# Badenhorst

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · August 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422287

## Case

- **Full name:** Leonard Badenhorst v. Daniel Monti, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., John and Jane Does, Members of the Psychiatry Board, and Dr. Bednarz
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LEONARD BADENHORST,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 25-cv-00382-SPM
v.

DANIEL MONTI,
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
JOHN AND JANE DOES, Members of the
Psychiatry Board, and
DR. BEDNARZ,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Leonard Badenhorst,1 an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is
currently incarcerated at Centralia Correctional Center (Centralia), filed this case claiming
constitutional violations regarding denial of treatment and services for her autism spectrum
disorder (ASD). (Doc. 1). Following initial screening of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915A, Plaintiff is proceeding with the following claims:
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Monti,
Wexford, John and Jane Does (members of the Psychiatry Board),
and Bednarz for denying Plaintiff screening, diagnosis, and
treatment for autism spectrum disorder.

(Doc. 15). Now before the Court is a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 41). In
the motion, Plaintiff states that the proposed amended complaint (1) removes references to Shulty,
Christine Vineyard, and Mental Health Authority Jane Doe 1, who were named in the original
Complaint as defendants and dismissed pursuant to Section 1915A; (2) repleads ADA claims; (3)

1 Plaintiff identifies herself as a transgender female, who goes by the name Samantha. (See Doc. 5, p. 1).
pleads allegations against newly added Defendant Warden Wehking; (4) removes the conspiracy
claim, which was asserted in the original Complaint and dismissed pursuant to Section 1915A; and
(5) adds new exhibits. (Id. at p. 1). Along with the motion, Plaintiff submitted a proposed amended
complaint. (Doc. 41-1). Defendant Monti opposes the motion. (Doc. 44, 52).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), courts “should freely give leave [to
amend] when justice so requires.” Under Rule 15(a), “district courts have broad discretion to deny
leave to amend where there is undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies, undue prejudice to defendants, or where the amendment would be futile.” Mulvania
v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cnty., 850 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Arreola v. Godinez, 546
F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008)). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed in her attempt to cure
the previous Complaint’s deficiencies and allowing Plaintiff to amend would be futile.
A review of the proposed amended complaint shows that in an attempt to correct
deficiencies and add claims and new defendants, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead her
existing claims. For example, currently, Plaintiff is proceeding on an Eighth Amendment claim

against Wexford for having a policy and/or practice of prohibiting medical staff from screening
and diagnosing ASD. (Doc. 1, p. 11; Doc. 15, p. 7). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Dr.
Bednarz and the psychiatry board created a policy not to screen or diagnose inmates for ASD at
the direction of Wexford, IDOC, and Warden Monti because “it has been deemed undesirable.”
(Id. at p. 11). As a result, all ASD related services for inmates have been denied, and Dr. Bednarz
was prohibited from screening Plaintiff for ASD and issuing a diagnosis. (Id.).
In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations against Wexford are different.
Plaintiff asserts that Wexford is liable for “maintaining a policy, practice, and custom to deny
medical treatment for autism spectrum disorder and conditions in combination that may lead to a

diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder.” (Doc. 41-1, p. 20). She then recounts how she was denied
medical treatment for ASD by Mental Health Professional James in April 2022 at Western Illinois
Correctional Center and then again by Dr. Bednarz at Centralia Correctional Center, after Dr.
Bednarz met with the psychiatry board. These allegations are not sufficient to state a claim against
Wexford. Plaintiff does not connect the conduct of medical staff to any Wexford policy, and

Wexford cannot be held liable solely for the misconduct of its employees. Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of
Corr., 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014). The facts do not allow the inference that a Wexford policy
caused a deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights based on the conclusory statement that Wexford has a
policy of denying medical treatment. See Myrick v. Anglin, 496 F. App’x 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2012)
(affirming dismissal of Monell claims based on an alleged policy “to cut medical costs” because
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Wexford in the
proposed amended complaint. Because an amended complaint renders the previous complaint
void, if Plaintiff is allowed to amend, the claim against Wexford would be dismissed. The Court
assumes it was not Plaintiff’s intention to dismiss Wexford from this litigation.

Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to state a new and viable claim under the ADA/RA.
Plaintiff asserts three ADA/RA claim. First, Plaintiff alleges that staff at Centralia are violating
the ADA/RA by denying her medical services for ASD. (Doc. 41-1, p. 9). A claim for denial of
medical treatment, however, is improper under the ADA/RA. See Wachter v. Director of IDOC,
No. 23-cv-02428-SPMm 2024 WL 416493, at *2 (S.D. Ill. 2024) (citations omitted). “A claim that
Plaintiff has not been properly treated for a medical condition is distinctly different from a claim
that [s]he has been denied access to services or programs because [s]he is disabled.” Id. Her first
ADA/RA claim, therefore, fails.
Second, Plaintiff claims that she was discriminated against in violation of the ADA/RA

when she was excluded from playing in the pickleball event because she could not find a partner
to be on her team. (Doc. 41-1, p. 13). Plaintiff alleges that to play in the pickle ball event the
facility had a rule requiring two-player teams to be from the same housing unit. (Id.). Plaintiff
states that because of her disability, ASD, she has difficulty socializing and forming relationships,
and as a result, no one in her housing unit wanted to be her partner. (Id. at p. 14). The only inmate

