# Berger

> District Court, S.D. Florida · July 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11419775

## Case

- **Full name:** Noah Berger v. International Sommelier Guild Global Investments, LLC
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
CASE NO. 25-60602-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/HUNT

NOAH BERGER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

INTERNATIONAL SOMMELIER GUILD
GLOBAL INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Defendant.
_____________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This matter is before this Court on Plaintiff’s petition for an award for damages and
attorney’s fees. ECF No. 24. The Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas referred this Motion
to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. ECF No. 26; see also 28 U.S.C. §
636; S.D. Fla. L.R., Mag. R. Upon thorough and careful review of the Motion, the
response and reply, the applicable law, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises,
the undersigned RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART.
Background
Plaintiff Noah Berger filed this copyright infringement action against Defendant
International Sommelier Guild Global Investments, LLC, on March 28, 2025, for unlawfully
posting Plaintiff’s copyrighted photograph on its website, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 501
et seq. Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Clerk issued an entry of
default as to the Defendant, and Plaintiff then sought a final default judgment against
Defendant. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring Defendant to respond,
and, after Defendant failed to do so, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion as to liability and
damages. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, by virtue of obtaining a judgment as to liability
and damages on its claim for copyright infringement, Plaintiff is the prevailing party and
may be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiff now moves

for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
Legal Standard
“If the admitted facts in the Complaint establish liability, then the Court must
determine the appropriate amount of any damages, including any award of attorneys’ fees
and costs allowed by the applicable statutes.” Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Jiujiang Hison Motor
Boat Mfg. Co., No. 12-20626-CIV-SEITZ, 2012 WL 2873733, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 29,
2012) (citation omitted).
Discussion
a. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Under the Copyright Act, “[t]he court may . . . award a reasonable attorney’s fee to

the prevailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. Such fee awards are “subject
to the limitations on such awards set forth in other provisions of Title 17.” Luken v. Int'l
Yacht Council, Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1235 (S.D. Fla. 2008). There is no argument
that any of the limitations under Title 17 apply, and the Court independently sees no
reason such an award would be statutorily barred. Fees award under the Copyright Act
are allowed in default judgments. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Joint Bar & Grill, LLC, No.
12-21209-CIV-LENARD/O’SULLIVAN, 2012 WL 12886426, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5,
2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 12-21209-CIV-LENARD/O’SULLIVAN,
2013 WL 12126004 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2013).
In determining whether to award fees in a copyright case, the Court must consider
the so-called Fogerty factors outlined in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
Under Fogerty, the Court must consider: (i) whether the action was frivolous; (ii) the
motivation behind the action; (iii) whether the claims were objectively unreasonable, both

in the factual and legal components of the case; and (iv) the need to advance
considerations of compensation and deterrence. See id. at 534 n.19; see also Acosta v.
Mega Media Holdings, Inc., No. 15-21837-CIV-COOKE/TORRES, 2017 WL 11680177,
at *9–12 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2017) (applying the Fogerty factors to a prevailing party’s fee
request in Copyright Act case), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-21837-CIV-
COOKE/TORRES, 2017 WL 11680178, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2017). “‘Fogerty does
not require the Court to weigh all of these factors’; rather, they serve to guide the Court’s
discretion to award fees within the spirit of the Copyright Act.” Acosta, 2017 WL
11680177, at *8 (quoting Katz v. Chevaldina, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1297 (S.D. Fla.
2015)). Courts also consider the degree of success obtained. Id.

Here, it does not appear that the action was frivolous nor the claims unreasonable.
Plaintiff sought to protect his intellectual property, and deterrence of such behavior favors
the award. Further, Plaintiff was wholly successful, in that a final default judgment was
entered against Defendant. The Court therefore finds the Fogerty factors support the
award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in this case.
I. Fees
This Court uses the lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees,
multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended.
Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). A
reasonable hourly rate for attorney’s fees is determined by evaluating “the prevailing
market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
895 (1984)); see also ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 438 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The

significant disparity in their experience should be reflected in the rates awarded.”); Brown
v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., No. 08-61592-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2010 WL 3282584, at
*3 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2010) (reducing the requested hourly rate).
The movant bears the burden of proving the requested rate is consistent with
prevailing market rates. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. In addition to evidence presented
by the movant, “[a] court . . . is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own
knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an
independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Id. at 1303
(quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, even when the submitted evidence is deficient, a court has the power to

make a fee award without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. Id.
Moreover, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is unnecessary for issues about which the
district court possesses sufficient expertise: ‘Such matters might include the
reasonableness of the fee, the reasonableness of the hours, and [the] significance of the
outcome.’” Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Norman, 826 F.2d at 1309). The primary issues here are the reasonableness of
counsel’s hourly rate and the reasonableness of the number of hours expended, matters
over which this Court possesses sufficient expertise.
A. Reasonable Hourly Rate
Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees based upon professional services rendered. When
“determining what is a ‘reasonable’ hourly rate and what number of compensable hours
is ‘reasonable,’” this Court must consider twelve factors. Meyrowitz v. Brendel, No. 16-

81793-CIV-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN, 2018 WL 4440492, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2018).
These factors are:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion
of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

