# Sweeney

> District Court, S.D. Texas · August 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11416904

## Case

- **Full name:** Patrick N. Sweeney v. Mario K. Castillo, J.D., et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** August 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT August 04, 2026
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION

PATRICK N. SWEENEY, §
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-CV-1558
§
MARIO K. CASTILLO, J.D., ET AL., §
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an Original Complaint (misnamed Original
Petition) against multiple individuals asserting that they violated, and conspired to
violate, his First Amendment right to free speech by terminating him as an adjunct
professor at Lone Star College (LSC).1 ECF 1. The Court, on November 21, 2025,
issued a Memorandum and Order granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss as to all
claims except Plaintiff’s § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claims against
Defendants in their individual capacities.2 ECF 36. As ordered, Defendants filed a
timely Second Motion to Dismiss. ECF 37. Plaintiff did not file a Response, opting
instead to file an objection titled “Magistrate Cannot Assist Parties” that accuses the

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this United States Magistrate Judge for all
purposes, including final judgment. ECF 19.
2 The individual Defendants are Lone Star College Chancellor Mario Castillo, Vice Chancellor
Legal Affairs and General Counsel Nancy Molina, Executive Vice Chancellor Academics Seelpa
Keshvala, President Lone Star College-Houston North Quentin Wright, Vice President of
Instruction, Lone Star College-Houston North John Maynard, Chief Conduct Officer Lone Star
College-Houston North Sheldon Moss, and Human Resources Director Lone Star College-
Houston North Ruth Hutyra. ECF 1 ¶3.
Court and opposing counsel of misconduct but does not substantively address
qualified immunity.3 ECF 38. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the

law, the Court grants Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss.4
I. Background
LSC entered into a contract with Plaintiff in August 2024 to teach three dual-

credit “HIST1301” history classes.5 ECF 1 at 3. One of the required topics covered
in HIST1301 is slavery. Id. at 4. Plaintiff contends that “immature students . . .
often cannot distinguish between learning about racist ideology in an historical
setting and racism.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that the students were

“disinterested,” so he instituted a “warm-up” exercise of writing a question on the
board before every class that the students had five minutes to answer. Id. at 5.
Plaintiff also alleges that on one occasion he told a student who had her head down

to “wake-up.” Id. at 6-7. On another occasion he told a student to take off her hood
and remove her earbuds. Id. Plaintiff believes these events gave rise to the
complaints that precipitated his termination.

3 The majority of Plaintiff’s brief, which the court will refer to as his “Response,” addresses alleged
misconduct by defense counsel Stephen J. Quezada, including the violation of consumer protection
statutes. Quezada is not a defendant in this case. Plaintiff has filed a separate lawsuit against
Quezada and co-counsel Brianna M. Herman. See Sweeney v. Quezada, Civil Action No.
4:25cv4621 (pending before District Judge George C. Hanks).
4 The Court has reviewed and considered all arguments and issues raised by the parties, whether
or not explicitly addressed herein.
5 A dual-credit class is one that allows a high school student to get Texas high school credit and
college credit. The classes Plaintiff taught were in association with Victory Early College School
(VECHS). ECF 1 at 2.
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint describes complaints by students and at least
one parent about what they viewed as racist behavior and comments by Plaintiff. Id.

at 7-20. Defendant John Maynard, Vice President of Instruction for LSC North,
notified Plaintiff by email on September 27, 2024 that Plaintiff was “being placed
on administrative leave effective immediately due to the alleged use of racially based

epithets and/or slurs.” Id. at 9 (emphasis in original). Maynard met with multiple
students after his September 27, 2024 email to Plaintiff. Id. at 12-13. Maynard then
met with Plaintiff on September 30, 2024 and asked him about a variety of
statements students claimed Plaintiff had made. Id. at 15. Plaintiff also alleges that

Maynard asked Plaintiff about a variety of comments Plaintiff made in class that
were not included in a student complaint. Id. at 17. Defendant Ruth Hutyra, Human
Resources Director for LSC North, attended the September 30, 2024 meeting as a

witness but did not speak. Id. at 15. On October 18, 2024, Defendant Quentin
Wright, President of LSC North, notified Plaintiff that Plaintiff was “being
terminated due to a violation of Section VI.D.12 of the Lone Star College Policy.”
ECF 1-3 at 52.

Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge of age discrimination under the ADEA and
race discrimination under Title VII and the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue
on February 27, 2025. ECF 1-3 at 53-54; ECF 1-4 at 5-7. Plaintiff filed his Original

Complaint on April 4, 2025. As noted above, only Plaintiff’s § 1983 First
Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants in their individual capacities
remain pending. ECF 36.

II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standards
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity is properly
analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards. Aguero Ramirez

v. Pharr San Juan Alamo Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 7:24-CV-00505, 2026 WL 899434,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2026). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603

(5th Cir. 2009). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Alexander v. AmeriPro Funding, Inc.,
848 F.3d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area

Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). However, the court does not apply
the same presumption to conclusory statements or legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678-79.
III. Analysis
A. Plaintiff’s unclear Original Complaint necessitated further briefing.

As a threshold matter, the Court quickly addresses Plaintiff’s unfounded and
scurrilous assertions that the Court’s decision to allow Defendants to file a Second
Motion to Dismiss is the result of retaliation, conspiracy, collusion, and bias. ECF

38. The Court noted at the start of the November 21, 2025 Memorandum and Order
that Plaintiff’s Original Compliant “does not specify whether Plaintiff is suing the
individual Defendants in their official or individual capacity.” ECF 36 at 1.
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss addressed official capacity claims. Nonetheless,

Defendants preserved a qualified immunity defense by asserting that “government
employees are entitled to official immunity when sued in their individual capacity
for official acts.”6 ECF 5 at 6; ECF 8 at 6; ECF 10 at 6. The Court, as it must,

construed Plaintiff’s pro se Original Complaint liberally and determined Plaintiff
intended to assert individual capacity First Amendment Retaliations claims. See
Chhim v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding the
court applies a more lenient standard when analyzing the complaints of pro se

plaintiffs).

6 Carter v. Diamond URS Huntsville, LLC, 175 F. Supp. 3d 711, 742 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (stating that
official immunity from state law claims and qualified immunity from federal claims are
“substantially the same.”); Martinez v. Harris Cnty., Texas, No. 24-20194, 2025 WL 914309, at
*6 (5th Cir. Mar. 26, 2025) (stating the test for official immunity is “derived substantially” from
the test for qualified immunity for § 1983 actions).
Qualified immunity is immunity from suit, not just immunity from liability,
and therefore the Court must address qualified immunity at the “earliest possible

stage of the litigation.” Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)). A Plaintiff
asserting a claim against an individual asserting qualified immunity must be able to

survive a motion to dismiss without any discovery. Id. at 311 (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684-85 (2009)). For these reasons, and no other, the Court
stayed discovery and permitted Defendants to file a Second Motion to Dismiss to
address Plaintiff’s individual capacity First Amendment retaliation claims. ECF 36

at 2.
B. First Amendment Retaliation Standards
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against individual state employees

who deprive a plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right while acting
under color of state law. Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194 (2024). The usual test
for evaluating a First Amendment retaliation claim by a government employee
involves a “threshold layer,” i.e., “whether the employee spoke as a citizen or instead

made “statements pursuant to [his] official duties.” Wetherbe v. Texas Tech Univ.
Sys., 138 F.4th 296, 303 (5th Cir. 2025). If the employee spoke as a citizen, the
employee must also prove that “(1) he suffered an adverse employment decision; (2)

his speech involved a matter of public concern; (3) his interest in speaking
outweighed the governmental defendant's interest in promoting efficiency; and (4)
the protected speech motivated the defendant's conduct.” Id.

In determining whether an employee engaged in speech on a matter of public
concern the Court considers “the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record.” Buchanan v. Alexander, 919 F.3d 847, 853 (5th Cir.

