# Jarrell

> District Court, M.D. Florida · July 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11416922

## Case

- **Full name:** Emmanuel Jarrell v. Truist Bank
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION

EMMANUEL JARRELL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 5:26-cv-39-SPC-PRL

TRUIST BANK,

Defendant.

ORDER
This cause, upon referral,1 comes before the Court on an Amended Motion to Compel
Arbitration and to Stay Case (“Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration”) filed by Defendant
Truist Bank (“Defendant” or “Truist”). (Doc. 25).2 Plaintiff responded in opposition. (Doc.
29). With leave of Court, Defendant filed a reply brief in support of its Amended Motion to
Compel Arbitration. (Doc. 33). Upon due consideration, Defendant’s Amended Motion to
Compel Arbitration is granted, and the case is stayed pending arbitration.

1 “Because a motion to compel arbitration does not address the merits of the dispute but
merely changes the forum, it is a non-dispositive matter that does not require a report and
recommendation.” Eugene v. Ciox Health LLC, No. 2:24-cv-944-SPC-KCD, 2024 WL 4869504, at *1
n.3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2024) (citing Soriano v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 2:22-cv-197-SPC-KCD,
2022 WL 17551786, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2022)).
2 Defendant initially moved to compel arbitration and stay the case on March 20, 2026. (Doc.
17). After Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc. 22) on April 8, 2026, Defendant filed the instant
Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. 25) on April 23, 2026.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 13, 2018, Plaintiff opened a bank account ending in 4424 (the
“Account”) with Truist’s predecessor, SunTrust Bank (“SunTrust”), and signed a Personal
Account Signature Card (“Signature Card”). (See Doc. 25 at p. 3; see also Doc. 25-1 at pp. 2,

5).3 The Signature Card stated that “[i]t is agreed that all transactions between the Bank and
the above signed shall be governed by the rules and regulations for this account and the above
signed hereby acknowledge(s) receipt of such rules and regulations and the funds availability
policy.” (See Doc. 25 at p. 3; see also Doc. 25-1 at p. 5)
Importantly, the Rules and Regulations for Deposit Accounts (“Rules and
Regulations”) governing the Account, provided that “[o]nce the Account is opened, you agree
to be bound by these rules and regulations and that the rules and regulations will continue to
govern your Account and your relationship with us even after your Account is closed.” (See
Doc. 25 at p. 3; see also Doc. 25-1 at pp. 2, 8). According to the Rules and Regulations

applicable to the Account at the time, the rules and regulations “may change from time to
time” and those updated rules and regulations will govern the Account. (See Doc. 25 at pp. 3-
4; see also Doc. 25-1 at p. 8). The original Rules and Regulations contained an Arbitration
Agreement and explained that a cardholder could opt out of the Arbitration Agreement by
sending a written notice within 45 days of opening the Account. (See Doc. 25 at p. 4; see also
Doc. 25-1 at pp. 3, 20-22). According to Truist, Plaintiff chose not to do so, as it has no record
of receipt of any written rejection or opt-out of the Arbitration Agreement associated with the

3 Defendant claims that Plaintiff “opened multiple deposit accounts” with Truist and
SunTrust, but Defendant does not provide any further information or context on these other accounts.
(See Doc. 25 at p. 2).
Account. (See Doc. 25 at p. 4; see also Doc. 25-1 at p. 3). Instead, Plaintiff kept the Account
open and continued to use it.
During Plaintiff’s use of the Account, the Rules and Regulations were updated in July
2020 to reflect SunTrust’s merger with BB&T to form Truist. (See Doc. 25 at p. 4; see also Doc.

25-1 at pp. 2-3, 46-103). Defendant sent notice of these changes to Plaintiff through his
account statements for the Account. (See Doc. 25 at p. 4; see also Doc. 25-1 at pp. 2-3, 36-40,
42-44). The updated Rules and Regulations contained an Arbitration Agreement, which
stated, in pertinent part, the following:
Claims Subject to Arbitration. A ‘Claim’ subject to arbitration is any claim,
dispute or controversy between you and us (other than an Excluded Claim or
Proceeding as set forth below), whether preexisting, present or future, which
arises out of or relates to the Account, these rules and regulations, any
transaction conducted with us in connection with the Account or these rules
and regulations, or our relationship. ‘Claim’ has the broadest possible meaning
and includes initial claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims and
federal, state, local and administrative claims. It includes disputes based upon
contract, tort, consumer rights, fraud and other intentional torts, constitution,
statute, regulation, ordinance, common law and equity and includes claims for
money damages and injunctive or declaratory relief. ‘Claim’ also includes
disputes concerning communications involving telephones, cell phones,
automatic dialing systems, artificial or prerecorded voice messages, text
messages, emails or facsimile machines and alleged violations of the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act and other statutes or regulations involving
telemarketing. Upon the demand of you or us, Claim(s) will be resolved by
individual (not class or class-wide) binding arbitration in accordance with the
terms specified in this arbitration agreement.

