# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · July 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418422

## Case

- **Full name:** Iban J. Frias Aquino v. Lifeguard Home Care Agency, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IBAN J. FRIAS AQUINO, CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff,

v.

LIFEGUARD HOME CARE AGENCY, NO. 25-cv-4693
INC.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Iban J. Frias-Aquino (“Frias-Aquino”) brings, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et. seq. (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101 et. seq. (“ADA”), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et.
seq. (“PHRA”), this pregnancy discrimination action against her former employer, Defendant
Life Guard Home Care, Inc. (“Life Guard”), premised, she says, on a hostile work environment
that culminated in her wrongful termination. Life Guard now moves for summary judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. It argues that: (1) Frias-
Aquino “cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on pregnancy nor perceived
disability and, even if she could, she cannot establish that the stated nondiscriminatory reason for
[Life Guard]’s actions” is pretextual; (2) Frias-Aquino “comes nowhere close to sufficient facts
to demonstrate a hostile work environment either based on pregnancy or perceived disability”;
and, (3) in any event, Frias-Aquino “failed to exhaust administrative remedies” for her ADA and
PHRA claims regarding perceived disability. For the reasons below, the motion shall be granted
in part and denied in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Frias-Aquino worked as a caregiver for a home care agency, Life Guard, which
specializes in “in-home personal care for adults.” When assigned to a patient, she took care of
the personal care needs of that patient with the precise nature of her care rendered differing with
each patient. Some required physical lifting on the part of their caregivers, while other, more
independent patients did not need such support.

Frias-Aquino was providing services to a client referred to herein as “Patient M” shortly
after she learned she was going to have a baby. One week after she notified Edwin Garcia
(“Garcia”), the co-owner and operations manager of Life Guard, of her pregnancy she was
rushed to the emergency room “due to bleeding and was told she was pregnant with twins.” She
informed Garcia. There is some dispute about what happened next. Life Guard asserts that
Frias-Aquino “requested accommodations due to her pregnancy,” while she maintains it was
Garcia who “immediately became falsely concerned with the news” and unilaterally labeled her
pregnancy as “high-risk.” All agree that she was reassigned from Patient M. “Patient N.S.,” her
new patient, “did not need any physical lifting and was more independent than Patient M.”
Frias-Aquino says that in the three or so weeks she worked with Patient N.S. her hours varied but

she estimates that the change of patient led to a reduction in the hours she worked per week: she
had worked for approximately thirty hours with Patient M which dropped to twenty-eight hours
when she took over Patient N.S.’s care.
The circumstances surrounding the conclusion of Frias-Aquino’s work with Patient
N.S.—which also marked the end of her employment with Life Guard—are also in dispute. She
maintains that her removal from Patient N.S. constituted termination because she was never
reassigned to another patient. Life Guard, however, asserts that she resigned when she indicated
that she did not want a replacement patient after being informed that Patient N.S. no longer
wanted her as her caregiver.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence

of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue
of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
“A disputed fact is ‘material’ if it would affect the outcome of the suit as determined by
the substantive law,” Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 771 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted), and an issue of material fact is “genuine,” and thus warrants trial, “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 252. Motions for summary judgment are evaluated with
the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and any reasonable
inferences must be made in that party’s favor. Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d

265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
The initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact lies
with the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving
party must then present affirmative evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could return a
verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
Importantly, the summary judgment “standard is applied with added rigor in employment
discrimination cases, where intent and credibility are crucial issues.” Stewart v. Rutgers, The
State Univ., 120 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Indeed,
the Third Circuit has advised that “[s]ummary judgment is to be used sparingly in employment
discrimination cases.” Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 369 (3d Cir. 2008).
DISCUSSION
A. Administrative Exhaustion of Perceived Disability Claims
As a threshold matter, Life Guard argues that Frias-Aquino’s perceived disability claims
under the ADA and PHRA must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