2019). The Supreme Court has held that classroom discussion is protected by the
First Amendment because academic freedom is “a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.” Buchanan v. Alexander, 919 F.3d 847, 852 n. 9 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). However, First Amendment
protection of classroom speech is limited. “In the college classroom context, speech
that does not serve an academic purpose is not of public concern.” Id. at 853.

Whether a professor’s classroom speech addressed a matter of public concern is a
question of law for the Court. Id.
C. Qualified Immunity Standards
Lone Star College is a Texas junior college organized under Chapter 130 of

the Texas Education Code. Young-Trezvant v. Lone Star Coll. Sys., No. 23-20551,
2024 WL 2794483, at *1 (5th Cir. May 31, 2024). The Defendants are all
employees of Lone Star College. See at 1, n.2 supra. As state employees,

Defendants are protected by qualified immunity from suits for money damages for
actions taken in the course of their employment. Wetherbe v. Texas Tech Univ. Sys.,
138 F.4th 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2025). Therefore, to survive Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for First Amendment retaliation, Plaintiff must plead
sufficient facts to overcome Defendants’ qualified immunity. Id. at 30. (holding
Dean entitled to qualified immunity from former professor’s First Amendment

retaliation claim). To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must plausibly allege
facts that show: (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2)
the right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Id. at 301
(citations omitted). A district court may address the two prongs in any order and

must dismiss the case if plaintiff fails to satisfy either. Id. at 303.
D. Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege Defendants’ violation of a clearly
established First Amendment right.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims
based on qualified immunity because Plaintiff does not allege facts that satisfy either
prong of the qualified immunity analysis.
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint sets forth in detail alleged discrepancies
between questions Plaintiff was asked by President Maynard in the meeting
regarding student complaints and the accusations reported in the student complaints.

See generally ECF 1. However, even in the specific section titled “Plaintiffs [sic]
Statement Were Protected Speech,” the Original Complaint fails to identify the
specific statements that constitute protected speech and which led to his termination.
Id. ¶¶53-57. Plaintiff’s “Response” neither offers details nor provides clarity. See
generally ECF 38. The closest Plaintiff comes to alleging protected speech on a

matter of public concern is paragraph 53 of the Original Complaint, which recounts
statements in a September 27, 2024 email from a student’s parent to the Lonestar
College Executive Counsel, a copy of which is attached to the Original Complaint.

ECF 1-2 at 27. The email states:
My daughter, along with several other students, has accused Mr.
Sweeney of making racist and deeply inappropriate comments during a
recent lecture on the topic of slavery. According to my daughter, Mr.
Sweeney singled out all the Black American students in the classroom,
including her, and explicitly referred to them as "slaves." Even more
troubling, he allegedly told one of the young Black male students that
he "would make a good slave" and went as far as to say that if he were
a slave owner, he would buy him.

Id. Significantly, Plaintiff does not deny making the alleged comments but only
contends that these comments were not included in any Student Civil Rights
Complaint produced to him. ECF 1 ¶56. Further, while the comments at issue were
made during a lesson on slavery, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show
the comments served an academic purpose as required by the Fifth Circuit and the
Supreme Court. See Buchanan v. Alexander, 919 F.3d 847, 853 (5th Cir. 2019);
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Plaintiff alleges that:
[P]ointing out African American students to use them in his examples
of slavery, saying that all the black students in that class could have
been slaves, that white students could have been slave owners and
asking students what they thought were the benefits of having a slave
are all discussion points to help students understand slavery on a
personal level rather than some distant abstract concept. African
American, Hispanic and Caucasian students alleged Plaintiff "singled
them out" while no student or administrator identified how Plaintiff's
treatment of students was disparate, unreasonably interfered with or
limited any student's ability to participate in or benefit from College
programs and activities or violated a civil right.

