# Garcia

> District Court, E.D. New York · August 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11416436

## Case

- **Full name:** Talik Garcia, on behalf of himself, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class v. Pop A Lock New York Inc., Automotive Locksmith Supply Inc., All City Services & Dispatch Inc., Carl Napolitano, Nicholas Napolitano, and Jennifer Cannizzaro
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------X
TALIK GARCIA, on behalf of himself,
FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
-against-
22 CV 5305 (RML)
POP A LOCK NEW YORK INC.,
AUTOMOTIVE LOCKSMITH SUPPLY
INC., ALL CITY SERVICES & DISPATCH
INC., CARL NAPOLITANO, NICHOLAS
NAPOLITANO, and JENNIFER
CANNIZZARO,
Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------X
LEVY, United States Magistrate Judge:
This case is before me on consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction, so ordered
Sept. 29, 2023, Dkt. No. 24.) On March 13, 2026, plaintiff filed his third motion for default
judgment and attorney’s fees. (Third Motion for Default Judgment and Attorney’s Fees, dated
Mar. 13, 2026, Dkt. No. 64.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and
denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Talik Garcia (“plaintiff” or “Garcia”) initiated this action against his
former employers, Pop A Lock New York Inc. (“Pop A Lock”), Automotive Locksmith Supply
Inc. (“Automotive”), All City Services & Dispatch Inc. (“All City”) (collectively, the “corporate
defendants”), and Carl Napolitano, Nicholas Napolitano, and Jennifer Cannizzaro (collectively,
the “individual defendants”) (together with the corporate defendants, “defendants”) for alleged
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), New
York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), and New York City Human Rights Law
(“NYCHRL”). (Complaint, filed Sept. 7, 2022 (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1.) The following facts, as
drawn from the complaint and affidavits, are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion.
(Id.; Declaration of C.K. Lee, Esq., sworn to Mar. 13, 2026 (“Lee Decl.”), Dkt. No. 65;

Declaration of Talik Garcia, sworn to Aug. 28, 2024 (“Garcia Decl.”), Dkt. No. 66.)
I. Facts
Defendants own and operate a locksmith business at 765 Forest Avenue, Staten
Island, New York. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Each of the corporate defendants is a domestic corporation
with a principal place of business located at 765 Forest Avenue, Staten Island, New York. (Id.
¶¶ 10–12.) The individual defendants own and operate Pop A Lock and Automotive, exercise
operational control over the corporate defendants, and exercise the power to (i) hire and fire
employees, (ii) supervise and control employee work schedules, (iii) determine the rate and
method of employee pay, (iv) maintain employment records, and (v) otherwise affect the quality,
terms, and conditions of employment. (Id. ¶¶ 13–15.) Defendants’ roadside assistance services

generated gross yearly revenues of between approximately $2,190,000 and $3,650,000 during
plaintiff’s employment. (Garcia Decl. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff, a Kings County resident, worked for defendants as a driver from around
October 2021 until June 26, 2022. (Id. ¶ 3; Compl. ¶¶ 7, 30.) Plaintiff performed personal
roadside assistance services, including changing flat tires, providing gas, and jumpstarting car
batteries. (Garcia Decl. ¶ 6.) Throughout plaintiff’s employment, defendants required him to
use vehicles, supplies, and equipment that were imported into New York and purchased from
vendors located within and outside New York. (Id. ¶ 12.) Defendants’ retail products were also
imported into New York. (Id.)
“From the start of his employment until in or around November 2021,” plaintiff
worked twelve hours per day five days per week for a total of sixty hours per week. (Compl. ¶
31.) “From in or around November 2021 until the end of his employment,” plaintiff worked
eight hours per day three times per week and twelve hours per day twice per week for a total of

forty-eight hours per week. (Id.; see also Garcia Decl. ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff’s regular and overtime pay rates were $16 and $24 per hour, respectively.
(Compl. ¶ 32; Garcia Decl. ¶ 5.) However, due to defendants’ policy of rounding down daily
hours worked to the nearest hour, plaintiff was not paid overtime for all hours he worked over
forty each week. (Compl. ¶¶ 34–35.) Plaintiff also spent between approximately $400 and $650
per week to maintain the company vehicle and purchase his own tools, “such as jacks, jumper
cables, slim jims, wheel lock tools and air compression tools,” none of which defendants
reimbursed. (Id. ¶ 36; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Third Motion, dated Mar. 13,
2026 (“Mem.”), Dkt. No. 58, at 6–7 (“Plaintiff was required to spend approximately $400.00 per
week, to (i) maintain the company vehicle Defendants provided him (including gas) and (ii)