“[B]oth the ADA and the PHRA require pursuit of administrative remedies before a
plaintiff may file a complaint in court.” Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir.
1999). This entails “fil[ing] a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful
employment practice.” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). Merely filing an administrative claim, however, does not
give a plaintiff carte blanche to pursue any claim in federal court; rather, the ensuing suit must
remain within the scope of the prior administrative claim. See Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200
F.3d 73, 94 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he parameters of a civil action in the District Court are defined
by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the
charge of discrimination . . . .” (citation and internal quotations omitted)). Nevertheless, “the

scope of the original charge should be liberally construed,” Hicks v. ABT Assocs. Inc., 572 F.2d
960, 965 (3d Cir. 1978), and the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies is therefore
satisfied so long as it “provide[s] the Commission with sufficient information so that it may
notify prospective defendants.” Rabzak v. Berks Cnty., 815 F.2d 17, 20 (3d Cir. 1987) (cleaned
up).
The EEOC charge filed by Frias-Aquino on February 17, 2025, reads in pertinent part as
follows:
In or about November of 2024, I learned that I was pregnant with twins and notified my
manager, Chery Brito (hereinafter “Brito”), of the same. Brito immediately became
concerned with the news that I was pregnant and told me that she would have to reassign
me to another patient that was “easier.” I did not request another patient, and I was
capable of performing my job with the same patient who I had already been assigned to.
However, Brito insisted that I needed a patient that was easier to handle because of my
pregnancy.
(emphasis added). Here, Frias-Aquino does not allege that she was reassigned merely because
she was pregnant, but instead because of the perception that she would need an “easier to
handle” patient by virtue of her being pregnant with twins. Although the phrase “perceived
disability” is not used explicitly in Frias-Aquino’s filing, the necessary implication of her alleged
discrimination is that Life Guard perceived her pregnancy as a disabling condition such that
accommodations—vis-à-vis an “easier” patient—were warranted.1 “[L]iberally constru[ing]”
Frias-Aquino’s EEOC charge, Hicks, 572 F.2d at 965, sufficient notice was therefore provided
regarding her alleged perceived disability discrimination so as to render her ADA and PHRA
claims administratively exhausted.
B. Wrongful Termination
Turning now to Frias-Aquino’s Title VII pregnancy and ADA perceived disability
discrimination claims, which are premised on wrongful termination. Both are governed by the
tripartite burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (providing the framework for Title VII cases); see also Shaner v. Synthes,

1 It bears mentioning that the instant facts are distinguishable from the out-of-district case relied on by Life Guard in
arguing that Frias-Aquino’s pregnancy is not an ADA-covered disability. See Matthews v. New Light, Inc., 2022
WL 11966542, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2022) (“Therefore, the Court finds that, because Plaintiff has alleged that
Defendant perceived her as being disabled because of her pregnancy—and since pregnancy is not a disability on its
own under the ADA—Plaintiff has not alleged a disability under the ADA.”). In Matthews, the plaintiff “allege[d]
that Defendant regarded her as pregnant (which is not a disability under the ADA), but she d[id] not specifically
allege that Defendant regarded her as having pregnancy-related complications (which may constitute a disability
under the ADA).” Id. at *3 (emphasis added). Here, Frias-Aquino’s allegation is precisely that Life Guard
“regarded her as having pregnancy-related complications,” id., such that she would require reassignment to an
“easier” and, impliedly, less strenuous patient. See Part III(B)(i)(b), infra. The principle espoused by Matthews is
therefore inapposite.
204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have indicated that the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas . . . applies to ADA disparate treatment and retaliation claims.”).2 The
McDonnell Douglas framework operates as follows:
Briefly summarized, the McDonnell Douglas analysis proceeds in three stages. [1] First,
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. [2] If the plaintiff
succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [adverse employment decision] . . . .
[3] Finally, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff then must have an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons
offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination . .
. . While the burden of production may shift, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all
times with the plaintiff.
Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations and internal quotations
omitted).
i. Frias-Aquino’s Prima Facie Cases
The first question to be answered is, accordingly, whether Frias-Aquino has established a
prima facie case for her pregnancy discrimination and perceived disability claims.
a. Pregnancy Discrimination
Under Title VII, employers are prohibited from “discriminat[ing] against any individual
with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), a 1978 amendment to Title VII, updated the statute’s

2 Frias-Aquino’s parallel claims under the PHRA are evaluated in the same manner as her Title VII and ADA
claims. See Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Generally, the PHRA is applied in accordance
with Title VII.” (citation omitted)); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dept., 380 F.2d 751, 761 n.6 (3d Cir.
2004), superseded on other grounds (“An analysis of an ADA claim applies equally to a PHRA claim.” (citation
and internal quotations omitted)); accord Gen. Elec. Corp. v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 469 Pa. 292, 304-06 (1976)
(adopting the holding of McDonnell Douglas).
prohibition of employment discrimination based on an employee’s sex, see id., to include
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (PDA).
Therefore, “[t]here is employment discrimination whenever an employee’s pregnancy is a
motivating factor for the employer’s adverse employment decision.” In re Carnegie Ctr.

Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)).
Only if a plaintiff establishes that she: (1) “is a member of a protected class”; (2) “is
qualified for the position”; (3) she “suffered some form of ‘adverse employment action’
sufficient to evoke the protection of Title VII and the PHRA”; and, (4) that she suffered that
action “under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination,” has her
prima facie case of employment discrimination been met. Jones, 198 F.3d at 410 (citations and
internal quotations omitted). “[T]he prima facie requirement for making a Title VII claim ‘is not
onerous’ and poses ‘a burden easily met.’” C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 365 (quoting
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
Life Guard “does not dispute that [Frias-Aquino] was pregnant during her employment.”

Thus, Frias-Aquino is a member of a protected class. Life Guard concedes that, “generally,
[Frias-Aquino] was qualified to perform the job of caretaker,” but maintains that she “was not,
however, qualified to perform the job duties related to Patient [M] as she was unable to lift him
anymore” after becoming pregnant. While Frias-Aquino argues in her brief that she was at all
times “dutiful and competent in working for [Patient M], and could have continued working for
M, had it not been for Defendant’s actions,” that is not what she testified to at her deposition.
When asked whether she “believe[d] [she] could have continued to lift that client if necessary,”
Frias-Aquino responded: “Not that one.” This inconsistency is relevant as Frias-Aquino argues
she suffered two separate adverse employment actions: her ultimate termination, as well as her
reassignment from Patient M.
To show that she was qualified, Frias-Aquino “must point to evidence from which a
factfinder could reasonably infer that [she] satisfied the criterion identified by the employer or
that the employer did not actually rely upon the stated criterion.” Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div.

of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 647 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 767
(3d Cir. 1994)). Because Frias-Aquino does not produce any evidence to counter Life Guard’s
position that lifting Patient M was a required job duty—and in fact admitted that she could not
continue to lift Patient M—no reasonable jury could find she was qualified for her position with
Patient M. Thus, Frias-Aquino cannot succeed on the theory that her reassignment from Patient
M to Patient N.S. was an unlawful discriminatory action.
Her next theory is that her termination from Life Guard was an adverse employment
decision. See Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 2001)
(“We hold that [Plaintiff]’s termination clearly fulfills the [adverse employment action] prong of
the prima facie case . . . .”). But Life Guard’s position is that she was not terminated: she

resigned. Life Guard points out that shortly after Frias-Aquino was assigned to Patient N.S.,
Cheril Brito-Perez (“Brito”), one of Life Guard’s co-owners and the head of its human resources
department, called her to inform her that Patient N.S. “complained that she wasn’t properly being
taken care of”; Brito says she then told Frias-Aquino that she “would no longer be assigned to
work with Patient N.S. . . . [and] would be assigned to a new client because Patient N.S.
requested another aide.” Life Guard interpreted Frias-Aquino’s response, “that it was fine[,] that
we should leave things as they were[,] and that [she wasn’t] interested on [sic] working another
case,” to “constitute[] resignation.” But, Frias-Aquino says that she “was never told [Patient
N.S.] requested another aide,” and that she only “found out she was no longer working with N.S.
when attempting to clock in to Defendant’s timekeeping app while at N.S.’s house and was
unable to do so.” She then made repeated—nine phone calls, she says—unsuccessful efforts to
reach Brito in order to be assigned a new patient, in addition to an office visit where Brito
“ignored [her], despite being present in the office.” She only learned, she says, that Life Guard

no longer considered her an employee after she “request[ed] an employment letter she could
provide to welfare,” which Life Guard supplied using the following language: “Employee
resigned from her position on December 9th, 2024. Last day worked was December 7, 2025
[sic].” Accordingly, whether Frias-Aquino was terminated or resigned is a genuine dispute of
material fact which turns on a fact finder’s credibility determinations. See Horowitz v. Fed.
Kemper Life Assur. Co., 57 F.3d 300, 302 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at
255).
Finally, Life Guard argues that Frias-Aquino’s departure did not occur “under
circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Jones, 198 F.3d at 410
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Unlawful discrimination can be inferred when a

