# Amones

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418172

## Case

- **Full name:** Gregory Allen Amones, Jr. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

GREGORY ALLEN AMONES, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 2:25-cv-1130-SJH

COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.
______________________________/
MEMORANDUM ORDER1
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal of an administrative
decision denying his application under the Social Security Act (“Act”) for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
found Plaintiff had not been under a disability from November 1, 2018, the alleged
disability onset date, through December 31, 2023, the date last insured. Tr. at 152–
165. For the reasons herein, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
I. Standard of Review
Plaintiff appeals the denial of his application under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 401 et seq.2 Under § 405(g), judicial review “is limited to an inquiry into whether there
is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner, and whether the

1 The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge.

2 The regulations under Title II are located at 20 CFR pt. 404.
correct legal standards were applied.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th
Cir. 2002); see also Ohneck v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 22-13984, 2023 WL
8946613, at *2 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 2023).3

The agency’s factual findings are “conclusive” if “substantial evidence”
supports them. Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 99 (2019). Substantial evidence
“means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. at 103 (citation omitted). Though requiring

“more than a mere scintilla” of evidence, the threshold for this standard “is not high[,]”
id. (citation omitted), and does not require a preponderance of the evidence, Flowers v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 97 F.4th 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2024); see also Parks ex rel. D.P.
v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 783 F.3d 847, 850 (11th Cir. 2015). So long as “the ALJ’s
decision clears the low evidentiary bar[,]” a reviewing court must affirm even if it

“would have reached a different result and even if a preponderance of the evidence
weighs against the Commissioner’s decision[.]” Flowers, 97 F.4th at 1309. A reviewing
court may not “decide the facts anew, make credibility determinations, or re-weigh
evidence.” Id. at 1306 (citation omitted); see also Rodriguez v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 118 F.4th
1302, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2024); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir.

1990).

3 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent; however, they may be cited when
persuasive on a particular point. See United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2000);
11th Cir. R. 36-2.
The same deference does not attach to conclusions of law. See Flowers, 97 F.4th
at 1304, 1306; Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. A “failure to apply the correct legal standards
or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient basis for a determination that proper

legal principles have been followed mandates reversal.” Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529; see
also Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007).
II. The ALJ’s Decision
Under the Act’s general statutory definition, a person is considered disabled if

unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable
impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).4 In
making a disability determination, the Social Security Administration generally uses a
five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).5 The ALJ applied this five-

4 Because the definitions of disability under Title II and Title XVI are the same, cases under
one statute are generally persuasive as to the other. See Jones v. Astrue, No. 3:10-cv-914-J-JBT, 2011
WL 13173806, at *2 n.2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2011).

5 At step one, the person must show the person is not engaged in substantial gainful activity.
At step two, the person must show the person has a severe impairment or combination of impairments.
At step three, the person may show the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals
the severity of one of the listings in the appendix of the applicable regulations. Absent such a showing,
at step four, the person must show the person cannot perform the person’s past relevant work given
the person’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Step five, at which the burden temporarily shifts to
the Commissioner, asks whether there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy the
person can perform given the person’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. If it is determined
at any step the person is or is not disabled, the analysis ends without proceeding further. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4); Flowers, 97 F.4th at 1308; Jacob v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:22-cv-2435-CEH-TGW,
2024 WL 3548902, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. July 26, 2024).
step sequential process. Tr. at 153–64.6 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from November 1, 2018,
the alleged disability onset date, through December 31, 2023, the date last insured. Id.

at 154. The ALJ found at step two that Plaintiff, through the date last insured, “had
the following severe impairments: vision loss of the left eye; degenerative joint disease
of the right hip; degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; generalized anxiety
disorder; and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).” Id. at 155.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not, through the date last insured, have

an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals a listed
impairment. Id. The ALJ found that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit for
six hours in an eight hour workday; stand and/or walk for six hours in
an eight hour workday; occasional climbing of ramps and/or stairs but
no climbing ladders, ropes, and/or scaffolds; frequent balancing,
stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; no commercial driving;
work environments of moderate noise as defined by Selected
Characteristics of Occupations noise code III; no working in high,
exposed places; no working in proximity to moving mechanical parts;
limited to jobs requiring monocular vision; no peripheral vision; no depth
perception; able to understand, remember, and carry out simple
instructions; able to make simple work-related decisions; able to adapt to
occasional changes in a routine work setting; occasional interaction with
co-workers and supervisors; an[d] no interaction with the public.

6 Title II of the Act “provides old-age, survivor, and disability benefits to insured individuals
irrespective of financial need.” Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, 475 (2019) (quotation omitted). The
ALJ found Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements on December 31, 2023. Tr. at 152, 154.
Id. at 157 (emphasis removed). The ALJ found at step four that Plaintiff has no past
relevant work through the date last insured, but found at step five that jobs exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform such that he

was not under a disability through the date last insured. Id. at 163–64.
III. Discussion
Plaintiff raises four issues on appeal:
1. Whether the [ALJ] erred in failing to reflect in the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) Plaintiff’s moderate limitation in
concentration, persistence, or pace or to adequately explain why such
restriction is not needed.

2. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to account for Plaintiff’s
headaches in the RFC and hypothetical questions to the vocational
expert (“VE”).

3. Whether the ALJ erred in citing router and price marker as these
jobs are obsolete.

4. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to address Plaintiff’s medication
side effects.

Doc. 19 at 1.7 Each is addressed in turn.

7 To the extent, within the discussion of the specific issues Plaintiff raises, Plaintiff buries
argument, in a perfunctory manner, as to other issues that have not been properly raised or developed,
any such issues or arguments are not properly before the Court and need not be considered. See Garrett
v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 21-11749, 2022 WL 3226308, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2022);
Hemmelgarn v. Bisignano, No. 8:24-cv-2723-CPT, 2026 WL 864993, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2026);
Jimenez v. Bisignano, No. 8:24-cv-2509-AAS, 2025 WL 2860069, at *3 n.5 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2025);
Mecias v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-cv-2353-LHP, 2022 WL 3716738, at *5 n.9 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29,
2022); see also In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig. MDL 2406, 85 F.4th 1070, 1092 (11th Cir. 2023);
Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1313 (11th Cir. 2023). To the extent the undersigned
nevertheless discusses any such issues or arguments herein, it is merely to explain, in the alternative,
why they would not warrant reversal even if properly raised and considered.
A. First Issue
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in failing to reflect in the RFC “Plaintiff’s

moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace or to adequately explain
why such restriction is not needed.” Doc. 19 at 1, 9. But, the ALJ expressly provided
that the RFC limits Plaintiff to “simple instructions in a routine work place with
occasional changes, which well account for moderate deficits in understanding and
remembering instructions as well as concentration, persistence [, or] pace deficits.” Tr.

at 163. Plaintiff concedes as much. Doc. 19 at 9. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument rests on
the premise that the ALJ’s “limitation to simple instructions in a routine work place
does address Plaintiff’s moderate limitation in understanding, remembering, and
carrying out instructions but has nothing to do with maintaining concentration,
persistence, or pace” such that “the ALJ’s claim that this limitation addresses

Plaintiff’s moderate limitation in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace is ill-
founded.” Id. at 9–10; see also Doc. 21 at 1. But Plaintiff cites no authority for this bare
assertion, which is reason enough not to accept Plaintiff’s argument as to issue one.
See Garrett v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 21-11749, 2022 WL 3226308, at *3 (11th
Cir. Aug. 10, 2022); Hemmelgarn v. Bisignano, No. 8:24-cv-2723-CPT, 2026 WL

864993, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2026); Jimenez, 2025 WL 2860069, at *3 n.5 (M.D.
Fla. Oct. 9, 2025); Mecias v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-cv-2353-LHP, 2022 WL
3716738, at *5 n.9 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2022); see also In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust
Litig. MDL 2406, 85 F.4th 1070, 1092 (11th Cir. 2023); Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP,
84 F.4th 1300, 1313 (11th Cir. 2023).
In any event, even if considered, Plaintiff’s bare premise—that a “limitation in
understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions” necessarily “has nothing
to do with maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace” (“CPP”) such that the

ALJ’s stated analysis was per se invalid—is unpersuasive. To be sure, courts have
“rejected the argument that an ALJ generally accounts for a claimant’s limitations in”
CPP “by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled
work. But when medical evidence demonstrates that a claimant can engage in simple,
routine tasks or unskilled work despite limitations in” CPP “courts have concluded

that limiting the hypothetical to include only unskilled work sufficiently accounts for
such limitations.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011);
see also Jarrett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 422 F. App’x 869, 872 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n
ALJ’s hypothetical restricting the claimant to simple and routine tasks adequately

accounts for restrictions related to” CPP “where the medical evidence demonstrates
that the claimant retains the ability to perform the tasks despite concentration
deficiencies.”); Andrews v. Dudek, No. 8:24-cv-205-WFJ-TGW, 2025 WL 920565, at
*7 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2025) (“The plaintiff argues, vaguely, that the RFC is deficient
because it does not include ‘pacing or production limitations’. This argument fails

because Eleventh Circuit law holds that an RFC for simple, routine tasks sufficiently
accounts for moderate limitations in CPP when there is medical evidence supporting
that conclusion, which is present here.” (internal citations omitted)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 917374 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2025); Rodriguez v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:17-cv-1374-Orl-22GJK, 2018 WL 840129, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 25, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 829600 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12,
2018).
As Plaintiff makes no effort to show that the analysis of the ALJ here was

unsupported—simply declaring it invalid—Plaintiff’s assignment of error fails.
Moreover, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s analysis, which is confirmed by
medical evidence. For example, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that the
opinions of Dr. James Brown, the state agency psychological consultant at
reconsideration, were persuasive. Tr. at 162. And, as the ALJ correctly noted, Dr.

Brown opined that notwithstanding Plaintiff’s moderate CPP limitations, Plaintiff was
“maximally able to understand, to remember, and to carry out somewhat detailed but
not complex instructions, make decisions, and/or concentrate for extended periods,
accept instructions and respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting.”
Id.; see also id. at 216. Plaintiff’s first assignment of error fails.

