# Quaye

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · August 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11419910

## Case

- **Full name:** Nafis Quaye v. Warden J. Greene
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
NAFIS QUAYE, : Civil No. 1:25-CV-02458
:
Petitioner, :
:
v. :
:
WARDEN J. GREENE , :
:
Respondents. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court are a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 filed by Nafis Quaye (“Petitioner”), an inmate currently housed at the Federal
Correctional Institution Allenwood Low (“FCI-Allenwood”), and a motion for
emergency jurisdiction and support, which reads more as a memorandum in
support of the petition. (Docs. 1, 2.) For the following reasons, the court will deny
Plaintiff’s petition and direct the Clerk of Court to term the pending motion
because it is not actually a motion.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 4, 2024, Petitioner was found guilty of conspiracy to commit
money laundering and sentenced to sixty-months imprisonment to be followed by
two years of supervised release. Quaye v. USA, No. 1:22-CR-0046-SE-2, Doc. 138
(D.N.H.). In addition to the imprisonment and supervised release, Petitioner was
ordered to pay an assessment of $100.00 and restitution of $3,287,200.00 with
interest waived for the restitution. Id. Special instructions for payment provided
the following:

Payment is ordered to begin immediately. Payments shall be made in
equal monthly installments of $200 within 30 days of commencement
of supervision and thereafter. Upon the defendant’s commencement of
supervision, the probation officer shall review the defendant’s financial
circumstances and, if necessary, recommend a revised payment
schedule on any outstanding balance for approval by the Court.

Id. The judgment also clearly stated the following: “Unless the court has expressly
ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal
monetary penalties is due during the period of imprisonment.” Id. The next day,
the sentencing court entered an amended judgment that added co-defendants as
joint and severally liable for the restitution. Id., at Doc. 140. However, the
instructions for payment remained the same in the amended judgment. Id.
On November 27, 2024, Petitioner entered into an Inmate Financial Plan to
pay a total of $100.00 per month starting in December of 2024 towards the
assessment and the restitution. (Doc. 16-5.) The inmate activity record indicates
that Petitioner was placed in “IFRP ‘REFUSED””1 status for failing to make the
February 2025 payment in full. (Doc. 16-8, p. 3.)2 Specifically, it states that
Petitioner’s payment was $40.18 short. (Id.)

1 Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”).

2 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
On March 4, 2025, Petitioner entered into an Inmate Financial Plan to pay a
total of $200.00 per month starting in April of 2025 towards the restitution. (Doc.

16-6.) On July 16, 2025, Petitioner was listed as refusing to pay the July of 2025
payment in the Inmate Activity Record. (Doc. 16-8, p. 3.)
On July 24, 2025, Petitioner entered into an Inmate Financial Plan to pay a

total of $125.00 per month starting in August of 2025 towards the restitution.
(Doc. 16-7.) The Inmate Activity Record states that on October 7, 2025, Petitioner
refused his October of 2025 payment. (Doc. 16-8, p. 2.)
On October 28, 2025, Petitioner entered into an Inmate Financial Plan to pay

a total of $60.00 per month starting in November of 2025 towards the restitution.
(Doc. 16-9.)
The Inmate Activity Record states that Petitioner’s prerelease status was

reviewed on January 8, 2026 and it was determined that time credits earned under
the Fist Step Act were not applied. (Doc. 16-8, p. 2.)
Petitioner’s FSA Time Credit Assessment disallowed Petitioner 27 days
from July 16, 2025 to August 12, 2025 and 21 days from October 7, 2025 to

October 28, 2025 based on a refusal to pay his restitution. (Doc. 16-11.)
On December 18, 2025, the court received and docketed Petitioner’s Section
2241 petition alleging that he was erroneously placed on IFRP refusal status for

alleged non-payment and loss of earned time credits under the First Step act as
punitive action. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner alleges that the BOP’s enforcement of the
IFRP during incarceration directly contradicts the judgment payment order entered

by the trial court, that he was arbitrarily placed in refusal status resulting in loss of
employment among other consequences, and that the BOP unlawfully withheld
earned time credits under the First Step Act. (Id.) As relief, Petitioner seeks an

order requiring the BOP to cease and desist all IFRP collections not explicitly
authorized by the sentencing court, direct the BOP to restore all withheld or
disallowed FSA time credits and apply them retroactively to his sentence, and the
removal of all refusal designations. (Id.) Accompanying the petition was a

document Petitioner titled “Expedited Motion for Emergency Judication And
Support Memorandum for Writ of Habeas Corpus 28 U S C 2241” that was
docketed as a motion but reads as a memorandum in support of the petition. (Doc.

