# Opinion

> District Court, S.D. Texas · August 5, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11416970

## Case

- **Full name:** Donald Lynn Thompson, Jr. v. Matagorda County, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** August 5, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT August 05, 2026
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
GALVESTON DIVISION
DONALD LYNN THOMPSON, JR., §
§
Plaintiff. §
§
V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00253
§
MATAGORDA COUNTY, et al., §
§
Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This civil rights case is before me on a motion to dismiss for the second time.
I previously recommended that Plaintiff Donald Thompson’s claims against all
defendants be dismissed, but that Thompson be given the opportunity to amend
his complaint. See Dkt. 42. Judge Jeffrey V. Brown adopted my recommendation,
see Dkt. 44, and Thompson amended his complaint. See Dkt. 45. The Matagorda
County Defendants now move to dismiss Thompson’s amended complaint.1 See
Dkt. 52. Having reviewed the briefing, the record, and the applicable law, I
recommend that the motion be granted. I also recommend that the court sua
sponte dismiss Buster Jackson d/b/a Jackson Towing Services.
BACKGROUND2
On May 14, 2023, Thompson was operating a vehicle in Markham, Texas,
when he was stopped and arrested by Defendant Deputy Raymond Gonzales for
driving with an expired registration. Gonzales handcuffed, arrested, and
transported Thompson to the Matagorda County Jail where he was detained for

