# JEFFERIES

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · July 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418221

## Case

- **Full name:** Ricardo Anthony Jefferies, Sr. v. C.O. Cavaleri, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418221

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICARDO ANTHONY JEFFERIES, SR.,:
Plaintiff, :

v. . CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-3478
C.O. CAVALERI, et ai., .
Defendants, :
MEMORANDUM
SCOTT, J. wy) , 2026
Plaintiff Ricardo Anthony Jefferies, Sr., a prisoner incarcerated at SCI Phoenix, initiated
this pro se civil action against C.O. Cavalari, C.O. Rienecker, C.O. Pierce, C.O. Davis, C.O.
Hunter, Superintendent Joe Terra, and the Pennsylvania Correctional Industries/Commissary
(“PCI/Commissary”). (See ECF No. | at 3-5.) He claims that the correctional officers use
electronic cigarettes in prison areas where their use is prohibited, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and state law. (/d. at 4.) Jefferies also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
(See ECF Nos. 5, 6, 8, 9.) The Court will grant Jefferies in forma pauperis status. Because the
Court concludes that the Eighth Amendment claims for exposure to Environmental Tobacco
Smoke (“ETS”) are plausible as pleaded against Cavalari, Rienecker, Pierce, Davis, and Hunter,
Jefferies will be permitted to proceed on those claims. All other claims will be dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Jefferies will be granted the
option of proceeding only on the claims that pass statutory screening or filing an amended
complaint to attempt to correct the deficiencies noted by the Court in the claims that are
dismissed. His motion for appointment of counsel will be held in abeyance until after he has
made that election.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS!
Jefferies is anon-smoker. (Compl. at 31.) Since at least October 2025, Jefferies was
housed in the FA Housing Unit at SCI-Phoenix. (/d. at 24.) Jefferies alleges that signs warning
that smoking/vaping are prohibited were posted at the “(L) side” of the exit door on the FA
Unit.” (/d. at 18.) Despite the signs, the corrections officers Defendants (Cavalari, Rienecker,
Pierce, Davis, and Hunter) and inmates vape on the FA Housing Unit. (/d. at 10.) Inmates vape
inside and outside the cells. (/d.) Jefferies contends that he is exposed to vaping all day, from the
morning until he goes outside for air at the end of the day. (/d. at 8, 10.) He allegedly suffered
an allergic reaction from the exposure to second-hand Environmental Tobacco Smoke (“ETS”)
from the Defendants’ and inmates’ vaping in the FA Housing Unit, and requires medical care to
offset his symptoms. (/d. at 6-7.) Since October 2025 the ambient smoke and other pollutants
have caused Jefferies to experience coughing, sneezing, shortness of breath, watery eyes,
sleeplessness, and frequent headaches. (/d. at 10.) Medical has prescribed Claritin to treat his
symptoms, which costs Jefferies $5 per month. (/d.)
Jefferies submitted several written form requests to staff. On October 31, 2025, he asked
Defendant Terra where vaping is permitted at the prison, and a handwritten answer of
“Recreation yards” is contained in the response section. (/d. at 31.) On January 3, 2026,

' The factual allegations are taken from Jefferies’s form Complaint and attachments.
(ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).) The Court deems the entire submission to constitute the Complaint and
adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.
According to a July 7, 2021 “Information Bulletin” directed to inmates at SCI Phoenix,
the use of e-cigarettes is banned inside of buildings and is allowed only in “designated outdoor
locations.” (Compl. at 29.) At the bottom of the page, the notice is marked “Housing Unit
Bulletin Boards (2 per Block) PLEASE POST,” and among the parties in the “cc” at the bottom
are “Control Centers / East and West Housing Units — Bulletin Boards; Activities — Inmate
Channel.” (/d.)

