# Buck

> District Court, E.D. North Carolina · August 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418437

## Case

- **Full name:** Reeces Chapel Missionary Baptist Church and John Doe v. Asa Buck
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** August 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:25-CV-183-D

REECES CHAPEL MISSIONARY )
BAPTIST CHURCH, and JOHN DOE, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) ORDER
v. )
)
ASA BUCK, )
)
Defendant. )

On October 6, 2025, Reeces Chapel Missionary Baptist Church (“Reeces Chapel”) and
John Doe (“Doe”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Asa Buck (“Buck” or
“defendant”) in his official capacity as Sheriff of Carteret County, North Carolina [D.E. 1]. The
action arises from Doe’s desire to attend religious services at the Reeces Chapel worship hall,
which is within 300 feet of areas used for minors. See id. [J 22-39. North Carolina law restricts
such attendance by sex offenders who committed an offense against a minor. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 14-208.18(a)(2), 14-208.11A. Plaintiffs assert three claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution: freedom of speech (count one), free exercise of
religion (count two), and right to associate (count three). See [D.E. 1] {] 40-72. On January 13,
2026, Buck moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure
to state a claim [D.E. 11] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 12]. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1), (6). On March 7, 2026, plaintiffs responded in opposition [D.E. 16]. On March 23,
2026, Buck replied [D.E. 18]. As explained below, the court denies Buck’s motion to dismiss the
complaint.

I,
Reeces Chapel is a religious organization that offers religious services in Newport, North
Carolina. See Compl. [D.E. 1] ff 1, 18. Reeces Chapel has a small play area and an area used for
the religious education of minors within 300 feet of its worship hall. See id. {] 4—6, 29-31. Buck
considers the Reeces Chapel worship hall off-limits under subsection 14-208.18(a)(2) and has
stated “that he will arrest any person subject to [the statute] [(‘“‘covered person”)] for being present
at Reeces Chapel for any purpose.” Id. J 7; see id. {| 21, 32-33. Doe is a member of Reeces
Chapel and is subject to subsection 14-208.18(a)(2). See id. F¥ 8, 23, 35.
Subsection 14-208.18(a)(2) prohibits an individual who is required to register as a sex
offender in North Carolina, and who committed any offense against a minor victim, from being
“{w]ithin 300 feet of any location intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors
when the place is located on premises that are not intended primarily for the use, care, or
supervision of minors, including, but not limited to, places described in subdivision (1) of this
subsection that are located in malls, shopping centers, or other property open to the general public.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.18(a)(2); see id. § 14-208.18(a), (c). Subdivision one describes “place[s]
intended primarily for the use, care, or supervision of minors” as including “schools, children’s
museums, child care centers, nurseries, and playgrounds.” Id. § 14-208.18(a)(1). Violating
subsection 14-208.18(a)(2) is a Class H felony. See id. § 14-208.18(h). Class H felonies carry a
presumptive term of imprisonment of up to 20 months, a fine, or both. See id. § 1SA-1340.17;
Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833, 839 (4th Cir. 2016).
Among other restrictions, subsection 14-208.11A makes it a Class H felony for an
individual who has reason to believe that an offender is violating subsection 14-208.18(a)(2), and
who intends to assist the offender in eluding arrest, to either:

(1) [w]ithhold information from, or fail to notify, a law enforcement agency about
the offender’s noncompliance with the requirements of [subsection
14-208.18(a)(2)], and, if known, the whereabouts of the offender[;]
(2) [h]arbor, attempt to harbor, or assist another person in harboring or attempting
to harbor, the offender[;]
(3) [c]Jonceal, or attempt to conceal, or assist another person in concealing or
attempting to conceal, the offender[; or]
(4) [p]rovide information to a law enforcement agency regarding the offender that
the person knows to be false information.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.11A(a)(1)}(4). Violators face a presumptive term of imprisonment of up
to 20 months, a fine, or both. See id. § 15A-1340.17; Doe, 842 F.3d at 839.
Doe desires to attend religious services in the Reeces Chapel worship hall “for the express
purpose of religious worship.” Compl. { 35; see id. fj 8, 39. Doe has a “sincerely held religious
belief’ that he must “attend worship services at a duly constituted Christian church.” Id. {J □□□□□□
Doe would attend religious services in the worship hall if not for subsections 14-208.18(a)(2) and
14-208.11A. See id. 738. Doe alleges that subsections 14-208.18(a)(2) and 14-208.11A “render
every church within a reasonable distance from [his] home off-limits because all such churches
have either play areas or areas dedicated to the instruction of minors.” Id. { 58.
Reeces Chapel knows of Doe’s conviction and status under subsection 14-208.18(a)(2) yet
desires to admit him for religious services because of its “duty to minister to those seeking the
comfort of Christ[,] . . . includ[ing] those persons on the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry.”
Id. FJ 50-51; see id. FJ 1, 9, 36-37. Reeces Chapel has a “sincerely held religious belief[]” that
this duty necessitates in-person congregational worship. Id. 752; cf. Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d
409, 415 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (recognizing the Christian admonition of “not forsaking the
assembling of ourselves together” (citation omitted)). Reeces Chapel also maintains a religious
value system it seeks to instill in its members through “expressive activities of religious worship,

teaching, learning, and other expressive activities.” Compl. f] 65-66. Thus, Reeces Chapel would
admit Doe to its religious services if not for subsections 14-208.18(a)(2) and 14-208.11A. See id.
4 37.
On October 6, 2025, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Buck, alleging that subsections
14-208.18(a)(2) and 14-208.11A substantially burden their First Amendment “rights of [s]peech,
[f]ree [e]xercise, and [a]ssociation.” Id. 39. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that as applied to them,
the statutes (1) place an overbroad “burden [on] protected speech—religious worship, teaching,
and evangelizing,” (2) unduly burden their free exercise of religion by restricting their ability to
offer and engage in congregational worship, and (3) unduly burden their freedom to associate “by
specifically excluding individuals from engaging in” expressive activities of religious worship,
teaching, and learning. Id. ff 41, 48, 55-56, 62, 66-67, 72. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment
that subsections 14-208.18(a)(2) and 14-208.11A are unconstitutional “as applied to [Doe’s]
attendance at Reeces Chapel for religious worship and activities and as applied generally to
attendance at a duly constituted church for religious worship and activities.” Id. at 11. Plaintiffs
also seek to enjoin Buck from enforcing subsections 14-208.18(a)(2) and 14-208.11A against
plaintiffs based on “Doe’s (or any other registrant’s) attendance or participation in religious
worship or instruction at Reeces Chapel or other duly constituted church.” Id.
I.
Buck moves to dismiss Reeces Chapel’s claims for lack of standing. See [D.E. 12] 4-6;
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests
subject-matter jurisdiction, which is the court’s “statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis omitted),
abrogated on other grounds by Riley, Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025); see Holloway v. Pagan River

Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 453 (4th Cir. 2012); Coristantine v, Rectors & Visitors of
Geo. Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 479-80 (4th Cir. 2005); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(1). A federal court
“must determine that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case before it can pass on the merits
of that case.” Constantine, 411 F.3d at 479-80. A plaintiff bears the burden of showing the court
has subject-matter jurisdiction over its claims, including whether the plaintiff has standing. See
Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 104; Ali v. Hogan, 26 F.4th 587, 595-96 (4th Cir. 2022); Evaiis v. B.F.
Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v.
United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). But “when a defendant asserts that the complaint
fails to allege sufficient facts to support subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court must apply a
standard patterned on Rule 12(b)(6) and assume the truthfulness of the facts alleged [in the
complaint].” Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009); see Winyah Rivers All.
v. Active Energy Renewable Power, LLC, 579 F. Supp. 3d 759, 764 (E.D.N.C. 2022).
A plaintiff-organization can show that it has standing to sue in its own right
(“organizational standing”) or on behalf of its members (“associational standing”). See, e.g.,
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harv. Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 199 (2023);
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
511 (1975); S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n v. OpenBaria at Broadlands, LLC, 713
F.3d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 2013); White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 458 (4th Cir. 2005);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 2000)
(en banc); N.C. Ait. for Retired Ams. v. Hirsci,, 741 F. Supp. 3d 318, 330 (E.D.N.C. 2024).
Reeces Chapel claims organizational standing. See, e.g., Compl. { 39; [D.E. 16] 3. A
plaintiff-organization “must adequately allege that (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a)
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the

injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” S. Walk, 713 F.3d
at 182 (cleaned up); see FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 393-94 (2024); Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000); cf. Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338-40 (2016); LaFave v. Cnty. of Fairfax, 149 F.4th 476, 484-85 (4th Cir.
2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1799 (2026); Kenny v. Wilson, 885 F.3d 280, 287 (4th Cir. 2018).
Moreover, it must establish standing for each claim and each form of relief sought. See Town of
Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008);
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 & n.7 (1983). The
Declaratory Judgment Act does not independently confer subject-matter jurisdiction or create
substantive rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 672 (2021); Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 506 (1961); Wells v. Johnson, 150 F.4th 289, 301 (4th Cir. 2025).
These standing requirements are “the irreducible constitutional minimum.” Lujan v. Defs.
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338. At the motion-to-dismiss
stage, however, the constitutional minimum is “relatively modest.” Lowy v. Daniel Def., LLC,
167 F.4th 175, 194 (4th Cir. 2026) (citation omitted).
Buck attacks injury-in-fact. Buck argues that Reeces Chapel fails to show an “actual or
imminent” injury because it does not allege a credible threat that Buck will prosecute the church
or its leadership under subsection 14-208.11A. See [D.E. 12] 5-6; [D.E. 18] 3-4. Buck also argues
that Reeces Chapel fails to show a “concrete or particularized” injury because the challenged
statutes “do not facially restrict expressive activity.” [D.E. 18] 2-4. For its part, Reeces Chapel
alleges that Buck has deemed its property off-limits under subsection 14-208.18(a)(2) and
threatened to arrest any covered person present at Reeces Chapel for any purpose, which when

combined with subsection 14-208.11A’s affirmative reporting requirements, has chilled its
expressive activities under the First Amendment. See Compl. ff 7, 32-39, 50-55, 64-70.
A plaintiff seeking prospective relief need not expose itself to prosecution before bringing
suit. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974). Instead, a plaintiff may bring a
pre-enforcement suit when it plausibly “allege[s] an intention to do something prohibited by the
statute and a credible threat of prosecution” burdening its legally-protected interest. LaFave, 149
F.4th at 485 (cleaned up); see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158-64 (2014);
Babbitt v. Farm Workers Nat’] Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979). A credible threat exists if a
plaintiff alleges “fears of state prosecution that are not imaginary or speculative and are actual and
well-founded enough to establish that the statute will be enforced against them.” Md. Shall Issue,
Inc. v. Hogan, 971 F.3d 199, 217 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up); see LaFave, 149 F.4th at 485; John
& Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 78 F.4th 622, 629 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he
claimed harm must not be so speculative as to lie at the end of a highly attenuated chain of
possibilities.” (citation omitted)); Bryant v. Woodall, 1 F.4th 280, 285 (4th Cir. 2021). A threat of
prosecution is particularly credible when the defendant has not disavowed enforcement against the
plaintiff's intended conduct. See Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 164-65; Bryant, 1 F.4th at 285; Kenny,
885 F.3d at 288; N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting a
“non-moribund statute that facially restricts expressive activity by the class to which plaintiffs
belong presents” a credible threat “in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary,”
particularly when “‘a statute tends to chill the exercise of First Amiendment rights” (Cleaned up)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also has held that a plaintiff may
bring a pre-enforcement suit if it “make[s] a sufficient showing of self-censorship, which occurs
when a claimant is chilled from exercising [its] right to free expression.” Kenny, 885 F.3d at 288