1 The Matagorda County Defendants are Matagorda County, Texas; Jennifer Chau, the
Matagorda County Attorney; Judge Jason Sanders, Justice of the Peace Precinct 1; Judge
Mark Finlay, Justice of the Peace Precinct 4; Matagorda County Sheriff’s Deputies
Raymond Gonzales and J. Wamget; Michaela Riley; and Jane Doe Deputy, alleged to be
employed by the Matagorda County Sheriff’s Department.
2 These facts, which I accept as true, are taken from Thompson’s first amended complaint
and the attachments to it. See Dkts. 45–48.
approximately 18 hours. In connection with his arrest, the vehicle that Thompson
was driving was towed by Jackson Towing Services after Gonzales and Jane Doe
Deputy allegedly searched it with flashlights.
On May 15, 2023, Defendant Judge Jason Sanders, Justice of the Peace for
Precinct 1, conducted a magistration and entered a disposition of time served
against Thompson.
On June 22, 2023, a vehicle tow hearing was held before Defendant Judge
Mark Finlay, Justice of the Peace for Precinct 4. Defendant County Attorney
Jennifer Chau appeared at the hearing, as did Buster Jackson, the owner of the
company that towed the vehicle that Thompson was driving. During the hearing,
Thompson’s wife requested the body-worn and dash camera footage of
Thompson’s arrest. Judge Finlay denied that request and ruled that the tow was
lawful. Michaela Riley, a records clerk, denied Thompson’s request for access to
body camera and dash camera footage.
Thompson asserts nine causes of action: (1) unlawful seizure against
Gonzales; (2) unlawful arrest against Gonzales; (3) unlawful search against
Gonzales and Jane Doe Deputy; (4) excessive force against Gonzales and Wamget;
(5) deprivation of due process against Judge Sanders based on jurisdictional
deprivation; (6) deprivation of due process against Chau, Riley, and Judge Finlay
based on the suppression of exculpatory evidence; (7) malicious prosecution
against Gonzales, Sanders, and Chau; (8) civil conspiracy to violate constitutional
rights against all defendants; and (9) Monell liability against Matagorda County.
The Matagorda County Defendants have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim.
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails “to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Conversely, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the
court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (cleaned up).
When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I accept “all well-pleaded facts as
true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings
v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation
omitted). I “do not, however, accept as true legal conclusions, conclusory
statements, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Benfield
v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Fifth Circuit “hold[s] pro se plaintiffs to a
more lenient standard than lawyers when analyzing complaints, but pro se
plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above the
speculative level.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th
Cir. 2016); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
ANALYSIS
The central dispute in this case is whether Gonzales lawfully stopped and
arrested Thompson for driving with an expired registration sticker.
A. GONZALES LAWFULLY STOPPED THOMPSON
Thompson concedes that the registration on the vehicle he was driving “was
factually expired.” Dkt. 45 at 4. There is ample authority, from the United States
Supreme Court down to the lowest courts, stating that: “If an officer has probable
cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); see also
Jaycox v. Pyle, No. 6:18-cv-00016, 2021 WL 1140865, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 25,
2021) (“The failure to display proper vehicle registration through a valid
registration sticker . . . [is] lawful grounds for arrest under Texas law.”); State v.
Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“[A]n arrest for a minor traffic
offense is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”); Hodnett
v. State, No. 05-01-01323-CR, 2002 WL 31845821, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec.
20, 2002, pet. ref’d) (“When an officer has probable cause to believe a person is
committing an offense, even a traffic offense, an officer can reasonably arrest that
person.”).
Against this mountain of authority, Thompson now argues that Gonzales’s
“own written records prove he lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop and
lacked probable cause to execute a custodial arrest within two minutes.” Dkt. 45 at
2. This is simply incorrect. Taking Thompson’s alleged facts as true, Thompson
“executed a lawful left-hand turn to travel southbound on Avenue I, at which point
Defendant Gonzales activated his emergency overhead lights and initiated a traffic
stop.” Id. at 9. According to Thompson, Gonzales was “traveling south-to-north”
on Avenue I. Id. Thus, when Thompson turned to travel southbound on the same
road that Gonzales was traveling northbound, Thompson’s vehicle was facing
Gonzales, and Gonzales could have easily visualized the registration sticker on the
driver’s side of the windshield. In any event, to have lawfully stopped Thompson,
Gonzales needed only reasonable suspicion that the registration sticker was
expired. See United States v. Montes-Hernandez, 350 F. App’x. 862, 867 (5th
Cir. 2009) (“To have an objectively reasonable suspicion, an officer does not have
to determine that a suspect has in fact violated the law.”). Thus, Thompson’s
unlawful seizure claim fails.
B. GONZALES LAWFULLY ARRESTED THOMPSON
Similarly, Gonzales lawfully arrested Thompson for driving with an expired
registration sticker. Thompson makes much of the fact “that no electronic
verification was conducted prior to the stop.” Dkt. 45 at 11. But Gonzales was not
required to verify anything electronically. “A person commits an offense if the
person operates on a public highway during a registration period a motor vehicle
that does not properly display the registration insignia issued by the department
that establishes that the license plates have been validated for the period.” Tex.
Transp. Code Ann. § 502.473(a). Texas law also prohibits displaying a registration
insignia “assigned for a registration period other than the registration period in
effect.” Tex. Transp. Code § 502.475(a)(3). Thus, the display offense did not
depend on whether an electronic inquiry would have shown that the underlying
registration had been renewed. In other words, even if Thompson’s registration
had been current, driving with an expired registration sticker is against the law,
and the admittedly expired sticker gave Gonzales probable cause to arrest
Thompson. Accordingly, Thompson’s unlawful arrest claim against Gonzales fails.
C. GONZALES AND DOE DID NOT SEARCH THOMPSON’S VEHICLE
Thompson alleges that while he was handcuffed, “Gonzales and Jane Doe
Deputy immediately began searching [his] vehicle with flashlights.” Dkt. 45 at 15.
Taking this fact as true, it does not constitute a search. The United States Supreme
Court has stated that it is “beyond dispute that . . . shining [a] flashlight to
illuminate the interior of [a plaintiff]’s car trenched upon no right secured to the
latter by the Fourth Amendment.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983).
Thus, Gonzales and Doe committed no Fourth Amendment violation by simply
shining their flashlights into Thompson’s vehicle.
D. GONZALES AND WAMGET DID NOT USE EXCESSIVE FORCE
Thompson contends that “Gonzales and Wamget used objectively
unreasonable and excessive physical force” when they arrested him. Dkt. 45 at 28.
Specifically, Thompson alleges that “Gonzales yanked [Thompson] from his
vehicle by opening the door from the outside (the interior handle was broken—the
only means of opening the door) without warning, before [Thompson] could fully
lower his window.” Id. According to Thompson, “Defendants then pushed
[Thompson] against the convertible top despite [his] verbal warnings of severe
pain from his deteriorating shoulders, hips, and knees.” Id.
“Although [the Fifth Circuit] no longer require[s] significant injury for
excessive force claims, the injury must be more than de minimis.” Tarver v. City
