# BLIJDEN

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · July 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418434

## Case

- **Full name:** Adeyemi B. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ADEYEMI B., : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff :
v. :
:
FRANK BISIGNANO, :
Commissioner of the Social Security :
Administration, :
Defendant : NO. 25-6722

MEMORANDUM

CAROL SANDRA MOORE WELLS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE July 31, 2026

Adeyemi B. (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“the Commissioner”),
denying his claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security
Act. He has filed a brief in support of his request for review, and the Commissioner has responded
to it.1 For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s request for review is denied.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

On April 24, 2023, Plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging that his disability commenced on
July 13, 2022. R. 17. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration; therefore, Plaintiff
requested a hearing. Id. On December 16, 2024, Plaintiff appeared for a telephonic hearing, before
Margaret M. Gabell, Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”). Id. Plaintiff, represented by an
attorney and vocational expert Irene Montgomery (“the VE”), testified at the hearing. Id. On

1 Plaintiff failed to file a Reply to the Commissioner’s Response by the deadline and failed to request an extension to
do so. See Doc. No. 8.
2 The court has reviewed and considered the following documents in analyzing this case: Plaintiff’s Brief and
Statement of Issues in Support of his Request for Review (“Pl. Br.”), the Brief of Defendant (“Resp.”), and the
administrative record. (“R.”).
February 27, 2025, the ALJ, using the sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) for disability,3 issued
an unfavorable decision. R. 17-30. The Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, on September 26, 2025, making the ALJ’s decision the
Commissioner’s final determination. R. 1-3. Plaintiff presently seeks judicial review, and the

parties have consented to this court’s jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Personal History
Plaintiff, born on February 2, 1972, was 50 years old on his alleged disability onset date,
and 53 years old at the time of the administrative hearing. R. 35. He has two minor children and
lives with his adult daughter, who helps ensure that he takes his medication. R. 49.
B. Plaintiff’s Testimony
At the February 27, 2025, hearing, Plaintiff testified that he was previously self-employed

3 The Social Security Regulations provide the following five-step sequential evaluation for determining whether an
adult claimant is disabled:

1. If claimant is working, doing substantial gainful activity, a finding of not
disabled is directed. Otherwise proceed to Step 2. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b),
416.920(b).

2. If claimant is found not to have a severe impairment which significantly limits
her physical or mental ability to do basic work activity, a finding of not disabled
is directed. Otherwise proceed to Step 3. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c),
416.920(c).

3. If claimant’s impairment meets or equals criteria for a listed impairment or
impairments in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Part 404 of 20 C.F.R., a finding of
disabled is directed. Otherwise proceed to Step 4. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
416.920(d).

4. If claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant
work, a finding of not disabled is directed. Otherwise proceed to Step 5. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).

5. The Commissioner will determine whether, given claimant’s residual
functional capacity, age, education and past work experience in conjunction with
criteria listed in Appendix 2, he is or is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(g), 416.920(g).
as a salesperson, selling and repairing phones from 2012 through 2019. R. 51. Before that, he
worked as an integrated medical transport driver, lifting and transporting individuals who used
wheelchairs and stretchers. R. 51-52. Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident while
driving for work on July 13, 2022, resulting in a concussion and injuries to his back and knees. R.

52-53.
Plaintiff suffers from headaches and seizures. He testified that he sometimes experiences a
headache before having a seizure. R. 51. He goes to the hospital every time he has a seizure. R.
58. His first seizure occurred on September 12, 2022, when he was at home. R. 53. Plaintiff also
testified that he had breakthrough seizures4 in March 2023 and on May 18, 2023, after failing to
take his medication. R. 61. Additionally, Plaintiff had a seizure in January 2024 while driving
home from his daughter's basketball game, resulting in an accident in which his car flipped over.
R. 54. As a result of these injuries, Plaintiff has difficulty maintaining his balance and can walk
only as far as the corner store before taking a break. R. 55. He keeps a walker in the trunk of his
car for use three to four days while recovering from a seizure. Id. Due to the two seizure-related

accidents, Plaintiff's driver's license is under medical suspension; he must obtain medical clearance
before he can drive again. R. 54.
Plaintiff testified that, during the six months preceding the hearing, he experienced
approximately one seizure per week. R. 53-54. He doesn’t remember anything when he has a
seizure. R. 56. He also experiences headaches every two days. R. 53. Whenever he has a headache,
he must lie down. R. 54. Plaintiff believes his seizures are triggered by headaches, stress, lack of

