# McCafferty

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418550

## Case

- **Full name:** BARBARA MCCAFFERTY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Katherine Shearl v. KENZIE KARE GROUP HOME I & II, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; CASSANDRA ELIZABETH MCKENZIE, an individual; GUARDIAN ASSURANCE SERVICES, INC., a Florida corporation; TERI ST. HILAIRE, an individual; KERRI STEVENS, an individual; PREMIER SUPPORT SERVICES, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; SHAWANA CAMMOCK, an individual; LUNESE PIERRE JOSEPH, an individual; LISEMONDE CADET MIDY, an individual; GLADYS PIERRE-JOSEPH, an individual; RONNIE MCKENZIE, an individual.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

BARBARA MCCAFFERTY, as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Katherine Shearl,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:25-cv-519-SPC-KRH

KENZIE KARE GROUP HOME
I & II, LLC, a Florida limited
liability company; CASSANDRA
ELIZABETH MCKENZIE, an
individual; GUARDIAN
ASSURANCE SERVICES, INC.,
a Florida corporation; TERI ST.
HILAIRE, an individual; KERRI
STEVENS, an individual;
PREMIER SUPPORT
SERVICES, LLC, a Florida
limited liability company;
SHAWANA CAMMOCK, an
individual; LUNESE PIERRE
JOSEPH, an individual;
LISEMONDE CADET MIDY, an
individual; GLADYS PIERRE-
JOSEPH, an individual;
RONNIE MCKENZIE, an
individual; DOLORES
CUERVO, an individual;
BENITE SANON, an individual;
MILDRED WOODSON, an
individual; SEIDE GUERLINE,
an individual; PETER SMART,
an individual; KIMONE
DAWINS, an individual;
RUPERT MCKENZIE, an
individual; EESHAWNNA
MATTHEWS, an individual;
CASSANDRA THOMPSON, an
individual; and RUTH
PHILDOR, an individual,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 103) filed by Defendants
Kerri Stevens (“Stevens”) and Premier Support Service, LLC (“Premier”) and
a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Kenzie Kare Group Home I & II, LLC
(“Kenzie Kare”) and individuals Cassandra Mckenzie (“McKenzie”), Cammock,
Joseph, Midy, Pierre-Joseph, Ronnie Mckenzie, Cuervo, Sanon, Woodson,
Guerline, Smart, Dawins, Rupert Mckenzie, Petit-Fort, and Phildor (Doc. 104)
(collectively, “Kenzie Defendants”). Plaintiff Barbara McCafferty filed a
response to each motion. (Docs. 118, 119.) The original Complaint was
dismissed as a shotgun pleading without prejudice to filing an amended
complaint not to exceed 80 pages. (Doc. 96.) The 75-page (Amended)
Complaint (Doc. 97) is the operative pleading.
Legal Standard
A district court should dismiss a claim where a party fails to plead facts

that make the claim facially plausible. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a court can draw a
reasonable inference, based on facts pled, that the opposing party is liable for
the alleged misconduct. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 668 (2009). When

considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the reviewing court must accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true and view them in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff. See id. at 678.
Background

Plaintiff Barbara McCafferty is the mother and personal representative
of the Estate of Katherine Shearl (“Shearl”). In 2013, Shearl was adjudicated
incompetent and appointed a plenary guardian, making her a ward of the
state. Shearl suffered from autism, cerebral palsy/developmental delay,

bipolar disorder, seizure disorder, and behavioral problems. Teri St. Hilaire
(“St. Hilaire”) was named Shearl’s new plenary guardian over Shearl’s person
and property.
Prior to April 2022, the State of Florida’s Agency for Persons with

Disabilities (“APD”) issued a group home facility license to Kenzie Kare. In
2022, St. Hilaire moved Shearl to Kenzie Kare, where Kerri Stevens became
her support coordinator. While residing at Kenzie Kare, APD paid for Shearl’s
room and board, and Medicaid covered her medical care. At the time of her

entry into the facility, apart from her underlying history, she was in good
health, participating in activities including shopping, sightseeing, playing in
the park, eating out, and visiting local attractions. Eight months into her stay,
Shearl was having difficulty swallowing, was nonverbal, had lost weight, and
had become cross-eyed.

In early March 2023, Shearl had a seizure and fell. She was treated at
Lehigh Hospital’s emergency room, where she received sutures to her chin. A
CT scan revealed Shearl had fractured her right jawbone. After treatment, she
returned to Kenzie Kare.

