# Rose

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · August 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417364

## Case

- **Full name:** Tina Rose v. State of Illinois, by and through its Judicial Branch, including the Second Judicial Circuit and the Franklin County Circuit Court
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417364

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TINA ROSE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-CV-1207-NJR

STATE OF ILLINOIS, by and through
its Judicial Branch, including the Second
Judicial Circuit and the Franklin County
Circuit Court,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 17). Pro se plaintiff Tina Rose sues
Defendant State of Illinois under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq., alleging that she has experienced discrimination and retaliation during the
course of over two dozen proceedings in state court. (Docs. 2; 10). Illinois argues that the
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that
Ms. Rose’s claims are barred by absolute judicial immunity, that the Court should abstain
under the Younger doctrine or similar principles of federal-state comity, and that
Ms. Rose’s allegations are legally insufficient. (Doc. 17). Ms. Rose has filed a response
arguing that her complaint should not be dismissed or, if it is dismissed, that she should
be given an opportunity to amend her complaint. (Doc. 19). For the following reasons,
the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The following facts from the complaint are taken as true for the purposes of
Illinois’s motion to dismiss.

Since August 2024, Ms. Rose has either filed or been a party to 29 cases in Illinois’s
Second Judicial Circuit, primarily in Franklin County, where she lives. (Doc. 2, at 3).
Some of these cases are civil; some are “quasi-criminal.” Id. As far as this Court can tell,
most or all of the 29 state court cases arise out of disputes between Rose, her landlord,
and city officials. See id. at 5.

Ms. Rose has been dissatisfied with the way the state court proceedings have
progressed. She has multiple disabilities, including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and chronic
pain disorders. Id. at 3. Due to these disabilities, she requested accommodations to enable
her to access court services and proceedings. Id. 3–6. For instance, she requested

permission to use something called “ADA notes.” Id. at 4. (While Ms. Rose does not list
all of the accommodations she requested, she does note that the Franklin County
Courthouse lacks an “ADA Advocate” and has no “handicap accessible functions” for its
front door.) Id. at 6.
But Ms. Rose did not receive her requested accommodations. Instead, she alleges

that her requests were denied and she was retaliated against for having made those
requests—both in violation of the ADA. Id. at 3–7, 10–21. Ms. Rose’s complaint is a little
disorganized and sometimes provides legal conclusions rather than allegations of fact;
however, as far as the Court can discern, the discriminatory and retaliatory acts Ms. Rose
endured include the following:!
e Refusal by state court judges to hear motions for ADA accommodations
until after delays of up to ten months, id. at 3-4;
e Refusal by state court judges to hear motions for ADA accommodations at
all, id. at 4;
e Insistence by state court judge that Ms. Rose provide live medical testimony
to establish her need for accommodations, id. at 4, 14-15, 20;
e Anti-disability ridicule from a state court judge, id.;
e Refusal by state court judge to permit Ms. Rose to use ADA notes in the
courtroom during a preliminary protective order hearing, id. at 4, 21;
e Refusal by state court judge to assign professional mediator to assist
Ms. Rose in negotiations, id. at 4, 12-13, 16;
e Order by state court judge consolidating three different hearings despite
Ms. Rose’s request for three hearings, causing her to endure physical
reactions and to eventually faint, id. at 5;
e Denial by state court judge of request to record hearings, id. at 12;
e Refusal by state court judge to allow unspecified ADA accommodations,
id. at 18; and
e Exhibition of hostility toward Ms. Rose by state court judges after she
requested ADA accommodations. Id., passim.
After screening Ms. Rose’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and permitting
it to proceed on her ADA claims, this Court directed service on Illinois. (Doc. 10).? Illinois
has now filed its motion to dismiss, arguing that it is immune from suit, that this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (or, if it has
jurisdiction, it should abstain from exercising it), and that Ms. Rose has failed to state a
claim on which relief can be granted.

1 Ms. Rose’s complaint originally sought relief on two additional claims that have since been dismissed:
one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Constitution, and one under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (Doc. 2; see Doc. 10). Some of the misconduct she
alleges in her complaint appears to be related to those two claims rather than disability discrimination or
retaliation. To the extent that Ms. Rose feels some of her factual allegations were incorrectly considered
unrelated to her ADA claims, she is welcome to re-allege them in an amended pleading.
2 See also Rose v. Illinois, No. 25-CV-1207, 2025 WL 3153411 (S.D. IIL Nov. 12, 2025).