4 A breakthrough seizure is a seizure that occurs after a period of seizure control and can be triggered by several factors
including missed medication, sleep deprivation, stress, and drug and alcohol use. Breakthrough Seizure Guide,
Epilepsy Foundation of Michigan (last visited June 25, 2026), chrome-
extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://epilepsymichigan.org/wp-
content/uploads/2025/06/Breakthrough_Seizure_Guide.pdf.
sleep, and high blood pressure. R. 58.
To treat his seizure disorder, Plaintiff was originally prescribed 500 milligrams of Keppra
every morning and 1,000 milligrams every night. R.53. At the time of the hearing, his dosage had
increased to 1,000-1,500 milligrams every morning and 1,500 milligrams every night. Id. He also

takes medication for anxiety, which makes it difficult for him to concentrate. R. 55. Plaintiff
testified that he has a medical marijuana card and smokes about one joint per day to help him fall
asleep. R. 58.
On a typical day, Plaintiff attends physical therapy, cleans his home, and conducts
administrative tasks. R. 56. He has been approved for a home health aide. Id. His girlfriend
cooks his meals and drops them off. Id. When Plaintiff is not recovering from a seizure, he bathes
and dresses himself. R. 57. He takes an Uber to and from his doctor’s appointments. R. 58.
Plaintiff testified that he can be forgetful. R. 59. Plaintiff testified that he failed to take
his medication either because he forgot to do so or because he mistakenly believed that he had
already taken it. R. 61. During the month preceding the hearing, Plaintiff implemented a pill-

sorting system where he places his daily morning and nighttime doses of anxiety and seizure
medicine in bottles to ensure that he does not miss a dose. R. 62.
C. Vocational Testimony
The VE classified Plaintiff’s past jobs as driver, medical transport, medium,5 semi-skilled,6
performed at a heavy7 level and self-employed salesperson, light,8 semi-skilled. R. 62. The ALJ

5 “Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing
up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c).
6 “Semi-skilled work is work which needs some skills but does not require doing the more complex work duties.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(b).
7 “Heavy work involves lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing
up to 50 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(d).
8 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing
up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal
asked the VE to consider a person having Plaintiff’s age, education and work experience who is
limited to light work and: occasional postural movements, no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,
no exposure to unprotected heights, occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, no driving, no
operating moving machinery, simple, routine tasks, simple decisions, tolerating only occasional

changes in a workplace, and frequent interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. R.
63. The VE opined that, although this individual could not perform Plaintiff’s past work, they
could perform three, light, unskilled9 jobs: (1) cashier, 120,000 positions in the national economy;
(2) marker, 140,000 positions in the national economy; and (3) housekeeper in an institutional
setting, 110,000 positions in the national economy. R. 63-64.
The VE opined that the following conditions would be work preclusive: missing two to
three days of work per month, having difficulty completing a normal workweek and leaving work
sixty minutes early once per week, or being off task and unproductive 15-20% per day because of
lapses in focus and concentration. R. 65.
THE ALJ’s FINDINGS

In her decision, the ALJ issued the following findings:
1. [Plaintiff] meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2026.

2. [Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since July 13, 2022, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571
et seq.).

3. [Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments: post-
concussive syndrome, seizure disorder, headaches, disorders
of the spine, hypertension, and anxiety disorder (20 CFR
404.1520(c)).

of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg
controls.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b).
9 “Unskilled work is work which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a
short period of time. The job may or may not require considerable strength . . . [a] person does not gain work skills
by doing unskilled jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(a).
4. [Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that
[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform
light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he can
perform postural activities occasionally but cannot climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and can climb ramps and stairs
occasionally; cannot work at unprotected heights; can do no
driving; cannot operate moving machinery; and is limited to
simple routine tasks, simple decisions, and occasional
changes in the workplace with frequent interaction with
coworkers and supervisors and the public.

6. [Plaintiff] is unable to perform any past relevant work (20
CFR 404.1565).

7. [Plaintiff] was born on February 2, 1972, and was 50 years
old, which is defined as an individual closely approaching
advanced age, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR
404.1563).

8. [Plaintiff] has at least a high school education (20 CFR
404.1564).

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the
determination of disability because using the Medical-
Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that
[Plaintiff] is “not disabled,” whether or not the [Plaintiff] has
transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 2).

10. Considering [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience,
and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff]
can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569a).

11. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from July 13, 2022, through the date of
this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).

