-4163, 2018 WL 3814299 (2d Cir. May 30, 2018))).
Because further amendment of this claim would be futile, Brown’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim arising from his inability to participate in the
diversion program is dismissed without leave to amend.
I. Warrantless Search
Liberally interpreting the complaint, Brown raises a Fourth Amendment
illegal search claim related to the taking of his blood sample at the hospital without
consent or probable cause. Dkt. 1 at 14.
“Although blood tests are ‘searches’ under the Fourth Amendment, the
Fourth Amendment only proscribes those searches that are unreasonable.” Luck v.
Westchester Med. Ctr., No. 17-CV-9110 (NSR), 2020 WL 564635, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 4, 2020) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989);
Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2003)). “A blood test at
the direction of law enforcement with probable cause, exigent circumstances, and a
reasonable examination procedure is not unreasonable.” Id.
Brown has stated a colorable Fourth Amendment claim by alleging that the
blood sample taken at the hospital was without his consent or probable cause.
However, he has not identified which officer or officers were responsible for ordering
the blood sample. This claim is therefore dismissed but with leave to amend.
J. Failure to Intervene
Brown characterizes his claim as a “failure to protect.” Failure to protect
claims arise from the duty of prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at

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the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). There
is no allegation that Brown was assaulted by a prisoner. Instead, the Court
interprets the complaint as alleging a failure to intervene claim, which is based on
the duty of law enforcement officers “to intervene to protect the constitutional rights
of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence.”
Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994).
“An officer may be liable for the preventable harm caused by the officer’s
failure to intervene during a constitutional violation where the officer ‘observes the
constitutional violation and has sufficient time to act to prevent it.” Loftin v. City
of New York, No. 15-CV-5656 (MKB), 2017 WL 3614437, at *10 (H.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,
2017) (alteration omitted) (quoting Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 106 (2d Cir.
2016)). The dismissal of all of the underlying constitutional claims requires
dismissal of the failure to intervene claim. Wieder v. City of New York, 569 F.
App’x. 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (“Because the underlying
constitutional claims were properly dismissed, we also affirm the district court's
dismissal of plaintiff's failure to intervene claim.”). Brown may, however, replead
this claim in an amended complaint. If he does so, the amended complaint shall
identify which officers failed to protect him from which constitutional violations.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Brown’s claims against Wydysh in his official
capacity for monetary damages, the Niagara Falls Police Department, and his
Fourteenth Amendment claim arising from his inability to participate in a diversion

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program are dismissed without leave to amend. His remaining claims are
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)Gi) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to
state a claim but with leave to amend. Brown may file an amended complaint by
October 5, 2026, in which he includes the necessary allegations as directed above
and in a manner that complies with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Brown is advised that an amended complaint completely replaces the prior
complaint in the action, and thus it “renders [any prior complaint] of no legal
effect.” Intl Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977). Therefore,
any amended complaint must include all allegations against each Defendant so that
the amended complaint stands alone as the only complaint in this action.
Brown is further advised that he has been granted leave to amend only those
claims addressed above. A district court has the inherent authority to dismiss
claims that exceed the scope of the court’s order granting leave to amend. See Palm
Beach Strategic Income, LP v. Salzman, 457 F. App’x 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2012)
(summary order) (collecting cases).
ORDER
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Brown’s application to proceed IFP, Dkt. 4,
is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Brown’s claims against Wydysh in his official capacity,
claims against the Niagara Falls Police Department, and his Fourteenth

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Amendment claim arising from his inability to participate in a diversion program
are DISMISSED without leave to amend; and it is further
ORDERED that the remaining claims alleged in the complaint are
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(6)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted but with leave to amend; and it is
further
ORDERED that Brown may file an amended complaint as directed above by
October 5, 2026; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send to Brown with this order, a
copy of the Amended Complaint, a blank Section 1983 complaint form, and the
instructions for preparing an amended complaint; and it is further
ORDERED that if Brown does not file an amended complaint by the deadline
set forth above, the claims dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim will remain dismissed and the Clerk of the
Court shall close this case as dismissed with prejudice without further order; and it
is further
ORDERED that in the event the complaint is dismissed because Brown has
failed to file an amended complaint, this Court hereby certifies, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith
and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person is denied. Coppedge v.
United States, 369 US. 438 (1962). Further requests to proceed on appeal as a poor
person should be directed, on motion, to the United States Court of Appeals for the

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Second Circuit, in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
ORDERED that pursuant to Western District of New York Local Rule of Civil
Procedure 5.2(d), Brown must immediately notify the Court in writing each time his
address changes. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of the action with
prejudice.
SO ORDERED. po
□□
Dated: August 19, 2026 [
Buffalo, New York |

JOHN L. SINATRA, JR. ~
UMTED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422592. Public record. Not legal advice.
