# Bailey

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · August 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417345

## Case

- **Full name:** Jordan Bailey v. Chaplain Lambert-Goheen, Galloway, Kevin Rehfuss, Carl W. Harmon, Rob Jeffreys
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JORDAN BAILEY, Y31943, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-362-DWD
)
CHAPLAIN LAMBERT-GOHEEN, )
GALLOWAY, )
KEVIN REHFUSS, )
CARL W. HARMON, )
ROB JEFFREYS, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:
On March 18, 2025, this matter was severed from a multi-plaintiff action
concerning multiple inmates’ ability to observe their religion at Shawnee Correctional
Center. See Clair et al. v. Lambert-Goheen, et al., Case No. 25-cv-82-DWD. The Plaintiffs
allege that from the third quarter of 2022 through January of 2023 they experienced
hinderances with their ability to observe their religion at Shawnee. They further claim
that after gathering for a Jumu’ah service in Shawnee’s chapel on January 20, 2023, they
became the targets of retaliatory transfers to Menard, and retaliatory discipline. In the
above-captioned case, Plaintiff Jordan Bailey was allowed to proceed on five claims
against the Defendants alleging Equal Protection violations, hinderances on his ability to
observe his religion, and alleged retaliation. Defendants have moved for summary
judgment on the issue of exhaustion (Doc. 47), and Plaintiff has responded (Doc. 53). For
reasons explained herein, the Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Background

Plaintiffs alleged that in the third quarter of 2022 when religious services in IDOC
returned to a more normal level after the Covid-19 pandemic, the Al-Islam followers were
not afforded the same opportunities to observe their religion as other groups. Previously,
the group had weekly hour-long Taleem and Jumu’ah services, but after the pandemic,
they were limited just to the Jumu’ah services. They claim that Lambert-Goheen allowed

other religious groups to go back to full operations, and that she assisted other groups in
things like recruiting outside volunteers to come in to deliver religious messages. They
also allege that Defendant Lambert-Goheen ensured that other religions received
appropriate meals for their religious dietary needs during special holidays, but she made
sure to be out of the office or otherwise failed to supervise dietary services for special

occasions such as Ramadan or Eid-Al-Fitr. They claim Defendant Galloway knew of this
from multiple missives but failed to do anything about it and thus participated in the
discriminatory treatment. (Doc. 1 at 13).
Plaintiffs allege that Jumu’ah services were subject to such stringent restrictions
that the services were essentially rendered ineffective as a form of observing the religion.

While other religions had outside volunteers that came to the prison to lead worship, the
Al-Islam members were not allowed an outside volunteer. On many occasions, this
meant that the Al-Islam inmates were left with a short 15–20-minute video for Jumu’ah,
while other religions enjoyed an hour-long service. On a handful of occasions, Lambert-
Goheen allowed inmates to consult on the contents of longer Jumu’ah gatherings, and
they were allowed to deliver pre-approved and strictly scripted messages themselves.

However, Lambert-Goheen hindered this effort by attempting to insist that inmate Clair
and a fellow-inmate needed to recruit other followers of the religion to deliver Jumu’ah
messages so that fellow inmates would not come to regard the two as religious leaders.
The two tried to explain that this would not be religiously appropriate because teachings
should only be delivered by those highly knowledgeable in the Quran, but Lambert-
Goheen remained steadfast. In mid-January of 2023, she promised to allow Clair to

deliver the service, but she swapped it out for the 20-minute video at the last minute.
Plaintiff faults Lambert-Goheen and Defendant Warden Galloway for making these
policies. (Doc. 1 at 16).
The plaintiffs alleged that on January 20, 2023, inmates went to the chapel
expecting to participate in a Jumu’ah service that Clair was to lead by delivering a pre-

approved speech. The speech had been delayed the previous week without warning, and
the Jumu’ah gathering on this day was delayed because Lambert-Goheen took time to
escort a volunteer religious leader for another religion out of the prison. While the
inmates were waiting, they discussed filing grievances about the unfair treatment of their
religion. When Lambert-Goheen arrived, she prepared the television for a video and

indicated to the inmates that she would be playing a video instead of having Clair speak
because she could not allow one inmate to become a leader of others. Prior to playing the
video, she initiated a Q&A session, as was typical. Many hands were raised, and she
indicated they would proceed as long as everyone maintained proper manners and
decorum. Individuals asked a variety of questions about why Clair could not always lead
services, or why they could not get an outside volunteer Imam to lead services, which

