# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. New York · July 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417577

## Case

- **Full name:** Allstate Insurance Company, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, Allstate Indemnity Company, and Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. GVA Group Inc., Aleksandr Ageyev, John Does 1 Through 5 and ABC Corporations 1 Through 5
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** July 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, ALLSTATE REPORT AND
INDEMNITY COMPANY, AND RECOMMENDATION
ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 25-CV-3240
(Merchant, J.)
Plaintiffs, (Marutollo, M.J.)

v.

GVA GROUP INC., ALEKSANDR AGEYEV,
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 5 AND
ABC CORPORATIONS 1 THROUGH 5,

Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiffs Allstate Insurance Company, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company,
Allstate Indemnity Company, and Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Defendants GVA Group Inc. (“GVA Group”)
and Aleksandr Ageyev (collectively, “Defaulting Defendants”), as well as John Does 1 through 5
and ABC Corporations 1 through 5 (collectively, “John Doe Defendants”), alleging an insurance
fraud scheme in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),
18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., as well as New York common law fraud and unjust enrichment claims.
See generally Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201
regarding Plaintiffs’ obligation to pay Defaulting Defendants’ unpaid claims. See id.
Currently pending before this Court, on a referral from the Honorable Orelia E. Merchant,
United States District Judge, is Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against Defaulting
Defendants. See Dkt. No. 27; Referral Order, dated Feb. 13, 2026. For the reasons set forth below,
the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion be granted in part and denied in
part.1
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), Plaintiffs’ default judgment

motion and the attachments thereto (Dkt. No. 27), and Plaintiffs’ submissions in response to
various Court orders (Dkt. Nos. 12-18, 20, 29, 30). The facts are assumed to be true for the
purposes of this motion. See Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that
“[i]n light of [the defendant’s] default, a court is required to accept all of [the plaintiff’s] factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor” (citation omitted)).
Plaintiffs—corporations organized under the laws of the State of Illinois and having their
principal places of business in Illinois—are “duly organized and licensed to engage in the writing
of automobile insurance policies in the State of New York and provide automobile insurance
coverage to their policyholders under and in accordance with New York State law.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶

62-67. Pursuant to New York’s Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Reparations Act (the
“No-Fault Law”), N.Y. Ins. Law § 5101, et seq., “Plaintiffs are required to pay, inter alia, for health
service expenses that are reasonably incurred as a result of injuries suffered by occupants of their
insured motor vehicles or pedestrians [(“Covered Persons”)], which arise from the use or operation
of such motor vehicles in the State of New York.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 19. “Covered Persons can also
assign these benefits to doctors and other properly licensed healthcare providers, including

1 Jessica Argento, a judicial intern who is a second-year law student at St. John’s University School of Law,
is gratefully acknowledged for her assistance in the research of this Report and Recommendation.
[durable medical equipment (“DME”)2] retailers, enabling them to bill insurance companies
directly for their services.” Id.
GVA Group—a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Brooklyn,
New York—is a retail DME supply company. Id. ¶ 69. GVA Group “bills for medical supplies
provided to, among others, individuals covered under the No-[F]ault Law.” Id. ¶ 79. “In exchange

for its services, GVA Group accepts assignments of benefits from Covered Persons covered under
the No-Fault Law and submits claims for payment to No-Fault insurance carriers, in general, and
to Plaintiffs, in particular.” Id. Ageyev is the “principal, officer, and/or director of GVA Group”
and “operated, managed, and/or controlled [GVA Group’s] activities.” Id. ¶ 68.3
In this action, Plaintiffs seek “to recover more than $53,000.00 that Defendants stole from
Plaintiffs through the submission of thousands of false and/or fraudulent insurance claims for
[DME] and/or orthotic devices.”4 Id. ¶ 2; see also Dkt. No. 27-15 (noting $53,256.23 as the total
payments made to GVA Group for which Plaintiffs seek to recover). Plaintiffs allege that
Defaulting Defendants—working with certain medical clinics that bill no-fault insurers for medical

services operating in the New York metropolitan area (“No-Fault Clinics”)—exploited the No-

2 Plaintiffs refer to “DME” generally as “equipment and/or supplies used for medical purposes by
individuals in their homes, including, among other things, cervical pillows, cervical traction units, cold/hot
water circulating pumps, EMS units, hot/cold packs, infrared heat lamps, lumbar cushions, [and]
mattresses.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2.

3 Plaintiffs allege that “[o]n information and belief, John Does 1 through 5 are individuals that are unknown
to Plaintiffs, who conspired, participated, conducted, and assisted in the fraudulent and unlawful conduct
alleged herein.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 70. Plaintiffs also allege that ABC Corporations 1 through 5 “are additional
companies that are unknown to Plaintiffs that are owned, controlled, and operated by one or more of the
John Doe Defendants, which were used in connection with the kickback scheme with the Defendants
alleged herein to obtain referrals, prescriptions and/or Covered Persons in furtherance of the scheme.” Id.
¶ 71.

4 Per Plaintiffs, “‘orthotic devices’ generally refers to items that are used to support a weak or deformed
body member or to restrict or eliminate movement for medical purposes. Such items include, but are not
limited to, back braces, cervical collars, knee braces, shoulder braces and wrist braces.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2.
Fault system by participating in illegal kickback or other financial compensation agreements. Dkt.
No. 1 ¶¶ 3-4. Plaintiffs argue that “unlicensed laypersons, rather than the healthcare professionals
working in the No-Fault Clinics, created and controlled the purported patient base at [the No-Fault]
Clinics, and directed fraudulent protocols used to maximize profits without regard to actual patient
care by exploiting the No-[F]ault Law and applicable Fee Schedule,” and in particular, through

“various deceptive billing tactics engineered to maximize the amount of reimbursement from
insurers, in general, and Plaintiffs, in particular.” Id. ¶ 120. Defaulting Defendants allegedly
engaged in these unlawful financial arrangements with the John Doe Defendants, allowing them
to submit hundreds of fraudulent charges for DME and/or orthotic devices. Id. ¶ 117.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the No-Fault Clinics provided fraudulent prescriptions to
Defaulting Defendants that Ageyev, through GVA Group, in turn, “generated and submitted bills
to Plaintiffs.” Id. ¶ 11. The No-Fault Clinics purportedly engaged in the scheme in several ways,
including by:
(i) ensuring that their associated doctors and/or chiropractors (. . .“Health Care
Practitioners” or “HCPs”) prescribed large amounts of virtually identical DME
and/or orthotic devices to their patient population, pursuant to a predetermined
course of treatment irrespective of medical necessity, with the prescribed items
being dictated by GVA Group;

(ii) ensuring that the prescriptions were sufficiently generic so that the nature,
quality, and cost of any DME and/or orthotic device could not be verified based on
the description of the prescribed item alone; and/or

(iii) ensuring that the prescriptions were provided directly to GVA Group to ensure
that GVA Group could bill Plaintiffs to purportedly fill the prescription rather than
allow the possibility that the Covered Person may fill the prescription at a DME
retailer of their own choosing.

Id. ¶ 5; see also id. ¶¶ 134-36, 138-39 (further describing the role of the No-Fault Clinics in the
scheme, including “routinely provid[ing] GVA Group with generic, non-descript prescriptions for
certain Fee Schedule Items . . . , which GVA Group then used to unilaterally determine the DME
provided to Covered Persons in purported fulfillment of the general prescriptions, in order to bill
for the most expensive type of DME and/or orthotic device”) .
Using the fraudulent prescriptions received from the No-Fault Clinics, Ageyev—through
GVA Group—purportedly submitted bills to Plaintiffs that knowingly misrepresented the actual
amounts paid for DME and/or orthotic devices, as well as the cost, quality, and medical necessity

of the items purportedly provided and whether these items were reimbursable under the Fee
Schedule, which determines the maximum permissible reimbursement amount for which health
care providers may charge for services under the No-Fault Law. See id. ¶¶ 11-14, 16, 17, 50-53;
see also Dkt. No. 1-4 at 3-55 (representative sample of fraudulent billing for medical equipment
and/or services provided regardless of medical necessity), 7-14 (representative sample of unpaid
No-Fault claims).
The prescriptions from the No-Fault Clinics were allegedly sent to GVA Group directly,
without any involvement from the patients, who were often not given an option to use any other
DME retailer other than GVA Group. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 124. DME and/or orthotic devices that GVA

Group purported to provide “seldom varied from patient-to-patient over a given period of time and
also did not change based on any differences in the Covered Person’s condition, age, complaints,
type of accident, or nature of alleged injury.” Id. ¶ 98. Plaintiffs allege that HCPs at the No-Fault
Clinics also routinely provided virtually identical DME and/or orthotic devices to two or more
patients who were involved in the same accident, where it is highly improbable that they would
require identical care. Id. ¶¶ 113-14. As a result of the fraudulent arrangements, Defaulting
Defendants “billed hundreds of thousands of dollars to Plaintiffs.” Id. ¶ 129.

5 Page citations are to the ECF-stamped pages unless otherwise noted.
Ageyev, through GVA Group, also routinely submitted fraudulent bills to Plaintiffs seeking
reimbursement for (i) “expensive custom-fabricated DME and/or orthotic devices, such as
shoulder and back braces, that were never provided;” (ii) “expensive DME and/or orthotic devices
that required a customized fitting that they never performed;” and/or (iii) “rates under expensive
fee schedule codes for DME and/or orthotic devices that GVA Group never actually provided.” Id.

¶ 147. Additionally, “GVA Group’s bills intentionally omitted the make, model, and manufacturer
of the DME and/or orthotic devices purportedly provided to Covered Persons in order to conceal
the fact that the DME and/or orthotic devices purportedly provided were inexpensive and of poor
quality, to the extent they were provided at all.” Id. ¶ 146; see also id. ¶ 182 (alleging that, when
GVA Group billed for cervical traction units under a certain code, it “falsely represented that they
provided expensive, medically necessary cervical traction units when in actuality they provided
cheap, inexpensive items that in many cases were replicas or knockoffs of trademarked items”).
“[T]o the extent that they provided any DME and/or orthotic devices at all, [Defendants] provided
Covered Persons with inferior, low-quality items, or items that directly contravened the treatment

plan indicated by the treating physicians, potentially compromising Covered Persons’ health.” Id.
¶ 54.
The New York No-Fault Law, regulations, and insurance policies require Plaintiffs to
process claims within thirty days of receipt of proof of claim. Id. ¶¶ 83, 229. In fulfilling this
obligation to promptly process claims, Plaintiffs relied on bills, documentation, and other
information mailed by Defaulting Defendants to Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 84. According to Plaintiffs, due
to Defaulting Defendants’ material representations and efforts to conceal their fraud, Plaintiffs did
not discover their damages were attributable to the fraud scheme until in or about February 2024.
Id. ¶ 230. Plaintiffs ultimately incurred damages of more than $53,000.00 based upon the
fraudulent bill submissions. Id. ¶ 229.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on June 10, 2025. Dkt. No. 1.
On July 30, 2025, Plaintiffs executed service on GVA Group via service on the New York