2.)
VENUE
A § 2241petition must be filed in the district where the petitioner is in
custody. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484,

494–95 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the person who seeks
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful
custody.”) Petitioner was housed at FCI-Allenwood in Union County,
Pennsylvania, which is located in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 118(b). Therefore,
this court is the proper venue for the action.

THE IFRP
The BOP established the IFRP to assist incarcerated individuals with
satisfying their court-ordered financial obligations. See 28 U.S.C. § 545.10; BOP
Program Statement 5380.08, Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (Aug. 15,

2005) (“PS 5380.08”) at 1. Through the IFRP, the BOP “encourages each
sentenced inmate to meet his or her legitimate financial obligations,” see 28 C.F.R.
§ 545.10, which include, inter alia, special assessments, court-ordered restitution,

as well as fines and court costs. See id. § 545.11(a)(1)–(3). The BOP assists an
inmate with financial obligations by having its unit staff “help th[e] inmate develop
a financial plan” and “monitor the inmate's progress in meeting that obligation.”
See id. § 545.11.

The process of developing a financial plan for the inmate begins at their
initial classification, during which “the unit team shall review [the] inmate’s
financial obligations, using all available documentation, including, but not limited

to, the Presentence Investigation and the Judgment and Commitment Order(s).”
See id. § 545.11(a). The unit staff will then develop a “documented” financial plan
for the inmate. See id. In creating this plan, BOP staff reviews deposits to the
inmate’s trust account during the prior six (6) months, deducts IFRP payments
made for UNICOR3 or non-UNICOR work assignments, then deducts $75 per
month ($450 for six (6) months) from the inmate’s account to allow them to have

telephone communication through the Inmate Telephone System (“ITS”). See id. §
545.11(b). The BOP may require payment from any remaining balance toward
restitution. See id. The IFRP establishes a minimum payment schedule of $25 per

quarter for non-UNICOR or UNICOR Grade 5 inmates and 50 percent of monthly
earnings for inmates assigned UNICOR Grades 1 through 4. See id. §
545.11(b)(1)–(2).
“The inmate is responsible for making satisfactory progress in meeting

[their] financial responsibility plan and for providing documentation of these
payments to unit staff.” Id. § 545.11(b). The inmate may make “[p]ayments ...
from institution resources or non-institution (community) resources.” See id.

BOP staff are responsible for monitoring the inmate’s “[p]articipation and/or
progress in the [IFRP],” and conducting a review “each time [they] assess [the]
inmate’s demonstrated level of responsible behavior.” See id. § 545.11(c). During
the IFRP program review, BOP staff must:

3 “UNICOR is the trade name of Federal Prison Industries, Inc., a self-sustaining government
corporation that provides employment and job training to BOP inmates while producing
marketable goods and services.” United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.3 (9th Cir.
2008); see also United States v. Allen, 190 F.3d 1208, 1209 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (“UNICOR is a
program through which inmates manufacture products pursuant to government contracts.”).
• determine the total funds deposited into the inmate’s trust fund
account for the previous six months;
• subtract the IFRP payments made by the inmate during the previous
six months; and
• subtract $450 (i.e., $75 x 6 months, ITS exclusion).
Any money remaining after the above computation may be considered
for IFRP payments, regardless of whether the money is in the inmate's
trust fund or phone credit account. The Unit Team has the discretion to
consider all monies above that computation to adjust the inmate's IFRP
payment plan.
See PS 5380.08 at 8. The unit manager has the authority to determine whether an
inmate’s IFRP payments are commensurate with their ability to pay and makes this
determination on a case-by-case basis after considering each inmate's unique
circumstances. See id.
To encourage inmates to pay their court-ordered financial obligations while
in BOP custody, the BOP affords certain privileges to inmates who are
participating in the IFRP that are unavailable to inmates who refuse to participate.
An inmate’s refusal to participate in the IFRP or refusal to comply with the