Jefferies wrote to J. Wychunis, Major of Unit Management, asking what the ETS level is on
Housing Unit FA, and stating, “I am experiencing symptoms possibly related to electronic
cigarettes vapor, to which I am being taken care of by medical. (Claritin) Staff and inmates
regularly vape on the Housing Unit.” (/d. at 32.) Wychunis apparently answered “IDK Ask Fire
Safety.” (/d.) On February 6, 2026, Jefferies wrote to the Fire Safety Manager about the ETS
level in Housing Unit FA, and a non-defendant named Joe Buckley answered, “There is no
research to the level of ETS someone can be safely exposed to inside of a building. However;
there are ways to lessen the affects [sic] and areas to be mindful of while inside, i.e. adequate
ventilation, distance, and time exposed to the particulates.” (/d. at 33.) Jefferies also filed two
grievances, dated October 28, 2025 and January 2, 2026, related to the alleged vaping in housing
units by inmates and staff and the sale of e-cigarettes by the commissary.’ (/d. at 24, 35.) His
first grievance was upheld in part and denied in part, which subsequent levels of review
affirmed. (/d. at 25-28.) The second grievance was similarly upheld in part and denied in part,
(id. at 36), but a final appeal was dismissed because Jefferies had purportedly not furnished a
“legible copy of [his] initial grievance” and appeal. (/d. at 35-39; 39.)
Jefferies filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the correctional officer
Defendants, Superintendent Terra, and the Commissary. (/d. at 3-5.) He attached logs
containing dates, times, locations, and names, allegedly reflecting vaping activity by Cavalari,
Rienecker, Pierce, Davis, and Hunter on his housing unit. (/d. at 9, 19-23.) Jefferies requests
monetary damages including $80 to cover the cost of Claritin, “$800,000 the value of physical

3 The second grievance dated January 2, 2026 does not appear to have been submitted on
that date because, in that grievance, Jefferies notes that he had exhausted the first grievance and
received a Final Appeal Decision. (Compl. at 35.) The Chief Grievance Officer issued the Final
Appeal Decision for the first grievance on January 26, 2026. (/d. at 27.)

functioning and to be restored to the original condition of the plaintiff before the incarceration at
SCI Phoenix,” and $1.6 million in punitive damages “for future harm because of the ETS Health
| Risk to plaintiff, i.e. medical bills and the total amount of sales from e-cigarettes sold on
Housing Unit FA.” (/d. at 10.) Jefferies also asks for the preservation of security camera
footage on Housing Unit FA, and to be free from any retaliation by defendants. (/d.)
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Jefferies appears to be unable to pay the filing fee in this matter, the Court will
grant him leave to proceed in forma pauperis.’ Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)ii) requires
the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.
1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 560 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). At this early stage of the
litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and ask only whether the complaint contains facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim. See Shorter y. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other
grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F 4th 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory
allegations do not suffice. Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Because Jefferies is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. See Vogt v.
Weizel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 7104 F.3d 239, 244-45
(3d Cir, 2013)), The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to
name it.” /d. However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a

* Because Jefferies is a prisoner, he must still pay the $350 filing fee for this case in
installments as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

claim.” Jd. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules —
they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala, 704 F.3d at 245; see also Doe v.
Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (per curiam)
(“While a court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of
whether the pro se litigant mentioned it b[y] name,’ Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002),
this does not require the court to act as an advocate to identify any possible claim that the facts alleged
could potentially support.”).
Il, DISCUSSION
A. Federal Claims
The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The statute “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 US. 386,
393-94 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must
show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Ina § 1983 action, the personal involvement of each
defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a required element, and, therefore, a plaintiff
must allege how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the
claims. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see
also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a
plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).

1. Claims Against PCI/Commissary
Jefferies has alleged claims for money damages against PCI/Commissary for deliberate
indifference under the Eighth Amendment. (Compl. at 7.) These claims must be dismissed,
however, because PCI does not qualify as a “person” under § 1983. Adams v. Pennsylvania
Corr. Indus., No. 23-149, 2023 WL 5835302, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 23-149, 2023 WL 5831644 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2023).
PC] is a subsidiary or entity operated by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”).
See id. Claims against the DOC under § 1983 are barred because that agency of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is not a person. Pettaway v. SCI Albion, 487 F. App’x 766, 768
(3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“[A]s a state agency and the prison it administers, the Department
of Corrections and SC]—Albion are not ‘persons’ and thus cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.”); see also Endrikat v. Little, No. 23-2167, 2023 WL 8519196, at *3 (3d Cir. Dec. 8, 2023)
(per curiam) (we concur with the District Court’s assessment that Endrikat failed to state a claim
with respect to [the Pennsylvania DOC, SCI] Waymart, and the Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole, as they are not subject to suit under § 1983) (citing Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516,
521 (3d Cir. 1973)).
Furthermore, to the extent that Jefferies has also brought state law claims against
PCI/Commissary, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal
court when the state has not waived that immunity, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has
not waived that immunity. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923,
926 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting, with regard to inmate’s negligence claims, that “the
state has expressly retained its Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of federal
lawsuits.””); Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining

that, “[b]Jecause the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections is a part of the
executive department of the Commonwealth, it shares in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity”). The Court will therefore dismiss the claims against PCI/Commissary
with prejudice.
2. Official Capacity Claims for Money Damages
In drafting his Complaint, Jefferies indicates that he seeks to name the Defendants in
their individual and official capacities. Suits against state officials acting in their official
capacities are really suits against the employing government agency, and as such, they are also
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.® A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir.
2003); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491

> To avoid the bar of the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he relief sought must be prospective,
declaratory, or injunctive relief governing an officer’s future conduct and cannot be
retrospective, such as money damages.” MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa.,271 F.3d 491,
506 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 102). “In determining
whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need
only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation
of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Jefferies
seeks various types of money damages from the Defendants. (See Compl. at 10 (requesting
nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages).) Among his requests for money damages,
Jefferies also asks that the security camera footage on FA Housing Unit be preserved, and that he
remain free from any retaliatory efforts of the Defendants. (/d.) The Court understands the first
request to restate an evidentiary expectation that a party in possession of evidence preserve what
it knows, or reasonably should know, will likely be requested on reasonably foreseeable
litigation. Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 80, 82 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (explaining
a party’s affirmative duty). This request does not seek prospective relief based on an “ongoing
violation of federal law.” Verizon Md, Inc., 535 U.S. at 645. To the extent that Jefferies’s
prayer for relief includes a request to prevent possible future retaliation by Defendants, the
request for injunctive relief cannot proceed. Jefferies alleges no allegations regarding retaliation
or threat of retaliation in his entire Complaint. Jefferies has not asserted “that he is under threat
of suffering ‘injury in fact’ that is concrete and particularized,” nor is there any suggestion of a
“threat [that is] actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Tineo v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 19-19403, 2021 WL 689144, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2021) (quoting Marcavage v.
Nat’! Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 862 (3d Cir. 2012)). The requests, as presented, are dismissed
without prejudice.

U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). In this case, claims for money damages alleged against the employees of
the DOC in their official capacities equate to claims against the Commonwealth that are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 309-10 (3d Cir.
2020) (explaining that “Eleventh Amendment immunity bars actions for retroactive relief against
state officers acting in their official capacity.” (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169
(1985)). As noted, the Commonwealth has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for
lawsuits filed in federal court, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521-22, so it and its departments, as well
as their officials sued in their official capacities, are immune from suits filed in federal court.
Accordingly, the official capacity claims alleged against Cavalari, Rienecker, Pierce, Davis,
Hunter, and Terra will be dismissed with prejudice.
3. Individual Capacity Claims
Jefferies has brought Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims based on ETS
exposure against Cavalari, Rienecker, Pierce, Davis, Hunter, and Terra in their individual
capacities. (Compl. at 5). ETS exposure by an inmate can state a plausible Eighth Amendment
claim. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (holding that an Eighth
Amendment claim from ETS exposure may be based on future health and present harm). Of the
two types of claims, the first is based on a prospective allegation “that exposure to ETS
unreasonably endangers his future health.” Moore v. Durand, No. 22-2915, 2023 WL 4884855,
at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2023) (per curiam), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2535 (2024). With that type of
claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) exposure to ‘unreasonably high’ levels of ETS contrary to
contemporary standards of decency; and (2) deliberate indifference by the authorities to the
exposure.” Id. The second type of claim addresses a present or pre-existing injury. /d. “To
allege that ETS exposure has aggravated a pre-existing illness, a plaintiff must show (1) a