Special Definition of ‘We,’ ‘Us’ and ‘Our.’ Solely for purposes of this
arbitration agreement, the terms ‘we,’ ‘us’ and ‘our[]’ . . . refer to SunTrust’s
employees, officers, directors, parents, controlling persons, subsidiaries,
affiliates, successors and assigns. ‘We,’ ‘us’ and ‘our’ also apply to third parties
if you assert a Claim against such third parties in connection with a Claim you
assert against us.
. . .

Class Action Waiver. Notwithstanding any other provision of these rules and
regulations, if either you or we elect to arbitrate a Claim, neither you nor we
will have the right: (a) to participate in a class action, private attorney general
action or other representative action in court or in arbitration, either as a class
representative or class member; or (b) to join or consolidate Claims with claims
of any other persons. . . .

Severability and Survival. This arbitration agreement shall survive the closing
of your Account and the termination of any relationship between us, including
the termination of these rules and regulations. . . .

(Doc. 25-1 at pp. 76-79). Plaintiff continued to use and maintain the Account by making
deposits and withdrawals after receiving notice of the changes to the Rules and Regulations
governing the Account. (See Doc. 25 at p. 5; see also Doc. 25-1 at pp. 3, 105-128). Plaintiff later
closed the Account on May 21, 2021. (See Doc. 25 at p. 5; see also Doc. 25-1 at p. 3).
Plaintiff initiated this putative class action against Defendant on January 18, 2026
(Doc. 1), and filed the operative amended complaint on April 8, 2026 (Doc. 22). In the
amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (“TCPA”) by calling his cell phone about alleged debt owed using artificial or
prerecorded voice calls without his consent. (See Doc. 22 at ¶¶ 3-4, 13, 18-19, 29-31, 34, 66-
68). Plaintiff contends that he began receiving calls from Defendant in October 2025, and
despite requests for Defendant to stop the calls, Defendant allegedly continued to make calls
to Plaintiff in an effort to collect a purported debt. (See id. at ¶¶ 13-14, 20-23).
Defendant now moves to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims on an individual basis
and stay the action pending arbitration, arguing that all requirements to compel arbitration
have been met. (Doc. 25). Specifically, Defendant contends that a valid Arbitration
Agreement exists, Plaintiff’s TCPA claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement,
there has been no waiver of the Arbitration Agreement, and the class action waiver in the
Arbitration Agreement is valid and enforceable. (See id. at pp. 10-16).
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, arguing that his TCPA claims fall outside the
scope of the Arbitration Agreement because his claims do not arise out of or relate to his
“relationship” with Defendant, and that the class action waiver does not apply, since his
TCPA claims on behalf of a class are not arbitrable. (Doc. 29). With leave of Court, Defendant

filed a reply, explaining why the cases Plaintiff cited in his response are inapposite, and
contending that the question of whether Plaintiff consented to receive calls from Truist is an
issue for the arbitrator to decide, not the Court. (Doc. 33).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, generally governs the validity
and enforcement of arbitration agreements. See Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d
1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Under the FAA, arbitration agreements are
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract[.]” See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC,

745 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2014). The FAA establishes “a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration [agreements] and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of
contract.” See Jones v. Waffle House, Inc., 866 F.3d 1257, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 943 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985) (recognizing that there is an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution”).
Section 4 of the FAA grants district courts the authority to compel arbitration once the

court is “satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not [a]n issue.” See 9 U.S.C. § 4. In considering whether to compel arbitration, a
court considers the following three factors: (1) “whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate
exists”; (2) “whether an arbitrable issue exists”; and (3) “whether the right to arbitrate has
been waived.” See Exceen v. Ramirez, No. 8:24-cv-00880-WFJ-AEP, 2024 WL 3327509, at *2