The reasonable hourly rate is defined as the prevailing market rate in the
relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skills, experience, and reputation. The fee applicant bears the
burden of establishing the claimed market rate. The Court may use its own
experience in assessing the reasonableness of attorney’s fees.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
This Court has considered the included affidavits and the twelve factors. Because
of their practice, reputation, and legal experience, counsel request the following hourly
rates:
• Craig Sanders, managing partner, requests a rate of $895.00 per hour.
• Joshua Vera, associate, requests a rate of $400.00 per hour.
• Jonathan Cader, senior associate, requests a rate of $600.00 per hour
• Julie Busch and Arielle Marra, paralegals, request a rate of $150.00 per hour.
Comparable fee awards indicate the proposed rates somewhat higher than rates
previously awarded in the Southern District. See Soc. Life Network, Inc. v. Peak One
Opportunity Fund, L.P., 21-21373-CIV-GAYLES/TORRES, 2023 WL 5053985, at *7 (S.D.
Fla. July 20, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 21-21373-CIV-
GAYLES/TORRES, 2023 WL 5036606 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2023) (holding that fees of $700
for a partner and $500 for a senior associate are reasonable); Karpel v. Knauf Gips KG,

No. 21-24168-CIV-SCOLA, 2023 WL 22173, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2023) (finding that
attorney rates ranging from $365.00 to $595.00 were reasonable). This Court previously
requested that Plaintiff submit a notice of prior awards of fees and costs in this District.
According to Plaintiff’s response to that request, Vera has recently been awarded his
$400.00 rate, while Sanders’ awards have ranged between $650.00 and $750.00 per
hour. ECF No. 28. Cader has been awarded $450.00 per hour, while the paralegals
awards ranged from $100.00 to $150.00 per hour. Id. In keeping with these awards, as
well as other rates previously awarded in the district, the undersigned recommends some
slight adjustment to counsels’ awards. As such, Vera should be compensated at $400.00
per hour, Sanders at $700.00 per hour, and Cader at $450.00 per hour. The paralegals

awards should be compensated at $125.00 per hour. See Garcia v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc.,
No. 22-60822-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/HUNT, 2023 WL 3792831, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 18,
2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-60822-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/HUNT,
2023 WL 3790761 (S.D. Fla. June 2, 2023).
Hours Reasonably Expended
Upon determination of the hourly rate, a court must determine the reasonable
number of hours expended in the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983). Inquiry into the reasonable number of hours focuses on an attorney’s exercise of
“billing judgment,” such as the attorney’s exclusion of hours “that would be unreasonable
to bill a client, and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation, or
experience of counsel.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). Fee applicants must exclude
hours that were not “reasonably expended” or that are determined to be “excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” from their fee calculations. Hensley, 461 U.S. at
434.
According to Plaintiff’s billing records, Sanders, a partner, spent 0.3 hours working
on the case. ECF No. 25-1. Vera, an associate, spent 10.7 hours on the case. Cader,
a senior associate, spent 3.7 hours on the case. Id. The paralegals collective spent 2.3
hours on the case. Id. Plaintiff is claiming a total of 17 hours spent working on the matter.
The attorneys aver that these hours were spent reviewing records, preparing the
complaint, communicating with their client, and preparing relevant motions. The Court
notes that the bulk of the work was assigned to the associate with the lowest billing rate.
Having examined the docket and the included billing records, the undersigned finds the

number of hours claimed reasonable.
C. Lodestar Amount and Adjustment
“[T]here is a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar figure is reasonable, but that
presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does
not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining
a reasonable fee.” Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010). The Supreme Court
has specifically identified three circumstances that may justify a deviation from the
lodestar amount: 1) “where the method used in determining the hourly rate employed in
the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value,
as demonstrated in part during the litigation”; 2) “if the attorney’s performance includes
an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally protracted”; and 3)
when there are “extraordinary circumstances in which an attorney’s performance involves
exceptional delay in the payment of fees.” Id. at 554–56.

In this case, the undersigned finds no reason to depart from the lodestar,
calculation. Therefore, Plaintiff should be awarded $4,280.00 for Vera (10.7 hours at
$400.00 per hour), $210.00 for Sanders (0.3 hours at $700.00 per hour), $1,665.00 for
Cader (3.7 hours at $450.00 per hour), and $287.50 for paralegals (2.3 hours at $125.00
per hour) for a total fees award of $6,442.50.
II. Costs
Plaintiff also seeks to recover from the $405.00 filing fee. Filing fees are routine
expenses in litigation, which the undersigned finds are compensable. See 28 U.S.C. §
1920 (enumerating costs that court may tax). Plaintiffs should therefore be awarded costs
of $405.00.

RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that
Plaintiffs’ request for damages and attorney’s fees, ECF No. 24, be GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART. The Motion should be granted to the extent that Plaintiff be
awarded $6,442.50 in fees, as well as $405.00 in costs, for a total award of $6,847.50.
The Motion should otherwise be DENIED.
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and
Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above
findings and recommendations as provided by the Local Rules for this district. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(b). The parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely
object waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and
Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
DONE and SUBMITTED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 17th day of July 2026.

PATRICK M. HUNT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:
The Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas
All counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11419775. Public record. Not legal advice.