# Arungwa

> District Court, E.D. New York · August 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11416444

## Case

- **Full name:** John Arungwa v. New York City Department of Correction
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOHN ARUNGWA,

Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM & ORDER
25-CV-05660 (HG) (CHK)
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION,

Defendant.

HECTOR GONZALEZ, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff John Arungwa, proceeding pro se, sued his former employer, the New York City
Department of Correction (“DOC”), alleging that he “was removed from [his] job as a result of
being sick.” ECF No. 1 at 5 (Complaint; “Compl.”).1 Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) is GRANTED. See ECF No. 4 (Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP). However,
his Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff initiated this action against DOC pursuant to the “Sick Leave Act (Medical
Emergency Act[)],” invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff
asserts that he was employed by DOC beginning “06/29/9,” but on May 4, 2022, he got sick
while on vacation. Id. at 5. He alleges that he told his “command and the sick desk,” but

1 Unless otherwise indicated, when quoting cases and Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court
omits all internal quotation marks, alteration marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations. The
Court refers to the pages assigned by the Electronic Case Files system (“ECF”).

2 The Court “recite[s] the substance of the allegations as if they represented true facts, with
the understanding that these are not findings of the [C]ourt, as [I] have no way of knowing at this
stage what are the true facts.” In re Hain Celestial Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 20 F.4th 131, 133 (2d
Cir. 2021).
nevertheless, he “was removed from [his] job as a result of being sick.” Id. Plaintiff asserts no
other facts to support his claim. As for relief, Plaintiff “ask[s] [the] Court [to] look into [his]
case and consider re-instat[ing] [him] back to [his] job position with any loss of wages.” Id. at 6.
LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim is plausible ‘when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all allegations
contained in a complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to provide: “(1) a short
and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Rule 8 “does not require detailed factual allegations . . . it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
A pro se complaint, however, “must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Harris v.
Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, courts “remain obligated
to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). Put differently, the Court must construe pro se
submissions “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover, “[a] pro se complaint should not be
dismissed without the Court’s granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the
complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Grullon v. City of New
Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013).
Finally, a district court shall dismiss an IFP action where it is satisfied that the action:

“(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
DISCUSSION
Because Plaintiff brought this case under the “Sick Leave Act (Medical Emergency
Act[)],” Compl. at 4, the Court liberally construes the Complaint to assert a claim under the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (the “FMLA” or the “Act”), which provides an eligible
employee with 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for certain delineated
reasons, including “a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform” his
job, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). However, for the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiff

fails to sufficiently plead a claim under the FMLA.
I. DOC is a Non-Suable Entity
First, Plaintiff improperly sued DOC, which is an agency of the City of New York and
thus a non-suable entity. Under the New York City Charter, “[a]ll actions and proceedings for
the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the City of
New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.” N.Y. City
Charter ch. 17, § 396. In other words, “suits arising from acts of the DOC must be brought
against the City of New York.” Bell v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., No. 26-cv-3956, 2026 WL
1910869, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2026). Therefore, if Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, he must name the City of New York as a defendant rather than DOC.
II. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim under the FMLA
Second, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege either type of FMLA claim recognized by the

Second Circuit: (1) an interference claim, “in which an employee asserts that his employer
denied or otherwise interfered with his substantive rights under the Act,” or (2) a retaliation
claim, “in which an employee asserts that his employer discriminated against him because he
engaged in activity protected by the Act.” Krosmico v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 06-cv-
1178, 2006 WL 3050869, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2006).
A. Interference Claim
To state a claim for FMLA interference, “a plaintiff must establish that the defendant
denied or otherwise interfered with a benefit to which [he] was entitled under the FMLA.”
Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 424 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the

exercise of or the attempt to exercise [ ] any right provided under this subchapter.”)).
Specifically, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that he is an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) that
the defendant is an employer under the FMLA; (3) that he was entitled to take leave under the
FMLA; (4) that he gave notice to the defendant of his intention to take leave; and (5) that he was
denied benefits to which he was entitled under the FMLA. Id.
Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to make these showings. First, Plaintiff does not
adequately allege that he is eligible for FMLA leave. An employee is eligible for FMLA
benefits if he has been employed for at least 12 months by his employer and has worked at least
1,250 hours during the previous 12-month period. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A). Plaintiff’s
allegation that he “was employed by the [DOC] from 06/29/9” is not sufficiently specific.
Compl. at 5. Second, although the FMLA defines “employer” to include a public agency like
DOC, see 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(iii), Plaintiff must explicitly assert that DOC is covered by the
FMLA, see Smith v. Westchester Cnty., 769 F. Supp. 2d 448, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting

cases). Third, Plaintiff’s bare allegation that he was sick does not establish his entitlement to
FMLA leave. See Compl. at 5. Plaintiff, however, can establish such entitlement by plausibly
alleging that he had “a serious health condition” rendering him “unable to perform the functions
of [his] position” at DOC. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Fourth, Plaintiff does not allege that he
gave notice to DOC of his intention to take FMLA leave. Although he “communicated to [his]
command and the sick desk,” Compl. at 5, courts in this Circuit have held that “[m]erely calling
in sick is insufficient to put a company on notice that an employee is requesting leave that may
be eligible under the FMLA,” De Figueroa v. New York, 403 F. Supp. 3d 133, 155 (E.D.N.Y.
2019) (Although “an employee need not give formal notice that [he] intends to take FMLA leave
. . . [he] must objectively assert [his] rights under the FMLA.”). Fifth, and finally, Plaintiff’s

assertion that he “was removed from [his] job as a result of being sick,” Compl. at 5, does not
establish that any request for FMLA leave was either formally denied or discouraged, De
Figueroa, 403 F. Supp. 3d at 155.
For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for FMLA interference.
B. Retaliation Claim
Next, to state a retaliation claim under the FMLA, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts
demonstrating that: “(1) [he] exercised rights protected under the FMLA, (2) [he] was qualified
for [his] position, (3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse
employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of retaliatory
intent.” Serby v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 526 F. App’x 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2013); see also
Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding
that a retaliation claim is actionable under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)).
Although Plaintiff’s assertion that he “was removed from [his] job as a result of being

sick” fits more neatly into a retaliation claim than an interference claim, Compl. at 5, Plaintiff
likewise fails to state a retaliation claim. First, Plaintiff does not allege that he exercised a right
protected under the FMLA; instead, he asserts that he got sick while on vacation and thereafter
“communicated to [his] command and the sick desk.” Id. Second, although Plaintiff does not
specifically allege that he was qualified for his position at DOC, assuming the truth of Plaintiff’s
statement that he was employed there “from 06/29/9” and was still employed there when he fell
sick in May 2022, id., the Court draws the reasonable inference that Plaintiff was so qualified,
see Philippe v. Santander Bank, N.A., No. 15-cv-2918, 2018 WL 1559765, at *10 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2018) (“Plaintiff has satisfied his minimal burden in demonstrating that he was
qualified for his position” because “Defendant saw fit not only to hire Plaintiff but retain him for

more than two years.”). Third, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that he suffered an adverse
employment action, and indeed, the paradigmatic one: he was terminated from his employment.
See Millea v. Metro-N. R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 2011) (An adverse employment action
is “any action by the employer that is likely to dissuade a reasonable worker in the plaintiff’s
position from exercising his legal rights.”). Fourth, however, Plaintiff does not establish that the
termination of his employment occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
retaliatory intent. Although he states that he “was removed from [his] job as a result of being
sick,” he provides no facts—for example, that he was removed immediately after calling in
sick—to support that conclusion. Compl. at 5.
Because Plaintiff has not satisfied each element of a FMLA retaliation claim, he fails to
state that claim.
III. Plaintiff FMLA Claim is Likely Time-Barred
Finally, the Court warns Plaintiff that his FMLA claim is likely time-barred. Plaintiff

alleges that he got sick on May 4, 2022, and was subsequently removed from his job, presumably
around the same time. Id. “The statute of limitations for violation of rights protected by the
FMLA is two years after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation, or three
years after the date of the last event constituting a willful violation of section 2615 of the
FMLA.” Islam v. Steiner, 822 F. Supp. 3d 407, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2026). Here, Plaintiff initiated
this action in October 2025. If Plaintiff’s claim accrued in May 2022, even assuming he could
demonstrate that Defendant willfully violated the FMLA—that Defendant “knew or showed
reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the [FMLA]”—
Plaintiff’s claim would still be time-barred. Id.3
CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Because Plaintiff is pro se, the Court grants him leave to file an amended complaint
properly naming the City of New York as the Defendant and pleading a timely claim with
specific facts showing how Defendant harmed Plaintiff and how Defendant’s actions violated

3 The FMLA limitations period can be equitably tolled, but that doctrine is only available
“in rare and exceptional circumstances in which a party is prevented in some extraordinary way
from exercising his rights.” Islam, 822 F. Supp. 3d at 419. To avail himself of equitable tolling,
Plaintiff must demonstrate that he “(1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period
[he] seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the
doctrine should apply.” Id. The Court discerns no such circumstances here.
federal law. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must do so on or before September 15,
2026. It should be captioned “Amended Complaint” and include docket number 25-CV-5660
(HG) (CHK). Any amended complaint that Plaintiff elects to file will be reviewed for
sufficiency.

No summons shall issue at this time, and all further proceedings shall be stayed. If
Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint by September 15, 2026, judgment shall be entered.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not
be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff at the address of record and note the mailing on
the docket.
Plaintiff may wish to consult the City Bar Justice Center’s Federal Pro Se Legal
Assistance Project at (212) 382-4729 or online at
https://www.citybarjusticecenter.org/projects/federal-pro-se-legal-assistance for free,

confidential, limited-scope legal assistance. The Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance Project is not
part of the United States District Court.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Hector Gonzalez
HECTOR GONZALEZ
United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
August 10, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11416444. Public record. Not legal advice.