Page 3 of 12

LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests whether the complaint states a
claim on which relief may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637

(7th Cir. 2012). The Court accepts as true the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations
and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture,
LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2013). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff only
needs to allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff need not plead detailed

factual allegations, but must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements.” Id.
Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), which “provides that a case will be
dismissed if the court lacks the authority to hear and decide the dispute,” are
“analyze[d] . . . as any other motion to dismiss.”3 Gonzalez v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 13

CV 3463, 2014 WL 26283, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2014) (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1);
and then citing United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946
(7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683
F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). Thus, when analyzing a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court “must accept as true all well-

3 With the exception (not relevant here) that, if a complaint formally and facially satisfies jurisdictional
requirements but the underlying facts do not, motions under Rule 12(b)(1) can be decided with reference
to materials outside the complaint itself. E.g., Gonzalez v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 13 CV 3463, 2014 WL
26283, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2014) (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); and then citing United Phosphorous,
Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Minn-Chem,
Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”
St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999)).
DISCUSSION
I. Subject matter jurisdiction
The Court first addresses Illinois’s objection under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
which “precludes federal district-court jurisdiction ‘over cases brought by state court
losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced.’” Bauer v. Koester, 951 F.3d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sykes v. Cook Cty.
Circuit Court Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2016)) (citing Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d
884, 885 (7th Cir. 2014)); see also Continental Indemnity Co. v. BII, Inc., 104 F.4th 630, 636
(7th Cir. 2024) (“Subject matter jurisdiction is the first issue in any case . . . .” (quoting
Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co., 926 F3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2019))). The doctrine therefore

“requires a party seeking review of a state court judgment or presenting a claim that a
state judicial proceeding has violated their constitutional rights to pursue relief through
the state court systema and ultimately to the Supreme Court.” Long, 182 F.3d at 554; see
also, e.g., Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that Rooker-Feldman
is based on “the principle that only the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the

civil judgments of state courts” (citations omitted)).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
blocks federal jurisdiction when four elements are present. First, the federal
plaintiff must have been a state-court loser. Second, the state-court judgment
must have become final before the federal proceedings began. Third, the
state-court judgment must have caused the alleged injury underlying the
federal claim. Fourth, the claim must invite the federal district court to
review and reject the state-court judgment.
Gilbank v. Wood Cnty Dep’t of Human Servs., 111 F.4th 754, 766 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc).
Illinois argues that the doctrine precludes jurisdiction over at least some portion
of Ms. Rose’s claims. (Doc. 17, at 7–8). First, Illinois correctly points out that much of
Ms. Rose’s complaint arises out of the alleged decisions of judges in 29 state court cases.
Three of those cases have proceeded to final judgment. Accordingly, by challenging the
adverse decisions in those cases (e.g., to deny Ms. Rose ADA accommodations), she is

effectively attempting to appeal those decisions in this Court, thus implicating the
doctrine.
But Illinois is incorrect, even as to the three cases that have proceeded to final
judgment. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude this Court’s jurisdiction
because the doctrine does not apply to interlocutory orders. Kowalski v. Boliker, 893 F.3d

987, 995 (7th Cir. 2018); see also T.M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1765
(2026) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“As the Court concedes, the doctrine applies only to ‘state-
court judgments’; it does not bar district courts from reviewing state-court interlocutory
orders.” (quoting T.M., 146 S. Ct. at 1744 (majority opinion))). Ms. Rose does not ask this
Court to review or reject any state court judgment as violating the ADA. Rather, her
complaint arises out of the interlocutory orders and conduct of Illinois judges during the

course of state court proceedings. Accordingly, the doctrine’s elements are unsatisfied,
and Rooker-Feldman does not bar this Court’s jurisdiction.
II. Abstention under Younger or other doctrines
Disposing of Illinois’s Rooker-Feldman objection does not end the jurisdictional
inquiry. Illinois also argues that, even if jurisdiction technically exists, this Court ought