State Secretary of State. Dkt. No. 9.
As to Ageyev, Plaintiffs initially believed that Ageyev resided at 60 Oceana Drive West,
Apt. 6C, Brooklyn, New York 11235. Dkt. No. 12 at 2. Plaintiffs, however, were unable to locate
Ageyev at that address when attempting service. Id. Following a search for an alternative address
for Ageyev, Plaintiffs attempted service at 1133 East 35th Street, Apt. 4D, Brooklyn, New York
11210 (the “35th Street Address”)—which was the address listed on GVA Group’s license
applications—but Plaintiffs found that the apartment was vacant and were unable to locate Ageyev.
Id. Plaintiffs then attempted service at a third residential address, 1854 Ocean Avenue, Apt. 3F,
Brooklyn, New York 11230 (the “Ocean Avenue Address”), but were still unable to locate Ageyev

despite numerous attempts to effectuate service. Id. As Ageyev is the listed owner of GVA Group,
Plaintiffs identified the 35th Street Address as GVA Group’s listed address, but, as previously
mentioned, Plaintiffs found that the apartment was vacant. Id. Plaintiffs additionally identified
2167 East 21st Street, Suite 242, Brooklyn, New York 11229 (the “21st Street Address”) as another
address used by GVA Group. Id. The 21st Street Address, however, was found to be a private
mailbox store, not a retail business. Id.
On September 4, 2025, Plaintiffs requested an extension of time to effectuate service on
Ageyev and leave to serve Ageyev by alternative means; specifically, to effectuate service on
Ageyev by serving the law firm representing GVA Group, Ageyev’s corporation, in civil actions
before the New York City Civil Court and arbitrations through the American Arbitration
Association. Id. at 3; see also Dkt. No. 13. On September 5, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiffs’
motion and extended the deadline to serve Ageyev until October 6, 2025, and granted Plaintiffs
leave to serve “Ageyev through counsel for his corporation, Defendant GVA Group, Inc., through
the Law Offices of Hillary Blumenthal, 711-32nd Street, 2nd Floor Union City, New Jersey 07087

and through the Law Offices of Zara Javakov, Esq., 100 Livingston Street, 4th Floor, Brooklyn,
New York 11201.” Text Order, dated Sep. 5, 2025. The Court found that, pursuant to New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules (“C.P.L.R.”) § 308(5), Plaintiffs demonstrated the impracticability
of traditional service on Ageyev, and that service through counsel for GVA Group was reasonably
calculated to give actual notice to Ageyev. Id.
On September 25, 2025, Plaintiffs reported that the attempts to serve Ageyev via the Law
Offices of Hillary Blumenthal and the Law Offices of Zara Javakov were rejected by counsel. Dkt.
No. 15 at 1-2. Plaintiffs requested that Plaintiffs instead be permitted to effectuate service on
Ageyev by “(1) mailing the [Summons and Complaint] to Defendant Ageyev, care of the co-

defendant corporation he owns, Defendant GVA Group Inc., to the address on file with the [New
York Department of State, Division of Corporations (“NYDOS”)] for service of process,” which
is the 35th Street Address; and by “(2) mailing the same to Defendant Ageyev, care of GVA Group
Inc, to the address that appears to be a private mailbox store, which Defendant GVA Group Inc.
listed on its recent billings to Plaintiffs,” which is the 21st Street Address. Id. at 2.
On September 26, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ request, and also directed Plaintiffs
to serve Ageyev “by publication, as well as via any email address or social media account of his
in Plaintiffs’ possession or ascertainable with reasonable diligence.” Text Order, dated Sep. 26,
2025. The Court also directed Plaintiffs to “‘nail’ a copy of the summons and complaint to the
35th Street Address, and call any telephone numbers of Defendant Ageyev in Plaintiffs’ possession
or ascertainable with reasonable diligence and supply the case caption and number,” and to
“contact the other attorney stated to be representing Defendant Ageyev by Law Offices of Hillary
Blumenthal in [Dkt. No.] 15 and attempt to serve Defendant Ageyev through the same.” Id.
Additionally, the Court sua sponte extended the deadline to serve Ageyev until October 15, 2025.

Id.
On September 29, 2025, Plaintiffs reported on its efforts to comply with the September 26,
2025 Text Order, and requested additional time to effectuate service. Dkt. No. 16. On September
30, 2025, the Court extended the deadline to serve Ageyev until November 14, 2025, and directed
Plaintiffs to further email a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Oleg Rybak, Esq. of the
Ryback Firm PLLC and to also serve Ageyev by publication in accordance with C.P.L.R. § 316.
Text Order, dated Sep. 30, 2025.
On November 13, 2025, Plaintiffs reported that, pursuant to the Court’s prior orders,
Plaintiffs “(1) completed service by affix and mail at the 35th Street Address; (2) completed service

by mail to the 21st Street Address; (3) completed service by publication by publishing a notice and
summons once in each of four consecutive weeks in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle and the Canarsie
Courier; and (4) emailed a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Oleg Rybak.” Dkt. No. 18 at
1-2 (footnotes omitted). Plaintiffs also reported that they “attempted to email a copy of the
Summons and Complaint to Defendant Ageyev at aageyev@proton.me, the email address on
record with the New York City Department of Consumer and Workplace Protection (‘DCWP’)
associated with GVA Group Inc’s DCWP license; attempted to identify social media accounts for
Defendant Ageyev; and attempted to call Defendant Ageyev at two phone numbers found using
online telephone number search websites without success.” Id. at 2.
On December 4, 2025, Plaintiffs reported that Ageyev and GVA Group were in default.
Dkt. No. 20. On December 19, 2025, Plaintiffs sought entry of certificates of default against GVA
Group and Ageyev. Dkt Nos. 22, 23. The Clerk of the Court entered certificates of default against
GVA Group and Ageyev on December 22, 2025. Dkt. Nos. 24, 25.
On February 12, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion. Dkt. No. 27.

II. Service, Jurisdiction, and Venue
The Court “must . . . satisfy itself that it has subject matter and personal jurisdiction before
rendering judgment against defendants.” Dumolo v. Dumolo, No. 17-CV-7294 (KAM) (CLP),
2019 WL 1367751, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2019) (citing Covington Indus., Inc. v. Resintex A.G.,
629 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1980) (“A judgment entered against parties not subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the rendering court is a nullity.”)).
A. Service of Process
“It is axiomatic that to obtain a default judgment against a defendant, the pleading must
have been properly served upon him.” Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Monteleone, 628 F. Supp. 3d 455,

460 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (adopting report and recommendation); see also Joe Hand Promotions, Inc.
v. Necessary Studios, Inc., No. 21-CV-5551 (LDH) (RER), 2022 WL 18858972, at *9 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 5, 2022) (quoting Happy Homes, LLC v. Jenerette-Snead, No. 15-CV-1788 (MKB) (RML),
2016 WL 6599826, at *3 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2016) (“Ineffective service-of-process is a ground
to deny a motion for default judgment.”)), report and recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated
Dec. 22, 2022.
Rule 4(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs service on a corporation,
partnership, or association, states that an entity “in a judicial district of the United States” must be
served, inter alia, “in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A). Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part,
Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an
incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served in a
judicial district of the United States by:
(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts
of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where
service is made; or
(2) doing any of the following:
(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
individual personally;
(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place
of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides
there; or
(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
New York law permits service on a corporation by
[p]ersonally delivering to and leaving with the secretary of state or a deputy, or with
any person authorized by the secretary of state to receive such service, at the office
of the department of state in the city of Albany, duplicate copies of such process
together with the statutory fee, which fee shall be a taxable disbursement. Service
of process on such corporation shall be complete when the secretary of state is so
served.
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 306(b)(1)(i); see also C.P.L.R. § 311(a)(1) (stating that personal service
upon a corporation may be made, inter alia, pursuant to section three hundred six or three hundred
seven of the business corporation law”); Logan v. World Luxury Cars, Inc., No. 15-CV-248 (ENV)
(PK), 2022 WL 2466834, at *405 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2022) (noting that “[w]hen the Secretary of
State is so served, service on a corporation is complete regardless of whether the corporation
receives the Summons and Complaint from the Secretary of State,” and recommending that such
service upon the Secretary of State was proper pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1) (citations omitted)), report
and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 156878 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2023).
Here, Plaintiffs served GVA Group on July 30, 2025 by delivering and leaving with an
authorized agent of the New York State Secretary of State, at the Office of the Department of State
in Albany, New York, two true copies of the Summons and Complaint, along with the statutory fee

of $40.00. Dkt. No. 9. Thus, GVA Group was properly served pursuant to N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §
306(b)(1) and Rule 4(h)(1). See Vazquez Romero v. La Morenita Fruit Mkt. Corp., No. 23-CV-
6300 (OEM) (MMH), 2026 WL 687228, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2026) (noting that the method
of service on a corporation via delivery to the New York Secretary of State “complies with federal
and state procedural rules” (citations omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, Text Order,
dated Mar. 31, 2026.
Further, as to Ageyev, an individual, state law provides that service of process should first
be attempted under C.P.L.R. § 308(1), (2), and (4), which “provide for service by personal delivery,
delivery and mailing, and nailing and mailing, respectively.” Weber Cap. LLC v. Racaniello, 821

F. Supp. 3d 361, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2026) (adopting report and recommendation) (citation omitted).
When service is “impracticable” under paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of § 308, paragraph (5) permits
alternative service “in such manner as the court . . . directs.” C.P.L.R. § 308(5).
As discussed at length above, Plaintiffs made numerous attempts to serve Ageyev at several
residential and business addresses that Plaintiffs believed to belong to Ageyev. See Dkt. Nos. 12,
13. On September 4, 2025, Plaintiffs requested leave, pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 308(5), to serve
Ageyev through counsel representing Ageyev’s corporation, GVA Group, in collection actions and
arbitrations. See Dkt. No. 12 at 1, 3. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ request, finding that Plaintiffs
demonstrated the impracticability of serving Ageyev by other means and that service through
counsel for GVA Group is reasonably calculated to give actual notice of this action to Ageyev.
Text Order, dated Sep. 5, 2025. The Court also entered subsequent orders directing alternative
service. See Text Order, dated Sep. 26, 2025; Text Order, dated Sep. 30, 2025. Plaintiffs complied
with the Court’s orders regarding alternative service for Ageyev. At bottom, Plaintiffs (1) affixed
and mailed copies of the Summons and Complaint at the 35th Street Address; (2) mailed a copy of

the Summons and Complaint to the 21st Street Address; (3) published a notice and the Summons
once in each of four consecutive weeks in the Brooklyn Daily Eagle and the Canarsie Courier; and
(4) emailed a copy of the Summons and Complaint to collections counsel for GVA Group. Dkt.
No. 18 at 1-2. Alternative service, therefore, was appropriate and satisfied in the present action
for Ageyev.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defaulting Defendants have
been properly served in compliance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal district courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising

under the . . . laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The district courts also have
original jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between,” inter alia, “citizens of different
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Supplemental jurisdiction extends to state law claims that so relate
to the claims within the court’s original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Claims form “part of the same case or controversy” when they
“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522
U.S. 156, 165 (1997) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
Claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact when the facts underlying the claims
“substantially overlap[].” Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 335 (2d Cir.
2006) (quoting Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 704 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Here, this Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim
arising under RICO, as this claim arises under federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Further,
Plaintiffs assert that the Court has jurisdiction over the state law claims in this action because (1)

“the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is between citizens of different states,” and (2) the state claims form part of the same case or
controversy as the RICO claim, supporting supplemental jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 73, 74.
As to diversity jurisdiction, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs are incorporated in Illinois
and their principal places of business are in Illinois. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 62-65. Thus, they are citizens
of Illinois for diversity purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). GVA Group is incorporated in New
York and has its principal place of business in New York. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 69; Dkt. No. 27-6. Thus,
GVA Group is a citizen of New York. The Complaint alleges that Ageyev resides in New York.
Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 68. “‘An individual’s citizenship, within the meaning of the diversity statute, is

determined by his domicile,’ and residence or place of employment alone are ‘insufficient to
establish domicile for jurisdictional purposes.’” Lue v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 21-892, 2022
WL 1146219, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 2022) (quoting Van Buskirk v. United Grp. of Cos., Inc., 935
F.3d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2019)). Because Plaintiffs alleged only where Ageyev resides, not where
he is domiciled or where he is a citizen, complete diversity has not been adequately alleged.6 See
Jacobs v. Pat. Enf’t Fund, Inc., 230 F.3d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs “failed
adequately to allege diversity in their original complaint” because “they had alleged only the