R. 20, 26, 35, 37.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision is as follows. The Commissioner’s
findings of fact will not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Poulos v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2007); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is not “a large or considerable amount of
evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation
omitted). While it is more than a mere scintilla of evidence, Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103
(2019), it may amount to less than an evidentiary preponderance. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d
34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001); Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988). Overall, this test is
deferential to the ALJ, and the court should affirm the ALJ’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, even when the court, acting de novo, might have reached a different
conclusion. Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.

denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987). Indeed, the court is not permitted to weigh the record evidence itself.
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). By contrast, the Commissioner’s legal
conclusions are subject to de novo review. Poulos, 474 F.3d at 91; Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431.
B. Burden of Proof in Disability Proceedings
To be found “disabled” under the Act, Plaintiff must carry the initial burden of
demonstrating that he is unable to engage in “any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1505(a). Plaintiff may establish a disability through: (1) medical evidence meeting one or
more of the serious impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; or (2)
proof that the impairment is severe enough that Plaintiff cannot engage in any type of “substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460
(1983); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

Under the first method, Plaintiff is considered per se disabled by meeting one of the “listed”
impairments. Heckler, 461 U.S. at 460. Under the second method, Plaintiff must initially
demonstrate that a medically determinable impairment prevents him from returning to his past
employment. See Brown, 845 F.2d at 1214. If Plaintiff proves that his impairment results in
functional limitations to performing his past relevant work, then the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner to prove that work does in fact exist in the national economy which Plaintiff can
perform given his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity. See Hess v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2019); Poulos, 474 F.3d at 92.
C. Review of the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determined that, although Plaintiff

could not perform his past relevant work, he could perform other work and, hence, was not
disabled. R. 17-29. Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s decision, arguing that the ALJ erred because she
(1) discounted his seizure and headache symptoms based on medication noncompliance without
explanation, and (2) improperly rejected RFC limitations contained in medical opinions by Drs.
Stone and Weinstein, without reviewable explanations. Pl. Br. at 6-10. The Commissioner
disagrees with Plaintiff’s assertions of error. Resp. 4-5. Plaintiff’s arguments fail.
1. The ALJ Properly Discounted Plaintiff’s Reasons for Treatment Noncompliance
First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by discounting his seizure symptoms based on
treatment noncompliance without meaningfully addressing the reasons he provided for failing to
comply with treatment. 10 Pl. Br. at 6. This argument fails, because the ALJ complied with Social
Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p when evaluating Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of his seizure symptoms, and properly discussed and discounted
Plaintiff’s reasons for medical noncompliance.

Social Security Ruling 16-3p sets forth the process by which an ALJ evaluates an
individual’s impairment-related symptoms in the disability determination process. The two-step
process for evaluating an individual’s allegations of impairment-related symptoms is as follows:
(1) the ALJ must determine whether there is an underlying medically determinable impairment
that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s symptoms;11 and (2) the ALJ must
evaluate the intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which they
limit the individual’s ability to perform work-related activities. SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at
*2-3 (Oct. 25, 2017). “[A]n individual’s statements of symptoms alone are not enough to establish
the existence of a physical or mental impairment or disability.” Id. at *2. Instead, the ALJ must
consider the extent to which the individual’s symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent

with the objective medical and other evidence in the record. Id. “[I]f an individual’s statements
about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms are inconsistent with the
objective medical evidence and the other evidence” the ALJ will determine that the individual’s
symptoms are “less likely to reduce his or her capacities to perform work-related activities.” Id.
at *8.
The ALJ must consider all the evidence when evaluating the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of an individual’s symptoms, including the following factors:

10 While also asserts this argument for his headache symptoms, his arguments are limited to his seizure symptoms. Pl.
Br. at 7. Therefore, the court will only address this argument pertaining to Plaintiff’s seizure symptoms.
11 Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s determination at Step 2, which is where the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s
medically determinable impairments.
1. Daily activities;
2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other
symptoms;
3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;
4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an
individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms;
5. Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received
for relief of pain or other symptoms;
6. Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to
relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing
for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and
7. Any other factors concerning an individual's functional limitations and
restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
…
If there is no information in the evidence of record regarding one of the
factors, we will not discuss that specific factor in the determination or
decision because it is not relevant to the case. We will discuss the factors
pertinent to the evidence of record.
Id. at *7-8.
The ALJ may also consider an individual’s attempts to follow prescribed treatment when
evaluating whether the intensity and persistence of his symptoms affect his ability to perform
work-related activities. Id. at *9. “Persistent attempts to obtain relief of symptoms, such as
increasing dosages and changing medications, trying a variety of treatments, obtaining referrals to
specialists, or changing treatment sources,” support a claimant’s assertion that the symptoms are
intense and persistent. Id. However, a claimant’s failure to follow prescribed treatment that might
improve the symptoms may support an ALJ’s finding that the alleged intensity and persistence of
the claimant’s symptoms are inconsistent with the overall evidence of record. Id. The ALJ must
also consider possible reasons why a claimant may not comply with prescribed treatment,
including, but not limited to, an inability to afford treatment, religious beliefs that prohibit the
treatment, or a mental impairment that prevents the claimant from understanding the need for
consistent treatment. Id. at *10.
a. The ALJ Properly Discounted Plaintiff’s Reasons for Noncompliance
Here, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s testimony that he experienced seizures because he
forgot to take his medication and because his Keppra dosage changed over time. R. 59-62.
Although forgetfulness is not among the factors listed in SSR 16-3p, Plaintiff advanced it in
support of his assertions that, despite failing to take seizure medication, his seizure symptoms are

