# Buchanan

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · August 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11419812

## Case

- **Full name:** Robert Buchanan, Jr. v. Warden Baker, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

ROBERT BUCHANAN, Jr., )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 26-4145-SEM-DJQ
)
WARDEN BAKER, et al., )
Defendants. )

ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Robert Buchanan, Jr., proceeding pro se and
currently in custody at Hill Correctional Center, filed a Complaint
(#1) on June 2, 2026. Plaintiff alleges therein that he is receiving
inadequate medical care at Hill. Plaintiff names as Defendants:
Warden Baker, Healthcare Unit Administrator Nellie Boone, Nurse
Practitioner Shinn, Nurse Practitioner Kramer, Wexford Health
Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), IDOC Director Hughes, Governor J.B.
Pritzker, Warden Bailey, Medical Provider Centurion, and
John/Jane Does.

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The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
and the case is now before the Court for a merit review of his

claims.
BACKGROUND
In the first half of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Wexford

and Centurion, private corporations that have contracted to provide
healthcare services to IDOC inmates, have a policy of deliberately
understaffing the prisons. He maintains that this policy results in

inmates across the IDOC being deprived of adequate healthcare.
Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that former Hill Warden Baker, IDOC
Director Hughes, and Governor Pritzker are well aware of the

medical understaffing in the prisons due to the class action
lawsuits that have been brought in the past but have done nothing
to remedy the issue.

Plaintiff next alleges that he fell and injured himself on August
15, 2025, after slipping on spilled water. He alleges that he and two
other inmates informed maintenance supervisor Kunutea and
correctional officers Scandlin, Kane, and Johnson about the water

on the floor. Plaintiff suggests that those four individuals should
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not have allowed the prisoners out of their cells and should instead
have seen to it that the water was mopped up.

Plaintiff then makes a number of allegations concerning
specific health issues. First, Plaintiff alleges that he has a heart
condition and that a device has been placed in his chest to monitor

his heart. The device is monitored by cardiac specialists at UIC
Hospital. On one occasion—some time around September 6, 2025—
he experienced chest pain and was supposed to be seen by the UIC

Hospital cardiologist. However, Plaintiff was never called to go to the
hospital.
Plaintiff also suffers from prostate issues that required him to

have surgery. After the surgery, he was told that he would be
monitored to be sure his condition did not worsen. Some time again
around September 6, 2025, Plaintiff began to experience

excruciating pain in his groin area. He made a request to go to the
healthcare unit but never heard back. He maintains that this was a
deliberate denial of adequate medical care.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he has been prescribed

Gabapentin for chronic pain in his knees. He asserts that the
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medication has been ineffective because Nurse Practitioners Shinn
and Kramer have forced him to take it via the crush and float”

method. Under this method, the capsule is opened up and the
contents dumped into a cup of water, to be drunk by the patient.
That method is employed, Plaintiff notes, because some inmates

have been caught hoarding pills.
Plaintiff maintains that the crush and float method renders
the medication “useless.” Plaintiff told Shinn and Kramer that the

Gabapentin, delivered in this manner, was not alleviating his pain,
yet they persisted in their course of treatment. Plaintiff filed
grievances on the matter on September 5 and 6, 2025. He alleges

that the IDOC and Hughes have “turned a blind eye” to the medical
staff using the crush and float method.
In the final portion of his Complaint, Plaintiff complains that

Shinn and Kramer are mere nurse practitioners, rather than
specialists, and are therefore insufficient to meet his many medical
needs. Plaintiff insists that he needs to be seen by “a specialist who
is an expert in a specified field of study of medicine.” Wexford,

Centurion, and the IDOC are unable to provide this, Plaintiff
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alleges, as proven by the fact that he was previously sent to UIC
Hospital.

Analysis
Request for Counsel
Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Request Counsel (#5). In deciding

whether to recruit counsel for a pro se litigant, the Court must
determine: (1) whether the indigent plaintiff has made a reasonable
attempt to obtain counsel on his own; and (2) “given the difficulty of

the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?”
Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff has attached to his Motion seven undated letters

requesting representation, each identical except for being addressed
to different law firms. He does not attach any replies, nor does he
otherwise state in the Motion that he has received any replies. The

Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a reasonable
attempt to obtain counsel on his own.
As for the second inquiry, Plaintiff states in his Motion that he
has attained his GED. He does not indicate that he has any

difficulty reading or writing. Indeed, his claims are neatly and
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cogently presented in his Complaint. Moreover, at least at this early
stage in the proceeding, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s claims to

be legally or factually complex. While most of those claims concern
Plaintiff’s medical care, they relate largely to issues of delay, rather
than complicated medical issues. Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Counsel (#5).
Merit Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must “screen”

Plaintiff’s complaint and, through such process, identify and
dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if
warranted. A claim is defective if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
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court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Plaintiff’s general allegations of inadequate medical treatment
suffered by all IDOC inmates due to a policy of understaffing are
insufficient to state a claim. To state a Section 1983 claim, a

plaintiff must allege that a defendant harmed them by infringing
specific constitutional rights. See Welton v. Anderson, 770 F.3d 670,
673 (7th Cir. 2014). “Section 1983 is a tort statute,” which means

Plaintiff must allege that he has suffered “cognizable legal harm.”
Doe v. Welborn, 110 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1997). Relatedly, to
state a claim for liability under Monell, a plaintiff must, inter alia,

plausibly allege that a policy or custom caused his constitutional
rights to be violated. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319,
324 (7th Cir. 2000). But “[w]ithout a harm, there is no causal link

between an injury and . . . a policy[.]” Fanady v. Dart, 2025 WL
2764509, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding that “[g]enerally
alleging inadequate medical care” is insufficient).
The court thus turns to Plaintiff’s specific allegations of harm

he has suffered. Plaintiff alleges that he put in a sick call requesting
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to be seen by a specialist regarding his heart condition and a sick
call regarding potential prostate-related pain. Both requests,

Plaintiff alleges, went unanswered.
In both of these instances, Plaintiff has failed to identify an
individual responsible for deprivation of his constitutional rights.