to abstain from exercising it. In support of this argument, it first invokes the doctrine of
Younger abstention. Then, perhaps sensing that Younger is (like Rooker-Feldman) an
imperfect fit, Illinois relies on a sort of composite abstention doctrine recently espoused
by the Seventh Circuit in J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 720–25 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding
abstention was proper “under the foundational principles of our federal system,” even

though “none of the abstention doctrines” in isolation were “a literal or perfect fit”). The
Court concludes that this latter abstention doctrine, which the Court refers to as “Woodard
abstention,” applies to this case.
Illinois first argues that this Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction
under Younger, which “directs federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over

federal claims that seek to interfere with pending state court proceedings.” Woodard, 997
F.3d at 722 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971)). The doctrine applies
“where federal court intervention would intrude” into (1) “ongoing state criminal
proceedings,” (2) “state-initiated civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal
prosecutions,” or (3) “civil proceedings implicating a state’s interest in enforcing orders

and judgments of its courts.” Id. (citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72–73
(2013)). Underlying Younger abstention is the principle “that, absent extraordinary
circumstances, a federal court should not interfere with pending state judicial
proceedings.” Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
Illinois argues that Younger applies to the extent that Ms. Rose seeks relief which
would interfere with 13 of the 29 cases she mentions in her complaint. (Doc. 17, at 8–9).

Those 13 cases, it points out, are identified by Ms. Rose as involving “orders of
protection,” which Illinois argues fall under the third category of Younger abstention. Id.
Ms. Rose counters that she “does not seek to enjoin any specific pending state
case” or “request an order directing how a state judge must rule.” (Doc. 19, at 11). In her
complaint, she asks for three primary forms of relief: a declaratory judgment that Illinois’s
courts violated federal law, compensatory damages of three million dollars, and

“appropriate injunctive and structural relief to prevent future . . . ADA violations.”
(Doc. 2, at 6–7, 9). While she does not specify what she means by “appropriate” injunctive
relief, id. at 9, Ms. Rose now avers that she is seeking “prospective compliance with
federal disability law rather than intervention in the merits of an ongoing state
proceeding.” (Doc. 19, at 12). She further argues that, rather than dismissing her ADA

claims in their entirety at the pleadings stage, this Court could “tailor” the forms of relief
she requests “to avoid interference with any particular proceeding.” Id.
Illinois argues, in the alternative, that Woodard abstention is appropriate in this
case. (Doc. 17, at 9–11). In Woodard, the Seventh Circuit identified a line of cases in which
none of the canonical abstention doctrines had applied but abstention was nonetheless

merited. Woodard, 997 F.3d at 723–24. The through-line was respect for comity between
federal and state courts: where a plaintiff requests federal intrusion into the
administration of state courts, comity dictates that the federal court abstain. Id.
At first blush, this case seems like the poster child for Woodard abstention. Ms. Rose
takes issue with the decisions of judges in more than two dozen state court cases. Some
of the decisions she objects to involve the minutia of docket management (such as the

consolidation of hearings), a responsibility familiar to all courts, federal and state. To
remedy her injuries from the myriad objected-to state court decisions, she asks this Court
to (1) declare that Illinois has violated federal law, (2) award her three million dollars,
and (3) issue “appropriate injunctive and structural relief” to prevent future ADA
violations. Because the ADA violations were allegedly constituted by a wide array of state
judicial decisions involving matters as anodyne as docket management, it is not unfair to

imagine that “appropriate injunctive relief” would require this Court to effectively
superintend the daily functioning of Illinois’s state courts. Thus, Ms. Rose’s request for
relief would “directly affect[] the administration of” state courts and “run[s] contrary to
the basic principles of equity, comity, and federalism.” Woodard, 997 F.3d at 724 (quoting
Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1070 (7th Cir. 2018)).

