# PERKINS

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · August 19, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422116

## Case

- **Full name:** Dorothea B. Perkins v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** August 19, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DOROTHEA B. PERKINS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:22-cv-890
)
PENNSYLVANIA HIGHER EDUCATION )
ASSISTANCE AGENCY, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OSTEEN, JR., District Judge
Before this court is Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, (Doc. 33). For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s
motion will be granted.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Because this court’s September 30, 2025 Order dismissing
the Secretary of the United States Department of Education as a
Defendant recited the facts of Plaintiff’s 325-page complaint,
(Doc. 28 at 1–8)1, a summary of the key facts relevant to
Defendant Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency’s
(“Penn Ed” or “PHEAA”) motion is set forth below.

1 All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to
documents filed with this court refer to the page numbers
located at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they
appear on CM/ECF.
In 1991, pro se Plaintiff Dorothea B. Perkins “responded to
a brochure left at law schools by the Pennsylvania Higher
Education Assistance Agency.” (Doc. 1-2 at 34.) This brochure
“advertised PHEAA’s Law Access Program nationwide.” (Id.) After
graduating from law school in 1994, Plaintiff “was contacted by
PHEAA’s unregistered aliases,” which “pretended they were
authorized loan servicers who assist banks in making Law Access-
branded federal student loans.” (Id. at 35.) During law school
these “unregistered aliases mailed pre-printed applications for

false federal Law Access loans and private Law Access loans to
me that included banks named by PHEAA, followed by pre-printed
promissory notes with the banks’ names.” (Id.) In 1995, the
“banks and trusts named by PHEAA were silent and unreachable in
January 1995 because they were both dead in 1995 due to
mergers.” (Id. at 36.)
This “bank records fraud scheme,” (id.) is one of twenty-
one theories of fraud that Plaintiff articulates in her
Complaint. (See Doc. 1-1 at 75–97.) Each theory “revolves around
a fake federal student loan consolidation check written by PHEAA
for a non-existent Law/Ameritrust student loan program.” (Id. at
12.) To effectuate this program, Plaintiff asserts that PHEAA

used “numerous unregistered aliases, hidden aliases, pre-printed
signatures, stamped signatures, and missing signatures,” (id.),
to create “the Law Access loan claim set” that “is fraudulent.”
(Doc. 39 at 2.) These “aliases pressured [Plaintiff] to
consolidate or default.” (Doc. 1-2 at 36.) The “consolidation
application/promissory note” Plaintiff received contained “pre-
printed incomplete and inaccurate loan information” and
“included the wrong number of claims, hid a cancellation
concealed in the National Student Loan Database, and avoided
disclosing interest rates.” (Id. at 36–37.) Moreover, “the dot-
matrix printing on the . . . promissory note showed PHEAA

swapped the names of the banks [Plaintiff] tried to contact with
trusts’ names, without ever identify[ing] the new trust
creditors.” (Id. at 37.) After identifying this “Disclosure
Statement fraud scheme,” Plaintiff states that the “Department
of Education refused to look at and advise on the PHEAA’s claim
set and deemed it a private matter.” (Id. at 37–38.)
Plaintiff argues that the consolidation affected both the
borrower and the government. (See Doc. 1-1 at 15.) While
“marketed” as “federal student loans for the subject claim set,”
(id. at 17), Plaintiff contends that “PHEAA’s unregistered Law
Access Loan Program . . . could not make federally insured
student loans and write student loan checks.” (Id. at 19.) Thus,

“PHEAA was trying to turn private loans into federal student
loans through unapproved branding.” (Id. at 62.) These
“unauthorized Law Access contracts,” not only “pretended to be
subject to procedures of the Higher Education Act, so that PHEAA
could fool consumers, the Department of Education, and the
courts to obtain untimely and unauthorized reinsurance money
from the Department of Education,” (id. at 15), but also
“tricked consumers with false advice provided by PHEAA’s
unregistered aliases that the consumers were obligated to pay
the dead banks who had no employees and never contacted the
consumers, including the Plaintiff.” (Id. at 19.) By combining

“the banks’ and trusts’ names with ‘Law Access,” PHEAA used
“aliases . . . to create blind spots around missing authorized
signatories to force unwarranted inferences about the missing
money trail.” (Id. at 57.) Because PHEAA had what Plaintiff
describes as “an impermissible cozy relationship with the
Department of Education,” (id. at 56), the two “conspired . . .
to administer PHEAA’s unregistered Law Access Program using fake
Check 150385 to continue collecting from the Plaintiff
currently.” (Id. at 56–57.)
The ”missing money trail” did not end with consolidation.
(Doc. 39 at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that “PHEAA left accounts open
in the fictionalized money trail so that the Plaintiff would

have to contact PHEAA and detrimentally rely on the advice given
by PHEAA’s unregistered aliases.” (Doc. 1-1 at 124.) By leaving
accounts open, along with “PHEAA recording false registration
numbers, false party names, false checks and no bank records,”
PHEAA “gaslit the Plaintiff, regulators, the court, and PHEAA’s
court counsel about the public’s interest in the claim set.”
(Id. at 148.) Plaintiff also asserts that “the subject Law
Access loan claim set” was impermissibly assigned to PHEAA, and
that PHEAA itself impermissibly assigned “the claim set to the
Department of Education,” (Doc. 1–2 at 14), which “falsely
reported an assignment from PHEAA,” (Doc. 1–1 at 132). The