sufficiently serious medical need related to the ETS exposure, and (2) deliberate indifference by
prison authorities.” /d. (citations omitted). Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard.
Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must allege that the
prison officials “knew or were aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to [his] health or
safety.” Jd. at 135.
a. Claims Against Terra
Jefferies identifies Joseph Terra as “Defendant No. 6,” with the other correctional officers
individually identified as Defendants “No. 1” through “No. 5.” (Compl. at 5.) In a separate
section of the Complaint where he makes specific allegations against each Defendant by
reference to their number, he repeats a nearly identical paragraph for all Defendants No. 1
through No. 6, claiming that each defendant “[p]ut plaintiff at risk for potential health hazzard
[sic]. Knowingly and deliberately violated SCI-prison policy by vaping on the FA Housing
Unit.” (See id. at 6-7.) Jefferies echoes the same allegations for “Defendant No. 6” as the other
correctional officers, but he has not specifically alleged any occasion that Terra vaped in the FA
Housing Unit. Although he provides detailed logs of alleged vaping activity by Cavalari,
Rienecker, Pierce, Davis, and Hunter at various dates, times, and locations in the housing unit
from October 2025 through January 2026, Terra’s name does not appear among the logs Jefferies
provides. (See id. at 9, 19-23.) Jefferies has not pleaded a plausible Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim with his undeveloped, undifferentiated statement that Terra, in the
guise of “Defendant No. 6,” personally vaped in the housing unit.
To the extent that Jefferies intends to attribute some level of liability to Terra “by not
policing their guards,” (id. at 7), he has not stated a plausible claim of Terra’s personal
involvement. Generalized allegations that a supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or

“responsible for” an office or facility are insufficient to allege personal involvement in an
underlying constitutional violation. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’ x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020)
(per curiam) (“Saisi asserted that some defendants were ‘in charge of agencies that allowed this
to happen,” and that liability stemmed merely from defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would
be ‘tolerated.’ However, a director cannot be held liable ‘simply because of his position as the
head of the [agency].’” (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005)). Rather,
“[s]uits against high-level government officials must satisfy the general requirements for
supervisory liability.” Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2017). There are “two
general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken
by subordinates.” Barkes vy. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed
on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015). First, a supervisor may be liable if
he or she “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy,
practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Jd. (quoting A.M. ex rel.
J.M.K. y. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in
original)). “Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated
in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had
knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.’”° Chavarriaga v.
New Jersey. Dept. of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015).

© The first type of liability includes a failure to supervise, however, a plaintiff asserting
such a claim must “identify a supervisory policy or practice that the supervisor failed to employ,
and [assert] that: (1) the policy or procedures in effect at the time of the alleged injury created an
unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the defendant-official was aware that the
policy created an unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the
constitutional injury was caused by the failure to implement the supervisory practice or
procedure.” Barkes, 766 F.3d at 317; see also Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227. A supervisory
claim requires “a showing that there was an actual constitutional violation at the hands of
subordinates” before finding liability on the part of the supervisor prison official. Allen v.
10

Jefferies does not make such direct allegations against Terra in the Complaint. While he
asserts that the behavior of prison guards was not being policed, (Compl. at 7), that vague
statement is not clearly asserted against Terra in particular. Jefferies has attached grievances to
his Complaint suggesting that Terra had notice of Jefferies’s initial complaints of staff and
inmate vaping and of his health symptoms. (/d. at 26.) However, a prison official’s participation
in the grievance process, failure to take action in response to a prisoner’s letter about the
conditions in which he is confined, or failure to act after becoming aware of an employee’s
actions, is, without more, an insufficient basis upon which to base those officials’ personal
involvement in the underlying violations. See Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F. Supp. 2d 776, 782 (W.D.
Pa. 2013) (dismissing chief grievance officer from action alleging ETS exposure where
complaint only alleged that she reviewed grievances concerning exposure); Murray v. McCoy,
No. 23-2582, 2024 WL 1328231, at *3 (3d Cir. Mar. 28, 2024) (per curiam) (“Superintendent
Ransom’s awareness of Murray’s allegations concerning C.O. McCoy, without more, is
insufficient to establish personal involvement” (citing cases)); Curtis v. Wetzel, 763 F. App’x
259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“The District Court properly determined that Defendants
[Superintendent] Wenerowicz, Lewis, and Shaylor — who participated only in the denial of
Curtis’ grievances — lacked the requisite personal involvement [in the conduct at issue].”);
Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, 2022 WL 17248100, at *2 (3d. Cir. Nov. 28, 2022) (per
curiam) (“Contrary to Robinson’s assertions, awareness of a grievance or complaint after the