(cleaned up); see Abbott v. Pastides, 900 F.3d 160, 176 (4th Cir. 2018); Cooksey v. Futrell, 721
F.3d 226, 235-36 (4th Cir. 2013); Benham v. City of Charlotte, 635 F.3d 129, 135 (4th Cir. 2011).
The chilling effect “must be objectively reasonable.” Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 236 (citation omitted).
A plaintiff-organization may suffer the same injury where a statute or governmental action chills
its expressive activities. See First Choice Women’s Res. Ctrs., Inc. v. Davenport, 146 S. Ct. 1114,
1124-26 (2026); La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 151 F.4th 273, 286 (Sth Cir. 2025), cert.
denied, No. 25-904, 2026 WL 1855021 (U.S. June 29, 2026), and cert. denied, No. 25-916, 2026
WL 1855121 (U.S. June 29, 2026); Inst. for Free Speech v. Johnson, 148 F.4th 318, 327-30 (Sth
Cir. 2025); Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d
104, 109-11 (2d Cir. 2017); Cath. League for Religious & C.R. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 624 F.3d
1043, 1048-49, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Reeces Chapel plausibly alleges an actual, concrete, and particularized injury to itself.
Reeces Chapel alleges that it sincerely believes that admitting Doe to in-person congregational
worship is an essential component of its religious ministry; that Doe is a member who presently
desires to attend; that Reeces Chapel presently desires to admit him; that Buck has declared Reeces
Chapel off-limits under subsection 14-208.18(a)(2) and threatened to arrest any covered person
(like Doe) present at Reeces Chapel for any purpose; and that Reeces Chapel therefore refrains
from admitting Doe. See Compl. 7-10, 32-39, 50-55, 64-70. Thus, Reeces Chapel alleges
that Buck’s stated enforcement position causes it to alter its own worship, teaching, and association
under the First Amendment. That self-censorship suffices to establish injury-in-fact. See Abbott,
900 F.3d at 176; Kenny, 885 F.3d at 288; Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 235-36; Benham, 635 F.3d at 135;
White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 460-61.

Buck’s contrary arguments construe Reeces Chapel’s injury too narrowly. Reeces Chapel
need not allege that Buck has separately threatened to prosecute its leadership under subsection
14-208.11A. Contra [D.E. 12] 5—6. Buck’s threat to enforce subsection 14-208.18(a)(2) at Reeces
Chapel against covered persons like Doe is the governmental action which causes Reeces Chapel
to refrain from admitting Doe, and Buck’s threat is actual, not “imaginary or wholly speculative.”
Bryant, 1 F.4th at 285 (citation omitted); cf. Kerns, 585 F.3d at 193 (noting the court must “assume
the truthfulness of the facts alleged” in the complaint when defendant claims the facts fail to
support subject-matter jurisdiction). Moreover, subsection 14-208.11A and its affirmative
reporting requirement reinforce the “objective[] reasonable[ness]” of that chill because Reeces
Chapel knows Doe’s status, desires to admit him notwithstanding Buck’s announced position that
Doe’s attendance would be unlawful, and alleges that it refrains from doing so because of the
challenged statutes. Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 236 (citation omitted); see Compl. {J 32-39. To have
standing, plaintiffs need not violate the statutes or await prosecution before seeking prospective
relief. See Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 158-64; Steffel, 415 U.S. at 452; Bryant, 1 F.4th at 285-86;
Kenny, 885 F.3d at 288; Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 710-11; Doe 1-5 v. Caaper, 40 F. Supp. 3d 657,
670-72 (M.D.N.C. 2014), aff'd, 842 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 2016).
As for traceability and redressability, Reeces Chapel’s injury is fairly traceable to Buck’s
enforcement position and would be redressed by declaratory or injunctive relief prohibiting Buck
from enforcing the challenged statutes against plaintiffs based on Doe’s attendance for religious
services at Reeces Chapel.! See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; White Tai! Park, 413 F.3d at 459-61;

1 Plaintiffs also request injunctive relief concerning unidentified registrants and nonparty
churches. See Compl. 11. The scope of any final declaratory or injunctive relief is not presently
before the court. And a potentially overbroad prayer for relief does not require the court to dismiss
an otherwise plausible claim. Of course, if plaintiffs prevail, the court will only “provide complete
relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.” Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025); see