assignment was made possible because “[t]he Defendants changed
the assignment of rights procedures so that concealment of the
entire money trail persists.” (Id. at 131.)
These actions, according to Plaintiff, resulted in payments
to PHEAA, (id. at 87), and collections against Plaintiff, (id.
at 105–106). In 2005, Plaintiff reports learning that “PHEAA was
paid reinsurance by the Department of Education in 2001.” (1–2
at 42.) Then in 2008, “PHEAA misused the court system to
legitimize the unsigned Check 150385 to obtain a second
reinsurance payment from the Department of Education.” (Doc. 1-1
at 50–51.) Plaintiff also states that PHEAA garnished her wages
in 2005 and 2006, but the garnishments were “not based on bank

records or eligible lender bank activity.” (Id. at 105–106.)
Then, the “Department of Education garnished and intercepted the
Plaintiff’s 2016 federal tax refund.” (Id. at 106.) This 2016
garnishment occurred “after the 2015 Hearing Decision based on
unsigned Check 150385,” where “[t]o justify using fake Check
150385 to collect without an authorized reinsurance payment, the
Department of Education changed the procedure for holding a
hearing for a Law Access loan.” (Id.) The “secret Hearing
involved contradictory claim set consideration reports and a
controversy over the amounts and dates of reinsurance payments
without bank records to amortize.” (Id. at 107.) These

discrepancies existed because “PHEAA’s Reinsurance Fraud Scheme
served to give the impression banks consolidated their own
federal student loans by paying off their own claims using
consolidation Check 150385, followed by insurance and
reinsurance payments.” (Id.)
In total, Plaintiff “noted and counted 181 bluffs; 99
computer overrides; bank federal identity thefts; conflicts of
interest; unauthorized branding; poor document imaging;
mismatched state and federal records; missing documents; 1,035
blind spots; numerous aliases; a silence scheme; document
destruction; an accumulation of 1,078 missing requirements; and
more.” (Doc. 1–2 at 51–52.) As a result of the twenty-one fraud

schemes, Plaintiff asserts twenty-two claims which this court
identified in its previous Order. (Doc. 28 at 6–7.) Because this
court dismissed the Secretary of the United States Department of
Education as a Defendant, (id. at 24), this court will consider
each claim as alleged against Defendant PHEAA.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed her claims in state
court. (Doc. 1-1 at 2.) The case was removed to this court on
October 19, 2022, (id. at 1), and PHEAA answered the Complaint
on October 26, 2022, (Doc. 7). Following this court’s dismissal
of the other named Defendant, (Doc. 28), PHEAA filed a Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Doc. 33), and supporting brief,
(Doc. 34). Plaintiff responded to the motion, (Doc. 39), and
PHEAA replied, (Doc. 40).
Defendant’s motion is ripe and ready for ruling. A hearing
is not necessary to resolve the motion.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court applies the same standard to a Rule 12(c) motion
for judgment on the pleadings as to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 115–16 (4th
Cir. 2013). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests “the sufficiency of a
complaint.” Butler v. United States, 702 F.3d 749, 752 (4th Cir.
2012) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243

(4th Cir. 1999)). “To survive such a motion, the complaint must
contain facts sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level’ and ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Occupy Columbia, 738 F.3d at 116
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
A claim is plausible on its face if “the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable” and demonstrates “more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556–57). While this court assumes the truth of all

factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
When a party is proceeding pro se, her filings are “to be
liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
However, the principles calling for “special judicial
solicitude” in viewing pro se filings “do[] not transform the
court into an advocate.” United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789,

797 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). This court cannot “conjure up questions never squarely
presented to” it, nor can it “be expected to construct full
blown claims from sentence fragments.” Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). This is
particularly relevant where, like here, Plaintiff is a law
school graduate with legal training and familiarity with the
legal system. See Polidi v. Bannon, 226 F. Supp. 3d 615, 616 n.1
(E.D. Va. 2016) (collecting cases).
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that “[a]ll of Plaintiff’s claims against

PHEAA are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because
the legitimacy of the consolidation loan at issue in this
lawsuit has already been adjudicated in PHEAA’s favor.” (Doc. 34
at 8.) The doctrine of collateral estoppel “is a subset of the
res judicata genre” that “forecloses the relitigation of issues
of fact or law that are identical to issues which have been
actually determined and necessarily decided in prior litigation
in which the party against whom [collateral estoppel] is
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.” In re
Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 355 F.3d 322, 326 (4th Cir.
2004) (quoting Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, Inc., 134 F.3d
219, 224 (4th Cir. 1998)). When the prior issue was litigated in

federal court, federal principles of collateral estoppel apply
to the issue before the court. Scott v. Metro. Health Corp., 12-
CV-383, 2013 WL 4520264, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2013), aff’d,
564 F. App’x 698 (4th Cir. 2014). Defendant, as the “party
seeking to rely on the doctrine of collateral estoppel,” must
establish five elements:
(1) that “the issue sought to be precluded is
identical to one previously litigated” (“element
one”); (2) that the issue was actually determined in
the prior proceeding (“element two”); (3) that the
issue’s determination was “a critical and necessary
part of the decision in the prior proceeding”
(“element three”); (4) that the prior judgment is
final and valid (“element four”); and (5) that the
party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted
“had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
in the previous forum” (“element five”).

Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 217 (4th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Sedlack, 134 F.3d at 224).
Defendant argues that each element is satisfied because
“the existence and legitimacy of the consolidation loan was
adjudicated more than twenty years ago by the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in
PHEAA’s favor.” (Doc. 34 at 8.) Both cases, according to
Defendant, are “premised on the nonexistence/illegitimacy of the
consolidation loan.” (Id. at 9.) While “the exact theory of
nonexistence/illegitimacy has seemingly evolved,” Defendant
argues that “[t]he foundation of Plaintiff’s Complaint and all
of her claims is that the consolidation loan does not exist and,
as a result, all actions taken subsequent to the ‘fake’
consolidation were improper.” (Id. at 9–10 (citing Doc. 28 at 3–
4).)
Along with the “identical” issue of the “existence/
legitimacy of the consolidation loan,” (id. at 10), Defendant
contends that the four other collateral estoppel elements are
satisfied. For element two, Defendant explains that “PHEAA
obtained a Judgment against Plaintiff in her adversary
proceeding where she challenged the existence/legitimacy of the
consolidation loan” and “the Bankruptcy Court determined the

consolidation loan existed.” (Id.) For element three, Defendant
identifies Plaintiff’s “attempt[] to discharge her law school
loans” through Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. (Id.) The “challenge” to
the “existence of the consolidation loan” was “specifically
rejected” as “one of three explicit issues that was critical and
necessary to determining whether Plaintiff’s education debts
could be discharged.” (Id. at 11.) For element four, Defendant
states that the court’s judgment “was final and did not proceed
to trial” and “Plaintiff did not appeal.” (Id.) For element
five, Defendant maintains that the “judgment was the product of
a complete adversarial proceeding in which Plaintiff was able to
conduct discovery and present all arguments and evidence

available to her to prove that the consolidation loan did not
exist/was illegitimate.” (Id. at 12.)
Plaintiff contends that “PHEAA fails on all five prongs of
the collateral estoppel test.” (Doc. 39 at 18.) “Because PHEAA
generated and controlled all the documents created,” Plaintiff
argues that “the bankruptcy court erroneously found a dead bank
was paid insurance when there was no insurance payment of bank
record.” (Id. at 18–19.) Moreover, “[c]ollateral estoppel should
not be found because PHEAA refused to file a proof of claim for
challenge.” (Id. at 19.) Because “PHEAA concealed four
consolidation dates and more,” Plaintiff asserts that “PHEAA’s

records must be removed.” (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that “the
bankruptcy court is a different kind of court with different
procedures which makes it clear the circumstances are
different.” (Id.) Plaintiff explains that “[t]he facts are
different” such that “Plaintiff did not know the consolidation
check had not been cashed; that no bank was involved or had a
record; that PHEAA was the hidden original lender; or that PHEAA
had already paid themselves reinsurance.” (Id.) These facts,
according to Plaintiff, meant that the “judgment wasn’t ‘valid
and final’ in a just sense.” (Id.) Instead, the “judgment’s lack
of integrity makes the judgment void or voidable.” (Id.) Thus,
the “bankruptcy court decision was merely advisory because it

was based on fraud committed and concealed by PHEAA, who was not
a real party in interest.” (Id.)
Construing Plaintiff’s challenges to collateral estoppel
liberally, as is required for a party proceeding without
counsel, see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, Plaintiff’s twenty-one
theories of fraud can be categorized into four variations based
on time and the actors involved. First, Plaintiff argues that
PHEAA, in 2004, committed fraud on the bankruptcy court. PHEAA,
according to Plaintiff, “intentionally corrupted the judicial
process itself, going beyond mere perjury or incorrect facts.”
(Id. at 14.) By using “tricky language in the Affidavit, PHEAA’s

attorneys committed fraud in seven ways.” (Id.) Second,
Plaintiff argues that the court, in 2004, did not consider
certain evidence of fraud. Plaintiff contends that “PHEAA’s
document custodian did not disclose contradictory evidence to
the court, like the single note marked ‘paid in full’ and the
cover letter; the trust owners name; and Law Access activity.”
(Id. at 10.) Third, Plaintiff argues that certain evidence of
fraud was not discovered until after the 2004 bankruptcy
proceeding. For example, Plaintiff asserts in her Complaint that
a 2014 audit report revealed “promissory notes . . . that were
alleged to be destroyed or somehow missing without a Missing
Records Report during the 2004 In Re Perkins Litigation.” (Doc.