of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 752 (5th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Thompson’s conclusory
allegation that he suffered “[e]xacerbation” of “severe, known physical disabilities
(deteriorating shoulders, hips, and knees)” does not suffice to establish an injury
that would qualify for an excessive force claim. Dkt. 45 at 35. And while
“psychological injuries can serve as a basis for § 1983 liability,” Thompson “does
not demonstrate that he suffered psychological injury” from his arrest. Tarver, 410
F.3d at 752. Rather, Thompson simply states that he has experienced emotional
distress and mental anguish. See Dkt. 45 at 35. Such conclusory allegations “do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, Thompson’s excessive force claim should be
dismissed.
E. JUDGE SANDERS AND JUDGE FINLAY ARE ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE
Thompson alleges that Judge Sanders deprived Thompson of his right to due
process when Judge “Sanders, acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,
unilaterally imposed a criminal conviction without a formal charging instrument,
without a plea, and without an open court proceeding.” Dkt. 45 at 28–29.
Additionally, Thompson alleges his “offense occurred within JP 4, not JP 1” and
“[n]o legal charging instrument existed to confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon
the JP 1 court for a JP 4 offense.” Id. at 29. These allegations cannot overcome
Judge Sanders’s judicial immunity.
The Fifth Circuit has explained the contours of judicial immunity:
Absolute judicial immunity extends to all judicial acts that are
not performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Adams v.
McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, a judge has no
immunity (1) for actions taken outside of his judicial capacity, or
(2) for actions that are judicial in nature, but occur in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction. . . .
In determining whether [a judge’s] actions were “judicial in
nature,” this Court considers four factors: (1) whether the precise act
complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the acts
occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the
judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case
pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out
of a visit to the judge in his official capacity. McAlester v. Brown, 469
F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972). The four factors are to be broadly
construed in favor of immunity, and immunity should not be denied
where the denial carries the potential of raising more than a frivolous
concern in a judge’s mind that to take proper action might expose him
to personal liability. Adams, 764 F.2d at 297. In some situations,
immunity is to be afforded even though one or more of the McAlester
factors is not met.
Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1993) (cleaned up).
Thompson alleges that “Judge Sanders had [Thompson] pulled from
holding and brought to the jailhouse picket window for what [Thompson] assumes
was a magistration. Due to the small county atmosphere, [Judge] Sanders
addressed [Thompson] by name and stated, ‘we’re going to get you outta here with
time served.’” Dkt. 45 at 16. This sequence satisfies all four factors required for
judicial immunity.
Although a jailhouse is not a courtroom or the judge’s chambers (second
factor), the Texas Judicial Council has recognized that “[m]agistration proceedings
usually occur in jail facilities.” Texas Judicial Council, Public Trust and Confidence
Committee Report and Recommendations (2024), https://www.txcourts.gov/med
ia/1459239/public-trust-and-confidence-committee-report-2024.pdf (last visited
Aug. 4, 2026). Indeed, Thompson himself assumed that Judge Sanders was there
for “a magistration,” which is a judicial function (first factor). Thompson had a case
before the court: Case No. 1-23-TR-0306 (third factor). Judge Sanders’s
sentencing of Thompson arose out of that case (fourth factor). Thus, all four factors
weigh in favor of upholding Judge Sanders’s judicial immunity.
Thompson believes that Judge Sanders acted without jurisdiction because
Thompson’s “offense occurred within JP 4, not JP 1” and “[n]o legal charging
instrument existed to confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon the JP 1 court for a
JP 4 offense.” Dkt. 45 at 29. “Where a court has some subject-matter jurisdiction,
there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.” Malina, 994 F.2d at 1125.
There is no question that Judge Sanders generally has jurisdiction to adjudicate
traffic offenses. See Thompson v. Matagorda County, No. 3:25-cv-00253, 2026
WL 1133358, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2026) (“Judge Sanders acted well within his
jurisdiction when he credited Thompson’s time served toward the fine for an
expired registration.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:25-cv-00253,
2026 WL 1300546 (S.D. Tex. May 12, 2026). Nothing about Thompson’s amended
pleading changes this inescapable fact. Accordingly, all Thompson’s claims against
Judge Sanders should be dismissed based on judicial immunity.
Likewise, Thompson’s claims against Judge Finlay should also be dismissed
on judicial immunity grounds. While Thompson argues against Judge Sanders’s
judicial immunity in his amended complaint, Thompson fails to even reference
Judge Finlay’s judicial immunity or attempt to explain why it would not apply.
Similarly, in his response brief, Thompson argues why he believes that judicial
immunity does not shield Judge Sanders but mentions Judge Finlay only in
passing. Because Judge Finlay’s denial of Thompson’s request for video evidence
was a quintessential judicial function (first factor); that occurred in a courtroom
(second factor); which centered around a case pending before the court (third
factor); and that arose out of Thompson’s appearance before Judge Finlay in his
judicial capacity (fourth factor), Judge Finlay is absolutely immune.
F. NEITHER CHAU NOR RILEY SUPPRESSED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
Thompson alleges that his right to due process was violated when “Chau and
Riley intentionally suppressed material, exculpatory video evidence [at the June
22, 2023 administrative tow hearing] that would have exposed Defendant
Gonzales’s perjury and the lack of probable cause.” Dkt. 45 at 29. Thompson claims
that this evidence would have shown: (1) that he was parked in a private driveway;
(2) that Gonzales could not have observed Thompson’s registration sticker;
(3) that Gonzales never ran Thompson’s plates before activating his lights; (4) that
Thompson was compliant; and (5) that any search was warrantless. See id. at 30.
Taking all these allegations as true, none of them show that the video evidence
Thompson sought was exculpatory because none of them suggest that Thompson’s
registration was not expired.
G. THOMPSON’S MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS FAIL
Having established that Gonzales lawfully stopped and arrested Thompson,
Thompson’s malicious prosecution claims against Gonzales, Judge Sanders,3 and
Chau necessarily fail. To state a constitutional malicious prosecution claim,
Thompson must allege:
(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal
proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant against
plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona
fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of
probable cause for such proceeding; (5) malice; and (6) damages.
Espinal v. City of Houston, 96 F.4th 741, 748 (5th Cir. 2024) (emphasis added).
Because there was probable cause to arrest Thompson, he cannot prevail on a
malicious prosecution claim.
H. THOMPSON’S DETENTION CLAIM FAILS
Thompson contends that his 18-hour detention was unconstitutional. To the
extent this claim rests on the duration of his detention alone, it fails. Thompson
alleges that he was brought before Judge Sanders and released within
approximately 18 hours. A probable-cause determination occurring within 48
hours is presumptively prompt absent facts showing that the delay was undertaken
to gather additional evidence, motivated by ill will, or imposed for delay’s sake. See
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–57 (1991). Thompson