(M.D. Fla. June 13, 2024) (citing Williams v. Eddie Acardi Motor Co., No. 3:07-cv-782-J-32JRK,
2008 WL 686222, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2008)); Hilton v. Fluent, LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d
1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2018).
Once a court is satisfied that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute, the FAA provides
that a court must stay the action pending arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 3; Smith v. Spizzirri, 601
U.S. 472, 478 (2024) (“When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute,
and a party requests a stay pending arbitration, § 3 of the FAA compels the court to stay the
proceeding.”); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam) (“Upon finding that a claim is subject to an arbitration agreement, the court should

order that the action be stayed pending arbitration.”) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3); Caley, 428 F.3d at
1368 (stating that “the FAA’s enforcement sections require a court to stay a proceeding where
the issue in the proceeding is referable to arbitration” under a written arbitration agreement)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., LLC,
No. 3:13-cv-576-J-34JFK, 2014 WL 757942, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2014) (“The Eleventh
Circuit has held that the proper course is to stay the proceedings rather than dismiss the
action.”) (citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that by opening the Account and signing the Signature
Card, he expressly agreed to the terms of the Rules and Regulations, which governed the
Account and included an Arbitration Agreement that he did not opt out of. Plaintiff contends

that his TCPA claims fall outside the scope of the Arbitration Agreement because his claims
do not arise out of or relate to any “relationship” he had with Defendant, but instead relate
to Defendant’s attempts to collect a third-party’s debt by calling his cell phone number
allegedly in violation of the TCPA. (See Doc. 29 at pp. 6-11).
The subject Arbitration Agreement provides that, among other things, “any claim,
dispute or controversy between you and us . . ., whether preexisting, present or future, which
arises out of or relates to . . . our relationship” must be “resolved by individual (not class or
class-wide) binding arbitration[.]” (See Doc. 25-1 at p. 76). The Arbitration Agreement defines
the term “claim” with the “broadest possible meaning” to include “disputes concerning

communications involving telephones, cell phones, automatic dialing systems, artificial or
prerecorded voice messages, text messages, emails or facsimile machines and alleged
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act . . . involving telemarketing.” (See id.).
The Arbitration Agreement also states that “[t]his arbitration agreement shall survive the
closing of your Account and the termination of any relationship between us[.]” (See id. at p.
78).
When determining whether a dispute is subject to an arbitration agreement, “[a]bsent
some ambiguity in the agreement, . . . it is the language of the contract that defines the scope
of disputes subject to arbitration.” See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002)

(citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)); see also All. Metals.
Inc. v. Hinely Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 2000) (“When parties define the terms
used in a contract, those definitions govern the construction of the contract.”) (citations
omitted). Courts must then “consider how the factual allegations in the complaint match up
with the causes of action asserted and measure that against the language of the arbitration

clause” to determine if the claims are within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See Doe
v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1220 n.13 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Mitsubishi Motors
Corp., 473 U.S. at 626).
“[F]ederal courts interpret arbitration clauses broadly where possible,” and “any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”
See Solymar Invs., Ltd. v. Banco Santander S.A., 672 F.3d 981, 988-89 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 945); Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626 (stating
that courts are to construe “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues . . . in favor
of arbitration”). Where an arbitration clause is broad, there is a heightened presumption of

arbitrability such that “[i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular
grievance from arbitration, . . . only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the
claim from arbitration can prevail.” See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475
U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 585-85 (1960)).
To further the FAA’s purpose of “guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual
arrangements,” arbitration agreements must be interpreted consistent with “the clear intent
of the parties.” See E.E.O.C., 534 U.S. at 294. Indeed, where an agreement “evidence[s] a clear
intent to cover more than just those matters set forth in the contract,” the Eleventh Circuit

has upheld and enforced broad clauses requiring arbitration of “all disputes between the
parties to the agreement.” See Bd. of Tr. of City of Delray Beach Police & Firefighters Ret. Sys. v.
Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 622 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); Int’l
Underwriters AG v. Triple I: Int’l Invs., Inc., 533 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining
that “an arbitration clause in an agreement sometimes can require arbitration of a dispute