1–1 at 107–08.) Fourth, Plaintiff argues that she now pleads
theories of fraud beyond the issues considered by the court in
2004. Plaintiff explains that she “never litigated PHEAA’s
fraud, Disclosure Statement identity theft, and deception.”
(Doc. 39 at 18.)
This court finds that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped
from pursuing claims premised on her educational debt
consolidation loan. As explained in this court’s previous order,
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina “held that with respect to the consolidation
loan, there was ‘no question of fact regarding the existence of

an educational loan debt.’” (Doc. 28 at 4 n.3 (quoting In re
Perkins, No. 03-80777C-7D, 03–9075, 2004 WL 3510116, at *2
(M.D.N.C. Br. May 20, 2004)). The bankruptcy court explained:
The record contains a copy of a promissory note for a
consolidation loan signed by Plaintiff in February
1995, and Plaintiff has admitted signing such a
promissory note. The affidavit of Ms. Diane Perneta,
an Administrative Officer with PHEAA, states that the
promissory note evidences the consolidation loan that
Plaintiff received on May 3, 1995 in the amount of
$44,205.46. Plaintiff argues that the consolidation
loan was never made as she never received proof of the
consolidation. However, the record contains a
disclosure statement sent by the lender, which
Plaintiff admits to receiving, that included a copy of
the check used to pay off the Plaintiff’s pre-
consolidation student loans, a list of such pre-
consolidation student loans, and a statement of the
amounts paid on each of the consolidated student
loans. Although Plaintiff now questions whether the
consolidation loan occurred, Plaintiff sent a letter
to the lender on October 27, 1995, requesting that the
consolidation of her student loans be rescinded. When
her request was denied, she requested and was granted
the first of several forbearances on the consolidation
loan.

Plaintiff’s argument that the consolidation loan was
not made in May 1995 appears to rest on the fact that
she received a copy of a promissory note for one of
her original student loans marked paid in full on 3–
21–96, and on the fact that an unnamed “disgruntled
employee” of PHEAA informed Plaintiff that her student
loans had not been properly consolidated. While
Plaintiff contends that the consolidation loan was
never made, Plaintiff admits that she has never been
contacted by any lender regarding payment on the
multiple student loans she took out to finance her
legal education. Even when the facts are taken in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, this court has
concluded that there is insufficient evidence to raise
a disputed issue of material fact as to whether an
educational loan exists.

In re Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *2-3 (emphasis added).
Applying the elements of collateral estoppel to the bankruptcy
court’s determination, this court finds that each element is
satisfied.
For the first element, Plaintiff’s action to “discharge
educational debts” required the bankruptcy court to find
“whether student loan debt exists” and “whether the debt is owed
to, insured by, or guaranteed by a governmental agency or non-
profit institution.” Id. at *2. Thus, the existence of
Plaintiff’s educational debt consolidation loan from PHEAA was
an element central to the bankruptcy proceedings. Just as
Plaintiff now argues that the case before this court “revolves”
around a “fake federal student loan consolidation check,” (Doc.
1–1 at 12), Plaintiff argued then that “her student loans had
not been properly consolidated” and the “consolidation loan was
never made.” In re Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *2. The court
rejected such arguments because Plaintiff “admitted signing such
a promissory note,” admitted to receiving “a disclosure
statement sent by the lender,” requested and received “several
forbearances on the consolidation loan,” and had “never been
contacted by any lender regarding payment on the multiple
student loans she took out to finance her legal education.” Id.

at *2–3. Because Plaintiff, both then and now, argued the
nonexistence of the same loan issued by the same Defendant, this
court finds the first element satisfied.
Second, the bankruptcy court actually resolved the issue.
In addition to the reasons stated above, the court found
Plaintiff’s evidence “that she received a copy of a promissory
note for one of her original student loans marked paid in full
on 3-21-96” insufficient. Id. at *3. Plaintiff continues to make
similar arguments before this court, contending that PHEAA
failed to “keep a copy of the cover letter for the note marked
‘paid in full’” and “[a]ny Federal Fund financial activity and
any note marked ‘paid in full’ would be based on unsigned

consolidation Check 150385.” (Doc. 1–1 at 40–41.) Thus,
Plaintiff not only relitigates the issue with evidence already
considered and rejected by the bankruptcy court, but in making
these arguments reaffirms the consolidation check as the “crux”
of any claims. McCray v. Samuel I. White, P.C., No. CV 18-3491,
2019 WL 6895986, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2019), aff’d sub nom.,
837 F. App’x 244 (4th Cir. 2021). Because the bankruptcy court
found, at summary judgment and after discovery, that “there is
no question of fact regarding the existence of an educational
loan debt,” In re Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *2, this court
finds the second element satisfied.

Third, resolution of the debt was critical and necessary to
the prior judgment. As explained by the Fourth Circuit, the
facts and issues resolved by prior proceedings must be more than
merely “supportive of” the prior judgment. In re Microsoft, 355
F.3d at 327. The bankruptcy court identified three elements
necessary for a “debtor to discharge educational debts.” In re
Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *2. In finding the first element of
“whether student loan debt exists,” id., the court “made the
necessary determination” that Defendant provided a consolidation
loan upon Plaintiff signing a promissory note. Afzal v. Aslam,
No. CIV. 11-395, 2011 WL 2457682, at *2 (D. Md. June 15, 2011),
aff’d, 467 F. App’x 189 (4th Cir. 2012). Had the court