intense, persistent and limit his ability to work, making it “pertinent” under the ruling. See SSR
16-3, at *7-8. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s seizure symptoms were not as intense or
persistent as he claims because Plaintiff’s assertion that he missed doses of Keppra because he was
forgetful was not supported by the record. R. 26-35.
The ALJ considered evidence that Plaintiff exhibited fair concentration and a linear, logical
thought process during a mental status exam on May 19, 2023; a coherent and goal-directed
thought process, intact attention and concentration, orientation to person, place, and time during a
mental status exam on October 18, 2023; and a linear, logical thought process and appropriate
concentration during a mental status exam on June 10, 2024. R. 24, 25, 27. The ALJ also observed
that Plaintiff’s recent and remote memory were intact during mental status exams on October 18,

2023, and March 13, 2024, although it was noted to be mildly impaired following a seizure on
May 13, 2024. R. 29, 33, 671, 804, 1474. The ALJ’s discussion of the evidence supports her
decision to discount Plaintiff’s assertion that he failed to comply with prescribed medication
because he was forgetful.12
The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s testimony that he did not take Keppra as prescribed
because his dosage changed over time. R. 29. However, the medical records show that, in fact,
his dosage did not change until January 2024. R. 771, 1427. By that point, there had already been

12 Likewise, Plaintiff's pill-sorting system, which he implemented during the month preceding the February 27, 2025,
hearing, is not relevant to and does not explain his failure to take Keppra as prescribed from 2022 through 2024.
at least two documented instances of treatment noncompliance that occurred prior to the change
in dosage. R. 28, 385, 519. The ALJ’s discussion of the evidence sufficiently discounts Plaintiff’s
assertion that he failed to comply with prescribed medication because of changes in dosage.
b. The ALJ’s Analysis of Plaintiff’s Seizure Symptoms Complies with SSR 16-3p
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of his seizure symptoms was inconsistent with her evaluation of the record, which
revealed that most of his seizures were due to failure to take prescribed treatment for unsupported
reasons and because of alcohol and benzodiazepines use. R. 27-31. The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s
first experienced seizure, on September 12, 2022. R. 28, 373. Plaintiff was hospitalized for two
days and prescribed Keppra. R. 378. When discussing this evidence, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff
had a history of alcohol use and a positive test result for benzodiazepine. R. 27. His wife further
informed doctors that he drank alcohol every day, R. 383; medical records indicated that Plaintiff
was informed that alcohol can “lower the seizure threshold and should be avoided or used in
moderation.” R. 374.
The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff’s first breakthrough seizure, which occurred on February

13, 2023. R. 28. Plaintiff admitted that he had missed a dose of Keppra the prior evening. R. 385.
Plaintiff confirmed that he had been drinking earlier that day, R. 535; his wife informed doctors
that he was generally noncompliant with taking medication. R. 487. Next, the ALJ discussed
Plaintiff’s breakthrough seizure from May 18, 2023. R. 28. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s wife
informed emergency medical services that he had been binge drinking for two days prior to the
seizure. Id. The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s wife’s report to doctors that he frequently missed doses
of his medication and usually had seizures after consuming alcohol. Id. The ALJ considered the
fact that Plaintiff tested positive for benzodiazepines. Id. Further, medical records show that
Plaintiff’s doctor opined that his seizure activity was triggered by medical noncompliance and
alcohol use. R. 29, 519. Medical records establish that Plaintiff was again informed that alcohol
can “lower the seizure threshold and should be avoided or used in moderation.” R. 791.
The ALJ further discussed Plaintiff’s breakthrough seizure of January 29, 2024. R. 28-29.
Doctors discussed marijuana cessation with Plaintiff and corrected his medication regimen to