arising not from the agreement itself but from another source, including another agreement,”
so long as “the arbitration clause applies to the dispute at issue”); Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin.
Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that an arbitration provision to
arbitrate “all claims between the parties” was not overly broad or vague and applied not just
to claims arising out of the parties’ contract). In short, “[a] party cannot avoid arbitration . . .
because the arbitration clause uses general, inclusive language, rather than listing every
possible specific claim.” See Brown, 211 F.3d at 1221.
In this case, Plaintiff’s TCPA claims fall within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement
because the arbitration provision is broad and expressly extends to any “relationship” Plaintiff

has, or had, with Defendant. First, the Arbitration Agreement is broadly drafted to cover
Plaintiff’s TCPA claims against Defendant. (See Doc. 25-1 at p. 76) (encompassing “any
claim, dispute or controversy between” Plaintiff and Defendant, including alleged violations
of the TCPA, which “arises out of or relates to” Plaintiff’s “relationship” with Defendant);
Brown, 211 F.3d at 1220-21 (construing arbitration provision with similarly inclusive
language—“any dispute between them or claim by either against the other,” and holding that
“the parties agreed to arbitrate any and all claims against each other, with no exceptions”);
Neal v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 38 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a broad
arbitration clause covering “any and all disputes” inescapably means that the arbitration

provision was intended to “reach all aspects of the parties’ relationship”); see, e.g., Drozdowski
v. Citibank, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-2786-STA-CGC, 2016 WL 4544543, at *6-8 (W.D. Tenn. Aug.
31, 2016) (determining that an arbitration clause covering “[a]ll Claims relating to your
account, a prior related account, or our relationship” was broad and governed plaintiffs’
TCPA claims, even though the bank’s calls to one spouse related to an account held solely by

the other spouse); Garcia v. Kendall Lakes Auto., LLC, No. 18-24397, 2019 WL 1359475, at *7
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2019) (finding that the arbitration provision covering claims “arising out
of or relating to” the Retail Buyers Order or “the parties relationship” was broad and covered
the issues raised in plaintiff’s complaint); Cara’s Notions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 140 F.3d
566, 571 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that an arbitration clause covering “[a]ny controversy or
claim” relating to “any aspects of the relationship” between the parties was very broad and
applied to all conflicts between the parties).
Further, despite Plaintiff’s contention that he closed the Account several years ago (see
Doc. 29 at pp. 3-4, 8, 10), the Arbitration Agreement is still valid and enforceable against

Plaintiff’s TCPA claims, as it explicitly includes a survival and severability clause, providing
that the subject arbitration agreement survives the closing of Plaintiff’s Account and
termination of any relationship between the parties. (See Doc. 25-1 at pp. 78-79); see, e.g.,
Garcia, 2019 WL 1359475, at *5-6 (concluding that plaintiff’s TCPA claim, which was based
on post-agreement conduct, was within the scope of the arbitration clause that explicitly stated
it survived termination of the contract); Shea v. BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-
23324-KMM, 2013 WL 869526, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2013) (noting that if the court were
to decide defendant’s motion to compel arbitration on the merits, it would find the arbitration
provision valid and enforceable against plaintiff’s TCPA claim based on the express language
providing that “[t]his arbitration provision shall survive termination of this Agreement and
the closing of your Account”).
Second, Plaintiff’s TCPA claims relate to his relationship with Defendant, as
contemplated by the arbitration provision. (See Doc. 25-1 at p. 76). As noted above, Plaintiff

opened the Account and signed the Signature Card in 2018, and continued to use the Account
after the Rules and Regulations were updated in July 2020 to reflect SunTrust’s merger with
BB&T to form Truist. (See Doc. 25-1 at pp. 2-3, 5, 105-128). In the amended complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by “using an artificial
or prerecorded voice in connection with calls it placed to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number
and the cellular telephone numbers of the members of the class, without consent.” (See Doc.
22 at ¶ 66). TCPA claims rely on the claimant not having consented to the calls. While
Plaintiff alleges that he did not give consent for the specific calls at issue, his TCPA claims
still implicate his relationship with Defendant, as it is undisputed that Plaintiff agreed to the