There is no doubt that Woodard abstention applies to at least some portion of
Ms. Rose’s claims; the tricky question is determining how much. For instance, Ms. Rose
complains that the entrance to the courthouse does not comply with the ADA. Certainly
neither an injunction requiring Illinois to modify that entrance nor an award of
compensatory damages would interfere with any pending state court proceedings. But

on the other hand, much the rest of Ms. Rose’s complaint focuses on the orders of state
court judges (e.g., denying her requests for accommodations). Nearly any relief
predicated on individual state court decisions—compensatory, declaratory, or
injunctive—would enable Ms. Rose to “shape—or perhaps change—the direction and
course” of those state court proceedings which remain pending. Woodard, 997 F.3d at 723;
see also Lopez v. Kubalanza, No. 24 C 13340, 2025 WL 2306815, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11,

2025) (applying Woodard to a plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and monetary relief as
well as to injunctive relief).
Another wrinkle: at least three of the state court proceedings giving rise to this suit
are no longer pending. (Doc. 17, at 7–8; Doc. 2, at 11, 13). While Ms. Rose cannot secure
prospective relief with respect to state judicial proceedings, the Court need not abstain
from suits for compensatory damages arising out of completed state court proceedings

under the Woodard or Younger doctrines. See Woodard, 997 F.3d at 724–25 (when
compensatory damages are sought in an action subject to Younger abstention, courts
should generally stay the case until the state court proceedings have finished). To the
extent that Ms. Rose is seeking compensatory damages for those three proceedings,
Woodard abstention does not apply; however, because Ms. Rose’s complaint is not

sufficiently specific in describing the relief she seeks, the Court cannot determine with
any precision what portion of her claims arise out of state cases that are no longer
pending.
Despite the lack of specificity in Ms. Rose’s complaint, the Court finds that
application of the Woodard abstention doctrine requires the following results:

1. To the extent that Ms. Rose seeks injunctive or declaratory relief with
respect to any state court judge’s decisions, conduct, or orders in a pending
state court proceeding, the Court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction.
Ms. Rose’s claims to that effect are DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. To the extent that Ms. Rose seeks compensatory relief with respect to any
state court judge’s decisions, conduct, or orders in a pending state court
proceeding, the Court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction and STAY
these proceedings in their entirety4 until each such state court proceeding
is no longer pending.
Neither Younger nor Woodard abstention would apply if, alternatively, Ms. Rose only
sought (1) relief from injuries caused by something other than the decisions, conduct, or
orders of state court judges, or (2) compensatory relief alone with respect to any state
court judge’s decisions, conduct, or orders in non-pending state court proceedings. If that
were so, this case could proceed.5
As it stands, the Court reads Ms. Rose’s complaint to seek compensatory relief

with respect to the decisions, conduct, and orders of state court judges arising out of
pending state court proceedings. As such, the proper disposition is to stay this case until
all 29 state court cases have been resolved. However, in light of Ms. Rose’s status as a
pro se litigant, the Court will first give Ms. Rose an opportunity to amend her
complaint.
Therefore, the Court HOLDS IN ABEYANCE its decision to stay this action.

If Ms. Rose so chooses, she may amend her complaint to remove her requests for
compensatory relief based on the decisions, conduct, or orders of state court judges in

4 If Ms. Rose seeks compensatory relief based on any state court judge’s judicial acts in any ongoing state
court proceeding, this entire action will be stayed. This is because any partial stay would be impracticable
to the point of being unmanageable. There are 29 cases addressed in Ms. Rose’s complaint; these
proceedings will never end if a new set of factual allegations suddenly springs to life each time one of the
26 pending state court cases is finalized. Judicial economy will best be preserved by litigating all of
Ms. Rose’s claims based on as-yet pending state court cases at the same time, which can only be
accomplished by staying this action until each state court case has been resolved.
5 Here, the Court does not reach Illinois’s arguments on the merits or on judicial immunity precisely
because it finds that, as Ms. Rose’s complaint stands, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over an
indeterminable portion of Ms. Rose’s claims until there are no longer any pending state court proceedings
at issue.
ongoing state court proceedings. If she successfully does so, no stay will be required.
Therefore, the Court ORDERS Ms. Rose to either file an amended complaint or a notice
stating her intention not to so amend on or before August 28, 2026.
If Ms. Rose does not choose to amend her complaint, or if her amended complaint
continues to require Woodard abstention, the Court will stay this action until such time as
the underlying state court proceedings for which Ms. Rose seeks compensatory relief
have each become final. If such a stay is entered, this Court will order Ms. Rose to keep
the Court informed of the status of the state-court proceedings.
Illinois’s motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Ms. Rose’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to any state court
judge’s decisions, conduct, or orders in a pending state court proceeding are
DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 14, 2026

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

Page 12 of 12

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417364. Public record. Not legal advice.