purchase tools necessary for the performance of duties Defendants assigned to him.”).)
Additionally, plaintiff claims that defendants “failed to provide wage and hour notices, at the
date of hiring and annually thereafter,” (Compl. ¶¶ 37, 40), and that his wage statements were
inaccurate (id. ¶ 38).
The complaint further alleges that plaintiff suffered constant abuse and
harassment at work on account of his race. (Id. ¶¶ 42–46.) “Throughout his employment,”
plaintiff, who is African American, “was constantly, on a daily basis, called ‘nigger’ by his
Manager Luis.” (Id. ¶ 43 (“Luis [ ] would say things like, ‘What’s up Nigger?’ and ‘Hurry up
Nigger.’”).) Plaintiff told his manager “several times” that “he did not want to be called a
‘Nigger’” but “Luis continued to call Plaintiff a ‘Nigger.’” (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff and other African
American employees “were given the hardest routes” and plaintiff “was given a car without air
conditioning.” (Id. ¶ 45.) “When Plaintiff complained about this to Manager Luis, nothing was
done.” (Id. ¶ 46.)

II. Procedural History
On September 7, 2022, plaintiff initiated this action against defendants, seeking
unpaid wages, unreimbursed costs for tools of the trade, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees
and costs under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. and NYLL; statutory penalties under NYLL;
and back wages, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs under the
NYSHRL and NYCHRL. (Compl. ¶¶ 1–4.) Defendants appeared through counsel on November
2, 2022 (Notice of Appearance, dated Nov. 2, 2022, Dkt. No. 12), and filed an answer on
December 9, 2022 (Answer, dated Dec. 9, 2022, Dkt. No. 17). After an unsuccessful mediation
and stalled discovery, counsel for defendants, Michael J. DeSantis, Esq., moved to withdraw his
representation, citing an “irretrievably broken down” attorney-client relationship. (Motion to

Withdraw as Attorney, dated Feb. 6, 2024, Dkt. No. 35, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff opposed the motion to
withdraw and “cross-moved” for sanctions and attorney’s fees of $58,330, “incurred in chasing
after Defendants to fulfill their discovery obligations.” (Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Sanctions,
dated Feb. 23, 2024, Dkt. No. 36; Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Withdraw and in
Support of Motion for Sanctions, dated Feb. 23, 2024, Dkt. No. 37, at 1.)
On April 30, 2024, I conditionally granted Mr. DeSantis’s motion to withdraw
and ordered defendants to retain new counsel by May 31, 2024. (Minute Entry, dated Apr. 30,
2024; see also Order granting Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, dated July 5, 2024.) I
specifically warned the corporate defendants that if they failed to obtain new counsel by May 31,
2024, they would be deemed to be in default. (Id.) I also advised the individual defendants that
if they did not obtain new counsel by May 31, 2024, they should be prepared to proceed pro se,
and I ordered all defendants to file complete responses to plaintiff’s outstanding discovery
requests on or before May 22, 2024. (Id.) No new counsel appeared on defendants’ behalf, and

defendants failed to respond to the discovery requests. I therefore granted plaintiff’s request to
move for default judgment. (Order, dated June 10, 2024.) On August 1, 2024, I denied
plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and directed plaintiff to include any request for attorney’s fees
and costs with the motion for default judgment. (Order, dated Aug. 1, 2024.)
Plaintiff first moved for default judgment and attorney’s fees on August 29, 2024.
(Plaintiff’s First Motion for Default Judgment, dated Aug. 29, 2024, Dkt. No. 50.) I denied that
motion for failure to comply with Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(3) and the Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act (“SCRA”), 50a U.S.C. § 521, and granted plaintiff thirty-days’ leave to correct and
renew his motion. (Order, dated Feb. 28, 2025, Dkt. No. 54.) Plaintiff filed his second motion
on March 26, 2025. (Second Motion for Default Judgment and Attorney’s Fees, dated Mar. 26,

2025, Dkt. No. 55; Memorandum of Law in Support of Second Motion, dated Mar. 26, 2025,
Dkt. No. 58.) Although that motion complied with the SCRA, it remained deficient under Local
Civil Rule 55.2(a)(3). I therefore denied it and granted plaintiff sixty-days’ leave to correct and
file a third motion for default judgment. (Order, dated Dec. 15, 2025, Dkt. No. 60.) I warned
plaintiff that failure to timely renew may lead to the complaint’s dismissal. (Id.) Plaintiff let the
sixty-day deadline pass and, on March 3, 2026, I dismissed the case for lack of prosecution.
(Order, dated Mar. 3, 2026, Dkt. No. 61; Judgment, dated Mar. 4, 2026, Dkt. No. 62.) Plaintiff
filed a motion to reopen the case on March 4, 2026, which I granted on March 8, 2026. (Motion
to Reopen, dated Mar. 4, 2026, Dkt. No. 63; Order, dated Mar. 8, 2026.) On March 13, 2026,
plaintiff filed the instant unopposed motion for default judgment and attorney’s fees. (Third
Motion for Default Judgment, dated Mar. 13, 2026, Dkt. No. 64.)1
DISCUSSION
I. Default Judgment Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 imposes “a two-step process for obtaining a
default judgment.” Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 2011). First, if a
defendant fails to appear, plaintiffs must obtain an entry of default by the clerk of the court. Id.
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a)). Second, once default is entered against the non-responsive
defendant, plaintiffs “must apply to the court for a default judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2).
In deciding a motion for default judgment, the court is required to accept all of the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Finkel
v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653
F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981)). “Nevertheless, it remains for the court to consider whether the
unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit

conclusions of law.” Payamps v. M & M Convenience Deli & Grocery Corp., No. 16 CV 4895,
2019 WL 8381264, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019) (citation omitted).
If the complaint suffices to establish liability, the court must “conduct an inquiry .
. . to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA),
Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999). “The plaintiff bears the burden of presenting
proof of damages, which may take the form of documentary evidence or detailed affidavits.”
Sanchez v. Ms. Wine Shop Inc., 643 F. Supp. 3d 355, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting Joe Hand

1 In compliance with Local Civil Rule 55.2(a)(3), plaintiff’s counsel certified that he mailed all
documents in support of plaintiff’s third motion for default judgment to defendants at their last
known addresses. (Certificate of Service, dated Mar. 16, 2026, Dkt. No. 68.)
Promotions, Inc. v. Benitez, No. 18 CV 6476, 2020 WL 5519200, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27,
2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5517240 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2020)); see
also Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., 951 F.2d 504, 508 (2d Cir. 1991). “When a defendant
defaults in an action brought under the FLSA, the plaintiff’s recollection and estimates of hours

worked are presumed to be correct.” Gunawan v. Sake Sushi Rest., 897 F. Supp. 2d 76, 83
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citation omitted).
II. Wage and Hour Claims
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to default judgment for defendants’ failure to
pay time-and-a-half for all overtime hours worked (Compl. ¶¶ 59, 63–64), to reimburse him for
“tools of the trade” (id. ¶ 65), and to furnish him with a wage notice or wage statements (id. ¶¶
66–67).
A. FLSA Liability
i. Employment Relationship
To establish a claim under the FLSA, a plaintiff must show that there was an

employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants as defined by the FLSA. See
Gangadharan v. GNS Goods & Servs., No. 18 CV 7342, 2022 WL 824135, at *10 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 18, 2022). The FLSA broadly defines an employer as “any person [or corporation] acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. §
203(d), (e)(1). “[E]mployment for FLSA purposes [is] a flexible concept to be determined on a
case-by-case basis by review of the totality of the circumstances.” Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722
F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Barfield v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132,
141–42 (2d Cir. 2008)). “[A]n employee may be jointly employed by two or more employers,”
and “[i]n such cases, joint employers are subject to joint and several liability for FLSA
violations.” Michalow v. E. Coast Restoration & Consulting Corp., No. 09 CV 5475, 2017 WL
9400690, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL
1559762 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018).
The Second Circuit has adopted a multi-factor test based on “economic reality” to

determine whether an employment relationship exists between a plaintiff and defendant.
Irizarry, 722 F.3d at 104–05. The test asks whether the alleged employer-defendant “(1) had the
power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled [employees’] work schedules
or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained
employment records.” Id. at 105 (quoting Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d
Cir. 1984)). The test looks at the totality of the circumstances, and no individual factor is
dispositive. Id. The allegations in the complaint and plaintiff’s declaration show that he had an
employment relationship with defendants. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants
employed him as a driver between October 2021 and June 26, 2022 (Compl. ¶ 30), and that the
individual defendants exercised “the authority to hire and fire [employees], supervise and control

work schedules, determine rate and method of pay, maintain employment records, and otherwise
affect the terms and conditions of employment for managerial employees who directly
supervise[d] Plaintiff . . . .” (Id. ¶¶ 13–15.) I find these allegations sufficient to find an
employment relationship within the meaning of the FLSA to impose liability on defendants. See
Gangadharan, 2022 WL 824135, at *10.
ii. Interstate Commerce Requirement
The FLSA further requires that the plaintiff-employee be (1) “engaged in
commerce or the production of goods for commerce” or (2) “employed in an enterprise engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). To be an
“enterprise engaged in commerce,” the defendant-employer must have (a) an annual gross sales
volume of at least $500,000, and (b) “employees handling, selling or otherwise working on
goods or materials that have been moving in or produced for commerce by any person.” Brito v.
Marina’s Bakery Corp., No. 19 CV 828, 2022 WL 875099, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2022)

(citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)). Plaintiff alleges that “[d]efendants’ roadside assistance
services alone generated gross yearly revenues of approximately $2,190,000 to $3,650,000”
(Garcia Decl. ¶ 10), and that he handled vehicles, supplies, and equipment that defendants
purchased from out-of-state vendors and imported into New York (id. ¶ 12). Defendants,
therefore, are an “enterprise engaged in interstate commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA.
B. NYLL Liability
To prevail on his NYLL law claims, plaintiff must establish that his employment
relationship with defendants is covered under the NYLL, which extends to “any person
employed for hire by an employer in any employment.” N.Y. Lab. L. § 190. Unlike the FLSA,
NYLL does not require that a defendant achieve a certain minimum in annual sales or business to

be subject to the law. Garcia v. Badyna, No. 13 CV 4021, 2014 WL 4728287, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 2014). Otherwise, the NYLL’s definition of “employer” is “nearly identical” to that of
the FLSA, and the analysis of the employment relationship under both statutes is based on the
same factors. See Mahoney v. Amekk Corp., No. 14 CV 4131, 2016 WL 6585810, at *9
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) (collecting cases holding that the FLSA and NYLL are interpreted
consistently with one another on the question of employer status), report and recommendation
adopted, 2016 WL 6601445 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2016). Because plaintiff has an employer-
employee relationship with defendants under the FLSA, plaintiff also has an employer-employee
relationship with defendants under NYLL.2
C. Violations and Damages
Having found that plaintiff qualifies for protection under the FLSA and NYLL,

the court next decides whether plaintiff is entitled to default judgment on his wage and hour
claims. As a preliminary matter, the court notes that plaintiff’s claims are timely under the
FLSA and NYLL. The FLSA statute of limitations is two years, “except that a cause of action
arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action
accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). “When a defendant defaults, the violation is considered ‘willful,’
and the three-year statute of limitations applies.” Rodriguez v. Queens Convenience Deli Corp.,
No. 09 CV 1089, 2011 WL 4962397, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011) (citation omitted). The
NYLL statute of limitations is six years. N.Y. LAB. L. §§ 198(3), 663(3). Both statutes start to
run when the employee begins working for the employer. Rodriguez, 2011 WL 4962397, at *2.
Plaintiff began working for defendants around October 2021 and initiated this action less than

one year later on September 7, 2022. (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff’s claims are therefore
timely under the FLSA and NYLL.
i. Unpaid Overtime
Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to compensate him for certain overtime
“due to an impermissible policy of rounding hours down.” (Compl. ¶ 59; see also id. ¶¶ 52–53,
63–64.) Under the FLSA and NYLL, an employee must “be compensated at a rate of no less

2 As I find that the individual defendants and the corporate defendants were jointly plaintiff’s
employers, each defendant is jointly and severally liable under the FLSA and NYLL for any
damages award made in plaintiff’s favor. See Cavalotti v. Daddyo’s BBQ, Inc., No. 15 CV
6469, 2018 WL 5456654, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2018) (collecting cases).
than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for any hours worked in excess of forty per
week.” Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 200 (2d Cir.
2013) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) and N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 142-2.2).
“Plaintiffs must provide sufficient detail demonstrating that they worked more than forty hours a

week and were not compensated for the hours worked in excess of forty hours.” Prudencio Trejo
v. Blanca’s Bakery & Deli Inc., No. 23 CV 6063, 2025 WL 1029523, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,
2025) (citing Nakahata,723 F.3d at 201), report and recommendation adopted in relevant part,
2025 WL 850625 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2025). Plaintiff states that throughout his employment, he
worked between forty-eight and sixty hours per week at a regular rate of $16 and an overtime
rate of $24. (Compl. ¶¶ 31–32, 34.) Plaintiff further states that because defendants “rounded
[his hours] down to the nearest hour,” his weekly wages did not account for all hours that he
worked. (Id. ¶ 35.) These allegations suffice to establish defendants’ liability for failing to pay
plaintiff the overtime compensation to which he was entitled under the FLSA and NYLL. See
Albim v. 1656 Wireless Inc., No. 23 CV 1732, 2025 WL 2791384, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8,

2025) (finding defendants liable for FLSA and NYLL overtime violations based on allegations
that plaintiffs were not paid time-and-a-half despite working between seventy-two and 93.5
hours per week); Newman v. W. Bar & Lounge, Inc., No. 20 CV 1141, 2021 WL 2401176, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2021) (finding defendants liable for FLSA and NYLL overtime violations
where plaintiff alleged “that he regularly worked sixty-two (62) hours per week while employed
by defendants” and was never paid an overtime premium).
Plaintiff is entitled to an overtime premium for all hours worked over forty at one
and one-half times his regular rate of pay. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit.
12, § 142-2.2. Plaintiff’s overtime rate was $24, which is one-and-one-half times his regular rate
of $16. (Compl. ¶ 32). Plaintiff estimates that defendants did not pay him for 2.5 hours of
overtime each week of his employment. (Lee Decl., Ex. D.) Plaintiff worked for defendants for
approximately thirty-seven weeks. Therefore, I find plaintiff is entitled to unpaid overtime
damages of $2,220 (2.5 hours of unpaid overtime per week × $24 per hour × 37 weeks).