provisions of their financial plan “ordinarily shall result” in the following:
(1) Where applicable, the Parole Commission will be notified of the
inmate’s failure to participate;
(2) The inmate will not receive any furlough (other than possibly an
emergency or medical furlough);
(3) The inmate will not receive performance pay above the maintenance
pay level, or bonus pay, or vacation pay;
(4) The inmate will not be assigned to any work detail outside the secure
perimeter of the facility;
(5) The inmate will not be placed in UNICOR. Any inmate assigned to
UNICOR who fails to make adequate progress on his/her financial plan
will be removed from UNICOR, and once removed, may not be placed
on a UNICOR waiting list for six months. Any exceptions to this
require approval of the Warden;
(6) The inmate shall be subject to a monthly commissary spending
limitation more stringent than the monthly commissary spending
limitation set for all inmates. This more stringent commissary spending
limitation for IFRP refusees shall be at least $25 per month, excluding
purchases of stamps, telephone credits, and, if the inmate is a common
fare participant, Kosher/Halal certified shelf-stable entrees to the extent
that such purchases are allowable under pertinent Bureau regulations;
(7) The inmate will be quartered in the lowest housing status
(dormitory, double bunking, etc.);
(8) The inmate will not be placed in a community-based program;
(9) The inmate will not receive a release gratuity unless approved by
the Warden;
...
[(10)] The inmate will not receive an incentive for participation in
residential drug treatment programs.
See 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d). Additionally, inmates who refuse to participate in IFRP
will not earn First Step Act (“FSA”) time credits (“FTCs”). See Program
Statement 5410.01, First Step Act of 2018 – Time Credits: Procedures for
Implementation of 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4) (Nov. 18, 2022) (“PS 5410.01”), at 11
(“If an inmate refuses to participate in required programs (e.g., [IFRP], Drug
Education, etc.), the inmate will not earn FTCs. While these programs are
voluntary, the refusal to participate can result in the loss of certain benefits
including the inability to earn FTCs.”); see also Vargas v. Rivers, No. 24-10703,

2025 WL 1380067, at *1–2 (5th Cir. May 13, 2025) (unpublished) (explaining that
the IFRP and FSA “intersect because the [BOP] has designated the IFRP as” a
“productive activit[y]” for purposes of earning FSA FTCs and that “[u]nder BOP

regulation, ‘[a]n inmate may lose earned FSA Time Credits for violation of the
requirements or rules of’ a productive activity program” (quoting 28 C.F.R. §
523.43(a) and citing PS 5410.01)).
SECTION 2241 STANDARD

Section 2241 confers federal jurisdiction over a habeas petition that has been
filed by a federal inmate challenging “not the validity but the execution of [their]
sentence.” See Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations
and footnote omitted); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d

Cir. 2005) (stating that Section 2241 “allows a federal prisoner to challenge the
‘execution’ of his sentence in habeas”). While “the precise meaning of ‘execution
of the sentence’ is hazy[,]” the phrase has been interpreted as to “put into effect” or

“carry out.” See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 242, 243 (citation omitted). Thus, Section
2241 allows a petitioner to challenge “the ‘manner, location, or conditions of a
sentence's execution.’” See id. at 242 (quoting Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d
861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000)).
DISCUSSION
A. The Payment of Restitution During Incarceration is Not Inconsistent
with the Judgment.
In Cardona v. Bledsoe, the Third Circuit found that challenges to “BOP
conduct that conflicted with express statements in the applicable sentencing

judgment” were actionable under Section 2241. See 681 F.3d at 536–37.
Importantly, the Third Circuit explained that “to challenge the execution of [their]
sentence under § 2241, [a petitioner] would need to allege that [the] BOP’s

conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the
sentencing judgment.” See id. at 537. Here, Petitioner’s assertion that the BOP’s
attempts to collect the restitution while he is incarcerated as inconsistent with his
sentencing judgment is squarely within the court’s jurisdiction under Section 2241.