determined that Plaintiff raised a disputed issue of material
fact on the existence of the loan, the court could not have
granted summary judgment or eventually considered the “portion
of the debt, if any, which is dischargeable.” In re Perkins,
2004 WL 3510116, at *4. This court therefore finds the third
element satisfied.
Fourth, the judgment is final and valid. “For purposes of
res judicata, a summary judgment has always been considered a
final disposition on the merits.” Adkins v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
729 F.2d 974, 976 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases). Fifth,
Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the

existence of the debt. Plaintiff “participated in a
sophisticated legal setting in two levels,” In re Swilley, 295
B.R. 839, 846 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003), first when challenging
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the debt’s existence,
In re Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *1, and second when arguing
that the debt was dischargeable. In re Perkins, 318 B.R. 300,
313 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2004). Plaintiff not only engaged in
discovery, but states in her Complaint that she “learn[ed] of
PHEAA’s branding fraud scheme in 2004 during court discovery.”
(Doc. 1–2 at 41.) This court therefore finds all five elements
satisfied.
This court finds Plaintiff’s arguments against collateral

estoppel unconvincing. From the four variations of the twenty-
one fraud theories noted above, the first two variations address
conduct occurring during the proceedings.2 For example, Plaintiff
asserts that Defendant “polluted the judicial machinery” with
its “treatment of the fake consolidation check.” (Doc. 39 at
16.) Because of the “seven ways” Defendant “committed fraud on
the bankruptcy court,” (id. at 14), “[t]he court was infected,”
(see Doc. 1-3 at 28, 69, 120, 151, 177, 210, 280), and it
“fictionalized that PHEAA paid dead Society National bank at
some point.” (Doc. 1–1 at 123.) Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates
that she not only knew of some alleged fraud at the time of the

proceedings, (see Doc. 1–2 at 41 (“I was surprised to learn of
PHEAA’s branding fraud scheme in 2004 during court discovery”)),
but that she argued fraud to the bankruptcy court, (see id. (“I
. . . believed the missing signatures and unknown authorized
signatories revealed fraud sufficiently”); Doc. 1–2 at 252 (“in
2004 . . . the judiciary reviewed sixteen (16) things out of
place on each ‘Law Access’ application”)). Thus, if Plaintiff
was aware of fraud at the time of the proceedings, this court
finds that Plaintiff is relitigating an unsatisfactory decision
and agrees with Defendant that “Plaintiff did not appeal the
Bankruptcy Court’s judgment and any attempt to challenge it now
would be more than twenty years too late.” (Doc. 34 at 11.)

2 Plaintiff’s third and fourth arguments relate to conduct
occurring after the proceedings, which this court will address
in its discussion of untimely filed claims.
Additionally, even if Plaintiff did not have evidence of
the alleged fraud until after the proceedings, (see, e.g., Doc.
1–1 at 27, 108, 125), this court again agrees with Defendant
that “Plaintiff never made any motion with the Bankruptcy Court”
to “relieve a party from judgment due to fraud on the Court”
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 40 at 2.) Any
“irregularities” must be raised in a timely and procedurally
proper manner through the original proceedings, not through
collateral proceedings. See McCray, 2019 WL 6895986, at *4.

Thus, any fraud-based arguments relating to Defendant’s conduct
or the court’s findings at the time of the bankruptcy
proceedings are untimely raised in an improper posture.
This court also rejects Plaintiff’s arguments that
collateral estoppel should not apply because of the nature of
the bankruptcy court and its proceedings. Plaintiff asserts that
the Department of Education should have been a defendant in the
bankruptcy proceedings. (Doc. 39 at 10.) Notwithstanding the
fact that Plaintiff filed the suit in bankruptcy court, (see
id.), courts have held that the inclusion of parties “does not
change the fact that the . . . previously dismissed suits
included the exact same issues of fact asserted here.” Gordon v.

Cathey, No. 3:13-CV-00229, 2013 WL 5561642, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Oct.
8, 2013). Plaintiff also argues that “bankruptcy court is a
different kind of court with different procedures which makes it
clear the circumstances are different.” (Doc. 39 at 19.) To the
contrary, the Fourth Circuit has maintained that “collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of those matters actually
considered and decided by the bankruptcy court.” 1616 Reminc
Ltd. P’ship v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 778 F.2d 183,
187 (4th Cir. 1985); see also In re Urb. Broad. Corp., 401 F.3d
236, 244–45 (4th Cir. 2005). It makes no difference that the
bankruptcy court considered the issue in the context of

discharging a debt, for collateral estoppel bars successive
litigation “even if the issue recurs in the context of a
different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).
Plaintiff’s next argument that “[t]he bankruptcy court
decision was merely advisory because it was based on fraud
committed and concealed by PHEAA, who was not a real party in
interest,” (Doc. 39 at 19), is belied by the proceedings that
followed the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment order. As the
court explained in its summary judgment order, “[r]emaining for
trial will be a determination of the amount of student loan
indebtedness, and the portion of the debt, if any, which is
dischargeable.” In re Perkins, 2004 WL 3510116, at *4. In a

later memorandum opinion finding that “Plaintiff has failed to
establish that requiring her to pay student loans would
constitute an undue hardship,” the court explained that an
“adversary proceeding came before the court for trial on
September 30, 2004.” In re Perkins, 318 B.R. at 303. The court’s
opinion on a substantial controversy over Plaintiff’s debts,
whereby both parties participated with adverse interests in its
dischargeability, reveals that the preceding order granting
summary judgment on the issue of the debt’s existence, which
Plaintiff challenged, was not an advisory opinion.
This court therefore finds that the doctrine of collateral