plaintiff shows “the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action is
‘unusually suggestive.’” LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Center Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d
Cir. 2007). While “[t]here is no bright-line rule to determine at what point temporal proximity,
in and of itself, can demonstrate an inference of discrimination . . . a span of days, and not
months, satisfies the requirement.” Ahern v. Eresearch Tech., Inc., 183 F. Supp.3d 663, 669-70
(E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Importantly, in those cases “where the temporal proximity is not so close as to be ‘unduly
suggestive,’” then “timing plus other evidence may be an appropriate test.” Farrell, 206 F.3d at
280. That is the case here, as the two-month lapse Frias-Aquino points to between her pregnancy
notification and subsequent termination is not so short as to be “unduly suggestive,” therefore
necessitating some additional evidence in order to raise an inference of discrimination. See id.;
Williams, 380 F.2d at 760, superseded on other grounds (holding that evidence in addition to
temporal proximity was necessary because the two-month period between plaintiff’s protected

activity and termination was “not so close as to be unduly suggestive”).
And Frias-Aquino does indeed produce additional evidence that supports an inference of
discrimination. In her deposition, she testified that she was never told that N.S. requested
another aid, that no documentation exists in the record showing N.S. requested another aid, and
that she only found out she was no longer working with N.S. when she was unable to clock into
Life Guard’s timekeeping app while at N.S.’s house. Accordingly, she argues that Life Guard’s
proffered explanation for her removal from Patient N.S. is fallacious and pretextual.3
Viewing the dispute regarding her removal from Patient N.S. in the light most favorable
to Frias-Aquino, this evidence—in addition to the two-month temporal proximity—is sufficient
for a jury to infer that her termination was discriminatory. Considering her light burden at this

stage, C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 365, Frias-Aquino can therefore establish her prima
facie case of pregnancy discrimination.
b. Perceived Disability Discrimination
Turning now to Frias-Aquino’s perceived disability discrimination claims under the ADA
and PHRA. The prima facie case for perceived disability is a slightly modified version of the
test used in the Title VII pregnancy discrimination context examined supra. To establish a prima

3 Although Frias-Aquino cites this evidence as part of her argument that Life Guard’s proffered explanation for her
termination is pretextual, “nothing about the McDonnell Douglas formula requires us to ration the evidence between
one stage or the other.” Farrell, 206 F.3d at 286 (citing Jalil v. Advel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 709 n.6 (3d Cir. 1989)
(“As we have observed before, the McDonnell Douglas formula does not compartmentalize the evidence so as to
limit its use to only one phase of the case. The plaintiff’s evidence might serve both to establish a prima facie
case and discredit a defendant’s explanation.” (citation and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added))).
facie case, Frias-Aquino must show that: (1) she “is a disabled person within the meaning of the
ADA,” Shaner, 204 F.3d at 500 (citation omitted)—a requirement she may satisfy by
demonstrating not that she was actually disabled, but that she was “regarded as having such
[physical or mental] impairment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); (2) she is “otherwise qualified to

perform the essential functions of the job”; and, (3) she “has suffered an otherwise adverse
employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Shaner, 204 F.3d at 500 (citation omitted);
see also Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Under the ADA and the EEOC
regulations, a claimant may be considered disabled even if his impairment does not substantially
limit a major life activity, if his impairment ‘is treated by a covered entity as constituting such
limitation.’” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1))). Once again, the burden upon Frias-Aquino “is
not [an] onerous” one. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 365 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty.
Affs., 450 U.S. at 253).
The sole argument advanced by Life Guard to contest Frias-Aquino’s prima facie case is
that pregnancy cannot be used as the basis of a perceived disability claim because pregnancy is

not an ADA-covered disability. 4 Life Guard is only partially correct. True, “[p]regnancy, alone,
does not constitute disability.” Ahern, 183 F. Supp.3d at 668-69 (collecting cases). However,
“certain impairments that a woman experiences as a result of pregnancy may qualify as a
disability for purposes of the [ADA].” Brown v. Aria Health, 2019 WL 1745653, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 17, 2019) (emphasis added) (collecting cases). Life Guard misses its mark by arguing that
Frias-Aquino did not actually suffer from such complications—a claim she never makes. What
Frias-Aquino does assert is that Life Guard “regarded her as ‘disabled’ when it falsely labeled
her as a ‘high-risk’ pregnancy, despite the fact that she was never ‘high-risk,’” and that it was

4 Here, Life Guard again errantly relies on Matthews, 2022 WL 11966542. See supra note 1.
these concerns of a complicated pregnancy that motivated her termination. Life Guard contests
this position and cites deposition testimony that it “never told [Frias-Aquino] that her pregnancy
was considered high-risk.” These conflicting accounts constitute a genuine dispute which,
viewed most favorably to Frias-Aquino, would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that Life

