# Hill

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · July 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417226

## Case

- **Full name:** Anthony Hill v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ANTHONY HILL,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:26-cv-558
Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF
OHIO (PUCO), et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Anthony Hill, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel,
sues Defendants, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”), American Electric Power
Service Corporation (“AEP”), and several attorneys and judges in connection with a billing
dispute with AEP. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s request to file a civil action in
forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma
pauperis. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had
been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF
No. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal
of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons
below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that when he opened a new account for electricity service with AEP in
2024, AEP erroneous applied part of Plaintiff’s deposit to a different account with which

Plaintiff had no association. This resulted in damage to Plaintiff’s credit and a shutoff of his
electricity service. Plaintiff filed a complaint with PUCO, which led to a settlement hearing
before a PUCO administrative law judge in which Plaintiff felt intimidated and coerced and
which afforded him no relief. Plaintiff then filed suit in the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas against AEP and PUCO. The state court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that his claims fell under the exclusive jurisdiction
of PUCO under Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 119 Ohio St. 3d 301 (2008).1
Three months later, Plaintiff commenced this action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. (ECF No. 1.) The case was subsequently transferred to this Court
on May 7, 2026. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff’s Complaint in this action repeats his claims against AEP

and PUCO arising from the allegedly misapplied deposit, and also names PUCO Administrative
Law Judge Jesse Davis, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark Serrott, Franklin
County Clerk of Court Maryellen O’Shaughnessy, and six attorneys representing AEP or PUCO
in the state court proceedings: Jason T. Gerken, Alexis R. Pannell, Michael J. Schuler, Thomas
G. Lindgren, Ashley M. Wnek, and Carrie Dunn-Lucco. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
conspired “to use the machinery of state administrative proceedings and the court system to

1 This Court properly takes judicial notice of the documents in Plaintiff’s state-court action
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). See Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 597 F.3d
812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings . . . .”).
conceal” “fraudulent charge-offs, false reporting, concealment of refunds, misuse of federal tax
credits, and obstruction of judicial process.” (Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff further alleges
that Defendants engaged “in official acts (disabling e-filing, docket manipulation, preventing
entry of final appealable order) that denied Plaintiff due process and access to the courts.” (Id. at
¶ 26.) Plaintiff advances claims for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq. (“RICO”), violation of the False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C §§ 3729, et seq. (“FCA”), violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681,
et seq. (“FCRA”), violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq.
(“FDCPA”), state-law conversion and unjust enrichment, violation of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for referral of Defendants for prosecution by the
United States Department of Justice. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
compensatory and punitive damages and attorney’s fees.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Failure to State a Claim on which Relief May be Granted
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
* * *
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic

federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual
demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).
Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial
plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The
plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the
strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504
(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,
614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient
treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim
asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

B. Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the federal in forma pauperis statute, Courts must sua sponte
dismiss an action upon determining that an in forma pauperis complaint fails to state a claim on
which relief can be granted. Thus, a typical initial screen involves consideration of the merits of
the claims asserted. In this case, however, upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the undersigned
determines that it is unnecessary to consider the merits of certain of his claims because this Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear such claims. When the face of the complaint provides no
basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court may dismiss an action as frivolous and for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(h)(3). Williams v. Cincy Urb. Apts., No. 1:10-cv-153, 2010 WL 883846, at *2 n.1

(S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (citing Carlock v. Williams, 182 F.3d 916, 1999 WL 454880, at *2 (6th
Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)).
III. ANALYSIS
All of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. First, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks redress
for AEP’s misapplication of his deposit and PUCO’s allegedly inadequate handling of his
complaint, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear those claims because they fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of PUCO. See Ohio Rev. Code § 4905.26 (conferring exclusive jurisdiction on
PUCO for any complaints against a public utility that “any rate, fare, charge, toll, rental,
schedule, classification, or service . . . is in any respect unjust, unreasonable, unjustly
discriminatory, unjustly preferential, or in violation of law”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating Co., 119 Ohio St.3d 301, 302 (2008) (PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over public
utility service-related matters apart from pure tort and contract claims). This disposes of
Plaintiff’s claims for violation of the FCA, FCRA, and FDCPA, and for conversion and unjust
enrichment.