estoppel precludes Plaintiff from relitigating the validity or
legitimacy of her educational debt consolidation loan.
Next, to the extent the Complaint alleges claims that do
not “revolve[] around a fake federal student loan consolidation
check written by PHEAA,” (Doc. 1–1 at 12), this court finds that
the claims are barred by any applicable statutes of limitation.3
Moreover, Plaintiff fails to plausibly state facts sufficient to
infer a continuing violation or support the doctrines of
equitable tolling and fraudulent concealment.
Defendant argues that all of Plaintiff’s claims are
“untimely under the applicable statutes of limitation.” (Doc. 34
at 16–17.) Citing this court’s previous Order, Defendant
explains that “the last conduct specifically alleged against
PHEAA was the 2008 assignment of the consolidation loan to the

DOE.” (Id. at 17 (citing Doc. 28 at 5).) Because “[t]he longest
statute of limitation governing any of Plaintiff’s claims is six
years,” (Doc. 40 at 3–4), and “[a]fter 2008, all collection
activity, garnishments, administrative proceedings, etc. concern

3 Many of the claims that Plaintiff asserts in her Complaint
do not have a private right of action. See Pro. Massage Training
Ctr., Inc. v. Accreditation All. of Career Schs. & Colls., 781
F.3d 161, 169 (4th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that under the Higher
Education Act “nearly every court to consider the issue” “agrees
that there is no express private right of action” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Kerpen v. Metro. Washington Airports
Auth., 907 F.3d 152, 160 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding “fatal” the
plaintiff’s failure to establish a defendant “as a federal
entity” under the Administrative Procedure Act); Swanson v.
King, No. 7:21-CV-80, 2021 WL 3856454, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 27,
2021) (“The Fifth Amendment restricts only governmental action,
and not the actions of private entities.” (citing Pub. Utils.
Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952))). Therefore,
assuming Plaintiff asserts these claims against PHEAA, and that
PHEAA is a government entity, this court will apply a six-year
statute of limitation for Plaintiff’s claims. See Jersey Heights
Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir.
1999).
allegations regarding DOE’s conduct,” (id. at 4), Defendant
asserts that “all of Plaintiff’s claims against PHEAA would . .
. be barred by the statutes of limitation.” (Id. at 5.)
Additionally, “even if there were some articulable theory of
liability that could link PHEAA to the DOE’s actions after
assignment,” Defendant states that “this Court has already
acknowledged that the last action allegedly taken by the DOE was
March 30, 2016, which would still render all of Plaintiff’s
claims untimely.” (Id. (citing Doc. 28 at 23).)

Assuming Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendant is a
government entity, Plaintiff’s Takings Clause, Administrative
Procedure Act, and Higher Education Act claims, to the extent a
private right of action exists, are subject to a six-year
statute of limitations. See infra note 3. Plaintiff’s federal
civil Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. CVLR
Performance Horses, Inc. v. Wynne, 792 F.3d 469, 476 (4th Cir.
2015). Plaintiff’s North Carolina RICO claims are subject to a
five-year statute of limitations. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75D-9.
Plaintiff’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claims
are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Jackson v.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 747 F. App’x 159, 160 (4th Cir. 2019)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)). Plaintiff’s North Carolina unfair
and deceptive trade practices claims, all alleged under Chapter
75 of the North Carolina General Statutes, are subject to a
four-year statute of limitations. Williams v. HomEq Servicing
Corp., 184 N.C. App. 413, 420, 646 S.E.2d 381, 386 (2007)
(citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75–16.2). Plaintiff’s voidable
contracts claim and actual fraud claim are subject to a three-
year statute of limitations. Christenbury Eye Ctr., P.A. v.
Medflow, Inc., 370 N.C. 1, 7 n.4, 802 S.E.2d 888, 892 (2017)
(citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1–52(1), (9)).

This court finds Plaintiff’s claims, to the extent they are
not precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, are
untimely filed. For many of the claims listed above, the statute
of limitations “begins to run” when the violative conduct
occurs. See, e.g., Richardson v. Shapiro & Brown, LLP, 751 F.
App’x 346, 349 (4th Cir. 2018). For such claims, assuming that
Defendant’s actions could be connected to the Department of
Educations’ actions in March 2016, and applying the longest
statute of limitations of six years, no claim would be timely
filed by the time of the Complaint on September 12, 2022, (Doc.
1–1 at 3).
For other claims, the statute of limitations does not

accrue until the aggrieved party discovers the facts giving rise
to the claim. See, e.g., Hyde v. Taylor, 70 N.C. App. 523, 528,
320 S.E.2d 904, 908 (1984). The Complaint indicates that
Plaintiff “learn[ed] of PHEAA’s branding fraud scheme in 2004
during court discovery.” (Doc. 1–2 at 41.) Construed liberally,
however, Plaintiff’s third and fourth variations of the twenty-
one fraud theories relate to conduct alleged to have occurred
outside the bankruptcy litigation, including evidence
“disclosed” after 2004, (see, e.g., Doc. 1–1 at 190), and claims
never litigated before the bankruptcy court, (see Doc. 39 at
18). Thus, for the claims with a discovery rule for the statute