Lambert-Goheen largely brushed off. When individuals began to press about names of
those in the Administration responsible for religious decisions so that they could file
grievances, the tone changed. Lambert-Goheen threatened to cancel the services entirely.
Clair then raised his hand and asked if she would really cancel services simply because
they were asking calm and valid questions about their services. Rather than responding,
Lambert-Goheen gave a single order for everyone to get out of the chapel and she

immediately began to collect prayer rugs.
The plaintiffs alleged that the inmates exited in an orderly fashion. Inmates
returned to their cells, and later that afternoon an officer came to Clair’s cell and told him
to pack his property to move to restrictive housing. Clair alleges he was never given an
investigative ticket, nor was he told directly why he was put in restrictive housing. Clair

alleges he eventually realized that all of the individuals taken to restrictive housing were
those who had previously filed grievances against Lambert-Goheen and who had been
seen on camera speaking to him. He was placed in restrictive housing on a Friday, and
he alleges that by the following Tuesday all inmates implicated had been transferred to
other facilities. Plaintiff Bailey alleged the same series of events, and indicated that

during the January 20, 2023, service at the chapel he never said anything to anyone.
Bailey and his former co-plaintiffs were all transferred to Menard, a maximum-
security facility. At Menard they each received an identical disciplinary ticket that
charged them with disobeying direct orders essential to safety and security, or a lesser
offense of insolence. (Doc. 1 at 20). The tickets were premised on information from
confidential sources, and alleged they had disrupted services on January 20, 2023, and

had been aggressive with the chaplain. Clair alleges that the disciplinary ticket and use
of confidential informants was intentional because Lambert-Goheen is “very calculated”
in her actions. He alleges the discipline was retaliatory. Clair faults Defendants Jeffreys
(former director of IDOC) and Warden Galloway for quickly signing off on inmate
transfers without doing an investigation. He further alleges Jeffreys, Galloway, Lambert-
Goheen, John Doe 2 (shift supervisor who signed the disciplinary report), Major Hillie,

Lt. Bradford, and Carl Harmon all violated the plaintiffs’ rights to due process and
punished them for attempting to exercise their religion. (Doc. 1 at 21).
Bailey and Wilson allege they requested witnesses and video footage for the
disciplinary hearing. A hearing was held for Clair on February 1, 2023, at which time he
was asked if he needed a continuance to get statements from his witnesses. Defendant

Schoenbeck insisted he did not, and then Clair proceeded to give a verbal account of
events, which he claims Schoenbeck heavily interrupted. Clair spoke on the nature of the
offenses alleged, as well as his own account of what transpired at the Shawnee chapel.
Clair was ultimately found guilty and received a month of C-grade and 28 days of
segregation. He claims that co-plaintiffs Wilson and Bailey’s hearings went similarly,

despite other individuals who faced the same disciplinary report having their offenses
expunged. Plaintiff Clair tried to grieve the disciplinary outcome via two channels, and
Defendants Bayler and Jeffreys refused to investigate further, however, he alleges that
they did direct Warden Wills to downgrade one of the charges to a lesser offense. He
claims that based on these events his Due Process rights were violated by Defendants
Schoenbeck, Jones, Wills, Bayler and Jeffreys.

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designated the following
claims:
Claim 1: Equal Protection claim against Defendant Lambert-Goheen
for affording Al-Islam observers a single 20–30-minute
Jumu’ah service once a week and for completely
discontinuing Taleem weekly educational gatherings,
while other religions were afforded hour-long gatherings
from late-2022 onward;

Claim 2: Equal protection claim against Defendant Lambert-Goheen
for failing to ensure adequate dietary accommodations for
Ramadan, Eid-Al-Fitr, and Eid-Al-Adha, despite ensuring
adequate dietary accommodations for religious holidays of
other religions such as Christmas or Passover.