ii. Liquidated Damages
Plaintiff seeks and is entitled to liquidated damages. (See Mem. at 13–14; Lee
Decl., Ex. G (proposing award of “New York State Liquidated damages”).) The NYLL provides
for liquidated damages for wage claim violations, calculated in an amount equal to one hundred
percent of the total amount of wages found to be due. N.Y. Lab. L. §§ 198(1-a), 663(1). “If the
employer shows that ‘the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he
had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation’ of the FLSA or
NYLL, a court may decide not to award liquidated damages.” Sanchez v. Hyper Structure Corp.,
No. 19 CV 4524, 2023 WL 2815717, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2023) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 260;
and citing N.Y. Lab. L. § 198(1-a) (granting good-faith exception to liquidated damages)).

Because defendants have not responded to the motion, there is no showing of good faith, and
liquidated damages are appropriate. Id. (citing Herrera v. Tri-State Kitchen & Bath, Inc., No. 14
CV 1695, 2015 WL 1529653, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015)). Accordingly, plaintiff is
entitled to $2,220 in liquidated damages.
iii. Tools of the Trade
Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the FLSA and NYLL by failing to
reimburse him for tools of the trade totaling $15,371.43. (Lee Decl., Ex. D).3 “An employer

3 Plaintiff’s weekly expenditures are unclear. The court reads the complaint to allege that
plaintiff spent a total of $650 per week on vehicle maintenance and tools. (See Compl. ¶ 36
(Continued . . . .)
violates the FLSA if it requires an employee to purchase ‘tools of the trade which will be used in
or are specifically required for the performance of the employer’s particular work’ and ‘the cost
of such tools [purchased by the employee] cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required to
be paid to [the employee].’” Salinas v. Starjem Rest. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 3d 442, 476 (S.D.N.Y.

2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 531.35). The same is true under
NYLL. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 146-2.7(c) (“If an employee must spend
money to carry out duties assigned by his or her employer, those expenses must not bring the
employee’s wage below the required minimum wage.”). “A court may accept a plaintiff’s sworn
statements to substantiate an expense for tools of the trade when lacking receipts or other
documentation.” Gautier v. 3 Way Rest., Inc., No. 20 CV 3776, 2025 WL 2807124, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2025) (citing Cocoletzi v. Fat Sal’s Pizza II, Corp., 15 CV 2696, 2019 WL
92456, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019)), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2806606
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2025)).
Plaintiff has not produced receipts or other documentation to substantiate his

reimbursement request of $15,371.43, and his declaration fails to mention weekly costs of any
kind. (See generally Garcia Decl.) Absent any explanation of plaintiff’s estimated expenses, the
court cannot evaluate his request for damages or understand the relative costs of his requested
reimbursements. Pinzon v. 168 8th Ave. Food Corp., No. 20 CV 6156, 2021 WL 4894678, at *5

(“Plaintiff spent about two hundred fifty dollars ($250) per week to maintain the [company]
vehicle. In addition, Plaintiff was required to purchase his own tools, such as jacks, jumper
cables, slim jim, wheel lock tools, and air compression tools. In total, Plaintiff spent four
hundred dollars ($400) per week on tools.”). The damages chart, however, cites “uniform [sic]
expenses per week” of $400. (See Lee Decl., Ex. D; see also Mem. at 6–7 (“Plaintiff was
required to expend approximately $400 per week, to (i) maintain the company vehicle
Defendants provided him (including gas) and (ii) purchase tools necessary for the performance
of the duties Defendants assigned to him.”).)
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4894614 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 1, 2021). Accordingly, I find defendants not liable for tools of the trade expenses. See
Gautier, 2025 WL 2807124, at *5 (finding defendants not liable for tools of the trade expenses
because plaintiff failed to allege his claim with sufficient detail); Mendoza v. Cavallo’s of

Chelsea, Inc., No. 18 CV 11147, 2022 WL 2531343, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2022) (finding
defendants not liable for equipment costs where plaintiff “provided no indication of the amount
of money that he had to expend for any particular purpose”), report and recommendation
adopted, 2022 WL 4387494 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2022); Pinzon 2021 WL 4894678, at *5–6
(finding defendants not liable for tools of the trade expenses where plaintiff failed to provide the
court with receipts or a sworn declaration accounting for his alleged costs).
iv. Wage Statement and Notices
Plaintiff alleges that defendants “failed to provide wage and hour notices, at the
date of hiring and annually thereafter,” (Compl. ¶¶ 37, 40), and that his wage statements were
inaccurate (id. ¶ 38) in violation of the New York Wage Theft Protection Act (the “WTPA”).