of limitations, Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly begin to run
after the 2004 bankruptcy litigation and the 2008 assignment
from PHEAA to the Department of Education. That said, this court
finds that Plaintiff’s claims are untimely under a discovery
rule because the Complaint establishes that by July 2015
Plaintiff received information that “confirmed” Defendant’s
fraudulent activity. (Doc. 1–2 at 44.)
The Complaint articulates three occasions where Plaintiff
received information that “revealed” the fraud schemes. (See
Doc. 1–1 at 41, 135, 238.) The first is described as “PHEAA’s
May 21, 2014 Bowman Report,” where PHEAA provided information
“in response to Plaintiff’s 2014 detailed audit request.” (Id.

at 135.) According to Plaintiff, this report disclosed “that the
banks PHEAA named on the 1995 Law Access consolidation
application/promissory note merged.” (Doc. 1–2 at 37.) It also
confirmed “that PHEAA provided an undocumented assignment to the
Department of Education on an assignment date which was later
than the date of assignment reported by the Department of
Education.” (Doc. 1–2 at 41.) The report also provided
“concealed promissory notes,” (Doc. 1–3 at 21), which “revealed
that PHEAA deliberately did not make and provide a full set of
copies of any Law Access-branded promissory notes marked ‘paid
in full’ for the claim set for the authority to collect on the

1995 consolidation claim.” (Doc. 1–1 at 41.) For Plaintiff, this
report “confirmed PHEAA defied the 2004 court Order compelling
PHEAA’s historical record by withholding vital promissory notes
that revealed clues of the banks’ deaths and lack of federal
registration.” (Doc. 1–2 at 44.)
The second set of information came from the Department of
Education’s “2015 Freedom of Information Act Request Response”
which “exposed that there were no authorized reinsurance
payments.” (Doc. 1–1 at 217.) In this response, Plaintiff “found
that the Department of Education’s employees were keeping
federal data in unnamed databases of false statements made to
the Plaintiff during the Plaintiff’s requests for audits and

documents so that Plaintiff’s requests would be ignored,
resulting in impermissible runaround.” (Id. at 97–98.) Plaintiff
also asserts that the report “revealed” a “fake entry” created
by the Department of Education “that created a false impression
about the Plaintiff’s audit request.” (Doc. 1–2 at 11–12.)
Following the information that “exposed that there was no
authorized reinsurance payment,” (Doc. 1–1 at 217), Plaintiff
received a “Debt Statement” from the Department of Education
“confirming there was no insurance payment or reinsurance
payment or transfer or physical delivery relating to the subject
Law Access loan claim set.” (Id.) This Debt Statement was “dated

July 10, 2015” and “the Department of Education admitted that
the subject claim set is time-barred because no insurance
payment, reinsurance payment, or transfer occurred.” (Id. at
68.) In other words, the Department of Education “recanted” the
“insurance payment and transfer stories,” (id. at 93), by
“admitt[ing] . . . that the federal reports of a transfer having
taken place were false.” (Id. at 135.)
The North Carolina Supreme Court has maintained that the
“discovery rule is an objective standard, not a subjective one.”
Taylor v. Bank of Am., N.A., 385 N.C. 783, 789, 898 S.E.2d 740,
746 (2024). This rule “tolls the statute of limitations only
until a reasonable person should have discovered the fraud under

the circumstances and in the exercise of reasonable prudence.”
Id. As such, “[t]he particular moment that a specific plaintiff
alleges he actually discovered the fraud is irrelevant.” Id.
(emphasis in original). While the Complaint arguably alleges
that the fraud was sufficiently discovered in 2004, (see Doc. 1–
2 at 41), it makes clear that Plaintiff believed her theories
were confirmed by July 2015. Thus, the statute of limitations
began to run by Defendant’s Disclosure Statement, making
Plaintiff’s claims before this court untimely.
The timing of Plaintiff’s discoveries also defeats
Plaintiff’s arguments for a continuing violation, equitable

tolling, or fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff asserts several
arguments against application of the statute of limitations. For
example, she maintains that “[f]raud on the court nullifies the
statute of limitations,” (Doc. 39 at 15), “[n]o statute of
limitations allows PHEAA to knowingly maintain fraudulent
records,” (id. at 17, 18), and “[t]he records PHEAA still
maintains must be removed as a source of inaccurate information
and financial statements used for continuing fraud.” (Id. at
15.) Construed liberally, Plaintiff argues that her claims are
not barred by the statutes of limitation under a continuing
violation theory, the doctrine of equitable tolling, and the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment.