B. Second Issue

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ “erred in failing to account for Plaintiff’s
headaches in the RFC and hypothetical questions to the” VE. Doc. 19 at 1, 13. Plaintiff
generally argues that the RFC “does not account for Plaintiff’s headaches”; that
Plaintiff reported his headaches and associated symptoms in a headache
questionnaire; that Plaintiff’s headaches, combined with his having only one eye,
contribute to vision problems; and that his headaches cause nausea and sensitivity to
noise. Id. at 13–14.
The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s headaches and found them to be a non-severe
impairment, which Plaintiff does not genuinely challenge. Tr. at 155.8 But the ALJ
also found other severe impairments, and, when discussing both those impairments

that were severe and those that were non-severe, stated that the ALJ “considered all
of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including those that were not
severe, when assessing the claimant’s” RFC. Id. Similarly, in discussing the RFC, the
ALJ expressly considered the entire record and of all of Plaintiff’s symptoms. Id. at
157–58. And the record bears out that these assurances were not hollow and thus

sufficient. See Peters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:22-cv-2665-JSS, 2023 WL 12176560,
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2023); Phim v. Kijakazi, No. 8:22-cv-1655-TGW, 2023 WL
12176561, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2023).
For example, when formulating the RFC, the ALJ discussed, inter alia,

Plaintiff’s subjectively reported symptoms—including his inability to sleep for more
than a few hours at a time and his sensitivity to sound—but found Plaintiff’s
allegations inconsistent with other evidence such that the evidence did not warrant any
greater limitations than those imposed in the RFC. Tr. at 158. The ALJ also discussed
Plaintiff’s treatment, which specifically included a March 2019 evaluation reflecting

8 Buried within Plaintiff’s argument as to issue two, Plaintiff includes a passing and
unsupported declaration that the ALJ should have found the headaches to be a severe impairment.
Doc. 19 at 14. Any such issue or argument has not been sufficiently and properly raised and need not
be considered. See supra note 7. Regardless, the ALJ found multiple severe impairments at step two
and proceeded to subsequent steps in the sequential analysis where, as discussed herein, the ALJ
properly considered all severe and non-severe impairments. See Tr. at 155; see also Peters v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 8:22-cv-2665-JSS, 2023 WL 12176560, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2023); Figueroa v.
Kljakazl, No. 8:22-cv-2216-AAS, 2023 WL 4574294, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2023).
“no need for headache medications” and normal imaging in April 2019 showing “no
temporal correlation with the claimant’s complaints of headaches.” Id. at 159. In short,
the ALJ properly considered all impairments, severe and non-severe, headaches

included, in formulating the RFC.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not cogently “identified any specific functional
limitation that was omitted that should have been included in the RFC due to
headaches.” Phim, 2023 WL 12176561, at *6. Nor has Plaintiff shown evidentiary
support for any functional limitation due to headaches that was not included in the

ALJ’s RFC. See id. at *7.9 Plaintiff’s second assignment of error fails.
C. Third Issue

Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s citation to the jobs of router and marker,
which Plaintiff argues are “obsolete.” Doc. 19 at 1, 15. The Court declines Plaintiff’s
invitation to declare the positions of router and marker obsolete and find
corresponding error. See Roper v. Dudek, No. 6:25-cv-226-CEM-DCI, 2025 WL
3036536, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
3034788 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2025); Hall v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:23-cv-1141-DNF,
2024 WL 3385452, at *5 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 2024); Gonzalez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.

8:23-cv-106-JSS, 2024 WL 489494, at *8–9 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2024); Hemmings v.

9 To the contrary, the ALJ’s restrictive RFC specifically accounts for, among other things,
vision limitations and sensitivity to sound. See Tr. at 157, 162–63. And state agency medical
consultants considered Plaintiff’s file (including allegations of headaches) and opined as to limitations
less restrictive than those ultimately imposed in the RFC (with the ALJ finding such opinions not
persuasive to the extent of imposing certain more restrictive limitations). See id. at 196–97, 201–03,
207–09, 211–14, 161–62.
Kijakazi, No. 8:23-cv-977-SPF, 2023 WL 6173448, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2023).
Plaintiff's third assignment of error fails.
D. Fourth Issue
Plaintiff finally contends that “the ALJ erred in failing to address Plaintiff's
medication side effects.” Doc. 19 at 1, 17. But the ALJ not only expressly considered
Plaintiffs medication side effects, Tr. at 158, the ALJ specifically acknowledged and
accounted for them in formulating the RFC, id. at 163.!° Plaintiffs fourth assignment
of error fails.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is ordered:
1. The Commissioner’s decision is affirmed; and
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant
and to close this file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on July 24, 2026.

[Z J. Horovitz
United States Magistrate Judge

‘© Defendant notes as much and that a plain reading of the ALJ’s decision belies Plaintiff's
argument, Doc. 20 at 13, which Plaintiff does not address on reply, Doc. 21.

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11418172. Public record. Not legal advice.