Eckard, 804 F. App’x 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (concluding that failure to train and
supervise claims asserted against supervisor defendants were meritless where the plaintiff failed
to make a plausible showing of an underlying constitutional violation). “Put another way, the
inmate must identify the supervisor’s specific acts or omissions demonstrating the supervisor’s
deliberate indifference to the inmate’s risk of injury and must establish a link between the
supervisor, the act, and the injury.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227.
11

allegedly unconstitutional conduct has occurred, without more, is insufficient to establish
personal involvement.”). Because it may be possible for Jefferies to alleged additional facts to
state plausible claims against Terra, his claims will be dismissed without prejudice, and he will
be granted leave to amend these claims.
B. State Law Claims
Jefferies alleges state law claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional
distress against the individual DOC Defendants. (Compl. at 10.) By statute, Pennsylvania law
provides the Commonwealth, its agencies, officials and employees acting in the scope of their
duties with sovereign immunity from damages claims. See 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2310
(establishing immunity for Commonwealth officials and employees); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521
(limiting waiver of immunity to specific exceptions); id. § 8522 (setting forth limited
exceptions); see also Stackhouse v. Com., Pa. State Police, 892 A.2d 54, 58 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2006) (“Generally, the Commonwealth and its agencies, officials and employees acting within
the scope of their duties are immune from suits for damages.”’). “As a general matter, subject
only to nine specific statutory exceptions, this sovereign immunity bars state law tort claims like
those alleged here, since Commonwealth employees are immune from liability for either
negligence or intentional torts.”’ Taalibuddeen v. Walmart, Inc., No. 22-1354, 2026 WL 972896,
at *10 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2026) (quoting Colon v. Kenwall, No. 18-840, 2018 WL 5809863, at
*6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2018))). Because Jeffries’s state law claims do not fall within any of the

7 “The nine exceptions to sovereign immunity relate to: vehicle liability; medical
professional liability; care, custody or control of personal property; Commonwealth real estate,
highways and sidewalks; potholes and other dangerous conditions; care, custody or control of
animals; liquor store sales; National Guard activities; and toxoids and vaccines.” Garcia v.
Howell, No. 800 C.D. 2018, 2019 WL 3986331, at *3 n.3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 23, 2019)
(citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522(b)).

12

recognized exceptions, the DOC employees are entitled to immunity on the negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court will grant Jefferies leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court is prepared
to serve Jefferies’s Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference based on alleged
exposure to ETS against Defendants Cavalari, Rienecker, Pierce, Davis, and Hunter. The claims
alleged against Terra are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Claims against Pennsylvania Correctional Industries/Commissary, claims for
money damages alleged against Defendants in their official capacities, and state law claims are
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.
Considering Jefferies’s pro se status, he will be granted the option of filing an amended
complaint to attempt to cure the defects identified by the Court.® In the alternative, Jefferies may
advise the Court that he seeks to proceed only on the deliberate indifference claims against
Defendants Cavalari, Rienecker, Pierce, Davis, and Hunter, which pass statutory screening.
Jefferies’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel will be held in abeyance at this time.

8 If Jefferies chooses to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint must be a
complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to
state aclaim. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 contemplates amended pleadings,
“an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original pleading a
nullity.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019). “Thus, the most recently
filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.” Jd. While the Court must liberally
construe pro se pleadings, “liberal construction of a pro se amended complaint does not mean
accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings.” Argentina v. Gillette, 778 F. App’x 173,
175 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019). This means that the submission of an amended complaint “effectively
constitutes an abandonment of any prior complaints filed by a plaintiff.” Smith v. Price, No. 11-
1581, 2012 WL 1068159, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2012), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 11-1581, 2012 WL 1072282 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2012). Accordingly, if Jeffries
does not include all of his claims in an amended complaint he files, they will be deemed waived.
13

An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

□□□ □□ SCOTT, J. 7

14

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418221. Public record. Not legal advice.