Abbott, 900 F.3d at 176-77. Accordingly, Reeces Chapel has standing in its own right to seek
prospective relief concerning Doe’s attendance at Reeces Chapel.
Alternatively, Reeces Chapel has associational standing. Under that theory, Reeces Chapel
“can assert standing as the representative of its members if (a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” W. Va. Rivers Coal., Inc. v. Chemours Co.
FC, 178 F.4th 102, 110-11 (4th Cir. 2026) (cleaned up); see Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.,
600 U.S. at 199. The parties do not dispute that Reeces Chapel’s member (Doe) has standing in
his own right. See [D.E. 12] 5—6 (arguing that Reeces Chapel’s leadership does not satisfy
associational standing). Doe’s participation in Reeces Chapel’s worship services is an interest
germane to its ecclesial purpose. And neither the claims asserted nor the declarative and injunctive
relief requested require Doe’s participation in the suit. Thus, the court denies Buck’s motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).
I.
Buck also moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim. See [D.E. 12]
6-17; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s
legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-63 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187,190 -
(4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.
2008). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter,

Town of Chester, 581 U.S. at 439; Chamber of Com. of the U.S. v. Lierman, 151 F.4th 530, 543
(4th Cir. 2025).
10

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” igbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(cleaned up); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302. In considering the
motion, the court must construe the facts and reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to
[the nonmoving party].” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted);
see Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other
grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015). A court need not accept as true a
complaint’s legal conclusions, “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”
Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302 (citation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Rather, plaintiffs’
factual allegations must “nudge[] [their] claims,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, beyond the realm of
“mere possibility” into “plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint does not suffice. id.
A.
In count one, plaintiffs allege that the challenged statutes violate the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment by placing an overbroad burden on their religious worship and teaching.
See Compl. FY 40-48.” Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the challenged statutes restricting Doe’s
presence at Reeces Chapel for religious services do not advance important governmental interests

2 Although plaintiffs characterize the challenged statutes as “overbroad” in count one,
plaintiffs bring their free speech claim “‘as-applied” to their own conduct; therefore, the court
construes count one as an as-applied First Amendment challenge and does not address whether
plaintiffs plausibly allege overbreadth to nonparties. Compl. {J 47-48; see Cooper, 40 F Supp. 3d
at 677 (construing similar pleadings as an as-applied claim because “there is no such thing as an
as-applied overbreadth challenge”).
11

unrelated to the suppression of speech and also burden substantially more speech than is necessary
to further those interests. See id. FJ 42-46.
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, “prohibits laws abridging the freedom of speech.” Free Speech Coal.,
Inc. v. Paxton, 606 U.S. 461, 470 (2025) (quotation omitted); see Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2019); Snyder v. Phelps, 580
F.3d 206, 214 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009), aff'd, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). But this principle “does not confer
an absolute right to speak.” Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The First Amendment
“protects speech along a spectrum,” meaning that speech laws “receive different levels of judicial
scrutiny depending on the type of regulation and the justifications and purposes underlying it.”
Fusaro, 930 F.3d at 248; see Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 244 (4th Cir. 2014). Religious
worship and teaching are protected speech. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6
(1981).
When a challenged law burdens protected speech, content-neutral restrictions are subject
to intermediate scrutiny and content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. See Billups v.
City of Charleston, 961 F.3d 673, 684-85 (4th Cir. 2020). A content-neutral law which merely
incidentally burdens protected speech is likewise subject to intermediate scrutiny and survives only
if it (1) “advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech”
and (2) “does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.”
Paxton, 606 U.S. at 478, 495-96; see Tumer Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997);
Am. Entertainers, LLC v. City of Rocky Mount, 888 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2018); Satellite Broad.
& Commce’ns Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337, 355 (4th Cir. 2001); cf. Reynolds v. Middleton, 779
F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2015). Where the government does not satisfy these elements, the court