6 Indeed, Plaintiffs state that information obtained from the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles
indicated that Ageyev’s New York driver’s license expired in 2011. Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 53. This information
further supports an inference that Ageyev may not have been a citizen of New York when this action was
initiated.
residence, and not the citizenship (or domicile), of the parties”). And even if Plaintiffs had properly
alleged Ageyev’s citizenship for diversity jurisdiction purposes, it is not clear that an amount in
controversy over $75,000 has been properly alleged. The Complaint seeks compensatory damages
“in excess of $53,000” on Plaintiffs’ fraud and unjust enrichment claims. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 255,
259. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not properly invoked the Court’s diversity jurisdiction as to the

state law claims.
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 74. The fraud and unjust
enrichment claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact with the RICO claims; namely,
submission of the allegedly fraudulent claim forms and other documentation containing false
representations. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 240, 248-49, 257. Therefore, the state law claims form part of the
same case or controversy as the RICO claims such that the Court may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. See Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Binns, No. 22-CV-1553 (NGG) (PK), 2024 WL 2112075,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2024) (recommending that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over

plaintiffs’ common law fraud and unjust enrichment claims, where plaintiffs also brought civil
RICO and civil RICO conspiracy claims), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1433278
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2024); ABF Cap. Mgmt. v. Askin Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 957 F. Supp. 1308, 1322
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that “[p]laintiffs’ state-law claims, which arise out of the same operative
facts as their federal RICO claim, fall within this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction”).
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.
C. Personal Jurisdiction
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that “a court may raise
personal jurisdiction sua sponte when a defendant has failed to appear.” Sinoying Logistics Pte
Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 213 n.7 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). District
courts within this Circuit have held that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction is ‘a necessary prerequisite to entry

of a default judgment.’” Burns v. Scott, 635 F. Supp. 3d 258, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (adopting report
and recommendation) (citation omitted). In an abundance of caution, the undersigned will analyze
personal jurisdiction.
To properly exercise personal jurisdiction, three requirements must be met. NLRB v.
Universal Smart Conts., LLC, 166 F.4th 304, 314 (2d Cir. 2026) (Sullivan, J.) (citations omitted).
First, “the plaintiff’s service of process upon the defendant must have been procedurally proper.”
Id. (citations omitted). Second, “there must be a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction that
renders such service of process effective.” Id. (citation omitted). Finally, “the district court’s
assertion of personal jurisdiction must otherwise ‘comport with constitutional due process

principles.’” Id. (citation omitted).
As to the first requirement, as explained above, the undersigned has already respectfully
recommended a finding that service on Defaulting Defendants was proper in this case. As to the
second requirement, the available statutory bases in federal courts are enumerated by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(k). Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL (“Licci I”), 673 F.3d
50, 59 (2d Cir. 2012). Rule 4(k)(1)(A) provides that “[s]erving a summons . . . establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction
in the state where the district court is located.” Licci I, 673 F.3d at 59 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(1)(A)). Accordingly, “[a] district court’s personal jurisdiction is determined by the law of the
state in which the court is located.” Id. (quoting Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir.
2010)). Thus, the court should look to New York law in determining the availability of personal
jurisdiction over Defaulting Defendants.
“There are two types of personal jurisdiction: specific and general.” Monbo v. Nathan, 623
F. Supp. 3d 56, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (Brodie, C.J.) (citation omitted). “General jurisdiction

permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant regardless of whether the
underlying claim has a connection to the forum.” Id. (citation omitted). “Specific jurisdiction
requires a connection between the forum exercising jurisdiction over the defendant and the
underlying controversy that gave rise to the claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Under New York law,
courts exercise general jurisdiction pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 301, and specific jurisdiction pursuant
to § 302. See Monbo, 623 F. Supp. 3d at 133.
First, there is general jurisdiction over GVA Group. “CPLR § 301 permits courts to
exercise ‘such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised
heretofore.’” Great Bowery, Inc. v. Royal Beauty Studio Inc., No. 25-CV-3627 (FB) (JAM), 2026

WL 1029641, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2026) (adopting report and recommendation). The general
jurisdiction of a corporate defendant is one in which “the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) (citation omitted).
“[E]xcept in a truly exceptional case, a corporate defendant may be treated as essentially at home
only where it is incorporated or maintains its principal place of business.” Great Bowery, 2026
WL 1029641, at *7 (quoting Monbo, 623 F. Supp. 3d at 136-37). Regarding general jurisdiction
for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that, “[w]ith respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of
business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.’” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 137 (2014) (citations omitted).
Here, as previously noted, GVA Group is a New York corporation with its principal place
of business in New York. Accordingly, the Court may exercise general jurisdiction over GVA
Group.

Second, as to Ageyev, as previously discussed, Plaintiffs have not set forth Ageyev’s
domicile, preventing the exercise of general jurisdiction as to him. The Supreme Court has held
that, “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the
individual’s domicile.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564 U.S. at 924 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). Domicile is different from residency, and one cannot infer one from the other.
See Reich v. Lopez, 858 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that owning an apartment in New York
is insufficient to establish domicile for purposes of general jurisdiction and noting that “[o]ne may
have more than one residence in different parts of this country or the world, but a person may have
only one domicile” (citation omitted)); N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins. v. Pouncey, No. 3:23-

CV-137 (SVN), 2024 WL 4037005, at *6 (D. Conn. Sep. 3, 2024) (“[A] statement of residence,
unlike domicile, tells the court only where the parties are living and not of which state they are
citizens.’ A court may not and cannot simply infer the latter from the former.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, Dkt. No. 39 (D. Conn. Sep. 30,
2024). Because Plaintiffs have set forth insufficient allegations to demonstrate that Ageyev is
subject to the Court’s general personal jurisdiction, the undersigned turns to New York’s long-arm
statute to evaluate specific personal jurisdiction. See Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Safe Chain Sols., LLC,
No. 21-CV-4106 (AMD) (RER), 2022 WL 22947596, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2022) (“In
assessing whether personal jurisdiction is authorized, the court must look first to the long-arm
statute of the forum state.” (quoting Yak v. BiggerPockets, LLC, No. 20-3498, 2022 WL 67740, at
*1 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 2022))).
C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) provides that “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent . . . transacts
any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state.”

Gilead Scis., 2022 WL 22947596, at *5 (quoting C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)). Accordingly, two
requirements must be met to establish personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1): “(1) The defendant
must have transacted business within the state [or contracted anywhere to supply goods or services
in the state]; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” Id. at *6 (quoting
Eades v. Kennedy, P.C. L. Offs., 799 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2015)); see also D & R Glob. Selections,
S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 78 N.E.3d 1172, 1175 (N.Y. 2017) (holding that courts
should conduct a “twofold jurisdictional inquiry” under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1): “[f]irst, the
defendant must have purposefully availed itself of ‘the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state’ by either transacting business in New York or contracting to supply goods or

services in New York,” and “[s]econd, the claim must arise from that business transaction or from
the contract to supply goods or services” (citation omitted)). “[P]roof of one transaction in New
York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters New York, so long
as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between
the transaction and the claim asserted.” Gilead Scis., 2022 WL 22947596, at *6 (quoting Chloé v.
Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 170 (2d Cir. 2010)); see also New York v. Vayu,
Inc., 206 N.E.3d 1236, 1240 (N.Y. 2023) (“CPLR 302 is a single-act statute requiring but one
transaction—albeit a purposeful transaction—to confer jurisdiction in New York.” (citations
omitted)).
Here, the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over Ageyev because he transacted
business in New York as the “principal, officer, and/or director of GVA Group,” a New York
corporation, and “operated, managed, and/or controlled [GVA Group’s] activities.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶
68. Furthermore, the Complaint alleges that Ageyev “incorporated, owned and/or controlled GVA
Group for the purpose of defrauding insurers, in general, and Plaintiffs, in particular.” Id. ¶ 106.

Ageyev’s conduct as “principal, officer, and/or director of GVA Group,” by which he engaged in
actions in New York in furtherance of the alleged scheme, gave rise to Plaintiffs’ claims. See id.
¶¶ 4-16. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims arise from that business activity which Ageyev conducted in New
York.
Last, the Court must determine whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction comports with
federal constitutional requirements of due process. See Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Perplexity AI,
Inc., 797 F. Supp. 3d 305, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). “Due process considerations require that the
defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 330 (citation

omitted). First, a court evaluates whether a defendant has “sufficient minimum contacts” with the
forum, and second, whether, in light of various factors, the exercise of jurisdiction would “comport
with fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 330-31 (citations omitted).
Regarding the minimum contacts, “[g]enerally, if a defendant meets the contacts
requirement under the long-arm statute, it also meets the minimum contacts requirements under
the constitutional analysis.” Id. at 331 (citing Am. Girl, LLC v. Zembrka, 118 F.4th 271, 279 (2d
Cir. 2024)). As discussed above, Ageyev meets the minimum contacts requirements under New
York’s long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), due to his various contacts with New York, and,
thus, Ageyev satisfies the minimum contacts requirements under the constitutional analysis.
As to fair play and substantial justice, the Court considers the following factors:
[i] the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; [ii] the
interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case; [iii] the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief; [iv] the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and [v] the
shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.
Dow Jones & Co., 797 F. Supp. 3d at 331 (citation omitted); see also Agric. Logistics LLC v.
Survival Transp. Inc., No. 22-CV-873 (MKB) (JMW), 2024 WL 4250354, at *8 (E.D.N.Y Aug. 7,
2024) (listing same factors), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4116684 (E.D.N.Y.
Sep. 9, 2024).
As an initial matter, the Second Circuit recognized that it would be “rare” and “unusual”
for the exercise of specific jurisdiction to “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice” where a defendant transacted business in New York and the asserted claim arose from that
business activity under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL
(“Licci II”), 732 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Furthermore, Defaulting
Defendants cannot present any compelling case that would render jurisdiction unreasonable. See
Agric. Logistics, 2024 WL 4250354, at *8 (stating that, “given Defendants’ default, [the Court]
has not been provided, nor does it find, any reason why exercise of specific jurisdiction would be
unreasonable”).
In any event, the factors as to fair play and substantial justice weigh in favor of the exercise
of specific jurisdiction over Ageyev here. First, the burden of the Court’s jurisdiction on Ageyev
is low because he is a resident of New York. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 68; see also Agric. Logistics, 2024
WL 4250354, at *8 (noting that “the burden on Defendant, if any, to litigate here does not weigh
strongly in its favor because ‘the conveniences of modern communication and transportation ease
what would have been a serious burden only a few decades ago’” (citation omitted)).
Second, “New York has a strong interest in adjudicating cases involving alleged RICO
violations and fraud that occurred in New York, at least in part,” Khan Funds Mgmt. Am., Inc. v.
Nations Techs. Inc., No. 22-CV-5055 (ER), 2025 WL 1003964, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025)
(citing Minnie Rose LLC v. Yu, 169 F. Supp. 3d 504, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)), and where the core
allegations are against a New York resident. Great W. Ins. Co. v. Graham, No. 18-CV-6249 (VSB),

2020 WL 3415026, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2020).
Third, Plaintiffs have a significant interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief. See
Henao v. Parts Auth., 557 F. Supp. 3d 490, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Plaintiffs have significant
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, which would be inefficient if they are required
to sue Parts Authority in New York and Browne in a separate forum.”).
The final two factors are neutral because New York has an interest in the efficient resolution
of controversies which arise under federal law, and New York has a shared interest in further
developing the substantive social policies. See Dow Jones & Co., 797 F. Supp. 3d at 332. Thus,
due process considerations are satisfied because Ageyev has minimum contacts with New York

such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. See id. at 330-32.
Furthermore, “[w]hile courts ‘generally look first to the jurisdictional rules of the forum
state’ to determine personal jurisdiction, ‘the RICO statute contains a separate jurisdictional
provision.’” Gilead Scis., 2022 WL 22947596, at *10 (quoting Milton v. Wazed, No. 16-CV-4542
(MKB) (JO), 2018 WL 2074179, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018)). Because Plaintiffs bring a RICO
claim against Ageyev (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 231-45), the Court also looks to RICO’s jurisdictional
provision. “RICO’s jurisdictional provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a), ‘does not provide for nationwide
personal jurisdiction over every defendant in every civil RICO case, no matter where the defendant
is found,’” but, rather, it “grants personal jurisdiction over an initial defendant in a civil RICO case
to the district court for the district in which that person resides, has an agent, or transacts his or her
affairs.” Gilead Scis., 2022 WL 22947596, at *10 (quoting Pincione v. D’Alfonso, 506 F. App’x
22, 24 (2d Cir. 2012)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (“Any civil action or proceeding under this
chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district

in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.”). “That is, personal
jurisdiction over the defendant requires the ‘minimum contacts’ test to be met for at least one
defendant.” City of New York v. Old Dominion Tobacco Co., Inc., No. 20-CV-5965 (ENV) (RER),
2023 WL 12027901, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2023) (first citing Elsevier Inc. v. W.H.P.R., Inc.,
692 F. Supp. 2d 297, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); and then citing PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork &
Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Corso v. Franz, No. 16-CV-2384 (FB) (SMG),
2018 WL 1513639, at *2 & n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (noting that RICO permits the exercise
of personal jurisdiction where minimum contacts are established (citations omitted)). For the
reasons stated above, Plaintiffs have established Ageyev’s minimum contacts with New York, and,

thus, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the RICO claim against Ageyev. See, e.g., Gilead Scis.,
2022 WL 22947596, at *10 (explaining that “the Court has jurisdiction over the defendant under
Section 302(a)(1) and has jurisdiction for the same reasons under Section 1965(a)”); Old Dominion
Tobacco Co., 2023 WL 12027901, at *6 (holding that defendant established defendant’s minimum
contacts with New York and the court has jurisdiction over the RICO claim).
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over Defaulting Defendants.
D. Venue
A civil action may be brought in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Here, venue is proper in
this District because Defaulting Defendants entered into arrangements with No-Fault Clinics in
this District, including in Kings County and Queens County, to execute the scheme to defraud. See

Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 4; see also id. ¶ 76 (stating that venue is proper because “the Eastern District of New
York is the district where a substantial amount of the activities forming the basis of the Complaint
occurred”).
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that venue is proper in this District.
III. Procedural Compliance with Federal Rules and Local Civil Rules
“A motion for default judgment will not be granted unless the party making the motion
adheres to all of the applicable procedural rules.” Annuity, Welfare & Apprenticeship Skill
Improvement & Safety Funds of Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Allstate Mapping & Layout,
LLC, No. 22-CV-1831 (PKC) (TAM), 2023 WL 1475389, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2023) (quoting

Century Surety Co. v. Atweek, Inc., No. 16-CV-335 (ENV) (PK), 2018 WL 10466835, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018)). “Local rules have the force of law, as long as they do not conflict with a
rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, Congress, or the Constitution.” Contino v. United States,
535 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Local Civil Rule 55.2 provides, in relevant part,
(a) In addition to following the applicable procedures in either (b) or (c) below, any
party seeking a default judgment must file:
(1) an affidavit or declaration showing that:
(A) the clerk has entered default under Local Civil Rule 55.1;
(B) the party seeking default judgment has complied with the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50a U.S.C. § 521; and
(C) the party against whom judgment is sought is not known to be a
minor or an incompetent person . . . . .
(2) if proceeding by motion, the papers required by Local Civil Rule 7.1,
including a memorandum of law, a proposed order detailing the proposed
judgment to be entered; and
(3) a certificate of service stating that all documents in support of the request
for default judgment, including the “Clerk’s Certificate of Default” and any
papers required by this rule, have been personally served on, or mailed to
the last known residence (for an individual defendant) or business address
(for other defendants) of, the party against whom default judgment is
sought.
. . .
(c) By the Court (available under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)). In addition to the matters
required in section (a), above, the party must file a statement of damages, sworn or
affirmed to by one or more people with personal knowledge, in support of the
request, showing the proposed damages and the basis for each element of damages,
including interest, attorney’s fees, and costs.
Loc. Civ. R. 55.2.
Here, Plaintiffs properly obtained the certificate of default against Defaulting Defendants
under Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(1)(A). See Dkt. Nos. 24, 25.
As to Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(1)(B), Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”). GVA Group is a corporate entity such that the SCRA
requirement does not apply to them. See Loc. 1992 Pension Fund v. All Serv. Equip. Corp., No.
22-CV-2522 (HG) (JMW), 2023 WL 11868244, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2023) (noting that the
SCRA’s affidavit requirement does not apply to corporate defendants), report and recommendation
adopted, Text Order, dated Aug. 18, 2023. As for Ageyev, Plaintiffs filed a report from the
Department of Defense Manpower Data Center—an entity that hosts the SCRA verification
website—certifying that Ageyev was not in active military service as of the filing of Plaintiffs’
motion. See Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 50; Dkt. No. 27-13; see also Wilmington Savs. Fund Soc’y FSB v.
Fernandez, 712 F. Supp. 3d 324, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (holding that “[a]dequate proof might
consist of a report from the Department of Defense’s website obtained after the defendant’s default
certifying that the defendant is not in active military service” (citation omitted)); ADI Glob.
Distrib. v. Green, No. 20-CV-3869 (AMD) (JMW), 2023 WL 3355049, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,
2023) (“Certification . . . of a defendant’s military status [under 50 U.S.C. § 3931(A)] can be
obtained from the Department of Defense’s Servicemembers Civil Relief Act website.” (citation
omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3346499 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2023).

Per Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(1)(C), no Defaulting Defendant is a minor or an incompetent
person. See Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶¶ 51-52, 54.
Next, Local Civil Rule 7.1 requires that a plaintiff attach to a motion for default judgment:
(1) a notice of motion specifying the applicable rules or statutes pursuant to which the motion is
brought and specifying the relief sought; (2) a memorandum of law setting forth the cases and
other authorities relied upon in support of the motion; (3) supporting affidavits and exhibits
containing any factual information and portions of the record necessary for the decision of the
motion; and (4) a certificate of compliance with the word count requirements of Local Civil Rule
7.1(c). See Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(a), (c). Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(2) also requires a proposed order

detailing the proposed judgment to be entered. Loc. Civ. R. 55.2(a)(2). Plaintiffs complied with
the procedural requirements of Local Civil Rule 7.1(a) by filing a notice of motion (Dkt. No. 27),
a memorandum of law (Dkt. No. 27-1), and declaration and exhibits in support of the motion (Dkt.
Nos. 27-2, 27-3, 27-5 – 27-19). Plaintiffs also filed a proposed order detailing the proposed
judgment to be entered in compliance with Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(2). Dkt. No. 27-4.7 Plaintiffs,
however, failed to include a page count certification statement in their memorandum of law as
required by Local Civil Rule 7.1(c). The undersigned respectfully recommends that the word count

7 Plaintiffs appear to have included a typographical error in its proposed judgment, substituting “Zenith
Medical Supply Corp.” for GVA Group in one paragraph of the proposed judgment. See Dkt. No. 27-4 at
2. The Court excuses such scrivener’s error.
certification requirement be waived because the omission is not material to the relief sought. See
Great Bowery, 2026 WL 1029641, at *9 n.6 (excusing the word count certification); see also Andy
Ryan Photographer, LLC v. City Visa, Inc., No. 24-CV-3369 (OEM) (JAM), 2025 WL 2778372, at
*5 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2025) (same), report and recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated
Oct. 20, 2025. In any event, on February 10, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to enlarge

the page limit of their memorandum of law to forty pages. Text Order, dated Feb. 10, 2026. Thus,
Plaintiffs complied with Local Civil Rules 7.1 and 55.2(a)(2).
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(3), Plaintiffs filed a certificate of service stating that
all documents in support of the request for default judgment, including the “Clerk’s Certificate of
Default” and any papers required by this rule, have been mailed to Defaulting Defendants’ last
known addresses. See Dkt. No. 28.
Finally, Plaintiffs have filed sufficient documentation to fulfill Local Rule 55.2(c)’s
requirement to “file a statement of damages, sworn or affirmed to by one or more people with
personal knowledge, . . . showing the proposed damages and the basis for each element of damages,

including interest, attorney’s fees, and costs.” Loc. Civ. R. 55.2(c). Plaintiffs filed the Declaration
of Oren Kutnowsky, an Analyst in the Special Investigations Unit of Plaintiff Allstate Insurance
Company, which sets forth, inter alia, the damages sustained by Plaintiffs. See Dkt. No. 27-2.
Kutnowsky “assisted with and was involved in [Plaintiffs’] identification and investigation of the
Defaulted Defendants in this action.” Id. ¶ 2.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court find that Plaintiffs
have satisfied Local Civil Rules 7.1 and 55.2.
IV. Entry of Default Judgment
As the Second Circuit has explained,
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a two-step process for
obtaining a default judgment. The first step is to obtain an entry of default. When a
party against whom affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend, a plaintiff may bring that fact to the court’s attention. In such circumstances
Rule 55(a) empowers the clerk of court to enter a default. The next step requires
the plaintiff to seek a judgment by default under Rule 55(b). Rule 55(b)(1) allows
the clerk to enter a default judgment if the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain and
the defendant has failed to appear. In all other cases Rule 55(b)(2) governs. It
requires a party seeking a judgment by default to apply to the court for entry of a
default judgment.
Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 504-05 (2d Cir. 2011). To “enter or effectuate
judgment,” a court is empowered to: “(A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of
damages; (C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
“A threshold question before reaching liability or damages is whether [the defaulting
defendant’s] conduct is sufficient to warrant default judgment being entered.” Annuity, Pension,
Welfare & Training Funds of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. NAMOW, Inc., No. 17-CV-
1469 (ARR) (SJB), 2018 WL 1440545, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1440542 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2018). The Second Circuit
“generally disfavor[s]” default judgment and has repeatedly expressed a “preference for resolving
disputes on the merits.” Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted). “Nevertheless, in evaluating a motion for default judgment, a court accepts as true the
plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, except those relating to damages.” BASF Corp. v.
Original Fender Mender, Inc., No. 23-CV-2796 (HG) (JAM), 2023 WL 8853704, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 22, 2023) (first citing Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155,
158 (2d Cir. 1992); and then citing Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974)), report and
recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated Jan. 9, 2024. The plaintiff bears the burden of
alleging “specific facts,” rather than “mere ‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of
the elements,’” so that a court may infer a defendant’s liability. Cardoza v. Mango King Farmers
Mkt. Corp., No. 14-CV-3314 (SJ) (RER), 2015 WL 5561033, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 1, 2015)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)), report and recommendation adopted, 2015
WL 5561180 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2015).
The decision to grant or deny a motion for default judgment is “left to the sound discretion

of a district court.” Esquivel v. Lima Rest. Corp., No. 20-CV-2914 (ENV) (MMH), 2023 WL
6338666, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2023) (quoting Shah v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Civ. Serv., 168 F.3d
610, 615 (2d Cir. 1999)), report and recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated Nov. 30, 2023.
“A court ‘possesses significant discretion’ in granting a motion for default judgment, ‘including
[determining] whether the grounds for default are clearly established.’” Chen v. Oceanica Chinese
Rest., Inc., No. 13-CV-4623 (NGG) (PK), 2023 WL 2583856, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2023)
(adopting report and recommendation) (citation omitted). The Court may also “consider numerous
factors, including whether plaintiff has been substantially prejudiced by the delay involved . . . and
whether the grounds for default are clearly established or in doubt.” Franco v. Ideal Mortg.

Bankers, Ltd., No. 07-CV-3956 (JS) (AKT), 2010 WL 3780972, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL
3780984 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 17, 2010).
As the Second Circuit has observed, “[t]hese widely accepted factors are: (1) whether the
default was willful; (2) whether setting aside the default would prejudice the adversary; and (3)
whether a meritorious defense is presented.” Enron Oil, 10 F.3d at 96 (citations omitted); see also
Trico Tarek Factory v. Jetax Inc., Nos. 24-CV-3731 (JMA) (ST), 24-CV-2409 (ST), 2025 WL
2625376, at *29 (E.D.N.Y Sep. 11, 2025) (“Notably, the Enron factors are used not only to
determine whether to set aside an entry of default or default judgment, but also in deciding whether
granting a default judgment is warranted in the first instance.” (citing Grp. One Ltd. v. GTE GmbH,
625 F. Supp. 3d 28, 54-61 (E.D.N.Y. 2022))), report and recommendation adopted, No. 24-CV-
3731 (JMA) (ST), 2025 WL 2782485 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2025). “Willfulness ‘is the most
significant factor’ but is not dispositive.” Henry v. Oluwole, 108 F.4th 45, 52 (2d Cir. 2024) (first
quoting In re Orion HealthCorp, Inc., 95 F.4th 98, 104 n.4 (2d Cir. 2024); and then citing W.B.