Starting with fraudulent concealment and Plaintiff’s
contention that “[f]raud on the court nullifies the statute of
limitations,” (id.), this court finds that Plaintiff’s claims
are untimely even if the elements were satisfied. The Fourth
Circuit has recognized that “pursuant to this doctrine, ‘when
fraud has been concealed or is of such a character as to conceal
itself,’ and the plaintiff is not negligent or guilty of laches,
the limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff
discovers the fraud.” Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow
Gold Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d 119, 122 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis
added) (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349

(1874)); see also Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 402, 104 S.
Ct. 756, 766, 78 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Fraud did not entirely repeal the bar of limitations; rather
the period of limitations simply did not begin to run until the
fraud was discovered, or at least discoverable.”) (citing
Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435 (1918)). Because
the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, if applied, would have
the same effect as claims under a discovery rule such that the
claims’ limitation period began to run by July 2015, this court
finds that Plaintiff’s claims are not timely filed.
This court also finds Plaintiff’s continuing violation
theory inapplicable. This theory “is occasioned by continual

unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original
violation.” Nat’l Advert. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158,
1166 (4th Cir. 1991). A violation is not a “continuing
violation” if the allegations reflect “an entirely new
violation.” A Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342,
348 (4th Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiff asserts fraud beyond the
alleged loan consolidation and reinsurance payment, contending
that the “records PHEAA still maintains must be removed as a
source of inaccurate information and financial statements used
for continuing fraud.” (Doc. 39 at 15.) To the extent
maintenance of records is not an “entirely new violation,” A

Soc’y Without A Name, 655 F.3d at 348, courts have recognized
that “a failure to provide notice or provide information or
documents as required is not treated as a continuing violation.”
Hartquist v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 11-CV-1067, 2016 WL 1312028,
at *7 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2016) (collecting cases). Additionally,
even if Plaintiff’s continuing violation theory was both
recognized and not an entirely new violation, courts have
maintained that “[i]f the continuing violation doctrine is
implicated, the limitations period begins to run at the time of
the last violation.” Id. (collecting cases). Therefore, this
court finds that a continuing violation theory could not support
Plaintiff’s time-barred claims.

Equitable tolling is “reserved for those rare instances
where – due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct
– it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period
against the party and gross injustice would result.” Harris v.
Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000). This doctrine
does not “extend to garden variety claims of excusable neglect.”
Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003). Courts have
recognized that, in the context of student debt relief cases,
“allegations of government harassment” when asserted through
“conclusory statements” are “not entitled to the assumption of
truth, and thus are not a basis for equitable tolling.” Winston

v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 8:22-CV-01965, 2023 WL 8452451, at
*7 (D. Md. Dec. 6, 2023).
The Fourth Circuit clarified the distinction between
equitable tolling and other equitable doctrines used to provide
relief from a limitations period. In Edmonson v. Eagle National
Bank, the Fourth Circuit recognized that equitable tolling is
“substantively different and therefore subject to different
pleading and proof standards” than fraudulent concealment. 922
F.3d 535, 550 (4th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original). Where
fraudulent concealment considers “the defendant’s wrongful acts
of concealment” such that “the plaintiff is not aware of the
facts giving rise to his claim within the limitations period,”

equitable tolling “focuses on whether there was excusable delay
by the plaintiff.” Id. at 549 (quoting Johnson v. Henderson, 314
F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2002)). Equitable tolling “differs from”
other doctrines “in that does not assume a wrongful – or any –
effort by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff from suing.”
Id. (quoting Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451
(7th Cir. 1990)). In other words, equitable tolling “is
potentially applicable when a plaintiff’s failure to timely file
suit is not attributable to wrongful conduct by the defendant,”
and a plaintiff seeks “relief based on its mistake.” Id. at 550–
51 (emphasis in original).

In this case, Plaintiff attributes the delays in filing to
Defendant. Plaintiff asserts that “no statute of limitations
applies because PHEAA committed fraud on the court.” (Doc. 39 at
15.) Defendant’s actions, according to Plaintiff, “were a
corruption of the judicial process itself.” (Id. at 16.)
Plaintiff cannot, as is required for equitable tolling, claim
that the failure to timely file was not attributable to
Defendant while simultaneously alleging that Defendant “polluted
the judicial machinery.” (Id.) This court agrees with Defendant
that “Plaintiff has been making the same arguments about PHEAA’s
allegedly improper consolidation of her student loan, ad
nauseam,” (Doc. 40 at 3), and continues to portray Defendant as

“the hidden original lender” that “concealed” information. (Doc.
39 at 19.) Equitable tolling is thus inapplicable.
This court therefore finds that Plaintiff is collaterally
estopped from relitigating the validity or legitimacy of her
educational debt consolidation loan. Additionally, any claims
not precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel are barred
by any applicable statutes of limitation. Plaintiff’s complaint
will be dismissed with prejudice. See Burnett v. Maryland Dep’t
of Lab., No. CV 24-3718, 2025 WL 2720147, at *6 (D. Md. Sep. 24,
2025) (collecting cases) (“Dismissal with prejudice is the
appropriate disposition when a plaintiff’s claims are barred by

res judicata.”); Foy v. Giant Food Inc., 298 F.3d 284, 291 (4th
Cir. 2002) (recognizing the district court “properly applied”
the statute of limitations and dismissed the “claims with
prejudice.”).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Doc. 33), is
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed, Plaintiff’s
Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Court-Ordered
Mediation Deadline, (Doc. 44), is DENIED AS MOOT.
A judgment dismissing this action will be filed

contemporaneously herewith.
This the 19th day of August, 2026.
Winw L. Blu,
United States District Judde

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11422116. Public record. Not legal advice.