Guard perceived her as disabled and terminated her accordingly. Thus, Frias-Aquino has
surmounted the “low bar for establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination,”
Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 539 (3d Cir.
2006), and has set out a prima facie case for her perceived disability discrimination claims.
ii. Life Guard’s Proffered Nondiscriminatory Reason5
Once Frias-Aquino has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of
production passes to Life Guard to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating
her employment. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs., 450 U.S. at 254. This is a “relatively light burden”
that is satisfied “by introducing evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that
there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment decision.” Fuentes, 32
F.3d at 763 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)). Indeed, “[t]he

employer need not prove that the tendered reason actually motivated its behavior, as throughout
this burden-shifting paradigm the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination always
rests with the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs., 450 U.S. at 253, 254, 256).
Here, Life Guard argues that Frias-Aquino was removed from her assignment with
Patient N.S. because of unsatisfactory job performance, citing Brito’s deposition testimony that
the patient complained about Frias-Aquino and “said to her service coordinator that [Frias-

5 From this juncture onward, the legal standards governing Frias-Aquino’s claims of pregnancy and perceived
disability discrimination become coterminous and are thus analyzed in tandem.
Aquino] was not doing her job” and had some “kind of a[n] attitude with [the patient].” This
explanation constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Frias-Aquino’s termination.
See Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2014) (recognizing that “demonstrably poor job
performance” qualifies as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination).

iii. Pretext
Accordingly, under the McDonnell Douglas framework “the burden of production
rebounds to [Frias-Aquino], who must now show by a preponderance of the evidence that [Life
Guard]’s explanation is pretextual.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763. To meet that burden, Frias-Aquino
must “point[] to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder would
reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that
an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause
of the employer’s action.” Shaner, 204 F.3d at 501 (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764; Sheridan v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotations
omitted). “[T]his standard places a difficult burden on the plaintiff,” putting the onus on Frias-
Aquino to “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or

contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence.’” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (quoting
Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr, & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Here, Life Guard argues that even if Frias-Aquino can make out her prima facie cases,
summary judgment is nevertheless appropriate because she cannot show that Life Guard’s
proffered reason for her termination is pretextual. However, the evidence Frias-Aquino presents
to cast doubt upon Life Guard’s explanation—which is essentially the same evidence she put
forth to establish her prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination—creates a genuine issue of
material fact that precludes summary judgment. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (citations omitted)
(“[I]f the plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficiently to discredit the defendant’s proffered
reasons, to survive summary judgment the plaintiff need not also come forward with additional
evidence of discrimination beyond his or her prima facie case.”). In particular, drawing all
reasonable inferences in Frias-Aquino’s favor and evaluating “the totality of the circumstances,”

Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2022), the following disputes
would warrant a reasonable trier of fact reaching the conclusion that Life Guard’s claim of
unsatisfactory job performance should not be believed. See Jalil, 873 F.2d at 707 (“Summary
judgment is inappropriate, however, if the plaintiff . . . counters the defendant’s proffered
explanation with evidence raising a factual issue regarding the employer’s true motivation for
discharge.”). Namely: (1) whether Patient N.S. actually complained about Frias-Aquino’s
services; (2) whether Patient N.S. actually requested a new caregiver; (3) if Frias-Aquino, upon
being informed of Patient N.S.’s alleged complaint, was also informed that Patient N.S. had
requested a new caregiver; (4) whether Life Guard properly investigated a report by Frias-
Aquino that Patient N.S. had stolen goods while shopping, which complaint was lodged to Life

Guard just one day before Patient N.S.’s own alleged complaint about Frias-Aquino; and, (5) the
circumstances surrounding Frias-Aquino’s repeated inability to reach Life Guard’s managers
over the phone and in-person to discuss her next patient assignment in the days following her
removal from Patient N.S. Thus, Frias-Aquino’s wrongful termination claims cannot be decided
on summary judgment.
C. Hostile Work Environment
Like her wrongful termination claims, Frias-Aquino’s hostile work environment claims
are also brought under Title VII, the ADA, and the PHRA. Each of these statutes has the same
standard for hostile work environment claims. See Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods.
Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009) (regarding the PHRA and Title VII); Colwell v. Rite
Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 499 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010) (regarding the PHRA and ADA). To prevail,
Frias-Aquino must satisfy the following: (1) she suffered “intentional discrimination” because of
her pregnancy and the perception that she was disabled because her pregnancy was high-risk; (2)
“the discrimination was severe or pervasive”; (3) she was “detrimentally affected” by the