At the end of April 2023, Kenzie Kare noted that Shearl is a vulnerable
adult due to autism, physical limitations, mental limitations, and mental
illness. They noted that Shearl had a black eye that appeared to be a week or
two old, but that no one knew anything about it. It was also noted that Shearl

frequently fell due to balance issues, and that it was unknown why she was
not being watched more carefully.
In early June 2023, Shearl fell a second time, striking her head on the
concrete floor and fracturing her nose and right jawbone. Shearl was

transported to the hospital, where it was noted that, in addition to the
fractures, she had pneumonia and COVID-19 and a history of a left mandible
fracture. She was discharged back to Kenzie Kare on June 6, 2023.
But that was not the last fall. In mid-June 2023, Shearl was left

unattended and unrestrained in a wheelchair in her room. She had a seizure,
fell for a third time, struck her head on the concrete floor, becoming
unresponsive. Shearl was taken to the hospital, placed on a ventilator, and
diagnosed with a right frontal epidural hematoma and acute respiratory
failure. The injuries required emergency brain surgery. Over the next few

days, Shearl continued to decline, and it was determined that all medical
interventions would be futile, as there was no chance of recovery. Shearl
remained on a ventilator until June 27, 2023, when it was removed. She died.
The death certificate listed the cause of death as complications of traumatic

intracranial hemorrhage, blunt trauma, and fall.
Now to consider the counts in the Amended Complaint. In Count I,
Plaintiff alleges that Mckenzie is a registered nurse, an employee, or agent of
Kenzie Kare, and the primary on-site manager and owner of Kenzie Kare.

Plaintiff further alleges that Kenzie Kare performed a State public function by
accepting and retaining custody of developmentally disabled persons. Prior to
entering Kenzie Kare, Shearl was known to Mckenzie to have a history of and
permanent diagnoses of autism, cerebral palsy/developmental delay, bipolar

disorder, and seizure disorder. Despite Mckenzie’s knowledge of Shearl’s
objectively serious medical conditions and injuries, she did not respond
reasonably to the risk of serious harm to Shearl from falls, abuse, and neglect.
Plaintiff also alleges that Mckenzie acted with subjective recklessness by

failing to timely notify St. Hilaire and/or Stevens of the need for changes to
Shearl’s plan of care, fall risk assessment, and safety plan. Plaintiff further
alleges that Mckenzie did not arrange for Shearl to be seen by a medical doctor
and failed to facilitate the implementation of and/or adhere to Shearl’s plan of
care, fall risk assessment, and safety plan. Mckenzie was aware that Shearl

required 24/7 monitoring and safeguards against falls, that this was not being
done, and that falls, and at least one instance of physical violence occurred.
She did so little that it amounted to deliberate indifference. Plaintiff alleges
that Mckenzie provided services that were so cursory as to amount to no

services at all with respect to fall prevention and abuse prevention. (Doc. 97
¶¶ 54–77).
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Kenzie Kare is a business entity
created by Mckenzie capable of separate liability for its policies of deliberate

indifference to serious medical conditions. Kenzie Kare entered into contracts
with APD and the State of Florida and is licensed by the State of Florida to
provide services to developmentally disabled persons who are wards of the
State of Florida. Under the Florida Administrative Code, Kenzie Kare was

required to employ qualified and experienced professionals and staff to ensure
Plaintiff’s health and safety. Kenzie Kare was also required to implement
client support plans and contact the support coordinator to ensure the
provision of medical care. Plaintiff alleges that Kenzie Kare acted with

subjective recklessness and maintained a longstanding practice of accepting
people who required medical care and/or services beyond what it could provide
due to Kenzie Kare’s practice of maintaining staff without medical training or
sufficient experience. Plaintiff alleges that Kenzie Kare maintained policies
and practices under which residents with serious medical needs were routinely

denied an adequate plan of care, fall risk assessment and/or safety plan,
causing Shearl’s injuries. Kenzie Kare’s policies were so settled and
permanent as to have the force of law, and residents have suffered or died as a
result of the policies. Kenzie Kare had a financial incentive not to provide the

proper services, and as a direct result, Shearl was deprived of her liberty
interest in her safety and security and her substantive due process rights. (Id.
at ¶¶ 80–94.)
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Stevens was an employee or agent of

Premier serving as a waiver support coordinator assigned to Shearl. Under
Florida statutes and regulations, Stevens had responsibilities toward Shearl,
including maintaining progress notes, mitigating risks, and matching service
requests to Shearl’s needs. Plaintiff alleges that providing services was a

governmental act discharging Florida’s function of providing support
coordination services. Shearl was involuntarily committed in a governmental
custodial setting as a ward of the State. Despite knowing of Shearl’s objectively
serious medical conditions, Stevens did not respond reasonably to the risk of

serious harm. Plaintiff alleges that Stevens was reckless in failing to assist
Shearl by placing her at Kenzie Kare without adequate support, and that she
acted with subjective recklessness by failing to respond to an acute change in
Shearl’s physical status. (Id. ¶¶ 99–103, 108–14.)