3 As established above, Judge Sanders has absolute judicial immunity irrespective of the
merits of Thompson’s malicious prosecution claim.
advances no such allegations. Accordingly, Thompson has not overcome the
presumption that his 18-hour detention was constitutional.4
I. MONELL LIABILITY AGAINST MATAGORDA COUNTY
As I have explained once before, Thompson’s claims against Matagorda
County should be dismissed because “Thompson cannot establish a constitutional
violation that would give rise to Monell liability.” Thompson, 2026 WL 1133358, at
*4; see also Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d 170, 178 (5th
Cir. 2018) (holding that claims against a municipality “cannot survive” where the
plaintiff “failed to demonstrate” a constitutional violation); Whitley v. Hanna, 726
F.3d 631, 648 (5th Cir. 2013) (“All of Whitley’s inadequate supervision, failure to
train, and policy, practice, or custom claims fail without an underlying
constitutional violation.”).
J. “NO DEPRIVATION; NO § 1983 CONSPIRACY.”5
Thompson alleges that all “Defendants reached a meeting of the minds and
acted jointly and in concert to deprive [Thompson] of his constitutional rights.”
Dkt. 45 at 31. Thompson’s “conspiracy claim [is] properly dismissed because [he]
has not plausibly pled any underlying constitutional deprivation by the
defendants.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 280 (5th Cir. 2023).
K. THOMPSON HAS NO CLAIM AGAINST JACKSON
Thompson’s only claim against Jackson is for civil conspiracy to violate
Thompson’s constitutional rights. See Dkt. 45 at 31. Because Thompson’s civil
conspiracy claim fails, Jackson should be dismissed from this lawsuit.6

4 Jauch v. Choctaw County, a case on which Thompson relies for the notion that his
detention was unconstitutional, involved 96 days of detention without an appearance
before a judge and is not analogous. See 874 F.3d 425, 428–29 (5th Cir. 2017).
5 Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2019).
6 “A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim on its own motion
as long as the procedure is fair.” Miller v. Sam Houston State Univ., 986 F.3d 880, 888
(5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). Fairness “requires both notice of the court’s intention
and an opportunity to respond.” Davoodi v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 755 F.3d 307, 310
(5th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). “This report is such notice. [Thompson’s] objections
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that the Matagorda County
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 52) be granted. I also recommend that the
court sua sponte dismiss Jackson as a defendant in this lawsuit.
The parties have 14 days from service of this Memorandum and
Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of
factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.
SIGNED this day of August 2026.

______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

to this report, if any, are his opportunity to be heard.” Crosswell v. Rodriguez, No. 4:22-
cv-01105, 2023 WL 6206911, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2023), report and recommendation
adopted as modified sub nom. Crosswell v. Martinez, No. 4:22-cv-01105, 2023 WL
6207754 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2023), aff’d, 120 F.4th 177 (5th Cir. 2024).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11416970. Public record. Not legal advice.