# Ball

> District Court, W.D. New York · August 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417413

## Case

- **Full name:** John Antoni Aguilar Guzman v. Michael Ball, in his official capacity as Acting Deputy Field Office Director, Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement; Philip Rhoney, in his official capacity as Acting Field Office Director, Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement; David Venturella, in his official capacity as Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement; Todd Blanche, in his official capacity as United States Attorney General; Markwayne Mullin, in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417413

## Opinion text

FATES DISTRICT
FiLED SQ
K os
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AUG 14 2026
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
a ANOREW ier. OF
Lema 5
STERN DISTRICL>
JOHN ANTONI AGUILAR GUZMAN,
Petitioner,
v. 6:26-CV-6655 (JLS)
MICHAEL BALL, tn his official capacity
as Acting Deputy Field Office Director,
Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement; PHILIP RHONEY,
in his official capacity as Acting Field
Office Director, Buffalo Field Office, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement;
DAVID VENTURELLA, in his official
capacity as Senior Official Performing the
Duties of the Director, U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enforcement; TODD
BLANCHE, in his official capacity as
United States Attorney General;
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official
capacity as Secretary of Homeland
Security;
Respondents. !

DECISION AND ORDER
Petitioner John Antoni Aguilar Guzman, a citizen and national of Mexico,
commenced this habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his
continued detention in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”). See Dkts. 1, 6. For the reasons below, Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

The caption has been updated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

BACKGROUND
In October 2011, Petitioner unlawfully entered the United States. Dkt. 1, at
3 491. He was not encountered by immigration authorities upon entry. Id.; see also
Dkt. 6, at 2 (Petitioner “arrived in the United States at an unknown location” and
“was not admitted or paroled.”). He “made a life in the [American] community” for
the next fifteen years. Dkt. 1, at 3] 3. On June 6, 2026, he was detained by
Respondents. Id. at 3 4 1.
On June 28, 2026, Petitioner was scheduled to have a custody
redetermination hearing. Dkt. 6, at 3; Dkt. 6-2 at 18. The hearing did not take
place, however, because Petitioner withdrew his request for it. Dkt. 6, at 3.
Petitioner nonetheless remains eligible for a custody redetermination hearing,
should he renew his request for one with the immigration court. See generally Dkt.
8.
Petitioner filed a petition on June 25, 2026, seeking a writ of habeas corpus
releasing him and providing that Respondents not re-detain him without “a pre-
deprivation hearing at which the government bears the burden... .” Dkt. 1, at 17.
Respondents moved to dismiss this case on the grounds that Petitioner had not
exhausted his administrative remedies before filing a petition with this Court and
that this Court is unable to order Petitioner’s release. Dkts. 5-6. Petitioner replied,
arguing that he did not need to exhaust administrative remedies because
exhaustion was futile and that he should either receive a bond hearing with the
burden of proof on the Government or immediate release. Dkt. 7. Respondents

then submitted a further filing, arguing that exhaustion was not futile, that it was
incorrect to determine the burden of proof of a bond hearing at this stage, and that
immediate release should be denied. Dkt. 8.
Because this Court finds that administrative exhaustion is warranted, the
petition must be dismissed.
DISCUSSION
A “habeas petitioner must normally exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking federal court intervention.” Castillo Lachapel v. Joyce, 786 F. Supp. 3d 860,
864 (S.D.N_Y. 2025) (quoting Michalski v. Decker, 279 F. Supp. 3d 487, 495
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (subsequent citation omitted). Although “Section 2241 does not
include a statutory exhaustion requirement, courts generally require exhaustion as
a ‘prudential matter.” Hossain v. Barr, No. 6:19-CV-06389-MAT, 2019 WL
5964678, at *8-5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2019) (quoting Michalski, 279 F. Supp. 3d at
495 (subsequent citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In the Second
Circuit, a “district court may excuse prudential exhaustion where: ‘(1) available
remedies provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief; (2) irreparable injury
may occur without immediate judicial relief; (3) administrative appeal would be
futile; and (4) in certain instances a plaintiff has raised a substantial constitutional
question.” Batista v. Genalo, No. 1:26-cv-05408-MKV, 2026 WL 2169849, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2026) (quoting Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir.
2003)).

Petitioner argues that exhaustion should be excused because the available
administrative remedies would be futile. See Dkt. 7, at 1 (“This Court has held
that, in a nearly identical matter, exhaustion was futile... .”). He also argues that
exhaustion ought to be excused because it is a prudential, not a statutory,
requirement, and the process to appeal bond before the Board of Immigration
Appeals is too long and cumbersome to be prudential. Id. at 1-2.
In order “to understand the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement,
the purposes behind the requirement of exhaustion . . . should be understood.”
Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62 (quoting Kennedy v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 989
F.2d 588, 594 (2d Cir. 1993)). These purposes include “protecting the authority of
administrative agencies, limiting interference in agency affairs, developing the
factual record to make judicial review more efficient, and resolving issues to render
judicial review unnecessary.” Id. at 62. If a petitioner shows “that pursuing
available administrative remedies would be futile,” then “a court will release the
[petitioner] from the exhaustion requirement” because “the purposes behind the
requirement of exhaustion are no longer served.” Id. (quoting Kennedy, 989 F.2d at
594). But it is not enough for a petitioner to argue that his or her claim would likely
fail in immigration court to demonstrate “that it would . . . be[] futile to raise it”
there. Jd.
Here, Petitioner essentially argues that, because he believes his claim may
fail in immigration court, it would be futile to raise it there. This is not enough to
establish futility. Further, prudence “counsels judicial restraint ..., especially in

the immigration arena in which the federal government’s political branches exercise
plenary authority.” Michalski, 279 F. Supp. at 497 (citing Rajah v. Makasey, 544
F.3d 427, 438 (2d Cir. 2008)). Additionally, “the substance of ICE’s individualized
determination” . . . “is outside [of] the Court’s jurisdiction.” Marshall v. Arteta, 1:26-
cv-04110-MKV, 2026 WL 1724311 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2026) (quoting Fontanelli ex
rel. Bernal Garcia v. Francis, No. 25-cv-7115, (JLR), 2025 WL 2773234, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025)). Petitioner may request a custody redetermination
hearing before an immigration judge.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 5, is granted,
and the Petition is dismissed without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court shall close this case.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2026 >
Buffalo, New York

JO L. SINATRA, JR.
UMTED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417413. Public record. Not legal advice.