Claim 3: First Amendment claim against Defendant Lambert-
Goheen for strictly limiting the content of the Khutbah
(sermon/speech) in late-December of 2022-January of 2023,
and/or for replacing the Khutbah with short video
presentations;

Claim 4: First Amendment retaliatory transfer claim against
Defendants Warden Galloway and Director Jeffreys for
allegedly quickly signing off on immediate transfers after
the January 20, 2023, chapel incident allegedly without
conducting any investigation;

Claim 5: First Amendment retaliatory discipline claim against
Defendants Lambert-Goheen, C/O Harmon (officer who
reported the January 20, 2023, incident for discipline), Kevin
Rehfuss (supervisor who signed off on the disciplinary
report) for “acting in cohesion” to retaliate against Plaintiffs
for using the grievance process regarding Al-Islam religious
practice.

Following initial discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment and
Plaintiff has responded.
Findings of Fact
The parties agree that grievances 310-2-23 and 339-2-23 are both relevant. Bailey
filed Grievance 310-2-23 on February 11, 2023, concerning the January 20, 2023, Jumu’ah

service. (Doc. 47-1 at 5). In the grievance he alleges that as inmates began to congregate
in the chapel, Lambert-Goheen was fielding questions and discussing religious matters
with inmates. (Id.). During this exchange, Lambert-Goheen indicated that the day’s
service could not be led by an inmate because her superiors said prayer cannot be led by
a single person regularly. (Id. at 5-6). After a few inmate queries, Lambert-Goheen

indicated the inmates could either watch a video service or end chapel. (Id. at 6). A
follow-up question prompted her to end chapel, and she directed the inmates to leave.
(Id.). Bailey left the chapel despite missing one of his five daily prayers dictated by his
Muslim religion. (Id.). Bailey alleges that on January 23, 2023, he was told to pack his
belongings because he was being placed in segregation under investigation. On January

24, 2023, Bailey was transferred from Shawnee to Menard, and on January 27 he received
a disciplinary ticket alleging multiple offenses related from chapel on January 20. (Id.).
Bailey alleged the disciplinary report was “completely fabricated and baseless.” (Id.). He
further alleges that the conditions in restrictive housing were harsh and exacerbated
physical and mental health issues. Bailey also complained that the transfer to Menard

interrupted a transfer request he had pending to relocate closer to family in Danville. (Id.
at 8).
The grievance officer recommended that the grievance be denied and the
discipline be upheld. (Doc. 47-1 at 3). In reaching this recommendation, the grievance
officer reviewed disciplinary documents, indicated the discipline conformed with
internal prison procedures, and indicated Bailey was allowed to make a statement on his

behalf at the hearing. (Id. at 3-4). The Warden concurred on April 14, 2023, and Plaintiff
signed the form to appeal on April 23, 2023. (Id. at 4). The Administrative Review Board
(ARB) stamped the grievance as received on May 15, 2023, and thus procedurally rejected
it as received more than 30 days after the Warden’s decision. (Id. at 2).
Bailey filed grievance 339-2-23 on February 17, 2023, also concerning the
disciplinary report. (Doc. 47-1 at 13). Bailey again alleges the disciplinary report was

“completely fabricated” and he attacks the plausibility of the events recounted in the
report. (Id. at 13-15). Specifically, he alleges it was signed three days after the incident,
and is based off of confidential source information when there were multiple staff
members present who could have provided non-confidential information. (Id. at 14).
Bailey alleges the adjustment committee who heard the ticket failed to investigate and

could have called his witnesses or reviewed camera footage. Bailey further alleges the
ticket is flawed because it matched the tickets for others verbatim. (Id. at 15-16).
The grievance officer recommended denying the grievance on the premise that the
discipline was already reviewed with grievance 310-2-23. (Id. at 12). The Warden
concurred on April 14, 2023, and Plaintiff signed his appeal on April 23, 2023. (Id.). The

ARB rejected the appeal as untimely received on May 15, 2023. (Id. at 11).
The grievance documents tendered by the parties referenced a third grievance
filed as an emergency, grievance 385-1-23, but neither side provided a copy of this
grievance. It appears based on the contents of grievance 339-2-23 that after grievance 385-
1-23 was denied emergency status, Bailey filed an entirely new grievance 339-2-23 via the
normal grievance process.