David & Co. v. De Beers Centenary AG, 507 F. App’x 67, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Grp.
One, 625 F. Supp. 3d at 55 (“However, in neither case did the court find default judgment
appropriate based solely on willfulness.”). “Other relevant equitable factors may also be
considered, for instance, whether the failure to follow a rule of procedure was a mistake made in
good faith and whether the entry of default would bring about a harsh or unfair result.” Enron Oil,
10 F.3d at 96 (citation omitted).
Here, as to the first factor, Defaulting Defendants’ failure to respond to the Complaint
demonstrates the willfulness of their default. “‘[W]illfulness,’ in the context of a default, . . .
refer[s] to conduct that is more than merely negligent or careless,” but is instead “egregious and .

. . not satisfactorily explained.” Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Loc. 2, Albany, N.Y. Pension
Fund v. Moulton Masonry & Const., LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). As
described above, Defaulting Defendants were properly served with the Complaint.
Notwithstanding that service, Defaulting Defendants did not respond to the Complaint, did not
appear, and have not in any way attempted to defend this action, thus constituting willfulness in
the context of default judgment. See, e.g., Krevat v. Burgers to Go, Inc., No. 13-CV-6258 (JS)
(AKT), 2014 WL 4638844, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 16, 2014) (adopting report and recommendation,
and holding that defendant’s failure to appear demonstrated willfulness of default); Sola Franchise
Corp. v. Solo Salon Studios Inc., No. 14-CV-946 (JS) (AKT), 2015 WL 1299259, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 23, 2015) (adopting report and recommendation, and holding that “[d]efendant’s failure to
answer the Complaint and to respond to the instant motion is sufficient to establish willfulness”
(citations omitted)). Although Plaintiffs have repeatedly served Defaulting Defendants with
filings throughout this case, see, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 22-4, 23-5, Defaulting Defendants have
consistently failed to respond or appear. Such disregard for the Court and the present litigation

militate in favor of the first factor being satisfied.
As to the second factor, the Second Circuit has held that “[w]hether a defense is meritorious
‘is measured not by whether there is a likelihood that it will carry the day, but whether the evidence
submitted, if proven at trial, would constitute a complete defense.’” In re Orion HealthCorp, 95
F.4th at 105 (quoting Enron Oil, 10 F.3d at 98). The Court cannot conclude that Defaulting
Defendants have a meritorious defense to the allegations in the Complaint because Defendants did
not appear in this case to proffer any defenses. See Korzeniewski v. Sapa Pho Vietnamese Rest.
Inc., No. 17-CV-5721 (MKB) (SJB), 2019 WL 312149, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019) (“[T]he
Court cannot conclude there is any meritorious defense to the allegations because [the defendant]

did not appear nor present evidence of such a defense.”), report and recommendation adopted,
2019 WL 291145 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019). This factor therefore weighs in favor of entering
default judgment because the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are deemed admitted. See Sola
Franchise, 2015 WL 1299259, at *6 (“Here, Defendant has not interposed an answer, nor has it
otherwise presented any defense to the Court. These factors weigh in favor of granting a default
judgment, and the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are deemed admitted.” (citation omitted)).
As to the third factor, the Second Circuit has held that “delay alone is not a sufficient basis
for establishing prejudice. Rather, it must be shown that delay will result in the loss of evidence,
create increased difficulties of discovery or provide greater opportunity for fraud and collusion.”
Henry, 108 F.4th at 52-53 (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs will suffer prejudice if their motion
is denied because without the entry of default judgment, Plaintiffs could be left without the ability
to recover against Defaulting Defendants for the claims set forth in the Complaint. See Grp. One,
625 F. Supp. 3d at 60 (“Plaintiff will suffer prejudice if its motion is denied because Plaintiff will
be unable to recover against Defendants for the claims adequately set forth in its Amended

Complaint.” (citation omitted)); Sola Franchise, 2015 WL 1299259, at *15 (“[D]enying this
motion would be prejudicial to Plaintiffs ‘as there are no additional steps available to secure relief
in this Court.’” (citation omitted)).
Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that all three factors permit entry of
default judgment against Defaulting Defendants. The Court next turns to evaluating liability and
damages.
V. Liability
As discussed above, Plaintiffs move for default judgment on their claims of (1) a pattern
of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) against Ageyev; (2) common law fraud

against Ageyev and GVA Group; and (3) unjust enrichment against Ageyev and GVA Group. See
Dkt. No. 27-1 at 18-35. As noted above, “[i]n the context of a motion for default judgment, a court
should accept the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint pertaining to liability as true.” Janssen
Scis. Ir. Unlimited Co. v. Safe Chain Sols., LLC, No. 22-CV-1983 (BMC), 2025 WL 3640661, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2025) (citing Greyhound Exhibitgroup, 973 F.2d at 158); see also Vera v.
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 946 F.3d 120, 135 (2d Cir. 2019) (“In reviewing a default
judgment, we generally ‘deem[] all the well-pleaded allegations [as to liability] in the pleadings to
be admitted.’” (quoting Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d
105, 108 (2d Cir. 1997)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other than one relating to the
amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not
denied.”).
The undersigned addresses liability as to each of Plaintiffs’ claims below.
A. RICO Claim Against Ageyev
1. Legal Standard

“To establish civil liability under RICO, a plaintiff must show a ‘substantive RICO
violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962,’ and that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result.” Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Maccabi Pharm. Rx Inc., No. 24-CV-6214 (CBA) (RML), 2026 WL 794231, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2026) (citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL
792509 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2026). As is relevant here, RICO makes it “unlawful for any person
employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.”
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

To demonstrate a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), a plaintiff must show: “(1) that
the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3) constituting a ‘pattern’ (4) of
‘racketeering activity’ (5) directly or indirectly invests in, or maintains [an] interest in, or
participates in (6) an ‘enterprise’ (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.”
Williams v. Affinion Grp., LLC, 889 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *5
(listing the elements of a § 1962(c) claim (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Infinity Health Prods.,
Ltd., No. 10-CV-5611 (JG) (JMA), 2012 WL 1427796, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1432213 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2012))). Under RICO, a
“‘person’ includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in
property;” and an “‘enterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3), (4). A “‘pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts
of racketeering activity, . . . the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of

imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.” Id. § 1961(5).
“Racketeering includes ‘mail fraud’ as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1341 to encompass using
interstate mails for a scheme to defraud.” Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *5 (citing
S.Q.K.F.C., Inc. v. Bell Atl. TriCon Leasing Corp., 84 F.3d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1996); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Nazarov, No. 11-CV-6187 (PKC) (VMS), 2015 WL 5774459, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30,
2015) (adopting report and recommendation)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (“‘[R]acketeering
activity’ means . . . any act which is indictable under . . . section 1341 (relating to mail fraud)” of
title 18 of the United States Code.). “The elements of mail or wire fraud are (i) a scheme to defraud
(ii) to get money or property (iii) furthered by the use of interstate mail or wires.” Williams, 889

F.3d at 124 (first quoting United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2000); and then
citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343). “The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud.” Id.
(quoting United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 657 (2d
Cir. 2016)). “A ‘scheme to defraud’ is ‘a plan to deprive a person of something of value by trick,
deceit, chicane or overreaching.’” Id. (quoting Autuori, 212 F.3d at 115). “To make out such a
scheme, a plaintiff must provide proof of a material misrepresentation.” Id. (citing Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999)). To sufficiently allege the “use of interstate mails,” Plaintiffs “need
not allege that each defendant sent a piece of mail; rather, ‘it need only be shown that [each
defendant] acted with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of
business, or that such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended.’”
Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *5 (quoting Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *12).
“The predicate acts must be related, and either amount to or pose a threat of continuing
criminal activity.” Id. (quoting Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *13). The continuity requirement
may be satisfied “either by showing a closed-ended pattern—a series of related predicate acts

extending over a substantial period of time—or by demonstrating an open-ended pattern of
racketeering activity that poses a threat of continuing criminal conduct beyond the period during
which the predicate acts were performed.” Id. (quoting Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *13). “A
closed-ended pattern generally requires that the predicate acts span at least two years.” Id. (first
citing Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Scheer, No. 13-CV-4039 (SLT) (SMG), 2014 WL 4966150, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014) (for purposes of default judgment, finding a closed-ended pattern where
the enterprise “submitted bills for reimbursement to which it was not entitled over a period
exceeding two years”), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 4966137 (E.D.N.Y. Sep.
30, 2014); and then citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smirnov, No. 12-CV-1246 (CBA) (SMG), 2013 WL

5407224, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2013) (finding RICO liability where the defendants submitted
bills for reimbursement to which they were not entitled over periods exceeding two years), report
and recommendation adopted, Dkt. No. 197 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2013)).
Because the Complaint here alleges mail fraud as a predicate act, “the allegations are
subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires that ‘a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake.’” Brodie v. Rower, No. 25-CV-103 (ALC), 2026 WL 880345, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2026) (citation omitted); see also Williams, 889 F.3d at 124-25 (“The elements of mail and wire
fraud must be pled with particularity. The complaint must detail the specific statements that are
false or fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when and where the statements were made, and
explain why the statements were fraudulent.” (citations omitted)).
“‘Given the powerful incentive for plaintiffs to attempt to fit garden variety fraud claims
within the standard of civil RICO,’ which allows for treble damages, ‘courts must scrutinize civil
RICO claims . . . to separate the rare complaint that actually states a claim for civil RICO from

that more obviously alleging common law fraud.’” Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *4
(quoting Rajaratnam v. Motley Rice, LLC, 449 F. Supp. 3d 45, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)).
2. Analysis
Plaintiffs adequately plead that Ageyev is liable for a RICO violation pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c). The undersigned examines each RICO element below.
a. The RICO Person and RICO Enterprise
The Complaint alleges that Ageyev is a natural person and liable under RICO. See Dkt.
No. 1 ¶ 68; Dkt. No. 27-1 at 19. The Complaint also alleges that GVA Group is a corporation that
constitutes an enterprise affecting interstate commerce. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 69, 232; Dkt. No. 27-1

at 20-22. The Complaint further alleges that Ageyev “operated, managed, and/or controlled” GVA
Group. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 69, 99, 234.
Furthermore, the enterprise must exist “separate and apart from the pattern of activity in
which it engages.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. New Century Pharm. Inc., No. 19-CV-5702 (ENV) (VMS),
2021 WL 7830141, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2021) (first quoting D. Penguin Bros. v. City Nat’l
Bank, 587 F. App’x 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2014); and then citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Yehudian, No. 14-
CV-4826 (JS) (AKT), 2018 WL 1767873, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) (“The alleged enterprise
through which a pattern of racketeering activity is conducted must be distinct from those persons
or entities who stand accused of conducting that racketeering activity.”), report and
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1686106 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018)), report and
recommendation adopted, Text Order, dated Mar. 24, 2022. “This requirement is met by
demonstrating that a ‘formal legal distinction’ exists between the individual defendants and the
RICO enterprise.” Id. (citing Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 165 (2001)).
“Where the alleged enterprises are corporations and the individual defendants are natural persons,

the person-enterprise distinction is met.” Id. (citing Palatkevich v. Choupak, No. 12-CV-1682
(CM), 2014 WL 1509236, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2014) (“[A] natural person named as the
defendant ‘person’ is inherently distinct from a corporate entity ‘enterprise’ for which he acts as
an agent; in such a case, the distinctness requirement is met.”)).
Here, because Ageyev—the party whom Plaintiffs seek to hold liable under RICO—is a
natural person, and the alleged enterprise—GVA Group—is a corporation, the required person-
enterprise distinction is met. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abramov, No. 16-CV-1465 (AMD)
(SJB), 2020 WL 1172697, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2020) (stating that the distinctiveness
requirement for RICO claims is met where “none of the RICO Defaulting Defendants is alleged to