In Count IV, Plaintiff incorporates the allegations made in Count III,
and alleges that Premier, under a contract with APD, undertook to perform
the governmental act of providing waiver support services to persons with
developmental disabilities and that it was required to train and supervise its

employees. Plaintiff further alleges that Premier’s employees or agents closely
cooperated and/or coordinated their efforts to provide ongoing case
management for Shearl. Premier received thousands of dollars from APD
and/or the State of Florida using taxpayer money to provide waiver support

services to persons in state custody, such as Shearl.
Plaintiff alleges that Premier had an official custom, pattern, and/or
practice of avoiding compliance with the mentoring program, failing to ensure
its support coordinators had the knowledge, skills, and abilities to provide

services, and failing to maintain and enforce standards and procedures to
ensure its support coordinators complied with their duties and responsibilities.
This was intended to keep expenses low and return as much profit as possible.
Plaintiff alleges that Premier was deliberately indifferent to Shearl’s

serious medical needs and failed to provide important support services.
Premier maintained policies and practices under which disabled persons with
serious medical needs were routinely denied support services, causing Shearl’s
injuries. Premier’s policies were persistent and widespread, and others have
suffered or died because of the deliberate indifference and financial incentive

to delay or deny support coordination services. (Id. ¶¶ 119–32.)
Analysis
As to Counts I and II, Kenzie Kare and Mckenzie argue that Plaintiff has
failed to allege they acted under color of state law for Section 1983 liability. In

Counts III and IV, Premier and Stevens argue that the two federal claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference fail because neither Premier
nor Stevens is a state actor under any applicable test. The Kenzie Defendants
continue to contend the Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading “replete

with conclusory and vague allegations.” The remaining individual defendants
are not named in the Section 1983 claims.
The Plaintiff counters that the threshold for a motion to dismiss is low
and that two of the three tests, the public function test and the nexus/joint

function test, are satisfied.
Section 1983 provides a private cause of action against any person who,
under color of state law, deprives a person of “any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42

U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983,
respondents must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was
committed under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999) (citation omitted).

“Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely
private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Focus on the
Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1276–77 (11th Cir.

2003) (citation omitted). “A private party is only considered a state actor in
the ‘rare circumstances’ that the private party meets one of three recognized
tests: the State compulsion test, the public function test, or the nexus/joint
action test.” Higdon v. Smith, 565 F. App’x 791, 792 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted).
To deem a private party a state actor, one of these conditions is required:
“(1) the State has coerced or at least significantly encouraged the action alleged
to violate the Constitution (“State compulsion test”); (2) the private parties

performed a public function that was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the State (“public function test”); or (3) “the State had so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence with the [private parties] that it was a joint
participant in the enterprise[]” (“nexus/joint action test”).” Rayburn ex rel.

Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing NBC, Inc. v.
Commc’ns Workers of Am., 860 F.2d 1022, 1026–27 (11th Cir. 1988). “We must
determine on a case-by-case basis whether sufficient state action is present
from a non-state actor (defendant) to sustain a section 1983 claim.” Willis v.
Univ. Health Servs., Inc., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).

State Compulsion Test
Under the state compulsion test, “a State normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or
has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the

choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (citations omitted). See also Nat’l Broad. Co., 860 F.2d
at 1026 (noting that the state compulsion test mirrors the language in Blum).
“The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself

convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (citation omitted).
There are no allegations that the State of Florida coerced or encouraged
any of the defendants to violate Shearl’s rights, and Plaintiff does not assert

that McKenzie, Kenzie Kare, Premier, and/or Stevens satisfy this test.
Accordingly, the state compulsion test need not be discussed further.
Public Function Test
“The public function test for state action has been limited strictly, and

covers only private actors performing functions ‘traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State.’” Nat’l Broad. Co., 860 F.2d at 1026 (quoting Jackson
v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)). “The mere fact that a business
is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the
State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350.