12

may assume intermediate scrutiny applies and not determine whether the law “might be
content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny.” Billups, 961 F.3d at 684-85.
To make a speech claim under the First Amendment, plaintiffs bear “the initial burden of
proving that speech was restricted by the governmental action in question.” Reynolds, 779 F.3d
at 226; see Hebb v. City of Asheville, 145 F.4th 421, 432 (4th Cir. 2025). If plaintiffs succeed in
their “initial showing, the burden then falls on the government to prove the constitutionality of the
speech restriction” under the appropriate level of scrutiny. Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 226; see Billups,
961 F.3d at 685; Doe, 842 F.3d at 846. Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must “present
actual evidence supporting its assertion that a speech restriction does not burden substantially more
speech than necessary.” Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 229; see Billups, 961 F.3d at 685; Doe, 842 F.3d
at 846; Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 371-72 (3d Cir. 2016); Ross v. Early, 746 F.3d
546, 556 (4th Cir. 2014). “[A]rgument unsupported by the evidence will not suffice to carry the
government’s burden.” Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 229.
Plaintiffs plausibly allege that their religious worship and teaching are protected speech;
that the challenged statutes exclude Doe from physically participating in that speech at Reeces
Chapel; that all reasonably accessible churches to Doe have areas for the use or instruction of
minors that produce the same restriction; and that Reeces Chapel faces an affirmative reporting
requirement or prosecution if it holds religious services with Doe present on the property. See
Compl. {J 37-38, 41, 48, 58. Plaintiffs also allege that Buck’s enforcement position applies
regardless of whether Doe enters the Reeces Chapel areas used for minors, interacts with a minor,
or poses any danger under the circumstances of a particular religious service. See id. FJ 22-33,
41-48. Thus, plaintiffs satisfy their initial showing and the burden shifts to the government to
show the fit of its restrictions. Cf., e.g., NetChoice v. Brown, No. CV 25-322, 2025 WL 3267786,

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at *14 (D. Md. Nov. 24, 2025) (unpublished) (noting at the pleading stage that courts generally
find “First Amendment challenges adequately alleged where the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
that the challenged statute applies to protected speech such that it triggers First Amendment
scrutiny’).
Buck as a governmental actor argues that the challenged statutes facially regulate conduct,
not speech, and that the North Carolina General Assembly cured the constitutional defect identified
in Doe, by limiting subsection 14-208.18(a)(2) to offenders whose offenses involved minors. 842
F.3d 833; see [D.E. 12] 8-11; [D.E. 18] 4-6. These arguments do not satisfy Buck’s burden.
As for how the challenged statutes apply, the statutes plausibly burden protected speech by
regulating who may be on certain church property for religious worship and teaching, and
subjecting to prosecution those who do not affirmatively report such presence, with no mechanism
to request an exception. See NC RSOL v. Boone, 402 F. Supp. 3d 240, 262-63 (M.D.N.C. 2019);
Cooper, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 680 (“While [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 14-208.18 could provide an outright
exception (as it does for voting) or an opportunity to seek permission to allow [pJlaintiffs to
exercise such a right (as it does for parents or guardians seeking to go to their children’s school),
[section] 14-208.18 provides no such exception for exercising one’s free speech rights . . . [or] an
option to petition a court for more tailored or individualized restrictions, as Virginia’s comparable
statute does.”). That incidental burden triggers intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Paxton, 606 U.S.
at 478. Moreover, although protecting minors is an important governmental interest, the
government also must establish the fit between that interest and the speech restrictions. See id. at
496; Turner Broad., 520 U.S. at 189; City of Rocky Mount, 888 F.3d at 715; Doe, 842 F.3d at
845-46; Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 228-29; Satellite Broad., 275 F.3d at 355; cf. Packingham v. North
Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2017).

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As for adequacy of the statutory amendment, curing one constitutional defect does not
foreclose the possibility of another. The amendment does not itself establish that the challenged
statutes, as applied to plaintiffs, do not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary.”
Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 226; see Boone, 402 F. Supp. 3d at 262-63. Instead, the court must consider
the statutes’ operation in their present form, the nature of the regulated location and activity, the
governmental interest asserted, and the fit between the restrictions and that interest. See, e.g., Doe,
842 F.3d at 842-48. The court cannot resolve those factual and evidentiary questions on the
complaint and statutory text alone. Thus, the court denies Buck’s motion to dismiss count one for
failure to state a claim.
B.
In count two, plaintiffs allege that the challenged statutes violate the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment by unduly burdening their free exercise of religion. See Compl. ff 49-62.
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Reeces Chapel has a sincerely held religious belief that it must
minister to “those persons on the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry” at in-person
congregational worship services; that Doe has a sincerely held religious belief that he must
physically participate in congregational worship; that Doe is a member of Reeces Chapel and
desires to attend its services; that Reeces Chapel desires to admit him; and that plaintiffs cannot
fulfill these duties in light of the challenged statutes and Buck’s enforcement position. See id.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws “prohibiting the free exercise of religion.” Mahmoud v.
Taylor, 606 U.S. 522, 545 (2025) (citation omitted); see Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597
US. 507, 524 (2022); Fulton v. City of Phila., 593 U.S. 522, 532 (2021); Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). “The clause forbids government from adopting

