# Opinion

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · August 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417729

## Case

- **Full name:** Southwest Materials Inc v. Gerald Miller; Louisiana Workers Compensation Corp.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

SOUTHWEST MATERIALS INC CASE NO. 2:24-CV-01441

JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. 28] filed by limitation
plaintiff Southwest Materials Inc. (“Southwest”). Claimant Gerald Miller opposes the
motion. Doc. 38. Claimant Louisiana Workers Compensation Corp. adopts Miller’s
opposition. Doc. 40.
I.
BACKGROUND

This limitation of liability suit arises from injuries suffered by Gerald Miller while
working on a materials barge owned and operated by Southwest on April 21, 2024, at the
Port Aggregates, Inc. (“PAI”) facility in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. Miller filed an
admiralty claim and third-party complaint against Southwest as his employer and PAI as
his borrowing employer, alleging that he was entitled to damages as a Jones Act seaman
injured aboard a vessel. Doc. 12. Limitation plaintiff Southwest now brings this motion for
summary judgment, asserting that Miller does not qualify as a Jones Act seaman and that
his claims for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and punitive
damages must be dismissed. Miller and the Louisiana Workers Compensation Corp.
oppose the motion. Docs. 38, 40.

II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party is initially responsible for identifying
portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact.
Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). He may meet his burden by
pointing out “the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case.” Malacara
v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2003). The non-moving party is then required to go
beyond the pleadings and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To this end he must submit
“significant probative evidence” in support of his claim. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v.
Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249 (citations omitted).
A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on
a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 150 (2000). The court is also required to view all evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Clift v.

Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, a genuine issue of material
fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

III.
LAW & APPLICATION

The Jones Act provides remedies in tort law for a seaman who is injured in the
course of his employment. Land-based maritime employees, on the other hand, are limited
to worker's compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
(“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. In re Two-J Ranch, Inc., 534 F.Supp.2d 671, 677
(W.D. La. 2008). The Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually exclusive compensation
regimes. Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 553 (1997).
To qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements:
(1) his duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its
mission, and (2) he must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiable
group of vessels) that is substantial both in duration and nature. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,
515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995). “To satisfy the first prong of the Chandris test, the claimant
need only show that he ‘do[es] the ship’s work.’” In re Endeavour Marine, Inc., 234 F.3d

287, 290 (5th Cir. 2000). This requirement is very broad. Id. The purpose of the second
prong is to “separate the sea-based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act
protection from those land-based workers who have only a transitory or sporadic
connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore, whose employment does not regularly
expose them to the perils of the sea.” Id. The second “substantial connection” requirement
involves consideration of both the duration and nature of an individual's employment,
which is a much more involved inquiry. Id. As the Supreme Court has stated:

the total circumstances of an individual's employment must be weighed to
determine whether he had a sufficient relationship to the navigation of
vessels and the perils attendant thereon. The duration of a worker's
connection to a vessel and the nature of the worker's activities, taken
together, determine whether a maritime employee is a seaman because the
ultimate inquiry is whether the worker in question is a member of the vessel's
crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on the
vessel at a given time.

Chandris, 515 U.S. at 370 (citation omitted). To establish a sufficient temporal connection
to meet the duration requirement, a plaintiff must show that he spends at least 30 percent
of his time in service of a vessel or an identifiable group of vessels. Roberts v. Cardinal
Services, Inc., 266 F.3d 368, 374–75 (5th Cir. 2001).
The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently provided three additional factors
that this court must consider in determining whether the “substantial connection”
requirement has been met to qualify as a seaman and derive benefits under the Jones Act.
Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas, Inc., 997 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2021). The court
overruled its prior opinion in Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLC, 744 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 2014),
emphasizing that the “perils of sea” test is only a consideration and should not be the sole
or primary test. Id. at 573. Instead, courts must consider the following additional factors:
(1) Does the worker owe his allegiance to the vessel, rather than simply to a
shoreside employer?
(2) Is the work sea-based or does it involve seagoing activity? and
(3) (a) Is the worker's assignment to a vessel limited to performance of a
discrete task after which the worker's connection to the vessel ends, or (b)
Does the worker's assignment include sailing with the vessel from port to
port or location to location?
Id.
Miller pled that he “was working as a Jones Act seaman aboard the SMI-101, a

materials barge owned, operated, and/or controlled by [PAI] and/or [Southwest], at all
pertinent times hereto, which was a vessel in navigation.” Doc. 12, ¶ IV. Southwest
provides unloading services for barges carrying construction materials at distinct locations
in southwest Louisiana. Doc. 28, att. 3, pp. 31–33. It owns and operates three spud barges
to carry out its operation, the SMI-101, SMI-103, and the SMI 107. Id. at 13. Southwest
operates with a single crew, which receives instruction from land-based superintendent