taking 500 mg of Keppra twice per day. R. 28, 762, 777. The ALJ then discussed the breakthrough
seizure dated April 16, 2024, which Plaintiff reported as a result of his failure to take medication,
because he was feeling nauseous. R. 29. Overall, the ALJ properly reviewed all relevant
evidence; therefore, her determination that Plaintiff’s seizure symptoms were caused by medical
noncompliance and/or drug and alcohol consumption is supported by substantial evidence.13 R.
27-31.
2. The ALJ Did Not Err Regarding Drs. Stone and Weinstein’s Medical Opinions
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical opinions of consultative
examiner, Dr. Marielle Stone, and neurologist, Dr. Adam J. Weinstein. Pl. Br. at 8-10. These
arguments lack merit.

An ALJ must analyze medical opinions for persuasiveness by explicitly considering
supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).14 Supportability refers to the
objective medical evidence and explanations the source himself or herself provides to justify the
opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Consistency asks how consistent the objective medical
and other evidence in the record is with the source’s opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2). An
RFC assessment is not a medical opinion but rather a determination reserved to the ALJ. Chandler
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011).

13 Plaintiff does not allege and the evidence in the record does not suggest that Plaintiff was prescribed benzodiazepines
for any of his impairments.
14 Other relevant factors which may be considered are: the source’s relationship to the claimant, the source’s
specialization and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(3)-(5).
a. The ALJ Properly Discussed Dr. Stone’s Medical Opinions
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred because she found Dr. Stone’s opinion partially
persuasive but failed to explain why she accepted certain opinions and rejected others. Pl. Br. at
8. This argument lacks merit.

The ALJ conducted a persuasiveness analysis of Dr. Stone’s medical opinions, including
her opinions that Plaintiff could never balance, could stand for only twenty minutes at one time,
and could stand and walk for only three hours each during an eight-hour workday. R. 30-31, 652-
55. The ALJ found that these opinions were “somewhat supported” by Dr. Stone’s consultative
exam but only “partially consistent” with the other evidence of record. R. 30-31. By finding Dr.
Stone’s opinions only partially persuasive, the ALJ necessarily accepted some of the opinions and
rejected others. It is apparent that the ALJ rejected those opinions that were inconsistent with
Plaintiff’s ability to perform light work, because she explained that Dr. Stone’s opinions were only
“somewhat supported” and only “partially consistent” with the record, which supported a finding
that Plaintiff “has the light residual functional capacity… with occasional postural activities and

additional seizure precautions.” R. 31. The ALJ was not required to use “magic words” when
evaluating the doctor’s opinions. Zaborowski v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir.
2024). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err when evaluating Dr. Stone's medical opinions.
b. The ALJ did not err Regarding Dr. Weinstein’s Medical Opinions
Plaintiff next asserts that the ALJ’s explanation is “not reviewable as written” and does not
permit the court to determine whether she rejected Dr. Weinstein’s opinions for proper reasons, or
whether she improperly omitted corresponding limitations from the RFC. Pl. Br. at 9. These
arguments lack merit.
The ALJ conducted a persuasiveness analysis of Dr. Weinstein’s medical opinions, and
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s rejection of the doctor’s opinions, R. 32-33, that Plaintiff would
require unscheduled breaks of indeterminate frequency and length, would need to lie down or sit
quietly during those breaks, and would likely be absent from work more than four times per month.
Pl. Br. at 9. The ALJ found that Dr. Weinstein’s opinions were “somewhat supported” by his

explanations and “partially consistent” with the other evidence of record to the extent they
supported a prohibition on driving. R. 32-33. She accepted Dr. Weinstein’s opinions that Plaintiff
is unable to drive because of his seizures. Id. However, she concluded that “Dr. Weinstein's
limitations are overstated given that headaches are rarely mentioned in the medical evidence of
record.” Id.
Like the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Stone’s medical opinions, the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr.
Weinstein’s opinions is sufficiently reviewable. It is apparent that the ALJ credited Dr.
Weinstein’s opinions insofar as they were consistent with a driving restriction, but found that they
overstated the severity of Plaintiff’s headache symptoms. Plaintiff neither challenges the
consistency or supportability factors, nor argues that the ALJ committed legal error or ignored

evidence. His reliance on the ALJ’s summary of his testimony regarding his headaches and the
ALJ’s finding that headaches constituted a severe impairment at step two are, in essence, an
invitation for the court to reweigh the evidence and arrive at a different conclusion. That is not
the Court’s role. See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err regarding her
discussion of Dr. Weinstein’s medical opinions.
An implementing order and order of judgment follow.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418434. Public record. Not legal advice.