discrimination; (4) “the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like
circumstances”; and, (5) respondeat superior liability renders Life Guard responsible for the
discrimination. Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167 (citing Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir.
2006), overruled on other grounds by, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53
(2006)). The gravamen of Life Guard’s opposition to these claims is that Frias-Aquino fails at
the second element, i.e., she “does not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate an environment
filled with either severe or pervasive harassment based on pregnancy or perceived disability.”
“‘[S]everity’ and ‘pervasiveness’ are alternative possibilities: some harassment may be
severe enough to contaminate an environment even if not pervasive; other, less objectionable,
conduct will contaminate the workplace only if it is pervasive.” Castleberry v. STI Group, 863

F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Jensen, 435 F.3d at 449 n.3). The conduct is evaluated by
“looking at the totality of the circumstances, including: ‘the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Id.
(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 410 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). The standard for hostile work
environment claims is “demanding.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998).
Here, Frias-Aquino articulates four acts by Life Guard which she asserts created a hostile
work environment. Assuming arguendo that the factual disputes underlying these four incidents
are resolved in Frias-Aquino’s favor, they would, nevertheless, neither independently nor in the
aggregate rise to the “demanding” standard Frias-Aquino must satisfy here. See id. The first two
revolve around Life Guard’s negative assessment of Frias-Aquino’s work with Patient N.S.
Namely, she says that Life Guard: (1) assumed that she “treated [Patient] N.S. poorly, despite
[Frias-Aquino] having a perfect track record with Life Guard”; and, (2) wrongfully alleged that

Frias-Aquino “made gestures” while working with the patient to indicate she did not like the
work. These are both the types of “[s]nubs and unjust criticisms of one’s work [which] are not
poisonous enough to create an actionable hostile work environment.” Miller v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 679 F. Supp. 495, 502 (W.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (emphasis
added).
Next, Frias-Aquino says Life Guard “assumed that, due to [her] ‘high-risk’ pregnancy,
she couldn’t perform the same job duties” as a non-pregnant woman or non-disabled employee.
She argues that this assumption manifested a hostile work environment in that it: (1) led to her
reassignment to Patient N.S., which act she labels a “functional[] demot[ion]”; and, (2) spurred
her termination. Regarding her reassignment, the record shows Life Guard’s assumption was in

fact valid insofar as Frias-Aquino was incapable of performing certain essential caretaker
responsibilities, i.e., lifting Patient M. And moreover, that this same assumption may well have
motivated Frias-Aquino’s removal from Patient N.S. speaks only to her termination being
discriminatory; without additional evidence, the only requisite, detrimental effect that it shows
Frias-Aquino experienced in the workplace was that she was wrongfully terminated from it—an
“adverse employment action that cannot itself create a hostile work environment.” Purnell v.
City of Phila., 2021 WL 3617161, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2021) (“Courts in this district have
repeatedly held that termination alone cannot support a claim of hostile work environment . . . .”
(citing Roberts v. Health Partners Plans, Inc., 2017 WL 3310691, at *5 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3,
2017) (collecting cases))).
Finally, Frias-Aquino says that Life Guard “associated negative stigmas” with her need to
take time off from work due to her pregnancy—a claim that is unsupported by the record. The
only evidence Frias-Aquino cites in support of this argument is a portion of Garcia’s deposition

testimony where he was asked about Frias-Aquino’s performance with Patient M. He responded
that “she was doing her job” at the beginning of the patient relationship, but by the end “was
calling to request sign-off very often,” which he confirmed was “an issue . . . [f]or the client’s
family.” A reasonable factfinder would most aptly characterize this evidence as a manager’s
routine assessment of a workplace concern, not stigmatization of the severity required to support
hostile work environment claims. See generally Fields v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 696 F. Supp.3d 66,
114-15 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (collecting cases where objectively more egregious incidents were
deemed insufficiently severe to establish a hostile work environment under Third Circuit case
law).
Accordingly, because Frias-Aquino cannot show that Life Guard subjected her to severe

or pervasive harassment, “the Court need not address the remaining elements of [her] hostile
work environment claim[s].” Id. at 117. Therefore, Life Guard’s motion will be granted with
respect to Frias-Aquino’s hostile work environment claims.
An appropriate order follows.
BY THE COURT:

____/s/ Wendy Beetlestone_______________
WENDY BEETLESTONE, C.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418422. Public record. Not legal advice.