Chad Alcock. Doc. 28, att. 4, p. 80. At the time of the accident, Miller worked for
Southwest as supervisor of this crew. Doc. 28, att. 4, pp. 35–36, 137–38.
The crew’s assignment to any of the three barges depends on the job and customer,
varying from day to day. Doc. 28, att. 3, pp. 31–35. The SMI-101 services PAI and Prairie
Construction, at Bayou d’Inde in Westlake, Louisiana, and occasionally out of PAI’s

facility in Mermentau, Louisiana. Id. at 32–35; doc. 28, att. 4, pp. 63–64. Regardless of
location, Southwest’s barges function as stationary, shoreside work platforms from which
material is transferred to land-based vehicles. Doc. 28, att. 3, pp. 48, 99; doc. 28, att. 4, pp.
62–63. They are spudded down about twenty-five feet from shore and remain stationary
during the unloading process. Doc. 28, att. 4, pp. 90–91, 183. The barges have no self-

propulsion, navigational lighting, rudder or steering controls, or crew quarters. Id. at 125.
The only motor aboard is a small combustion engineer to power the hopper equipment. Id.
When a Southwest barge is traveling a short distance between customer locations, portions
of the crew (including Miller) will regularly ride along on the barge. Id. at 127–28; doc.
28, att. 5, p. 38. The crew does no work during this time, however, and the barge instead
has its own deckhands to assist in navigation. Doc. 28, att. 5, pp. 39–40.

Upon arrival of the product barge, Miller’s crew directs its positioning by hand or
voice signal and then ties it off for unloading—but the product barges are propelled by
third parties with their own captains and crews. Id. at 72–74; doc. 128, att. 5, pp. 37–38.
Apart from telling the tug captain when the crew is ready to move or stop and how they
want the product positioned, Miller does not instruct the tug captain on how to navigate or
operate his vessel. Doc. 28, att. 4, pp. 114–15; doc. 28, att. 3, p. 70. However, the Southwest

crew uses its own ropes to tie up barges and moves product barges with a track hoe as they
are emptied. Doc. 38, att. 6, pp. 48–49. Miller described his crew’s core function at any job
site as getting product unloaded. Doc. 28, att. 4, p. 111. At the end of each shift, he leaves
the barge and drives home. Id. at 93. He has never slept aboard the Southwest barges, which
do not contain sleeping quarters. Id. at 142–43.

Miller was injured on April 21, 2024. He arrived at the worksite around 6:00 that
morning and inspected the barge to make sure it was ready to begin work. Doc. 28, att. 4,
pp. 94, 155, 253. About fifteen minutes later, while walking on the deck, he tripped on
hydraulic hoses that ran along the deck surface. Id. at 180, 219–20. Miller points to
evidence that the SMI-101 was poorly maintained, with numerous waste holes in the

decking. Doc. 38, att. 3, pp. 20, 40. Miller also emphasizes that only one of the two spuds
on the SMI-101 was operational at the time of his accident, meaning that the barge was
poorly secured and would rock back and forth when it was meant to be stationary. See doc.
38, att. 1, pp. 281–83; doc. 38, att. 6, pp. 19–21.
The facts in this matter are similar to three recent cases rejecting Jones Act status
under Chandris and Sanchez. In Meaux v. Cooper Consolidated, LLC, the plaintiff worked

as a flagger and utility man as borrowed employee of Cooper, which loads and unloads
vessels moored in the Mississippi River. The court initially granted summary judgment on
seaman status, taking note of the “separation from the safety of land, even if not all that
far, taken together with the fact that all of Meaux’s work was performed aboard vessels
midstream in a dangerous river[.]” Meaux v. Cooper Consol., LLC, 545 F.Supp.3d 383,
388 (E.D. La. 2021) (ASHE, J.). After a bench trial, however, the court reconsidered its

ruling and determined that Meaux was not a seaman. Meaux v. Cooper Consol., LLC, 601
F.Supp.3d 38, 42 (E.D. La. 2022). Even though Meaux’s work was done midstream, the
court determined, boarding a crew boat and performing longshore work near or around
water did not qualify as seagoing activity under Sanchez. Id. at 54. “Otherwise, scores of
maritime workers would be transformed into Jones Act seamen who the law currently does

not recognize as such.” Id.
In Rutherford v. Pontchartrain Materials Corp., LLC, 732 F.Supp.3d 536 (E.D. La.
2024) (ASHE, J.), the defendant owned and operated three spud barges that it used in
conjunction with material handling. Id. at 539. During unloading, its barges were spudded
down or tied to shore and connected to land by a gangplank. Id. For short trips Pontchartrain