be a RICO enterprise”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1166498 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
11, 2020); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abutova, No. 13-CV-3494 (ARR) (LB), 2017 WL 1185222, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2017) (“Since these allegations must be accepted as true in the context of a
default judgment, courts have held that this degree of specificity in pleading is sufficient to satisfy
the distinctiveness requirement under RICO, when alleged in the context of a no-fault billing
insurance case.” (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Afanasyev, No. 12-CV-2423 (JBW) (CLP), 2016 WL
1156769, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1189284
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2016))), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1184107 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2017).
Accordingly, the first and sixth elements of a RICO cause of action have been adequately
alleged.
b. Participation in a Pattern of Racketeering Activity
Plaintiffs allege that, beginning in 2021, Ageyev engaged in racketeering acts on a
“continued basis” as part of his ongoing scheme to “fraudulently bill for DME and/or orthotic

devices to defraud insurers.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 69, 105, 233, 237. “Through the GVA Group
enterprise, Defendant Ageyev submitted numerous . . . fraudulent claim forms seeking payment
for DME and/or orthotic devices that were purportedly (but not actually) provided to numerous of
Covered Persons as billed.” Id. ¶ 240. Plaintiffs detail the mechanics of the scheme to defraud.
See id. ¶¶ 105-52. Plaintiffs allege the ways in which Ageyev fraudulently billed for custom
fabricated or custom fit DME and/or orthotic devices, cervical traction equipment, and DME
and/or orthotic devices that were not actually provided, and mis-used fee schedule codes. See id.
¶¶ 153-227. Plaintiffs also provide further specific allegations regarding a “representative sample
of predicate acts” in an appendix attached to the Complaint, which “identifies the nature and date

of mailings that were made by Defendant Ageyev, in furtherance of the scheme as well as the
specific misrepresentations identified for each of the mailings.” Id. ¶ 241; see also Dkt. No. 1-3.
Further, Plaintiffs allege that the “bills and supporting documents that were sent by Defendant
Ageyev, as well as the payments that Plaintiffs made in response to those bills, were sent through
the United States Postal Service.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 240. Plaintiffs also contend that they suffered
“injur[y] in their business and property and have been damaged in the aggregate amount presently
in excess of $53,000.00, the exact amount to be determined at trial.” Id. ¶ 244.
In short, the factual allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to demonstrate that Ageyev
engaged in two or more acts that constitute a pattern of mail fraud in which Ageyev, via GVA
Group, repeatedly used the U.S. Mail to submit fraudulent claims between at least 2021 and 2023,
and that Plaintiffs suffered significant monetary damages caused by Ageyev’s conduct in that
Ageyev’s repeated submission of fraudulent no-fault claims caused Plaintiffs, reasonably relying
on the false documentation, to make payments on those claims. See, e.g., New Century Pharm.,
2021 WL 7830141, at *10 (finding that plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to establish a pattern of

racketeering activity under RICO where defendants participated in a large-scale scheme repeatedly
using the U.S. Mail to submit fraudulent claims containing charges for drugs, medications,
treatments, tests, and services that were medically unnecessary over at least two years, and
plaintiffs described the specific circumstances of the fraudulent scheme and their significant
monetary damages); Abramov, 2020 WL 1172697, at *8 (finding that plaintiffs pled sufficient facts
to establish a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO where plaintiffs alleged how defendants
mailed thousands of fraudulent insurance claims over periods of time ranging from three to fifteen
years); Abutova, 2017 WL 1185222, at *6 (finding that plaintiffs established that defendants
participated in a pattern of racketeering activity where they alleged specific facts showing that the

defendants engaged in two or more acts of mail fraud by mailing fraudulent invoices between the
Retail defendants and the Wholesale defendants).
Accordingly, elements two through five of a RICO cause of action have been adequately
alleged.
c. Activities Affecting Interstate Commerce
“The law in this Circuit does not require RICO plaintiffs to show more than a minimal
effect on interstate commerce.” DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 309 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted); see also Abramov, 2020 WL 1172697, at *8 (“[P]laintiffs need only show a minimal
effect on interstate commerce.” (quoting Abutova, 2017 WL 1185222, at *6)). Here, Plaintiffs
have alleged a fraudulent scheme involving national insurance companies and the mailing and
cashing of checks obtained through falsely inflated invoices. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 50, 62-65,
84, 101, 239. “Such facts are sufficient to meet the interstate commerce requirement.” Abramov,
2020 WL 1172697, at *8 (citing Afanasyev, 2016 WL 1156769, at *10 (collecting cases, and noting
that “[s]everal courts have found that identical facts are sufficient to establish the necessary impact

on interstate commerce”)).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have properly pled the seventh, and final, element of a civil RICO
claim.
***
The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court find that Plaintiffs have
adequately stated a RICO claim against Ageyev.
While the Complaint also brings RICO claims against the John Doe Defendants, as set
forth in Plaintiffs’ June 23, 2026 letter, Plaintiffs state that they intend to voluntarily dismiss,
without prejudice, all claims against the John Doe Defendants upon the Court’s granting of their

motion for default judgment, in whole or in part. Dkt. No. 30. The undersigned, therefore,
respectfully recommends that the John Doe Defendants be dismissed from this action without
prejudice.
B. New York State Common Law Fraud Claim Against Ageyev and GVA Group
1. Legal Standard
To state a common law fraud claim under New York law, “a plaintiff must allege (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission of fact; (2) which the defendant knew to be false; (3) which
the defendant made with the intent to defraud; (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied; and
(5) which caused injury to the plaintiff.” Fin. Guar. Ins. Co. v. Putnam Advisory Co., LLC, 783
F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 2015) (first citing Crigger v. Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d 230, 234 (2d
Cir.2006); and then citing Wynn v. AC Rochester, 273 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir.2001) (per curium));
see also Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *8 (stating the elements of a New York common
law fraud claim as: “(1) a material representation or omission of fact; (2) made with knowledge of
its falsity; (3) with scienter or an intent to defraud; (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied;

and (5) [that] such reliance caused damage to the plaintiff” (quoting Soley v. Wasserman, 823 F.
Supp. 2d 221, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011))). A common law fraud claim, like Plaintiffs’ RICO claim, is
subject to the particularity pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), “which requires that the plaintiff
(1) detail the statements (or omissions) that the plaintiff contends are fraudulent, (2) identify the
speaker, (3) state where and when the statements (or omissions) were made, and (4) explain why
the statements (or omissions) are fraudulent.” Fin. Guar. Ins., 783 F.3d at 402-03 (quoting Eternity
Glob. Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 187 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Under Rule 9(b), “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind
may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs still must allege facts that “give rise to

a strong inference of fraudulent intent” either “(a) by alleging facts to show the defendants had
both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.” Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v.
Elmwood Park Med. Grp., P.C., No. 21-CV-617 (FB) (RER), 2022 WL 772737, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 23, 2022) (first quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Badia, No. 13-CV-1720 (CBA) (VMS), 2015
WL 1258218, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2015) (adopting report and recommendation); and then
citing Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Hollis Med. Care, P.C., No. 10-CV-4341 (ILG) (RML), 2011 WL
5507426, at *8 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2011)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
768360 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022). “The intent prong of common law fraud is established ‘when
it is clear that a scheme, viewed broadly, is necessarily going to injure.’” Id. (quoting Scheer, 2014
WL 4966150, at *6).
2. Analysis
Plaintiffs adequately plead that Ageyev and GVA Group are liable for fraud.
First, Plaintiffs allege that Defaulting Defendants “made material misrepresentations

and/or omitted material statements in submitting No-fault claims to Plaintiffs for payment,” and
that “[e]ach and every bill and supporting documentation submitted by [Defaulting Defendants] to
Plaintiffs set forth false and fraudulent amounts for reimbursement for DME and/or orthotic
devices that they purportedly supplied to Covered Persons.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 247-48. Plaintiffs
allege that documents submitted to them by Defaulting Defendants contained: (1) “[f]alse and
misleading statements as to the nature, quality, and cost of the DME and/or orthotic devices
purportedly supplied to Covered Persons;” (2) “[f]alse and misleading statements as to the amounts
GVA Group was entitled to be reimbursed under the No-fault Law;” (3) “[w]ith respect to Fee
Schedule items, false and misleading statements . . . that the DME and/or orthotic devices allegedly

supplied were in fact the items supplied to the Covered Persons;” (4) “[w]ith respect to Non-Fee
Schedule items, false and misleading statements . . . misrepresenting that the charges for the DME
and/or orthotic devices did not exceed the lesser of the actual wholesale cost of the medical
equipment to the provider, plus 50%; or the usual and customary price charged to the public;” (5)
“[f]alse and misleading prescriptions for the DME and/or orthotic devices purportedly supplied to
Covered Persons, generically describing the item to conceal the type of item being prescribed;”
and/or (6) “[f]alse and misleading prescriptions for DME and/or orthotic devices, concealing the
fact that the (a) DME and/or orthotic devices were prescribed and supplied pursuant to a pre-
determined, fraudulent protocol whereby” medically unnecessary DME and/or orthotic devices
were prescribed; “(b) DME and/or orthotic devices were not covered by the . . . Fee Schedule; and
(c) DME and/or orthotic devices were generically described on the prescriptions, all of which was
designed to permit [Defaulting Defendants] to manipulate the payment formulas and their claims
submissions in order to maximize the charges” submitted to Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 249. Plaintiffs further
allege that Defaulting Defendants knew that these material misrepresentations were false. Id. ¶

251.
The Complaint also contains specific examples in a “Compendium of Exhibits” and
appendix incorporated into the Complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 1-3, 1-4. These documents detail
representative samples of claims submitted by Defendants and identify “the specific
misrepresentations identified for each of the mailings.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 241, 250. Several courts
have held that these documents, attached to the Complaint, are sufficient to identify with
particularly the requirements of Rule 9(b). See Elmwood Park Med. Grp., 2022 WL 772737, at
*7 (holding that plaintiff’s “allegations and the supporting charts are sufficient to establish with
particularity the first element of common law fraud” where, “[i]n addition to describing the scheme

generally, [plaintiff] provides detailed charts listing a representative sample of the charges that the
Defaulting Defendants submitted or caused to be submitted to [plaintiff], the date [plaintiff]
received each submission, and the claim numbers that correspond with each submission”
(collecting cases)); New Century Pharm., 2021 WL 7830141, at *5 (finding that plaintiffs met Rule
9(b) standard for common law fraud where “[t]he complaint attaches as exhibits a chart that lists
claims submitted by [defendant] under allegedly fraudulent [Current Procedural Terminology]
codes, as well as lists of allegedly fraudulent No-Fault claims paid out by Allstate to” defendants
(citations omitted)); Abramov, 2020 WL 1172697, at *10 (“The Claims Charts—which contain
statements or claims made by each of the Fraud Defaulting Defendants and when those claims
were made—are sufficient to meet this standard” under Rule 9(b). (collecting cases)).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ allegations and their supporting documents are sufficient to establish with
particularity the first element of common law fraud.
Second, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the knowledge and scienter elements. Plaintiffs
contend that Defaulting Defendants “intended to defraud Plaintiffs” by making these false

representations, and that Defaulting Defendants “knew the foregoing material misrepresentations
to be false when made and nevertheless made these false representations with the intention and
purpose of inducing Plaintiffs to rely thereon.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 248, 251. Further, Plaintiffs allege
that Defaulting Defendants “intended to deceive and mislead Plaintiffs into paying [Defaulting
Defendants’] claims under the No-fault Law.” Id. ¶ 250. Plaintiffs also allege that Defaulting
Defendants’ scheme was “motivated by money.” Id. ¶ 54. These allegations are sufficient to set
forth the second and third elements of common law fraud. See, e.g., Elmwood Park Med. Grp.,
2022 WL 772737, at *8 (finding the knowledge and intent to defraud elements satisfied where
plaintiff “avers in detail that the Defaulting Defendants knew that the claims they submitted were

fraudulent, and that the submissions were made as part of an intentional scheme to defraud the
insurer” (citation omitted)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Avetisyan, No. 17-CV-4275 (RPK) (RML), 2021
WL 1227625, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2021) (finding that the Amended Complaint alleged that
the defendants “had both motive and opportunity for the fraud: they each had strong motive to
receive monetary reimbursements to which they were not entitled, and they had the opportunity
and ability to receive those reimbursements by submitting fraudulent claims to plaintiffs” (citations
omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1224101 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021);
Abutova, 2017 WL 1185222, at *7 (finding that the intent element was adequately alleged where
plaintiffs alleged that defendants “established a process to submit false claims and invoices in an
attempt to obtain undeserved and inflated payments from [plaintiffs]”).
Finally, the fourth and fifth elements of fraud have also been adequately pled. “A
plaintiff’s reliance on intentionally fraudulent statements is reasonable without further
investigation when ‘matters are held to be peculiarly within defendant’s knowledge, as plaintiff

has no independent means of ascertaining the truth.’” Elmwood Park Med. Grp., 2022 WL
772737, at *8 (quoting Scheer, 2014 WL 4966150, at *6). “In the context of insurance fraud
schemes, courts in this district regularly find that [i]nsurance companies are permitted to rely on
facially valid insurance reimbursement claims.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defaulting Defendants represented that the claims were facially
valid, and that, “[t]o fulfill its obligation to promptly process claims, Plaintiffs justifiably relied
upon the bills and documentation submitted by GVA Group in support of its claims, and paid GVA
Group based on the representations and information contained in the bills and documentation that