As set forth above, Petitioner was ordered to pay an assessment of $100.00
and restitution of $3,287,200.00 with interest waived for the restitution. Quaye,
No. 1:22-CR-0046-SE-2, Doc. 140. Special instructions for payment provided the

following:
Payment is ordered to begin immediately. Payments shall be made in
equal monthly installments of $200 within 30 days of commencement
of supervision and thereafter. Upon the defendant’s commencement of
supervision, the probation officer shall review the defendant’s financial
circumstances and, if necessary, recommend a revised payment
schedule on any outstanding balance for approval by the Court.
Id. The judgment also clearly stated that “[u]nless the court has expressly ordered
otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary

penalties is due during the period of imprisonment.” Id.
Petitioner asserts that the judgment only requires payment upon release to
supervision: “The sentencing court expressly limited payments to begin upon

commencement of supervision, not during imprisonment. Thus, the BOP’s actions
constitute an unlawful modification of a judicial sentence in violation of the
separations of powers.” (Doc. 2, p. 3.) However, Petitioner’s interpretation of the
judgment is not supported in the record. The judgment clearly states that payment

is to begin immediately and “[u]nless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if
this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is
due during the period of imprisonment.” Quaye, No. 1:22-CR-0046-SE-2, Doc.

140. Therefore, Petitioner’s argument premised on the statements contained in the
judgment alone cannot succeed.
The court acknowledges that the Third Circuit has stated that “[i]n
interpreting a sentencing court’s statements, we inspect the sentencing transcript as

well as the judgment the sentencing court entered.” United States v. Shvets, 154,
F.4th 74, 89 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 133 (3d Cir.
2002)). Here, Petitioner did not submit a transcript of the sentencing hearing as

evidence in support of his assertions concerning the alleged ambiguity of the
sentencing judgment. It is well established that a federal habeas corpus petitioner
generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a discharge from custody.

Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations omitted); see also
Brown v. Cuyler, 669 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1982). Petitioner, by relying on the
text of the judgment alone, has not met this burden. Therefore, his petition will be

denied.
B. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Address Petitioner’s Challenges to
Refusal Status and Denial of Time Credits Under the FSA.
Petitioner’s complaints about the BOP placing him in refusal status and the
imposition of corresponding consequences do not relate to the execution of his
sentence and, therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. “[T]he IFRP

has been upheld as constitutional and as fulfilling legitimate penological interests.”
Thomas v. Ramirez, No. 18-22064, 2018 WL 3015014, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 30,
2018) (citing McGhee v. Clark, 166 F.3d 884, 886–87 (7th Cir. 1998)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3014085 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2018). “The

consequences of choosing not to participate in the IFRP do not amount to
constitutional violations.” Jordan v. Holt, 488 F. App'x 587, 588 (3d Cir. 2012)
(unpublished) (citing United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir.

2008); see also Balter v. Martinez, 477 F. App'x 873, 875 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Balter
‘ha[s] no entitlement, constitutional or otherwise, to any of the benefits agreeing to
participate in the IFRP would provide, such as work detail outside the prison
perimeter, a higher commissary spending limit, a release gratuity, or pay beyond
the maintenance pay level.’” (quoting Lemoine, 546 F.3d at 1049)); Duronio v.

Gonzales, 293 F. App'x 155, 157 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“While being in the
‘IFRP Refuse’ category denies a prisoner certain privileges, it does not result in the
imposition of discipline that would trigger a constitutionally protected interest.”).

Similarly, his inability to apply certain earned time credits under the First
Step Act does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g.,
Alexandre v. Greene, 2026 WL 264283, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2026) (finding
that petitioner challenging his denial of earned time credits under the FSA based on

his refusal status was not cognizable under Section 2241); Garcia v. Ortiz, No. 20-
cv-01728, 2023 WL 1794752, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2023) (“Petitioner does not
have a liberty interest [for due process purposes] in FSA Time Credits he might

have earned from his UNICOR JOB, but for his finding of guilt of a prison code
violation.” (citation omitted)); Gant v. King, No. 23-cv-01766, 2023 WL 6910771,
at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2023) (“Given the contingent nature of the application of
FSA time credits to prerelease custody, they cannot reasonably be regarded as an

entitlement.”). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Section 2241 habeas
claim and, as such, this court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of his petition
with respect to this issue.
Even if the court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition, it
would fail. The Third Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that “participation in the

IFRP is voluntary. The BOP only ‘implements’ the IFRP after a prisoner has
chosen to participate in it.” See Jordan, 488 F. App'x at 588. Thus, Petitioner,
who repeatedly entered into IFRP contracts, “cannot be heard to complain about

the unlawful action of scheduling his restitution payments after he elected
participation in the IFRP.” See id. (cleaned up) (citation omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court will deny the petition and direct the

Clerk of Court to term the pending motion for jurisdiction and support, which
reads as a memorandum in support of the petition. The court will close the case.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: August 17, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11419910. Public record. Not legal advice.