employees also occasionally rode on the spud barges. Id. The plaintiff was a loader, who
was primarily assigned to one of the spud barges. Id. During unloading, he would work on
the third-party-owned material barges to signal crane operators or move materials with a
front-end loader. Id. He also assisted in moving the material barge, including tying it to the
shore. Id. at 540. He was injured while aboard one of the material barges, when he was
knocked into the water by the bucket of an excavator. Id. Judge Ashe granted summary

judgment for the defendant on seaman status, finding that the matter “[did] not present as
close of a call as did Meaux.” Id. at 546. To this end he noted that Rutherford “nearly
always worked on vessels that were only a gangplank away from shore,” that the material
barges were almost always located near shore during his work, and that “he never worked
on any vessel while it was in motion.” Id.
Meanwhile, in Bouton v. Manson Construction Company, 705 F.Supp.3d 622 (W.D.

La. 2023) (JOSEPH, J.), the plaintiff worked as a laborer on a spudded-down platform at a
dock demolition and construction project. Id. at 626. He contended that he also worked
aboard several vessels owned or leased by Manson, and that his duties included piloting a
skiff, traveling with a transport barge, and other vessel-related tasks. Id. The court rejected
the notion that Bouton owed his allegiance to a vessel, however. It observed that he was

not assigned to any particular vessel and “only occasionally boarded a tugboat to move the
position of the barges . . . [;] these tasks were part and parcel with [his] discrete job
responsibilities in assisting with the demolition of the old dock.” Id. at 633. It further
concluded that Bouton’s work was not seagoing, because his duties on the barges were
accomplished while they were spudded down or tied off close to shore. Id. at 628.

In contrast, Miller relies on Cole v. Oceaneering International, 681 F.Supp.3d 658
(E.D. La. 2023). There the court reconsidered its prior ruling and granted summary
judgment to a crane operator, finding that he established a sufficient connection to his
vessel to qualify as a seaman. Id. As the court noted, however, and in contrast to Miller,
Cole worked aboard a vessel in navigation (operating in the Gulf of America) and slept
aboard that vessel. Id. at 687. Defendant did not challenge Cole’s assertion that his work

was sea-based, as he assisted with the vessel’s projects including “underwater salvage
operations, platform and stub removal, remotely operated underwater vehicle and diving
support services, pipeline riser and subsea work, platform jacket repairs and other offshore
subsea and surface inspection, maintenance, repair, and installation operations.” Id.
Furthermore, Cole slept aboard the vessel for the entirety of its hitches. Id. at 574.
Accordingly, he made a much stronger case under all three of the Sanchez factors.

As these cases illustrate, it is usually the nature of the work rather than the proximity
to water that separates a seaman from a longshoreman. Under Chandris, as explained
above, the claimant must show that (1) his duties must contribute to the function of the
vessel or the accomplishment of its mission, and (2) he must have a connection to a vessel
in navigation (or an identifiable group of vessels) that is substantial both in duration and

nature. 515 U.S. at 368 (1995). Under the first prong, a vessel includes “any watercraft
practically capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or state of
transit at a particular time.” Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 497 (2005).
Accordingly, a spud barge that is still moved regularly (even if only over short distances)
qualifies as a vessel. Ducote v. V. Keeler & Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 1992).

The court focuses its inquiry on the substantial prong, under which it must consider:
(1) Does the worker owe his allegiance to the vessel, rather than simply to a
shoreside employer?
(2) Is the work sea-based or does it involve seagoing activity? and
(3) (a) Is the worker's assignment to a vessel limited to performance of a
discrete task after which the worker's connection to the vessel ends, or (b)
Does the worker's assignment include sailing with the vessel from port to
port or location to location?

Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 573.
Here, as in Rutherford, Miller is not a Jones Act seaman even if he satisfies the other
prongs because he does not engage in sea-based or seagoing activity. 732 F.Supp.3d at 546.
Although he was sometimes transported on the barge, his actual work was accomplished
while it was stationary. His evidence that the barge was not as securely spudded as it could
have been, and that the platform would shift slightly with wind or currents, cannot convert
a platform to a vessel in navigation. His duties aboard that structure, which related chiefly
to unloading moored material barges, were “decidedly not sea-based.” Bouton, 705
F.Supp.3d at 633. While Miller took a limited role in positioning the materials barge, this

was only done in service of unloading the vessels—the role of a longshoreman, not a
seaman. As the courts emphasized in Rutherford and Bouton, Miller remained a short
distance from shore. And as in these cases and Meaux, he did not sleep aboard the vessel.
Accordingly, the vessel served as a stationary platform during the time Miller was actually
working aboard it and its involvement in this matter does not transform Miller into a

seaman.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. 28] will be
GRANTED and Miller’s claims for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance
and cure, and punitive damages will be dismissed.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on the 14th da August, 2026.

JAMES D. CAIN, JR. .
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417729. Public record. Not legal advice.