Grievance officer Jeffrey Olson declared that Plaintiff filed two grievances at
Menard from January to May of 2023, though he gives grievance numbers for three
grievances (385-1-23, 310-2-23, 339-2-23). (Olson Decl., Doc. 47-3 at ¶ 9). Plaintiff attests
via signed declaration that on or about April 23, 2023, he appealed grievances 310-2-23
and 339-2-23 to the ARB by placing the appeals in the custody of an officer. (Bailey Decl.,
Doc. 53 at 32 ¶ 2). Bailey also attested that on January 21, 2023, he tendered a grievance

at Shawnee about the denial of Jumu’ah, Taleem, and religious meals. (Id. at ¶ 3). He
alleges he filed this grievance by giving it to Sgt. Sams, which was common practice at
Shawnee. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5). He further attests that he made a copy for himself, which he
attached as an exhibit to his response. (Id. at ¶ 6, Doc. 53 at 24). The grievance purports
to be submitted on January 21, 2023. The first page indicates that on January 20, 2023,

Bailey had been denied Jumu’ah for several weeks, and on that day he was informed
inmates would only be afforded a 30 minute video. (Doc. 53 at 24). As relief, Bailey
sought fairness amongst religions and the ability to practice his faith and beliefs and to
attend services. (Id.). Though a box is checked indicating the grievance narrative
continued on additional pages, only the first page is appended to Bailey’s response.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Legal Standards

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In
determining a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most
favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex

Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Courts generally cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment. See
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (“[A] judge’s function at summary judgment is
not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
However, when the motion for summary judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to conduct an
evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner’s efforts to
exhaust. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008).1 After hearing evidence,
finding facts, and determining credibility, the court must decide whether to allow the
claim to proceed or to dismiss it for failure to exhaust. Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1004

(7th Cir. 2018). The court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing if there is no
genuine dispute of material fact, and the determination is purely legal. See e.g., Walker v.
Harris, 2021 WL 3287832 * 1 (S.D. Ill 2021); Miller v. Wexford Health Source, Inc., 2017 WL
951399 *2 (S.D. Ill. 2017).

1 The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025), held that if the facts
necessary for a ruling on exhaustion are intertwined with the merits of the claim, a jury trial is required.
But the Perttu Court did not go so far as to extend the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial to all
exhaustion disputes. Plaintiff argues that there is intertwinement in this case simply because he has claims
proceeding premised on retaliation, but Plaintiff’s claims are not intertwined in the way contemplated in
Perttu. Intertwinement exists when the facts needed to resolve the exhaustion dispute overlap with the
facts that will ultimately weigh on the merits of the substantive claims. Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that
any of the named defendants confiscated or destroyed his grievances, as the plaintiff had in Perttu, so the
factual issues to be resolved concerning exhaustion are not intertwined with the merits of his First
Amendment claims, and the exhaustion issue does not need to be deferred to trial.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner may not bring
a lawsuit about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey, 544 F.3d at 740. “The exhaustion
requirement is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear the burden of proving.”
Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011). For a prisoner to properly exhaust his
administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and
at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022,
1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the

administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 1024.
As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance process
outlined in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017).
Section 504.810(c) requires that a grievance state: “what happened, when, where and the
name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.

