# Mullin

> District Court, S.D. California · July 29, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11419297

## Case

- **Full name:** Freddy Evaristo Garmendia Ruiz v. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** July 29, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11419297

## Opinion text

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 FREDDY EVARISTO GARMENDIA Case No.: 26-CV-3996 JAO (GC)
RUIZ,
12
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
Petitioner,
13 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
v.
14
(ECF No. 1)
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of
15
the United States Department of
16 Homeland Security, et al.,
17 Respondents.
18
19 Before the Court is Petitioner Freddy Evaristo Garmendia Ruiz’s Petition for Writ
20 of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). Also before the Court is
21 Respondents, Markwayne Mullin’s (Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security),
22 David Venturella’s (Acting Director of ICE), Todd Blanche’s (Acting Attorney General
23 of the United States), and Jeremy Casey’s (Warden of Imperial Regional Detention
24 Facility) (collectively, “Respondents” or the “Government”) Return to the Petition (ECF
25 No. 4).
26 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition on due
27 process grounds.
28
1 BACKGROUND
2 Petitioner is a Nicaraguan citizen who fled persecution by the Sandinista
3 dictatorship and entered the United States on January 11, 2022 to seek asylum. ECF No.
4 1 ¶¶ 2, 4. At that time he was subject to the “Migrant Protection Protocol” or “MPP,”
5 which required him to remain in Mexico while waiting for an Immigration Court date.
6 See id. ¶ 5. He underwent a credible fear interview and was found to have a credible fear
7 of being persecuted or tortured if he returned to Nicaragua. See id. ¶ 8. Immigration
8 officials thereafter necessarily determined that he was neither a flight risk or danger to the
9 community and paroled him into the United States of April 14, 2022 to continue pursuing
10 his asylum claim. See id. ¶ 8.
11 On December 9, 2025, Petitioner was driving to work when ICE stopped him at a
12 highway checkpoint, detained him, and took him to Imperial Regional Detention Facility,
13 where he has remained since. See id. ¶¶ 15–16. He received no notice or pre-detention
14 hearing before being detained. See id. ¶¶ 14, 21. The Government issued him a Notice to
15 Appear charging him as removable, see id. ¶ 17, and an Immigration Judge summarily
16 denied his asylum claim on March 2, 2026, see id. ¶ 18. Petitioner appealed the denial,
17 which remains pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals, meaning there is no
18 final order of removal against Petitioner. See id. ¶ 18.
19 LEGAL STANDARD
20 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
21 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district
22 of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole
23 judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or
24 removal is the court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas
25 v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
26 13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral
27 issues arising independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of
28 indefinite detention—federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court.
1 Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other
2 grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F.
3 Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted).
4 DISCUSSION
5 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his release from his 2022
6 detention without notice or a hearing violates the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 72–
7 81.1 Respondents maintain that “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under §
8 1225(b)(2),” but “acknowledge[] that this Court, and Courts in this District, have
9 repeatedly reached the opposite conclusion under the same and/or similar facts.” See
10 ECF No. 4 at 2. Thus, they “do[] not oppose the petition.” See id. at 3. The Court
11 concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates the Due Process Clause.
12 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
13 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due
14 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
15 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis,
16 533 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment
17 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507
18 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a
19 hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch,
20 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their
21 liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a
22 protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D.
23 Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an
24 individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to
25 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that
26 individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the
27

28 1 Because the Court finds that Respondents violated Petitioner’s rights to Due Process and orders his
1 . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
2 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen
3 pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a
4 protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032
5 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
6 Petitioner has been out of custody since 2022, when the government implicitly
7 determined he was not a danger to the community or a flight risk and paroled him into the
8 country. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 8. Since his parole, Petitioner has complied with the law and
9 conditions of his parole. See id. ¶ 20. Petitioner thus has a protected liberty interest
10 continuing to remain out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034
11 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after [his] initial apprehension reflected a
12 determination by the government that [he] was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
13 community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless [he] no
14 longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 (“Petitioner
15 is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a
16 year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s
17 guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d
18 1120, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding the petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his
19 release).
20 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
21 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v.
22 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally
23 sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Mathews factors.
24 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider:
25 (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
26
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
27 additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s interest including the function involved and the
28
1 fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”
2
Id.
3
The Court finds that all three factors support a determination that the
4
Government’s re-detention of Petitioner without notification, reasoning, or an
5
opportunity to be heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed
6
above, Petitioner has a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to
7
his release in 2022. Petitioner has been cut off from his community in the United States,
8
including his sister and many friends. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 23. “Freedom from
9
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
10
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas,
11
533 U.S. at 690; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of
12
his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to
13
form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).
14
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as
15
Respondents revoked Petitioner’s release from custody without providing Petitioner with
16
notification, reasoning, or a hearing. See id. ¶¶ 14, 21. Since the government’s initial
17
determination in 2022 that Petitioner should be released because he posed no danger to
18
the community and was not a flight risk, there is no evidence that these findings have
19
changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
20
(“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger
21
to the community or a flight risk.”). Indeed, after his release from custody, Petitioner has
22
apparently complied with all conditions of release. “Once a noncitizen has been released,
23
the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to
24
removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of
25
materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact
26
dangerous or has become a flight risk[.]” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. “Where as
27
here, ‘the petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an
28
1 erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner]
2 has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.”
3 Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047
4 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up).
5 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
6 and a hearing is “low.” See Alvarenga Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1130; Pinchi, 792 F.
7 Supp. 3d at 1036; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If the
8 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
9 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”).
10 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release in
11 violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Monroy
12 Martinez v. Lyons, 2026 WL 1047937, at * 5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026) (granting a writ of
13 habeas corpus on due process grounds where the petitioner’s release on bond was
14 revoked); Navarro Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
15 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the
16 conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds).
17 CONCLUSION
18 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition for Writ of
19 Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release
20 Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting release. The Court
21 ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of
22 the reasons for revocation of his release on bond and a hearing before a neutral decision
23 maker to determine whether detention is warranted. The government shall bear the
24 burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger
25 to the community or a risk of flight. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1038. The
26
27
28
1 || Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by August 12, 2026, confirming that
2 || Petitioner has been released.”
3 IT IS SO ORDERED.
4 ||Dated: July 29, 2026
5

Ly ©

g —
Jill A. Otake
9 », —" @& United States District Judge
10 ay i >

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 || ———__
27 ? Petitioner requested attorney’s fees, related expenses, and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice
Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See ECF No. 1 at 41. Petitioner’s counsel may submit an appropriate
28 || EAJA fee application within 30 days of the issuance of this Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11419297. Public record. Not legal advice.