Defendants mailed to Plaintiffs.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 82, 84. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the
“documents submitted to Plaintiffs in support of the fraudulent claims at issue, combined with the
material misrepresentations, omissions and acts of fraudulent concealment described [in the
Complaint], were designed to, and did cause Plaintiffs to justifiably rely on them,” and that, as “a
proximate result, Plaintiffs have incurred damages of more than $53,000.00 based upon the
fraudulent bill submissions.” Id. ¶ 229.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently set forth the fourth and fifth elements of common
law fraud. See, e.g., Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *9 (finding that the fourth and fifth
elements were satisfied where plaintiff averred that “it relied on the facially valid documents that
were submitted by the defaulting defendants,” and, therefore, “paid out at least $516,988 in claims
otherwise not reimbursable under the no-fault law” (citation omitted)); New Century Pharm., 2021
WL 7830141, at *6 (same); Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *15 (finding that the issuance of
reimbursements based on fraudulent billing satisfies the fourth and fifth prongs).
***

The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court find that Plaintiffs have
adequately alleged common law fraud as to Defaulting Defendants.
C. Unjust Enrichment
Plaintiffs also seek default judgment on their unjust enrichment claim against Defaulting
Defendants. See Dkt. No. 27-1 at 34-35. Because the undersigned recommends granting default
judgment on the common law fraud claims against these parties, it is unnecessary to also grant
judgment on the unjust enrichment claims.
“Properly understood, an unjust enrichment claim is intended to protect a plaintiff only in
those circumstances where it has no other recourse in tort or contract.” Maccabi Pharm., 2026

WL 794231, at *9 (first quoting Avetisyan, 2021 WL 1227625, at *6; and then citing Corsello v.
Verizon N.Y., Inc., 967 N.E.2d 1177, 1186 (N.Y. 2012) (“[Unjust enrichment] is available only in
unusual situations when, though the defendant has not breached a contract nor committed a
recognized tort, circumstances create an equitable obligation running from the defendant to the
plaintiff . . . . An unjust enrichment claim is not available where it simply duplicates, or replaces,
a conventional contract or tort claim.”)).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defaulting Defendants were unjustly enriched at Plaintiffs’
expense, but based these claims on the same transactions as their claims for common law fraud.
See Dkt. No. 27-1 at 35; Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 257-59. Accordingly, the unjust enrichment claims are
duplicative of the fraud claims and, as a result, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a judgment on their
unjust enrichment claims. See, e.g., Elmwood Park Med. Grp., 2022 WL 772737, at *9 (“[F]inding
liability on [plaintiff’s] unjust enrichment claims would be inappropriate given that they are based
on the same transactions and conduct as the common law fraud claims.”); Abramov, 2020 WL
1172697, at *12 (finding unjust enrichment claims duplicative of fraud claims (first citing Hughes

v. Ester C Co., 330 F. Supp. 3d 862, 877 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Unjust enrichment claims should be
dismissed where the violative conduct alleged is conterminous with a conventional tort or contract
claim, regardless of whether the tort or contract claim is dismissed.”); then citing Spinnato v. Unity
of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 3d 377, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“The instant case is not
representative of the ‘unusual’ circumstances which provide for an unjust enrichment claim. The
Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim rehashes and improperly duplicates their fraud claims . . . . As
this claim is based on the same set of facts as the fraud claim, the Plaintiffs’ thirteenth (unjust
enrichment) claim is dismissed.”); and then citing Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *16 (denying
liability in default judgment motion reasoning that “as Plaintiffs have established the Danilovich

Defendants’ liability for common law fraud, Plaintiffs have not adequately pled a claim for unjust
enrichment because that claim would rely on duplicative facts”))).
Thus, in light of the undersigned’s recommendation that the Court grant default judgment
on the common law fraud claims against Defaulting Defendants, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that the Court deny Plaintiffs’ request for default judgment on their unjust enrichment
claim and dismiss the unjust enrichment claim.
VI. Damages
As Plaintiffs have proven Defaulting Defendants’ liability on their RICO and common law
fraud claims, the Court next evaluates damages. “While a party’s default is deemed to constitute
a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability, it is not considered an admission of
damages.” Greyhound Exhibitgroup, 973 F.2d at 158 (citations omitted). “Rather, [t]he [C]ourt
must be satisfied that [the] [p]laintiff has met the burden of proving damages to the [C]ourt with
reasonable certainty.” Balhetchet v. Su Caso Mktg. Inc., No. 19-CV-4475 (PKC) (SJB), 2020 WL
4738242, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On a

default judgment motion, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is not required; rather, in determining damages,
the Court may rely on detailed affidavits and other documentary evidence.” Abbott Lab’ys v.
Adelphia Supply USA, No. 15-CV-5826 (CBA) (LB), 2024 WL 4250223, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22,
2024) (citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4263935 (E.D.N.Y. Sep.
23, 2024). Concerning the scope of damage recovery pursuant to a default judgment, the Second
Circuit has held that a default judgment does not give plaintiff “a blank check to recover from
[defendant] any losses it had ever suffered from whatever source. [The plaintiff] could only
recover those damages arising from the acts and injuries pleaded and in this sense it was
[plaintiff’s] burden to show ‘proximate cause.’” Greyhound Exhibitgroup, 973 F.2d at 159

(citation omitted).
Plaintiffs seek treble compensatory damages as well as prejudgment interest against
Ageyev in the total amount of $168,510.72. See Dkt. No. 27-4 at 2; Dkt. No. 27-17 at 2. As to
GVA Group, Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages with prejudgment interest in the total amount
of $61,988.26. See Dkt. No. 27-4 at 2; Dkt. No. 27-17 at 2. In support of their damages requests,
Plaintiffs have filed the Declaration of Oren Kutnowsky, an Analyst in the Special Investigations
Unit of Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Company, and a spreadsheet “containing information extracted
from summaries of payments made on claims for reimbursement under the No-Fault law,” which
are “maintained by Allstate in its ordinary course of business.” See Dkt. No. 27-2; Dkt. No. 27-3
¶ 58; Dkt. No. 27-15. The spreadsheet itemizes “each payment made by Plaintiffs to the GVA
Group enterprise in which Ageyev is alleged to have participated.” Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 58; see also
Dkt. No. 27-15. The spreadsheet lists the claim numbers submitted, the dates of payment, the
amounts paid, and the check numbers. See Dkt. No. 27-15. The spreadsheet shows compensatory
damages in the total amount of $53,256.23. Id. Plaintiffs also filed their prejudgment interest

calculations. See Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 64; Dkt. No. 27-16.8
A. RICO Damages Against Ageyev
Plaintiffs argue that, based on the itemized spreadsheet and the underlying information,
they sustained damages in the amount of $53,256.23, which they argue should be trebled under
RICO against Ageyev for a total award of $159,768.69. Dkt. No. 27-1 at 36-37.
The documents filed by Plaintiffs support their claim of $53,256.23 in damages related to
the RICO violation. See Nazarov, 2015 WL 5774459, at *17 (noting that “[i]n similar cases, courts
have found such documentation [(an affidavit from an Allstate Special Investigations Unit analyst
and copies of payment summaries)] sufficient to support a damages award” (collecting cases));

Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *11 (finding damages calculations submitted by plaintiffs,
supported by a declaration of a Allstate Special Investigations Unit analyst, sufficient evidence on
which to award RICO damages (collecting cases)).
Pursuant to RICO, “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see also Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Geykhman, No. 24-CV-4580 (PKC) (CLP), 2025 WL 2576749, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2025)
(noting that “an injured party is automatically entitled to recover ‘threefold the damages’ it sustains

8 Plaintiffs do not seek attorneys’ fees or costs, see Dkt. No. 29, nor do they seek postjudgment interest.
for a RICO violation” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c))), report and recommendation adopted in part,
Text Order, dated Feb. 19, 2026. “Courts have found that an award of treble damages is
appropriate in no-fault billing cases involving RICO fraud claims, even in the context of a default.”
Avetisyan, 2021 WL 1227625, at *8 (quoting Afanasyev, 2016 WL 1156769, at *12 (collecting
cases)); Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *10 (same). Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to

trebled damages on the RICO claim.
The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court award Plaintiffs treble damages
on their RICO claim against Ageyev, in the total amount of $159,768.69.
B. Fraud Damages and Joint and Several Liability
Plaintiffs do not seek any additional damages on their fraud claim as to Ageyev, but seek
compensatory damages in the amount of $53,256.23 against GVA Group on the fraud claim and
argue that Ageyev and GVA Group are “jointly and severally liable for all damages” relating to
the fraud claim. See Dkt. No. 27-1 at 36; Dkt. No. 27-4 at 2; Dkt. No. 27-17 at 2.
“As Plaintiffs have demonstrated liability on their fraud claims, they are entitled to

damages in the entire amount they paid to Defaulting Defendants, unless they are already
recovering those same damages under RICO.” New Century Pharm., 2021 WL 7830141, at *12
(first citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Williams, No. 13-CV-2893 (RJD) (JMA), 2014 WL 6900121, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014) (adopting report & recommendation, and finding that “separate awards
under RICO and state law would be duplicative”); and then citing Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Esses,
No. 12-CV-4424 (RJD) (VVP), 2013 WL 5972481, at *10 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2013) (adopting
report & recommendation)). Where RICO damages wholly compensate a plaintiff and that award
has been trebled, a separate award of damages on an overlapping fraud claim would “amount to
double recovery for plaintiff.” Am. Transit Ins. Co. v. Bilyk, 514 F. Supp. 3d 463, 479 (E.D.N.Y.
2021) (Cogan, J.) (citation omitted). Moreover, “New York law provides for joint and several
liability for fraudulent acts where defendants acted jointly or concurrently to produce a single
injury.” New Century Pharm., 2021 WL 7830141, at *12 (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Ageyev submitted or caused to be submitted fraudulent claims
through his company, GVA Group and, accordingly, Ageyev is jointly and severally liable with

GVA Group for the $53,256.23 in common law fraud damages. These damages overlap with
$53,256.23 of the $159,768.69 sought against Ageyev for the RICO violation. Plaintiffs’ damages
calculation and proposed judgment, however, appear to seek $53,256.23 from GVA Group
separate and apart from the $159,768.69 sought from Ageyev. See Dkt. No. 27-4 at 2; Dkt. No.
27-17 at 4. Because the RICO damages wholly compensate Plaintiffs, and that award has been
trebled, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a separate award on the fraud claim. See Esses, 2013 WL
5972481, at *10 n.3 (“Since the award of damages under RICO wholly compensates the plaintiffs,
and the award having been trebled, the plaintiffs are not entitled to separate awards of damages on
the claims for common law fraud and unjust enrichment.”).