This provision does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of
individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much descriptive
information about the individual as possible.” An inmate may request that a grievance
be handled as an emergency by forwarding it directly to the CAO. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.840. If it is determined that there exists a substantial risk of imminent personal

injury or other serious or irreparable harm, the grievance is handled on an emergency
basis, which allows for expedited processing of the grievance. Id.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he can file an appeal with
the IDOC Director through the Administrative Review Board (ARB). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal within 30 days of the date of the CAO’s
decision. Id. The inmate must attach copies of the responses from the grievance officer

and CAO to his appeal. Id.
B. Analysis

Defendants argue that Plaintiff knew of the grievance process, had access to it, and
successfully filed appeals. (Doc. 47 at 5-6). They contend that Claims 1 and 2 alleging
equal protection violations by Defendant Lambert-Goheen were never grieved. (Id. at 6-
7). Plaintiff counters via a signed declaration, and an exhibit, that he submitted a
grievance at Shawnee on January 21, 2023, concerning equal treatment of religions for
services and a religious diet. (Doc. 53 at 24, Bailey Decl., Doc. 53 at 31 ¶¶2-6). Though
the exhibit that purports to be a copy of the January 21, 2023, grievance appears to be
missing pages, the contents on the first page suggest that the grievance is about different
religions being treated differently in relation to services and dietary needs. (Doc. 53 at

24). The excerpt, coupled with Plaintiff’s declaration, is enough to create a genuine
dispute of fact about Plaintiff’s exhaustion concerning Claims 1 and 2.
Next, Defendants argue that grievances 310-2-23 and 339-2-23 are not sufficient for
exhaustion under the PLRA because they are procedurally defective and were rejected as
untimely by the ARB. (Doc. 47 at 6). Plaintiff counters that the prison mailbox rule should

apply, he tendered his grievances well in advance of the 30-day deadline, and thus the
ARB was wrong to reject them as untimely. Plaintiff supports this line of argumentation
with a sworn statement in his declaration that he gave his appeals to a prison employee
for transmission on or about April 23, 2023. (Bailey Decl., Doc. 53 at 31 ¶ 1).
In Dole v. Chandler, an inmate gave a grievance appeal to an officer for transmission
to the ARB, and the grievance never arrived for processing by the ARB. Dole v. Chandler,

438 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the inmate did all he could
once he gave the appeal to the officer because he had no control over the time or means
through which the appeal was transmitted, and he had no notice or opportunity to
remedy the issue. Id. at 810-11. Although the Seventh Circuit has not explicitly endorsed
the applicability of the prison mailbox rule to the PLRA exhaustion context, many courts
in this circuit have applied the prison mailbox rule in this context. See e.g., Warren v.

Jeffreys, et al., 2023 WL 6605433 at * 6 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2023) (collecting cases for the
proposition that per the prison mailbox rule, a grievance is filed when the prisoner places
it in the mail); Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d 851, 858-59 (7th Cir. 2015) (federal courts generally
apply the prison mailbox rule which provides that an inmate's document is “filed” at the
moment the inmate places it in the prison mail system). Here, the Court agrees with

Plaintiff’s position, when an inmate tenders a grievance appeal to staff for transmission
to the ARB, the appeal should be considered timely if it is given to staff on time.
Therefore, the Court treats grievances 310-2-23 and 339-2-23 as timely appealed.
Next, the Court must consider which claims might be exhausted by grievances
310-2-23 and 339-2-23. Defendants argue that the grievances do not mention Defendants

Harmon, Rehfuss, or Galloway2 by name, so the grievances cannot exhaust the claims

2 Though the attorney general’s office entered an appearance for Defendant Jeffreys (Doc. 15), the
Defendants’ summary judgment motion (Doc. 47) does not make any argument about Jeffreys. The Court
assumes this to be a scrivener’s error. Arguments applicable to Galloway would clearly apply with the
same force to Jeffreys, so the Court will consider both defendants for any argument presented on behalf of
Galloway.
against them. (Doc. 47 at 7). Plaintiff argues that failing to name a defendant in a
grievance is a mere technical defect if the unnamed individual’s wrongdoing is

sufficiently described for the prison to take action. (Doc. 53 at 10). In support of this
proposition, Plaintiff cites Lindsey v. McClanahan, Case No. 24-cv-2290 (S.D. Ill. p. 7).3
Though the Seventh Circuit does not maintain a firm requirement that a grievance
name all defendants, it has held that the PLRA requires a grievance to at least contain
enough information for the prison to address the merits of an issue later presented in a
lawsuit. Compare Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721-22 (7th Cir. 2011) with Schillinger v.