15

laws designed to suppress religious belief or practice.” Am. Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d
642, 654 (4th Cir. 1995). But no constitutional right—including the right of free exercise of
religion—is absolute. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
A “neutral, generally applicable law does not offend the Free Exercise Clause, even if the
law has an incidental effect on religious practice.” Reno, 47 F.3d at 654; see Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449, 460 (2017); Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531; Emp’t
Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990). But a law may reveal
a lack of neutrality “by protecting secular activities more than comparable religious ones.” Berean
Baptist Church v. Cooper, 460 F. Supp. 3d 651, 662 (E.D.N.C. 2020) (citation omitted). Moreover,
a law is not generally applicable “if it prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct
that undermines the government’s asserted interests in a similar way, or if it provides a mechanism
for individualized exemptions.” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 526 (cleaned up); see Fulton, 593 U.S. at
533. “Failing either the neutrality or general applicability test is sufficient to trigger strict
scrutiny,” requiring the government to show “that its restrictions serve a compelling interest and
are natrowly tailored to that end.” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 526, 532; see Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
Section 14-208.18 includes four exceptions to subsection (a) providing relief mechanisms
for covered persons (1) who are the parent or guardian of a student enrolled in a school to visit that
school property, (2) who are eligible to vote to visit polling places, (3) who are eligible to attend
public school to attend such schools, or (4) who are juveniles to visit restricted areas for medical
treatment or mental health services. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.18(d)(g). Furthermore,
because subsection 14-208.11A imposes a duty to report covered persons who violate any
requirement in Article 14, section 14-208.11A as applied to plaintiffs’ conduct necessarily
incorporates the four exceptions within section 14-208.18. See id. § 14-208.11A. Such an

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exception regime “reveal[s] a lack of neutrality by protecting secular activities more than
comparable religious ones.” Berean Baptist Church, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 662 (citation omitted).
The state appears to trust the community’s safety more when an offender votes or spends time at
his child’s school than when the offender goes to church (where minors may or may not be
present). It cannot do so without justifying its choice with evidence. Additionally, the challenged
statutes are not generally applicable because they tum on mechanisms for individualized
exemptions. See, e.g., Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 526. Because failing either test triggers strict scrutiny,
Buck must show that the “restrictions serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that
end.” Id. at 532.
Denying that the challenged statutes at all burden plaintiffs, Buck argues the laws “do not
affect [Doe’s] ability to exercise religion” because Doe “can join Reeces Chapel and participate in
fellowship” so long as Doe complies with subsection 14-208.18(a)(2) like “[a]ll sex.offenders”
subjected to the statute, and that Reeces Chapel may include Doe in its ministry so long as it does
not violate subsection 14-208.11A. [D.E.12] 13. In support, Buck cites Doe y, Virginia
Department of State Police, where the court dismissed the plaintiff's free exercise claim against
an analogous neutral proximity law of general applicability. See No. 3:10-CV-533, 2011 WL
2551014, at *12-13 (E.D. Va. June 27, 2011) (unpublished), aff'd, 713 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 2013);
[D.E. 12] 12-13.
As for Buck’s argument that the challenged statutes do not burden plaintiffs’ free exercise
rights so long as plaintiffs do not violate the law, Buck’s conclusory assertions do not satisfy his
burden under strict scrutiny. Indeed, his evidence-free assertions would not be enough to satisfy
the lower burden under intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 229. Although “the
existence of a governmental interest may be established by reference to case law,” and case law