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court decline to award any
additional damages based on common law fraud, but recommends that GVA Group be held jointly
and severally liable with Ageyev for $53,256.23 of the RICO damages, the actual damages from
the GVA Group enterprise. See, e.g., New Century Pharm., 2021 WL 7830141, at *13
(recommending denial of plaintiffs’ request for additional damages based on the common law fraud
claim, but also recommending that the Court hold the non-RICO defendant jointly and severally
liable with the RICO defendant for the fraud damages also attributed to the non-RICO defendant);
Bilyk, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 479 (awarding trebled RICO damages against each individual defendant,
“plus prejudgment interest on the fraud damages, for which the associated Retail Defendant is
jointly and severally liable for the total amount of fraud damages”); Badia, 2015 WL 1258218, at
*24 (recommending that “Baneur and the Referral Defendants are jointly and severally liable for
the $117,210.85 in actual damages arising from the fraud and RICO claims, respectively, and that
the Referral Defendants alone are jointly and severally liable among themselves for $234,421.70
(which represents the trebled RICO damages reduced by $117,210.85)”).

C. Prejudgment Interest
Plaintiffs seek prejudgment interest on the damages awards under RICO and the state
claims. Dkt. No. 27-1 at 37-38.
First, as to RICO, “[a]n award of prejudgment interest is [not] mandatory . . . under RICO”;
rather, prejudgment interest is “awarded at the discretion of the Court.” Abramov, 2020 WL
1172697, at *14 (citations omitted). “Courts in this circuit generally only award prejudgment
interest in civil RICO actions where treble damages do not adequately compensate for plaintiff’s
losses.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs are already sufficiently compensated by the recommended award of
treble damages for their RICO claim, and, thus, an award of prejudgment interest from Ageyev on

the RICO damages is inappropriate. See id. (“[T]he Court finds that Allstate is already sufficiently
compensated by the award of treble damages for its RICO claims, and thus an award of
prejudgment interest from the RICO Defaulting Defendants is inappropriate.”); Abutova, 2017 WL
1185222, at *9 (“[T]he Court finds that the treble damages awarded under the civil RICO claims
are sufficient to compensate Allstate.”); Avetisyan, 2021 WL 1227625, at *9 (finding “that
plaintiffs are already sufficiently compensated by the award of treble damages for their RICO
claims, and thus an award of prejudgment interest from the RICO defendants is inappropriate”).
Thus, no prejudment interested is warranted on the RICO claim.
Second, as to prejudgment interest relating to the common law fraud claim, as discussed
above, the undersigned has recommended that the Court decline to award any additional damages
based on common law fraud, but recommends that GVA Group be held jointly and severally liable
with Ageyev for $53,256.23 of the RICO damages. Although prejudgment interest is mandatory
for state law fraud in New York, see Avetisyan, 2021 WL 1227625, at *9 (citations omitted), here

the undersigned has recommended that Plaintiffs not receive additional compensatory damages on
their fraud claim. Plaintiffs, therefore, are not entitled to interest on those damages. See Gov’t
Emps. Ins. Co. v. Direct RX Pharm., Inc., No. 19-CV-5876 (DG) (LB), 2021 WL 6494722, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2021) (recommending that plaintiffs “should not recover compensatory
damages nor interest for their common law fraud claim”), report and recommendation adopted,
2022 WL 125822 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2022).
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court deny Plaintiffs’
request for prejudgment interest.
D. Postjudgment Interest

The Second Circuit has “consistently held that an award of postjudgment interest is
mandatory.” Schipani v. McLeod, 541 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Postjudgment interest is mandatory, even if not sought by the plaintiff. See Garcia v. Three Star
Constr. Grp. LLC, No. 26-CV-1353 (BMC), 2026 WL 1983312, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2026)
(“Plaintiff argues that the judgment should include a provision for post-judgment interest. That is
unnecessary as post-judgment interest accrues on every federal judgment as a matter of law.”
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1961)); Garcia v. J&L Constr. LLC, No. 24-CV-5260 (DEH) (GS), 2026 WL
789496, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2026) (recommending that the award of postjudgment interest
is mandatory “regardless of whether postjudgment interest is sought by the plaintiff” (citing
Bleecker v. Zetian Sys., Inc., No. 12-CV-2151 (DLC) (SN), 2013 WL 5951162, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 1, 2013) (adopting report and recommendation, and noting that, “[a]lthough the Complaint
did not seek relief in the form of post-judgment interest, such relief is mandatory under federal
law”))), report and recommendation adopted, Dkt. No. 62 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2026). Moreover,
federal courts award postjudgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) on civil RICO and

common law fraud claims. See, e.g., Zamora v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 14-CV-5344
(WHP) (SN), 2019 WL 3401693, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2019) (recommending postjudgment
interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 in a case involving civil RICO on a default judgment motion),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom., Zamora v. FIT Int’l Grp., Corp., 2019 WL 2416941
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2019); see also J&L Constr., 2026 WL 789496, at *13 (awarding postjudgment
interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 for a fraud claim because “in a diversity case ‘postjudgment
interest is governed by federal statute’” (quoting Schipani, 541 F.3d at 164-65)).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, “interest is calculated ‘from the date of the entry of judgment, at
a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding[] the date of
the judgment.’” Weber Cap., 821 F. Supp. 3d at 389 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs be awarded
postjudgment interest, to be calculated from the date the Clerk of Court enters judgment in this
action until the date of payment, using the federal rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
VII. Declaratory Judgment
Finally, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, relieving Plaintiffs
“from any obligation to pay any unpaid No-Fault claims submitted to them by GVA Group.” Dkt.
No. 27-4 at 3; see also Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 260-267; Dkt. No. 27-1 at 38-41. “Under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, ‘any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be sought.’” Elmwood Park Med. Grp., 2022 WL 772737, at *12
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201). The Declaratory Judgment Act “is an enabling Act, which confers a
discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant. The propriety of issuing a

declaratory judgment may depend upon equitable considerations, and is also informed by the
teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power.” Id.
(quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black River Regulating Dist., 673 F.3d
84, 106 n.7 (2d Cir. 2012)).
“A court may consider whether to enter a declaratory judgment only if the action presents
an actual case or controversy that is ‘real and immediate, allowing specific and conclusive relief,’
and ‘ripe for adjudication.’” Id. (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Neurology Grp., LLC,
No. 14-CV-5277 (ENV) (SMG), 2016 WL 11395017, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom., Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Premier Pro. Servs., 2016 WL

1071099 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2016)); see also Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *9 (“A party
seeking a declaratory judgment must allege that there is a ‘substantial controversy, between parties
with adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.’” (quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca
Indians, 94 F.3d 747, 752 (2d Cir. 1996))). “The controversy must be ‘real and substantial’ such
that declaratory relief will provide ‘specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’”
Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *9 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Williams, No. 13-CV-2893
(RJD) (JO), 2015 WL 5560543, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2015), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dublin, 2015 WL 5560546 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2015)).
Declaratory relief “is appropriate ‘(1) where the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying
and settling the legal relations in issue; or (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the
uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceedings.’” Elmwood Park Med.
Grp., 2022 WL 772737, at *12; see also Maccabi Pharm., 2026 WL 794231, at *10 (same).

“Courts within this district have, on numerous occasions, found these requirements met in actions
by insurers seeking declaratory judgments regarding obligations relating to allegedly fraudulent
claims.” Bilyk, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 475 (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Jacques, No. 14-CV-5299
(KAM) (VMS), 2017 WL 9487191, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2017), report and recommendation
adopted, 2017 WL 1214460 (Mar. 31, 2017)).
Here, Plaintiffs have filed a spreadsheet that contains information, extracted from billing
summaries, reflecting the bills that Plaintiffs have received from GVA Group but remain unpaid.
See Dkt. No. 27-2 ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 67; Dkt. No. 27-18. A total of $96,721.25 in pending and/or
unpaid claims submitted to Plaintiffs by GVA Group remains actively in dispute. See Dkt. No. 27-

2 ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 66; Dkt. No. 27-18. Further, GVA Group continues to pursue one collection
proceeding in Kings County Civil Court. Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 68; see also Dkt. No. 27-19. A review
of the docket of the Kings County Civil Court proceeding identified by Plaintiffs demonstrates that
GVA Group initiated a proceeding against Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company in
2023, alleging failure to pay an insurance claim for $9,848.58, interest, and attorney’s fees, and
that, on May 20, 2024, GVA Group filed a Notice of Trial, indicating that the proceeding was ready
for trial. See Notice of Trial, GVA Group Inc. v. Allstate Property & Casualty Ins. Co., No. CV-
705362-24/KI (May 20, 2024), Dkt. No. 7. The case remains pending. Plaintiffs argue, therefore,
that “unless or until Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief is granted, [GVA Group] may continue to submit
to new claims and file collections proceedings for the unpaid claims either in the civil courts of
the State of New York and/or before Arbitrators of the American Arbitration Association seeking
payment from Plaintiffs for the same DME, and/or orthotic devices that Plaintiffs’ Complaint
alleges has been fraudulently billed.” Dkt. No. 27-3 ¶ 68.
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that there is an actual controversy between Plaintiffs

and Defaulting Defendants of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment. Specifically, the unpaid claims and pending collection proceeding
constitute an actual controversy for which a declaratory judgment would provide specific and
conclusive relief from the uncertainty that those claims pose. “Courts in this district routinely
grant declaratory relief in similar circumstances, where fraudulently incorporated medical
practices have fraudulent claims pending against insurers for No-Fault benefits.” Elmwood Park
Med. Grp., 2022 WL 772737, at *13 (collecting cases); see also Avetisyan, 2021 WL 1227625, at
*10 (“Courts in this district have granted declaratory relief in numerous cases where the defendants
. . . were involved in similar schemes to defraud insurers for charges that are not permissible under

the no-fault law.” (collecting cases)); Bilyk, 514 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (granting plaintiff’s request for
a declaratory judgment and ordering that “plaintiff is not obligated to pay any of the defaulted
Retail Defendants’ pending claims” where plaintiff “established the existence of an actual
controversy so as to warrant a declaratory judgment” via plaintiff’s “chart demonstrating that 181
collections actions and arbitrations are pending between itself and the defaulted Retail Defendants”
and plaintiff’s sufficiently particular allegations regarding how “how defendants’ pending, unpaid
claims are part of a fraudulent scheme to submit inflated claims”).
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs are entitled to a
declaration that they are not obligated to pay GVA Group’s outstanding claims and that their
request for declaratory relief be granted.
VIII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion

be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the undersigned respectfully recommends that
the Court hold that Defendant Ageyev is liable under RICO for the first cause of action alleged in
the Complaint, that Defaulting Defendants are liable for common law fraud as to the second cause
of action alleged in the Complaint, and that RICO damages be trebled and awarded against Ageyev
in the amount of $159,768.69, $53,256.23 of which GVA Group should be held jointly and
severally liable with Ageyev. Additionally, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the
Court grant Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief and direct that Plaintiffs are not obligated to
pay GVA Group’s outstanding claims. Further, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the
Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for unjust enrichment, deny Plaintiffs’ request for

prejudgment interest, and dismiss the John Doe Defendants from this action without prejudice.
Finally, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court award postjudgment interest.
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being electronically served on counsel. This
Court directs Plaintiffs’ counsel to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation by first-class
mail and overnight mail on Defendants and to file proof of service on ECF by July 16, 2026.
Copies shall be served at the following addresses:
GVA Group Inc.
2167 East 21st St., Suite 242
Brooklyn, NY 11229
GVA Group Inc.
1133 East 35th St., Suite 4D
Brooklyn, NY 11210

Aleksandr Ageyev
1854 Ocean Avenue, Apartment 3F
Brooklyn, New York 11230

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days
after service of this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d) (addressing computation of days). Any requests for an
extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Merchant. The “failure to object
timely to a [magistrate judge]’s report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the
[magistrate judge]’s decision.” Caidor v. Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Small v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d. Cir. 1989)).
Dated: Brooklyn, New York SO ORDERED.
July 15, 2026

/s/ Joseph A. Marutollo
JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417577. Public record. Not legal advice.