Kiley, et al., 954 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 2020). In Maddox v. Love, the Seventh Circuit found that
an inmate’s grievance clearly complaining of issues accessing religious services was
sufficient to exhaust a claim against a prison warden and chaplain where both individuals
participated in the resolution of the grievance and the grievance was addressed at all
levels of review on the merits. 655 F.3d 709, 721-22. By contrast, in Schillinger, the court

found that an inmate’s grievance about a failure to protect that did not name several
officers and only discussed staff conduct during and after an attack was not sufficient to
exhaust a failure to protect claim centered on what the defendants knew before the attack.
The Schillinger Court emphasized that at minimum, a grievance must provide the prison
with notice of the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought, and it must give the

3 Finding that a grievance complaining about bugs in food, that did not name Defendant McClanahan, was
sufficient to exhaust an Eighth Amendment claim against McClanahan because he participated in
responding to the grievance and was identified in the grievance response as an officer who was aware of
the bug issue and provided new food trays. Lindsey v. McClanahan, 2025 WL 3492752 at * 4-5 (S.D. Ill. Dec.
5, 2025). The Court reasoned that the grievance obviously served its purpose by alerting the prison to the
issue with the food and gave the prison ample chance to respond.
prison’s administrative authority an opportunity to correct mistakes prior to litigation.
954 F.3d 990, 995-96.

There are many cases finding grievances adequate even where the grievance does
not name prison employees. See e.g., Glick v. Walker, 385 Fed. App’x 579, 582-83 (7th Cir.
2010) (finding that two grievances that clearly described issues without employee names,
and that were substantively assessed at each level of the grievance process, were
sufficient for exhaustion because the PLRA does not have a strict “name all defendants”
mandate); Williams v. Luking, 2023 WL 317663 at * 5 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2023) (finding that

an inmate’s grievance that reasonably described deficient medical care, included a
consultation of relevant medical professionals in the response process, and was
exhausted at all levels, was sufficient for exhaustion even if it did not contain the names
of prison officials). But there are also a growing body of cases that find grievances about
a broad issue insufficient to exhaust discrete claims later brought against employees who

are not identified in the underlying grievance. See e.g., Olden v. Jackson, 2024 WL 4601042
at *4 (Oct. 29, 2024) (unpublished panel decision) (finding that a grievance with a passing
mention of “telepsyci” was insufficient to exhaust a claim against a psychiatrist who was
one of four at the prison where the grievance did not detail when the inmate interacted
with the psychiatrist and did not say anything that would help the prison know which

psychiatrist was allegedly responsible for a misdeed); King v. Dart, 63 F.4th 602, 608 (7th
Cir. 2023) (finding that a grievance about medical care with a generic reference to
correctional staff who sent an inmate for medical care the day after an attack was not
sufficient to exhaust a claim against an officer who allegedly had involvement with the
inmate the day of the attack); Bowers v. Dart, 1 F.4th 513, 517-18 (7th Cir. 2021) (finding
that a grievance that alleged an officer ignored an inmate during an attack was not aligned

with later allegations in litigation that several officers knew of the risk of an attack before
the attack occurred).
First, the Court will consider if grievance 310-2-23 contained sufficient allegations
to alert the prison to an issue, and if that issue aligns with Claims 3-5 of this lawsuit. (Doc.
47-1 at 5-8). In grievance 310-2-23, Bailey indicates that a disturbance occurred at the
chapel on January 20, 2023. Specifically, he alleged in the grievance that when he arrived

at chapel, Lambert-Goheen explained to inmates that they could not conduct the service
in their preferred fashion, and she eventually offered a video as the only option for service
that day. (Doc. 47-1 at 5-6). He maintains that he said nothing during the verbal exchange
between others and the chaplain and he peacefully and silently exited. (Id. at 6). Bailey
alleges that three days later he was moved to restrictive housing for an investigation of

the disturbance, and a day after that he was transferred to Menard’s maximum security
restrictive housing. He goes on to complain about a few specific conditions at Menard,
and alleges that the disciplinary ticket he received was “completely fabricated and
baseless.” (Id. at 6).
In the complaint, and in Claim 3 as designated by the Court, Bailey alleged that