The WTPA requires employers to provide annual wage notices to employees hired after April 9,
2011, and to provide each employee with accurate wage statements each time wages are paid.
N.Y. Lab. L. §§ 195(1)(a), 195(3). Section 195(1) requires an employer to provide employees a
written notice at the time of hiring, containing, among other things, “the rate or rates of pay and
basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other . . .
allowances.” Id. § 195(1)(a). Section 195(3) requires an employer to provide employees with
certain wage statement information “with every payment of wages.” Id. § 195(3). Failure to
comply with either section of the law renders employers liable for damages for each instance that
the violations occurred or continued to occur. Id. § 198(1-b) (stating that damages for wage
notice violations under § 195(1) accumulate at rate of $50 per day, but not to exceed $5,000); §
198(1-d) (stating that damages for wage statement violations under § 195(3) accumulate at rate
of $250 per day but may not exceed $5,000).
Plaintiff must establish Article III standing to maintain these claims. A “technical

violation” triggering statutory damages confers Article III standing only if the plaintiff plausibly
alleges an actual and concrete injury resulting from the violation. See Guthrie v. Rainbow
Fencing Inc., No. 21 CV 5929, 2022 WL 18999832, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted as modified, 2023 WL 2206568 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2023), aff’d, 113
F.4th 300 (2d Cir. 2024) (“Guthrie II”). To demonstrate standing to pursue a WTPA claim in
federal court, “a plaintiff must show some causal connection between the lack of accurate notices
and the downstream harm.” Guthrie II, 113 F.4th at 308; see also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
594 U.S. 413, 440 (2021) (“[B]are procedural violations, divorced from any concrete harm, . . .
do[ ] not suffice for Article III standing.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). For
example, a plaintiff may have suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to establish standing if an

inaccurate statement prevented him from being timely and fully paid. Guthrie II, 113 F.4th at
309. In other words, “the plaintiff-employee must support a plausible ‘theory as to how he was
injured by [the] defendants’ failure to provide the required documents.’” Id. (emphasis and
alteration in original) (quoting Quieju v. La Jugueria Inc., No. 23 CV 264, 2023 WL 3073518, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2023)).
Here, plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to provide him with a wage notice as
required by the WTPA, section 195(1)(a) of the NYLL. (Compl. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff also alleges that
defendants failed to provide him with accurate wage statements, in violation of section 195(3) of
the NYLL. (Id. ¶ 38.) Because the complaint fails to allege that plaintiff suffered any
downstream harm due to the alleged WTPA violations, I find that plaintiff lacks standing to
bring these claims. See Guthrie II, 113 F.4th at 311 (“Without plausible allegations that he
suffered a concrete injury because of [defendants’] failure to provide the required notices and
statements, [plaintiff] lacks standing to sue for that statutory violation.”); McLaughlin v.

Onanafe Mgmt. Sols. LLC, No. 22 CV 6792, 2024 WL 4184485, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14,
2024) (finding that plaintiff failed to establish the requirements for Article III standing where the
complaint failed to allege that plaintiff “suffered a concrete injury because of [defendants’]
failure to provide the required notices and statements”), report and recommendation adopted,
2024 WL 4355485 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024). Plaintiff’s WTPA claims are therefore dismissed
without prejudice.
III. Hostile Work Environment Claims
A. NYSHRL and NYCHRL Liability
Plaintiff also alleges that defendants subjected him to a hostile work environment
because of his race in violation of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. (Compl. ¶¶ 69–82.) To

establish a NYSHRL hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that he was
subjected to “inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of [his]
membership in one or more . . . protected categories,” including race. N.Y. Exec. L. §§
296(1)(h), 300 (“The provisions of this article shall be construed liberally for the
accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws,
including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article, have
been so construed.”). Courts have interpreted this amended pleading standard to be analogous to
that of the NYCHRL, which requires a plaintiff only to show that he was treated less well than
other employees because of his protected characteristics. Choudhury v. Northwell Health, Inc.,
No. 23 CV 1406, 2025 WL 2300220, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2025) (quoting Wheeler v. Praxair
Surface Techs., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 3d 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)). Under this more lenient
standard, a hostile work environment claim should only be dismissed if the plaintiff alleges
nothing more than a petty slight or trivial inconvenience. See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole

Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 114 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Pryor v. Jaffe & Asher, LLP,
992 F. Supp. 2d 252, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Employers may only avoid liability under the
NYCRHL for conduct that results in an employee being treated less well because of [a protected
category], when the conduct complained of constitutes nothing more than petty slights and trivial
inconveniences.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Here, plaintiff’s undisputed allegations establish a hostile work environment
claim under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL because he plausibly asserts that he was treated “less
well” than other employees because of his race. Plaintiff alleges that “because he was African
American[,] [h]e was constantly, on a daily basis, called ‘nigger’ by his Manager Luis.” (Compl.
¶ 43 (“Luis [ ] would say things like, ‘What’s up Nigger?’ and ‘Hurry up Nigger.’”).) Plaintiff

told his manager “several times” that “he did not want to be called a ‘Nigger’” but “Luis
continued to call Plaintiff a ‘Nigger.’” (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff and other African American
employees “were given the hardest routes” and plaintiff “was given a car without air
conditioning.” (Id. ¶ 45.) “When Plaintiff complained about this to Manager Luis, nothing was
done.” (Id. ¶ 46.) These allegations sufficiently show that plaintiff was treated less well due to
his race. See, e.g., La Grande v. DeCrescente Distrib. Co., 370 F. App’x 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“[P]erhaps no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive working environment than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as [the N-
word] by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates.”); Philip v. Gtech Corp., No. 14 CV
9261, 2016 WL 3959729, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2016) (concluding that “an African-
American plaintiff’s personal observation of his supervisor using the [N-word]—combined with
other, secondhand evidence of racial bias—” is sufficient to survive summary judgment under
the NYCHRL).

B. Damages
According to the damages chart attached to plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration,
plaintiff seeks $50,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages under the
NYSHRL and NYCHRL. (Lee Decl. ¶ 31, Ex. D; see also Mem. at 14 (stating only that
“[p]laintiff invokes his statutory right to payment of these compensatory and punitive damages in
full”).)
i. Compensatory Damages
“Victims of employment discrimination are entitled to reasonable damages that
would make the plaintiff whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination.” Rodriguez v. Express World Wide, LLC, No. 12 CV 4572, 2014 WL 1347369,

at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 1350350
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014). However, as stated above, a party’s default is not considered an
admission of damages. Greyhound, 973 F.2d at 158. Once a party’s default as to liability is
established, a plaintiff still must prove damages. Gutman v. Klein, No. 03 CV 1570, 2010 WL
4975593, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2010) (“While a default judgment constitutes an admission of
liability, the quantum of damages remains to be established by proof unless the amount is
liquidated or susceptible of mathematical computation.” (citing Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702,
707 (2d Cir. 1974))). Plaintiff tells the court nothing about how he calculated his requested
compensatory damages of $50,000. Plaintiff’s declaration makes no mention of suffering any
loss of employment, loss of income, loss of employment benefits, emotional distress,
embarrassment, or reputational damage as a direct and proximate result of defendants’ acts. The
New York City Human Rights Commission has deemed awards of $1,000 to be sufficient in
cases where complainants did not establish any particular damage “other than what a decent and

reasonable individual would suffer when faced with such ignorant behavior.” Okoumou v. Cnty.
Recovery Corp., OATH No. 09-445, 2009 WL 6910263, at *2 (N.Y.C. Comm. Hum. Rts. June
1, 2009); see also Shalto v. Bay of Bengal Kabob Corp., No. 12 CV 920, 2013 WL 867429, at
*10 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2013) (awarding compensatory damages of $1,000 where plaintiff failed
to explain “how he reache[d] the figure of $25,000 in compensatory damages”), report and
recommendation adopted in relevant part, 2013 WL 867420 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013).
Accordingly, plaintiff is awarded compensatory damages of $1,000.
ii. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are available under the NYCHRL only. See N.Y.C. Admin.
Code § 8-502 (sanctioning punitive damages for “unlawful discriminatory practices”); Farias v.

Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It is undisputed that the New York
State Human Rights Law does not provide for punitive damages.” (citations omitted)).
Under the NYCHRL, punitive damages are available if defendants have
discriminated with “willful or wanton negligence,” recklessness, or a “conscious disregard of the
rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard.” Chauca v. Abraham, 885
F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Chauca v. Abraham, 89 N.E.3d 475, 481 (N.Y. 2017)).
This standard “represent[s] the lowest threshold, and the least stringent form, for the state of
mind required to impose punitive damages.” Casmento v. Volmar Constr., Inc., No. 20 CV 944,
2022 WL 15773966, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2022)). However, “the New York Court of
Appeals has expressly rejected the idea that ‘a punitive damages charge is automatic on a finding
of liability’ under the NYCHRL, instead ‘requiring an appropriate showing of heightened
culpability for [an award of] punitive damages.’” Edelman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 141
F.4th 28, 43 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Chauca, 89 N.E.3d at 481). “Such conduct requires a high

degree of moral culpability.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Awards of punitive damages are by nature speculative, arbitrary
approximations.” Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2013). “No objective standard exists
that justifies the award of one amount, as opposed to another, to punish a tortfeasor appropriately
for his misconduct.” Id. Nevertheless, “[t]he Supreme Court has delineated several factors for
courts to consider in assessing the reasonableness of punitive damages, including: ‘(1) the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the difference between the actual or potential
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between
the punitive damages awarded and the civil penalties imposed in comparable cases.’” Tenecora
v. Ba-kal Rest. Corp., No. 18 CV 7311, 2020 WL 8771256, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020)