Further, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under RICO. A plaintiff seeking to advance a civil
RICO claim “must plead the following elements: ‘(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a
pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’” Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 723 (6th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)). Further, any such
claim must allege an illicit agreement “to participate directly or indirectly in the affairs of an
enterprise through the commission of two or more predicate crimes.” Heinrich v. Waiting Angels
Adoption Servs., 668 F.3d 393, 411 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d
1250, 1261 (6th Cir. 1983)). A plaintiff advancing a civil RICO claim must also allege injury to
business or property. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Here, Plaintiff's civil RICO claims lack the factual

specificity required under Iqbal. Although Plaintiff makes stray references to mail fraud, wire
fraud, and evidence tampering, these references are conclusory and unsupported by any facts on
which the Court could rely to conclude that Defendants comprised an enterprise engaged in a
pattern of racketeering activity.
Nor does Plaintiff state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim under
§ 1983. “The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving individuals of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.” Johnson v. Morales, 946 F.3d 911, 921 (6th Cir. 2020)
(citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
process violation, a plaintiff must show that a liberty or property interest is at stake. Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Thus, the procedural due process analysis involves two steps:
“the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with
by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were
constitutionally sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations
omitted). “In other words, the question of what process is due is relevant only if the [plaintiff]

establishes a constitutionally protected interest.” Pickelhaupt v. Jackson, 364 F. App’x 221, 224
(6th Cir. 2010) (citing Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224). Here, Plaintiff alleges no deprivation of
liberty. To the extent that Plaintiff relies on a property interest, he fails to plausibly allege the
inadequacy of available state remedies (such as his settlement hearing before PUCO). Although
Plaintiff alleges that he felt “intimidated” and “coerced” at the “sham” settlement hearing before
Defendant Davis, Plaintiff fails to support these allegations with any facts on which the Court
could rely to conclude that PUCO’s administrative proceedings failed to provide Plaintiff with an
adequate remedy. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); cf. Jefferson v. Jefferson

Cty. Pub. Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2004) (“If satisfactory state procedures are
provided in a procedural due process case, then no constitutional deprivation has occurred
despite the injury.”).
Plaintiff’s § 1983 First Amendment access-to-courts claim fares no better. To state a
claim for violation of that right, a plaintiff must allege an “actual injury” and official conduct
that is more than mere negligence. See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 2005);
Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 379 (6th Cir. 1993). “Actual injury” can be demonstrated by “the
late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious claim.” Pilgrim v.
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). In addition, the underlying action cannot be
frivolous. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353; accord Hadix v. Johnson, 182 F.3d 400, 405–06 (6th Cir.
1999) (“By explicitly requiring that plaintiffs show actual prejudice to non-frivolous claims,
Lewis did in fact change the ‘actual injury’ requirement as it had previously been applied in this
circuit.”). Thus, “the underlying cause of action . . . is an element that must be described in the
complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.”

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353, n.3). “Like any
other element of an access claim, the underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be
addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.” Id. at 416.
Accordingly, in drafting a complaint, a plaintiff must: (1) clearly state the underlying claim; and
(2) include supporting facts that describe “official acts frustrating the litigation” to show actual
injury. Id. at 415. Here, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate actual injury because—even if true that
state-court staff disabled Plaintiff’s e-filing access, manipulated the docket, or prevented entry of
a final appealable order—Plaintiff’s state-court action would still have been subject to dismissal
owing to PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction over service-related claims against public utilities. The

essential nature of Plaintiff’s claims meant that Plaintiff’s state-court action could never succeed.
Defendants’ conduct therefore did not deprive Plaintiff of any court-afforded remedy.
As to Plaintiff’s request that Defendants be criminally prosecuted, Plaintiff lacks standing
to obtain this relief. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“a private citizen
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”); Waskul v.
Washtenaw Cty. Cmty. Mental Health, 900 F.3d 250, 255 (6th Cir. 2018) (“a plaintiff must
demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press” and “a plaintiff must demonstrate
standing separately for each form of relief sought”) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)).
Finally, it should be noted that Judge Serrott is entitled to absolute immunity from civil
liability. Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suit when acting within the scope of their
duties. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (judges immune); Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citations omitted) (immunity overcome only if actions taken are not within the
judge’s judicial capacity or if the actions, “though judicial in nature, [are] taken in the complete

absence of all jurisdiction”). The Complaint contains no facts on which the Court could rely to
conclude that the exceptions to judicial immunity apply to Judge Serrott’s conduct.
Administrative Law Judge Jesse Davis may also be entitled to immunity; however, the Court is
not presently in possession of the facts necessary to determine whether PUCO administrative
proceedings “share[ ] enough of the characteristics of the judicial process that those who
participate in such adjudication should also be immune from suits for damages.” Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
IV. DISPOSITION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.
In addition, for the reasons above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s

Complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted.
Prior to this case’s transfer from the District Court for the District of Columbia, Plaintiff
filed two motions related to his use of a P.O. box for receiving service of court filings (which is
prohibited without leave of court under the local rules of the District Court for the District of
Columbia). Because using a P.O. box is not prohibited in the Southern District of Ohio,
Plaintiff’s motions (ECF Nos. 6–7) are DENIED AS MOOT.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive
further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11417226. Public record. Not legal advice.