Lambert-Goheen was strictly limiting the contents of religious services or only offering
short video presentations, in violation of the First Amendment. The contents of grievance
310-2-23 are sufficient to exhaust this claim. The grievance discusses Lambert-Goheen’s
conduct, mentioning her by name, and describing the way she controlled the contents of
a religious service. Plaintiff alleged in the complaint and in the grievance that this caused
him to miss his ability to properly observe his religion. Thus, Claim 3 is properly

exhausted.
In the complaint, and in Claim 4 as designated by the Court, Bailey alleged that
Galloway and Jeffreys quickly signed off on the transfer without investigating as an act
of retaliation. Neither Galloway or Jeffreys was named in the grievance, so the question
is whether the substance of the grievance was enough to alert prison officials that Bailey
believed the transfer was retaliatory. Though the transfer is mentioned as a fact in the

series of events surrounding the January 20 chapel incident, the transfer is certainly not
the focus of the grievance, and nothing about the grievance suggests that Bailey was
trying to alert prison officials that the transfer in and of itself retaliatory or improper.
Thus, the Court concludes that the substance of grievance 310-2-23 was not sufficient to
alert the prison to a potential future retaliatory transfer claim against Galloway or Jeffreys

and the claim is not exhausted.
In the complaint, and in Claim 5 as designated by the Court, Bailey alleged that
Lambert-Goheen, Harmon, and Rehfuss engaged in retaliatory discipline when they
participated in the issuance of the disciplinary ticket issued in relation to the January 20,
2023, chapel incident. Neither Harmon nor Rehfuss are named in grievance 310-2-23.

The grievance does not contain any allegations by Bailey that he personally engaged in
protected speech, either at the chapel or via the grievance procedure before he got the
disciplinary ticket. While the grievance complains that the ticket was “completely
fabricated and baseless,” it does not allege that there was a specific retaliatory motive to
the ticket. Though the grievance mentions Lambert-Goheen’s actions in the chapel, it
does not mention her involvement in the disciplinary ticket, and it also does not say

anything that would cause the reader to think of Harmon or Rehfuss—officials who
allegedly prepared and signed off on the ticket. At most, the grievance says the ticket
was signed on January 23, 2023, rather than on January 20, 2023, when it was authored,
but this alone does not suggest retaliation or ill-will as opposed to a slow bureaucratic
process. On the whole, the Court does not read grievance 310-2-23 as asking the prison
to address and remedy retaliatory conduct. The grievance expresses dissatisfaction and

disbelief with the discipline, but it does not tell the prison three bad actors issued the
ticket for retaliatory reasons. As such, the grievance is not sufficient to exhaust Claim 5
against Lambert-Goheen, Harmon, or Rehfuss.
Additionally, the Court considered whether grievance 339-2-23 was sufficient to
exhaust claims 4 or 5. Grievance 339-2-23 focused on the disciplinary report that Bailey

received on January 23, 2023. (Doc. 47-1 at 13-16). Bailey alleges two lieutenants told him
to pack up for restrictive housing on January 23 and on January 24 he was transferred to
Menard. He claims he eventually learned he was never under investigation and he goes
on to attack the plausibility of the contents of the disciplinary report. (Id. at 14). Bailey
argues that his alleged behavior was a mismatch for some of the charges in the ticket, that

the confidential informants were not reliable, and that the ticket violated provisions of
the prison’s administrative code, among other things. (Id.). Bailey also alleges that the
disciplinary committee who reviewed the ticket at Menard was not impartial and they
failed to investigate. (Id. at 16).
As with grievance 310-2-23, grievance 339-2-23 mentions the fact that Bailey was
transferred in passing, but it does not say anything about Galloway or Jeffreys’