Being given “co-extensive” powers is irrelevant because the private actor must
be “given powers (or perform functions) that are ‘traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State,’” and “[f]ew activities are ‘exclusively reserved to the
states.’” Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1131 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations

omitted).
Nexus/Joint Action Test
Under the third test, the Court asks whether “‘the State had so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private party that

it was a joint participant in the enterprise.’” Nat’l Broad. Co., 860 F.2d at
1026–27 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357–58). “[T]he mere fact that a State
regulates a private party is not sufficient to make that party a State actor.”
Rayburn, 241 F.3d at 1348 (citations omitted). The government and the

private party must be “intertwined in a ‘symbiotic relationship.’” Nat’l Broad.
Co., 860 F.2d at 1027 (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357).
Plaintiff argues that Defendants qualify as state actors under the “public
function test” and the “nexus/joint function” test. (Doc. 118 at 1–10; Doc. 119

at 6–13). Plaintiff further argues that the “iBudget system is a mandatory
government program under the Medicaid umbrella[.] In other words, the
government care being administered was a government-guaranteed and
mandated service” and thus a public function. (Doc. 118 at 3; Doc. 119 at 6–7).
Plaintiff contends that “[i]f Florida did not administer the programs through

its agencies and private actors, the state would be legally obligated to provide
the care itself.” (Doc. 118 at 3; Doc. 119 at 7.)
Kenzie Kare Defendants argue that “[a] private group home and its
personnel do not become state actors merely by being licensed, regulated, or

receiving Medicaid/APD funds.” They also argue that no facts establish that
the State took custody of Plaintiff or that Kenzie Kare imposed the type of
governmental restraint that would trigger a constitutional duty. (Doc. 104 at
8, 10.) Stevens and Premier argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege that the

responsibilities and duties performed by Defendants were within the State’s
traditional and exclusive prerogative, and that none of the allegations are
sufficient to transform private conduct into state action. (Doc. 103 at 7, 11–
12).

The APD is “responsible for providing all services provided to persons
with developmental disabilities under chapter 393, including the operation of
all state institutional programs and the programmatic management of
Medicaid waivers established to provide services to persons with

developmental disabilities.” Fla. Stat. § 20.197(3). The APD “provides an
array of treatment, training, and support services to adults and children with
developmental disabilities.” Agency for Persons With Disabilities v. Dallas, 38
So. 3d 831, 832 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). The agency may take disciplinary
action, including revoking or suspending a license, if the Department of

Children and Families verifies abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult. Fla.
Stat. § 393.0673(1)(b); see also Fla. Admin. Code r. 28-106.2015(1) (the agency
must serve an administrative complaint before suspending a license or
imposing administrative fines).

Chapter 393 of the Florida Statutes sets out the “community-based
services the Agency may provide.” Id. Stevens is described as a “support
coordinator,” defined as an employee of a “qualified organization”1 designated
to “assist individuals and families in identifying their capacities, needs, and

resources, as well as finding and gaining access to necessary supports and
services; coordinating the delivery of supports and services; advocating on
behalf of the individual and family; maintaining relevant records; and
monitoring and evaluating the delivery of supports and services to determine

the extent to which they meet the needs and expectations identified by the
individual, family, and others who participated in the development of the
support plan.” Fla. Stat. § 393.063(43). The statute provides legislative
findings and declarations:

1 “[T]he term “qualified organization” means an organization determined by the
agency to meet the requirements of this section and of the Developmental Disabilities
Individual Budgeting Waiver Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook.” Fla. Stat. §
393.0663(2)(a).
The Legislature, therefore, declares that all persons with
developmental disabilities who live in licensed community
homes shall have a family living environment comparable
to other Floridians and that such residences shall be
considered and treated as a functional equivalent of a
family unit and not as an institution, business, or boarding
home. The Legislature further declares that, in developing
community-based programs and services for individuals
with developmental disabilities, private businesses, not-
for-profit corporations, units of local government, and other
organizations capable of providing needed services to
clients in a cost-efficient manner shall be given preference
in lieu of operation of programs directly by state agencies.
Finally, it is the intent of the Legislature that all
caretakers unrelated to individuals with developmental
disabilities receiving care shall be of good moral character.
Fla. Stat. § 393.062.
To satisfy the public function test, Plaintiff must show that defendants
exercised the authority of the State of Florida “traditionally exclusively
reserved to the state, such as holding elections,” or “eminent domain.”
Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff cannot meet
this high bar in this case, as the private entity providing support and the
support coordinator are not positions exclusive to the state. As in an at-risk
youth facility, foster homes, and foster parents are not considered state actors
or agents of the state. See, e.g., Howell v. Father Maloney’s Boys’ Haven, Inc.,
976 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d
704, 710–11 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 343–
46 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 896 (8th Cir. 2005);
Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1348 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2001);
Milburn by Milburn v. Anne Arundel Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 871 F.2d 474,
479 (4th Cir. 1989). This is distinct from the situation in Perez v. Sugarman,