“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a
defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a
constitutional right.” Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th

Cir. 1995).
To the extent Plaintiff may intend to pursue these claims
under a Monell theory, he never explicitly asserts that the delay in

his care was connected to his general allegations of understaffing
made earlier in his Complaint. “Monell complaints are typically
dismissed where plaintiffs have failed to tie the alleged policy to

their particular injury or have failed to provide any facts beyond a
bare assertion that the policy exists.” Sanchez v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., 2026 WL 691871, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2026)
(cleaned up); see also Arita v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 2016 WL

6432578, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2016) (dismissing the plaintiff's
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“factually unsupported, boilerplate allegation” regarding a general
policy of ignoring inmates’ requests for medical attention).

Furthermore, Plaintiff makes clear later in his Complaint the
precise parameters of his issue with the staffing at the prison: He
would like more doctors and specialists to be on staff. There is no

plausible inference to be drawn from Plaintiff’s allegations that the
lack of such medical professionals was the cause of his not getting
a response to his sick call requests. See Ruiz-Cortez v. City of

Chicago, 931 F.3d 592, 599 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Causation under
Monell requires a ‘direct causal link’ between the [policy] and the
constitutional injury.”).

Plaintiff next alleges that nurse practitioners Shinn and
Kramer have persisted in providing him Gabapentin delivered via
crush and float method despite knowing that the medication, taken

in this manner, is “useless.” These allegations “straddle the line
between demanding care versus receiving allegedly inadequate or
inappropriate care.” Lyons v. Crain, 2026 WL 1045499, at *7 (S.D.
Ill. Apr. 17, 2026). Still, the Court at this preliminary juncture must

accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true. Allegations that Defendants
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Shinn and Kramer declined to adjust Plaintiff’s chronic pain
treatment—whether by switching him to a new medication or by

terminating the crush and float delivery—despite knowing that the
present treatment was doing nothing for his chronic pain, are
sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifferent to serious

medical needs. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 752 (7th Cir.
2011).
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Hughes or Baker

responsible, on a policy level, for the administration of his
medication via crush and float method, the Court notes that the
Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff from suing these Defendants for

damages. Trujillo v. Hughes, 2025 WL 1724484, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June
20, 2025) (citing Gerlach v. Rokita, 95 F. 4th 493, 498-99 (7th Cir.
2024)). While injunctive relief against these Defendants would be

available, Plaintiff does not seek any injunctive relief relating to his
Gabapentin.
Finally, Plaintiff seeks to hold maintenance supervisor
Kunutea and correctional officers Scandlin, Kane, and Johnson for

his slip on spilled water. The Court notes that none of these
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individuals are named as Defendants in the caption of Plaintiff’s
Complaint or in the list of Defendants provided within the

Complaint. More importantly, A plaintiff “may join Defendants in
the same action only if the claims against each one ‘aris[e] out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences[.]” Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 502-03 (7th Cir.
2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)). “[U]nrelated claims against
different defendants belong in separate lawsuits[.]” Owens v.

Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011). “Rule 21 grants district
courts broad discretion to sever or dismiss claims and parties that
are improperly joined in the same action.” Davenport v. Baker, 2024

WL 3088529 (S.D. Ill. June 21, 2024).
Plaintiff’s claims against Kunutea, Scandlin, Kane, and
Johnson are wholly unrelated to those against Shinn, Howard, or

any other medical Defendant. Those claims against those parties
are therefore improperly joined here and should be brought in a
separate lawsuit. As the incident in question took place in August of
2025, dismissal for misjoinder will have no statute of limitations

ramifications. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Kunutea,
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Scandlin, Kane, and Johnson will be dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Counsel (#5) is DENIED.
2. Pursuant to its review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
Complaint states a claim against Defendants Shinn and Kramer for

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Any additional claims shall not be included in
the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for

good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15.
3. The Clerk is directed to DISMISS all other defendants

from this case.
4. The Clerk is directed to effect service of process on
Defendants Shinn and Kramer pursuant to the Court’s standard

procedures.
5. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before
filing any motions in order to give Defendant notice and an

opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
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Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be
denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the

Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
6. The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing
waivers of service to him. Defendant has sixty (60) days from the

date the waiver is sent to file an answer. If Defendant has not
filed an answer or appeared through counsel within ninety (90) days
of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the

status of service. After Defendant has been served, the Court will
enter an Order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
7. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the

address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant
worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said

Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used
only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding
addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be
maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

8. Defendant shall file an answer within sixty (60) days of
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the date the waiver is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is not
an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate

under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings
shall be to the issues and claims stated in this opinion. In general,
an answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule

on the merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by
Defendant. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or
will be considered.

9. This District uses electronic filing, which means that,
after defense counsel has filed an appearance, defense counsel will
automatically receive electronic notice of any motion or other paper

filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to
defense counsel copies of motions and other papers that Plaintiff
has filed with the Clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery

requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not
filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and
responses directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or
responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled, unless they are

attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does
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not begin until defense counsel has filed an appearance and the
Court has entered a Scheduling Order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.
10. Counsel for Defendant is hereby granted leave to depose
Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Counsel for Defendant shall

arrange the time for the deposition.
11. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of
any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s

failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone
number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.
12. If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the Clerk within thirty (30) days after the waiver is sent, the
Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through
the U.S. Marshal Service on Defendant and will require Defendant

to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
13. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified
protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.
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ENTERED August 17, 2026.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough
________________________________
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11419812. Public record. Not legal advice.