involvement and it does not suggest the transfer was retaliatory. Thus, the grievance
does not exhaust Claim 4. The same goes for Claim 5. While the grievance challenges
the discipline at length, it says nothing that points to Harmon or Rehfuss. It also does not
say anything suggesting Lambert-Goheen participated in any retaliatory capacity. One
of the pillars of a retaliation claims is an assertion that the plaintiff engaged in protected
speech, but grievance 339-2-23 does not say anything tending to suggest Bailey engaged

in protected speech prior to the chapel incident or the subsequent disciplinary ticket. As
such, grievance 339-2-23 is also insufficient to exhaust Claim 5.
In sum, Claim 3 against Defendant Lambert-Goheen is properly exhausted by
grievance 310-2-23. There is a genuine dispute of material fact about if Bailey submitted
a grievance on January 21, 2023, that could exhaust the equal protection theories in

Claims 1 and 2 against Defendant Lambert-Goheen. By contrast, Claims 4 and 5 are not
exhausted concerning Defendants Galloway, Jeffreys, Harmon, Rehfuss and Lambert-
Goheen. Given that no claims survive concerning Galloway, Jeffreys, Harmon, or
Rehfuss, these four defendants will be terminated. Defendant Lambert-Goheen shall
have 14 days to request an evidentiary hearing concerning Claims 1 and 2 and the dispute

about if Bailey submitted a grievance on January 21, 2023, as he alleges. If Lambert-
Goheen does not request a hearing, Claims 1-3 will advance solely against her.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT The Defendants’ Motion for an Extension (Doc.
46) is GRANTED instanter, and the Defendants’ for Summary Judgment (Doc. 47) is
GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED as to Claims 4 and
5, which have not been exhausted for reasons explained in this Order. The Clerk of Court
shall TERMINATE Defendants Galloway, Jeffreys, Harmon, and Rehfuss, because they
were only named in Claims 4 and 5.
The Motion (Doc. 47) is DENIED as to Claims 1 and 2, but for these claims there
is a genuine dispute of material fact, so Defendant Lambert-Goheen shall have 14 days to
file a Notice either withdrawing the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust or requesting
Pavey hearing. The Pavey hearing shall be limited to the issue of whether Bailey
tendered a grievance on January 21, 2023, as suggested by exhibit C. (Doc. 53 at 24).
The Motion is DENIED as to Claim 3 against Defendant Lambert-Goheen because
grievance 310-2-23 was sufficient to exhaust this claim. A Pavey hearing may not be
sought on Claim 3, and Claim 3 shall advance to merits discovery.
Plaintiff's Motion for Status (Doc. 54) is GRANTED by the issuance of this Order.
Next steps will depend on Defendant Lambert-Goheen’s decision to either request an
evidentiary hearing or to withdraw the affirmative defense on Claims 1 and 2.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Jud Ge rave Dagan
Dated: August 14, 2026 D U g an exes 0500"
DAVID W.DUGAN
United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

This Order is an initial decision that you have presented enough evidence to refute the
defendant(s) arguments about the exhaustion of administrative remedies for your claims
in this lawsuit. The defendant(s) now have the choice to withdraw their exhaustion
argument, or to ask for a hearing to give more evidence about this issue. If the defendants
withdraw the defense, you will get a scheduling order for next steps on the merits of your
claims. If the defendants ask for a hearing, you will get an order that will explain next
steps to prepare for the hearing. Any hearing will be limited strictly to the ‘dispute(s) of
material fact’ specifically identified in this Order. You will not need to present evidence
on anything other than what is specifically identified. If a hearing is scheduled, you will
be allowed to present evidence and testimony on your own behalf. Details about a future
hearing will be provided by future order if one is scheduled. You do not need to do
anything now. The Defendants have 14 days to file a motion about what they want to
do. You will get a copy of that motion, and you will get further instructions once the
Defendants have filed their motion. Please be aware that there can be delays in the
mailing of copies, so you should wait at least 30 days before asking for the status of this
matter.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417345. Public record. Not legal advice.