where “the statutory scheme expressly contemplates that in performing [the]
public function of caring for children the State may utilize private entities[.]”
99 F.2d 761, 765 (2d Cir. 1974).
Private disability facilities have also been found not to engage in a

traditional state function. Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc.,
No. 06 CV 4899 (JG), 2007 WL 1202864, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2007) (finding
that care for the mentally disabled is neither traditionally nor exclusively
reserved to the state), aff’d, 546 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 2008); Carter v. Takoda

Trails, No. 1:25-CV-00019, 2026 WL 1217712, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 5, 2026)
(“Just because the Ohio legislature uses expansive language in Section
2744.01(C)(2)(o), to include within the definition of a “governmental function”
developmental disabilities facilities like Takoda Trails ICF, this does not

necessarily convert that function into one exclusively reserved to the State.”).
The APD’s role is limited to regulating licensing and revoking licenses
through administrative proceedings. “The mere fact that a business is subject
to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for

purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 350 (1974); see also Howell, 976 F.3d at 755 (“Requiring private actors
to follow statutory mandates, even if they’re “extensive,” doesn’t transform
them into public servants.”). “In essence, it must be demonstrated that the
State is intimately involved in the challenged private conduct in order for that

conduct to become attributable to the state for purposes of a § 1983 action.”
Bier v. Fleming, 717 F.2d 308, 311 (6th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). The
alleged incentive for financial gain or receipt of funds from Medicare does not
make defendants state actors. Fields v. Unnamed Emps. of Carlton Palms

Educ. Ctr., No. 5:11-CV-657-OC-10PRL, 2012 WL 4009619, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 12, 2012) (“‘[I]t is well settled that a private institution does not become
a state actor because ‘virtually all of its income was derived from government
funding.’”) (citation omitted).

Remaining Counts
Plaintiff’s arguments as to Counts I through IV fail and must be
dismissed. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).2 Therefore, the Court will

2 The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim under subsection (a) if--
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
dismiss without prejudice Count V (survival claim as to the individual Kenzie
Kare Defendants), Count VI (wrongful death claim as to the individual Kenzie

Kare Defendants), Count VII (survival claim as to Mckenzie), Count VIII
(wrongful death claim as to Mckenzie), Count IX (vicarious liability survival
claim as to Kenzie Kare), Count X (vicarious liability wrongful death as to
Kenzie Kare), Count XI (negligent training claim as to Kenzie Kare), Count XII

(negligent supervision claim as to Kenzie Kare), Count XIII (survival claim as
to Kenzie Kare), Count XIV (survival claim as to Teri St. Hilaire), Count XV
(wrongful death claim as to Teri St. Hilaire), Count XVI (vicarious liability
claim as to Guardian Assurance Services), Count XVII (survival claim as to

Kerri Stevens), Count XVIII (wrongful death claim as to Stevens), Count XIX
(vicarious liability claim as to Stevens), Count XX (negligent training as to
Premier Support), and Count XXI (negligent supervision of Stevens as to
Premier Support).

Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Premier Support Service, LLC and
Kerri Steven (Doc. 103) is GRANTED as to Counts III and IV.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
2. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Kenzie Kare Group Home I & II, LLC
and individuals Cassandra Mckenzie, Cammock, Joseph, Midy,
Pierre-Joseph, Ronnie Mckenzie, Cuervo, Sanon, Woodson, Guerline,
Smart, Dawins, Rupert Mckenzie, Petit-Fort, and Phildor (Doc. 104)
is GRANTED as to Counts I and II.
3. Counts I, II, III, and IV of the (Amended) Complaint (Doc. 97) are
DISMISSED with prejudice.
4. Having dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims, Counts V through XXI, which are
DISMISSED without prejudice.
5. The Clerk shall enter judgment, terminate all deadlines, and close the

case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida on July 27, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418550. Public record. Not legal advice.