terms of the Rules and Regulations, which governed the Account and contained a broad
arbitration provision explicitly stating that any claim relating to “our relationship” (including
alleged violations of the TCPA) must be resolved by individual binding arbitration. (See Doc.
25-1 at p. 76); Drozdowski, 2016 WL 4544543, at *6-8 (finding that plaintiff Monika
Drozdowski, who sued Citibank, alleging TCPA violations for calls she received about her
husband’s alleged debt on his account, had an account with Citibank which subjected her to
arbitration for claims concerning her “relationship” with Citibank); see also Princess Cruise
Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d at 1218 (stating that “related to” language in an arbitration provision
requires some direct connection between the dispute and the agreement).
As Defendant correctly notes, in defending against Plaintiff’s TCPA claims, questions
concerning Plaintiff’s possible consent will necessarily arise, which implicate Plaintiff’s
“relationship” with Defendant. See Carr v. Citibank, N.A., No. 15-cv-6993 (SAS), 2015 WL
9598797, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2015) (explaining that “[t]he Card Agreement

contemplate[d] the arbitration of any claim related to the parties’ relationship,” and that issues
of consent in TCPA claims “undeniably implicate[] the parties’ relationship with each
other”); see also Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014)
(recognizing the “consent exception” within the TCPA).4 Because questions of consent relate
to Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendant and ultimately go to the merits of Plaintiff’s TCPA
claims, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant must be arbitrated. See AT&T Techs., Inc., 475
U.S. at 649 (“[I]n deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance
to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims.”); see also
Carr, 2015 WL 9598797, at *3 (“[E]ven claims that merely ‘implicate’ parties rights and

obligations under an agreement are subject to arbitration.”) (citing Collins & Aikman Prods. Co.
v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1995)). Such a conclusion is consistent with the
FAA’s goal of enforcing valid arbitration agreements.

4 To the extent Plaintiff challenges such consent, and to the extent this raises any unresolved
ambiguities regarding whether Plaintiff’s claim falls within the scope of the arbitration provision, the
Court points to the well-settled federal policy requiring that “[a]ny doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S.
at 24-25; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 631 (recognizing that there is an “emphatic federal policy
in favor of arbitral dispute resolution”); Sullivan v. Navient Sols., LLC, No. 6:18-cv-1225-ORL-37LRH,
2019 WL 13245871, at *5 n.7 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2019) (“[I]n accordance with U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, even if there is a dispute concerning the scope of arbitrable issues, the Court is to resolve it
in favor of arbitration. . . . for an arbitrator to decide.”) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at
24-25).
As a final matter, the subject Arbitration Agreement contains a class action waiver
providing that “neither you nor we will have the right . . . to participate in a class action . . .
in court or in arbitration, either as a class representative or class member[.]” (See Doc. 25-1 at
p. 77). Plaintiff contends that the class action waiver does not apply because his TCPA claims

are not arbitrable. (See Doc. 29 at p. 11). “The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure
the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms[.]” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at
344. The Eleventh Circuit has “regularly enforced arbitration agreements that contain class
action waivers.” See Otis v. Arise Virtual Sols., Inc., No. 12-62143-CIV, 2013 WL 12106056, at
*4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2013) (collecting cases).
Because the Court finds that the arbitration provision applies to Plaintiff’s claims,
Plaintiff must pursue his claims against Defendant on an individual, non-class basis pursuant
to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. See Kline v. Getaround, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-06113-
MCR-ZCB, 2023 WL 9325764, at *1 (N.D. Fla. July 5, 2023) (stating that plaintiff “must

individually pursue her claims [brought under the TCPA and the Florida Telephone
Solicitation Act] against [defendant] according to the arbitration procedures established in the
arbitration agreement”) (citing Otis, 2013 WL 12106056, at *4); Shea, 2013 WL 869526, at *3
n.7 (compelling plaintiff’s claims brought under the TCPA to arbitration on an individualized
basis).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
(1) Defendant’s Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Case (Doc. 25)
is GRANTED. The parties shall submit all claims to binding arbitration in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement.
(2) This case is STAYED pending arbitration. On or before October 16, 2026, and
every 90 days thereafter, Defendant Truist Bank shall file a report as to the status
of the arbitration proceeding. Additionally, Defendant Truist Bank shall notify this
Court within 10 days of the final resolution of the arbitration proceeding or other
resolution of this dispute.
(3) The Clerk is directed to administratively close this case.
(4) Defendant’s earlier Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Case (Doc. 17) is
DENIED as moot.
DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on July 20, 2026.
)
PL ros
PHILIP R. LAMMENS
United States Magistrate Judge
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11416922. Public record. Not legal advice.