ECF 1 ¶67. The first sentence of the quoted paragraph may be Plaintiff’s sincere
opinion but singling out African American students as individuals who could have
been enslaved, even in an effort to make students consider the effects of slavery on
a personal level, does not serve a legitimate academic purpose. Moreover, while the
second sentence of the above paragraph may be true, whether speech serves an
academic purpose is not determined simply by the lack of a disparate impact or
interference with participation with benefits, theories borrowed from non-First
Amendment discrimination cases. See Buchanan, 919 F.3d at 853 (explaining that
whether speech is a matter of public concern is determined by “the content, form,
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record”).
Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants violated a clearly established

constitutional right. Plaintiff cannot rest on “generalized propositions” to show that
a right is clearly established and instead must “identify ‘similar circumstances’ in
previous cases that established ‘particular conduct as unlawful.’” Thorpe as next

friend A.B. v. Weaver, No. 24-40472, 2026 WL 1969094, at *4 (5thCir. July 8, 2026)
(citing Stevenson v. Tocé, 113 F.4th 494, 504 (5th Cir. 2024)). Thus, while it is true
that classroom speech that serves an academic purpose is protected, to overcome
qualified immunity Plaintiff must present controlling authority establishing that his
particular comments are entitled to First Amendment protection. Wetherbe, 138

F.4th at 301–02 (holding that “[a]s a general proposition, to show a violation of
clearly established law, [a plaintiff] must identify a case that put [the defendant] on
notice that his specific conduct was unlawful” (change in original, emphasis added,

citation omitted)). The best Plaintiff has done is cite to a 2001 Sixth Circuit case,
Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 682 (6th Cir. 2001). ECF 1 ¶5. The
fact that Plaintiff had to reach outside of the Fifth Circuit for case support
underscores his failure to sufficiently allege violation of a clearly established law.

Hardy is also readily distinguished from this case. Professor Hardy alleged First
Amendment retaliation when he was disciplined after a student complained about
his use of the “n-word” and “bitch” in class. Id. at 674. Professor Hardy used the

offensive terms in a lecture on the power and effect of language, such as the n-word
and bitch, in a course on interpersonal communications. Id. at 674-75. The Sixth
Circuit found Hardy's speech protected because it was germane to the subject of the
power and effect of language and was limited to an academic discussion of the words

in question. Id. at 679. The case contained no allegation that Professor Hardy
singled out any student in class as an example of the “n-word” or “bitch.” In sum,
Plaintiff has failed to cite authority that would have put Defendants on notice that

his comments were constitutionally protected speech.
E. Plaintiff fails to satisfy the causation element of a First Amendment
retaliation claim.

Even if Plaintiff’s Original Complaint were found to allege protected speech
on a matter of public concern, Plaintiff must also plausibly allege that “the protected
speech motivated the defendant’s conduct.” Wetherbe, 138 F.4th at 303 (5th Cir.
2025). Although the letters informing Plaintiff of his suspension and termination
were signed by Wright, Plaintiff neither alleges who made the decision to terminate
his employment nor the role any individual Defendant played in the termination

decision. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint fails to allege anything other than the
conclusory recitation of legal principles holding that non-decisionmakers can be
liable for First Amendment retaliation without any factual allegations tied to any

Defendant. ECF 1 ¶¶68-69. Plaintiff specifically accuses only Maynard of
misconduct, whom he alleges “tampered with witnesses” and “fabricated
allegations.” ECF 1 ¶¶36, 74. But these claims are belied by Plaintiff’s own
allegations and evidence, attached to his Complaint, establishing multiple

complaints of Plaintiff’s use of racially charged comments in the classroom. See,
e.g., ECF 1-2 at 10. 16, 18-24, 27; ECF 1-3 at 2-30. Furthermore, the Original
Complaint fails to allege that Maynard communicated to a decisionmaker any

allegedly fabricated complaints that led to Plaintiff’s termination, as opposed to
documented complaints.
IV. Conclusion and Order
For all the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss
(ECF 37) is GRANTED. It is ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE. The Court will issue a separate Final Judgment.

Signed on August 04, 2026, at Houston, Texas.

Christina A. Bryan 6
United States Magistrate Judge

13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11416904. Public record. Not legal advice.