17

readily supports that protecting minors is important, the government also must provide “actual
evidence” to support the fit of its regulation. Id. at 228-29. Even if referencing case law satisfied
Buck’s burden, Buck erroneously cites Doe v. Virginia Department of State Police. In Doe, a
sex-offender registrant brought a free-exercise challenge against Virginia’s analogous proximity
law, which “contains a provision that can relax the prohibition against entering” restricted areas.
2011 WL 2551014, at *2. The plaintiff did not request an exception before bringing suit. Instead,
she claimed that the “registration law and its procedures . . . frustrate[d] [her] ability to attend
churches with adjoining daycares” by requiring that she first “ask for permission.” Id. at *12. The
court dismissed her claim, deeming the registration law a neutral law of general applicability which
“only incidentally affect[ed] the plaintiffs ability to practice her religion.” Id. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed for lack of standing because the plaintiff's harm was hypothetical—she had “not taken
any of the steps necessary to access” the desired properties. Doe, 713 F.3d at 754.
In contrast, Reeces Chapel and Doe lack opportunities (other than a lawsuit) to request
accommodation of their free exercise right under the challenged statutes. See Cooper, 40 F. Supp.
3d at 670-71 (finding the same in challenge to unamended section 14-208.18). Plaintiffs concede
that an exception mechanism similar to Doe’s “might cure the constitutional defect” they plausibly
allege arises in the challenged statutes. [D.E. 16] 6. But where that mechanism does not exist in
North Carolina, and where Buck does not present evidence of how the challenged statutes are
nafrowly tailored, Buck has not met his burden for dismissal. See Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 532;
Fulton, 593 U.S. at 533; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546; Berean Baptist Church, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 662.
Thus, the court denies Buck’s motion to dismiss count two for failure to state a claim.

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C.
In count three, plaintiffs allege that the challenged statutes violate the First Amendment by
unduly burdening their right to freely associate for expressive activities. See Compl. {J 63-72.
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Reeces Chapel’s core activities are worship, teaching, and
evangelizing; that these activities are inherently expressive; that Reeces Chapel and its members
(like Doe) presently seek to associate for the express purpose of these activities; and that the
challenged statutes severely burden their ability to associate and engage in these activities. See id.
“The First Amendment guarantees all Americans the rights to speak, worship, publish,
assemble, and petition their government freely,” and each of these rights “necessarily carries with
it a corresponding right to associate with others.” Davenport, 146 S. Ct. at 1122 (cleaned up)
(emphasis added); see 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 586 (2023); Ams. for Prosperity
Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 606 (2021); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48
(2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (collecting cases); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). “[G]Jovernment actions tending to curtail the freedom to
associate warrant the closest scrutiny under the First Amendment.” Davenport, 146 S. Ct. at 1122
(cleaned up). But like any constitutional right, the right to expressive association is not absolute.
The government may burden it with laws so long as they are “adopted to serve compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly
less restrictive of associational freedoms.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
Reeces Chapel alleges that it maintains and communicates a system of religious values to
its members through congregational worship, teaching, and evangelism; that the challenged
statutes exclude Doe from physically participating in the church’s central expressive activities
because Reeces Chapel’s worship hall is within 300 feet of areas used for minors; and that all

19

reasonably accessible churches to Doe have areas for the use or instruction of minors that produce
the same restriction. See Compl. fj 32-39, 58, 64-70. These allegations plausibly allege more
than an incidental effect on expressive association. Cf, McGuire v. Marshall, 512 F. Supp. 3d
1189, 1232-34 (M.D. Ala. 2021) (finding the same where Alabama’s proximity law restricts sex
offenders from within 2,000 feet of areas used for minors); Cooper, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 676, 680-81.
The court cannot resolve on the pleadings whether such exclusion is sufficiently justified and
appropriately tailored. See Def.’s Mem. [D.E. 12] 16-17 (making conclusory arguments that the
challenged statutes do not “affect[] Reeces Chapel’s composition as a group or organization” or
“affect [Doe’s] membership in the congregation” because these laws merely “regulate conduct”);
Davenport, 146 S. Ct. at 1122; Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-48; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Buckley, 424
U.S. at 25. Thus, the court denies Buck’s motion to dismiss count three for failure to state a claim.
IV.
In sum, the court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim [D.E. 11].
SO ORDERED. This |4 day of August, 2026.

+ Daven
J S C. DEVER II
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418437. Public record. Not legal advice.