who would partner with Plaintiff was from another housing unit. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that she
requested that the rule be modified to allow her and the inmate from the other housing unit to team-
up and register together, but the event was held before she received a response. (Id.). These facts,
as pled, do not state a claim under the ADA or RA. There are no facts in the proposed amended
complaint from which the Court can infer that staff acting intentionally on the basis of Plaintiff’s
disability or that staff refused to provide reasonable accommodation. (See Doc. 41-2, p. 14-15).
Additionally, Plaintiff’s assertion that she could not play in the pickleball event on a single
occasion is more akin to an “inconvenience,” rather than a total denial of a program or service. See
Wagoner v. Lemon, 778 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that a paraplegic inmate did not
state an ADA or RA claim based on inadequate transportation for a wheelchair or the lack of

wheelchair repairs because while both issues caused inconveniences, they did not deny him access
to services or programs). Thus, she has failed to state an ADA/RA claim regarding the pickleball
event.
And third and finally, Plaintiff attempts to state an ADA/RA claim based on the denial of
communication and interpretation services. (Doc. 41-1, p. 14). Plaintiff asserts that on July 16,
2025, another inmate with ASD, named Wachter, submitted a letter to the IDOC ADA coordinator
requesting “peer-led interpretive services” on behalf Wachter and Plaintiff. (See Doc. 41-2, p. 86-
87). The ADA coordinator never responded to the letter. (Doc. 41-1, p. 15). According to the letter,
peer-led interpretive services would involve assigning an inmate who is trusted by Plaintiff to

accompany Plaintiff throughout the day and “observe all interactions but not interfere. After the
interaction with inmates or staff, the [inmate] would provide missing non-verbal information and
correct or explain missing interpretations.” (Doc. 41-2, p. 88). According to Plaintiff, she was
informed by Wachter that Warden Wehking stated that no services would be provided to inmates
with ASD without a court order. (Doc. 41-1, p. 15). Plaintiff asserts that without communication

services, she will be (1) subjected to continued “unwanted sexual encounters” with other inmates;
and (2) repeatedly issued disciplinary tickets. (Id.). Although without a peer-led interpretive
service, Plaintiff is finding it difficult to communicate with fellow inmates and prison staff, she
does not assert facts suggesting that she is being denied the benefits of a service, program, or
activity based on her disability and how her requested accommodation, “peer-led interpretive
services,” would allow her to access Centralia’s services on the same basis as other inmates. See
Shuhaiber v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 980 F.3d 1167, at *1170 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming that the
plaintiff, who was confined to a wheelchair, had failed to state an ADA/RA claim where he alleged
difficulties with his cell, shower, and van, but did not specify that he was denied access to facilities
or services). Plaintiff has therefore failed to state an ADA/RA claim for denial of peer-led

interpretive services.
Based on these two issues alone, Plaintiff’s failure to replead the existing claim against
Wexford and failure to state a new and viable ADA/RA claim, the Court finds that allowing
Plaintiff to amend would be futile. Accordingly, the motion for leave to file an amended complaint
is DENIED. (Doc. 41).
OTHER MOTIONS
Plaintiff has also filed a motion seeking additional time to identify the John and Jane Doe
Defendants, described as members of the psychiatry board. (Doc. 40). The motion is GRANTED.
The deadline for Plaintiff to identify the John/Jane Doe Defendants and file a motion to substitute

is extended to September 15, 2026. On or before August 25, 2026, Defendants shall file a notice
with the Court informing the Court of whether they have provided Plaintiff with the names of the
individuals who served on the psychiatry board during the relevant time frames.
The motion to stay the deadline to file a motion for summary judgment on exhaustion filed
by Defendant Warden Monti is GRANTED. (Doc. 48). The dispositive motion re exhaustion of

administrative remedies deadline is STAYED and will be reset once all Defendants are identified
and served.
The motion to withdraw affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies
filed by Defendants Wexford and Bednarz is GRANTED. (Doc. 49). Their affirmative defense of
failure to exhaust is DEEMED withdrawn. Merits discovery remains STAYED.
Plaintiff has filed a motion seeking the Court’s assistance in resolving issues she has had
with filing documents in this case and a motion to supplement. (Doc. 51, 53). The motions are
DENIED. The Court previously addressed Plaintiff’s concerns regarding obtaining a copy of the
documents electronically filed with the Court in Doc. 56 and provided Plaintiff with instructions
on how to obtain copy of any of the documents filed on the docket. Plaintiff has a copy of the

operative Complaint in this case (see Doc. 53), and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended
complaint and to supplement have been denied. (Doc. 41, 46, 55). Plaintiff has filed hundreds of
pages in this case, and the record does not support Plaintiff’s assertion that she is being impeded
from filing documents with the Court. The declines to take any action regarding Plaintiff’s
assertions that the prosecution of her claims is being obstructed by staff at Centralia.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion for leave to file an amended complaint filed by
Plaintiff Badenhorst is DENIED. (Doc. 41).
Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time is GRANTED. (Doc. 40). The deadline for

Plaintiff to identify the John/Jane Doe Defendants and file a motion to substitute is extended to
September 15, 2026. On or before August 25, 2026, Defendants shall file a notice with the Court
informing the Court of whether they have provided Plaintiff with the names of the individuals who
served on the psychiatry board during the relevant time frames.
The motion to stay the deadline to file a motion for summary judgment on exhaustion filed

by Defendant Warden Monti is GRANTED. (Doc. 48).
The motion to withdraw affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies
filed by Defendants Wexford and Bednarz is GRANTED. (Doc. 49). Their affirmative defense of
failure to exhaust is DEEMED withdrawn.
Plaintiff’s motion for court order and motion to supplement are DENIED. (Doc. 51, 53).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 18, 2026

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422287. Public record. Not legal advice.