(quoting Antoine v. Brooklyn Maids 26, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 3d 68, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)), report
and recommendation adopted in part, 2021 WL 424364 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2021). “In addition,
no matter how egregious the underlying conduct, the court is required to consider the defendant’s
financial circumstances in determining an award of punitive damages.” Antoine, 489 F. Supp.
3d at 101.
Defendants’ conduct meets the standard for punitive damages under the
NYCHRL. Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected constantly, on a daily basis, to racial slurs by
his manager and defendants’ employee. (See Compl. ¶ 43.) Despite plaintiff’s repeated
complaints and protestations, defendants took no action to address or remedy their employee’s
conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 46.) “Because [d]efendant[s] ha[ve] not shown that [they] made good-faith
efforts to prevent discrimination in the workplace, an award of punitive damages is appropriate.”
Bethel v. Royal Leaf NY LLC, No. 24 CV 9073, 2025 WL 3216640, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9,
2025) (punitive damages appropriate where defaulting defendants “failed to take any action to

address or remedy” gender- and race-based harassment of plaintiff-employee in the workplace),
report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3216413 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2025); see also
Bloise v. Q4 Generational Wealth, Inc., 22 CV 10488, 2025 WL 4685566, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
30, 2025) (punitive damages warranted where “[p]laintiff allege[d] repeated instances on almost
a daily basis of [defendant’s] employees . . . using racial slurs directed towards her”), report and
recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 880241 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026).
With respect to the quantum of punitive damages, the court finds plaintiff’s
request of $50,000 to be excessive. “Under New York law, whether to award punitive damages
and how much to award are ‘primarily questions which reside in the sound discretion of the
original trier of the facts,’ . . . subject to constitutional limits.” Kargar v. Kamolov, No. 22 CV

664, 2025 WL 4063721, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2025) (quoting Greenbaum v.
Handelsbanken, 67 F. Supp. 2d 228, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Sotomayor, C.J., sitting by
designation)), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 149786 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2026).
“Courts in this Circuit routinely award punitive damages in an amount equal to or less than an
award of compensatory damages.” Bloise, 2025 WL 4685566, at *10 (first citing Pizarro v.
Quezada, No. 24 CV 2422, 2025 WL 2865251, at *4 (2d Cir. Oct. 9, 2025) (“[C]ourts in this
circuit have often awarded punitive damages in an amount equal to, or less than, an award of
compensatory damages . . . .”); then citing Duarte v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 3d 306,
333 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding punitive damages award equal to compensatory damages award
appropriate)). Having considered all the relevant factors, the court finds punitive damages of
$1,000 to be appropriate. Additionally, the court notes that, by defaulting, defendants have
surrendered the opportunity to demonstrate that their financial circumstances should constrain
the amount of any such award. See Antoine, 489 F. Supp. 3d at 102. Accordingly, plaintiff is

awarded punitive damages of $1,000.
IV. Attorney’s Fees
As the prevailing party, plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs under the FLSA and NYLL. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), N.Y. Lab. L. §§ 198, 663(1).
Attorney’s fees are also available under the NYCHRL. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–502(f).
Courts in this Circuit exercise their discretion to determine the reasonableness of
attorney’s fees using the “presumptively reasonable fee” standard. Arbor Hill Concerned
Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2008). The
presumptively reasonable fee, also known as the lodestar, is “the product of a reasonable hourly
rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co.,

658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011). The calculation of a reasonable fee is within the district
court’s discretion. Id. The burden is on the party seeking the fee award to prove that the
requested fees and hours are reasonable. See Scott v. City of New York, 643 F.3d 56, 58-59 (2d
Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
The court first assesses whether plaintiff’s counsel requests a reasonable hourly
rate. Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994). A reasonable hourly rate is
“the rate a paying client would be willing to pay . . . bear[ing] in mind that a reasonable, paying
client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Arbor Hill, 522
F.3d at 190. “[C]ourts assess the reasonableness of hourly rates by comparing the rates
requested with the prevailing rates charged by attorneys practicing in the district where the court
sits.” Abularach v. High Wing Aviation LLC, No. 22 CV 1266, 2025 WL 405986, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2025); see also Dacas v. Duhaney, No. 17 CV 3568, 2020 WL 4587343, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020) (“This rate should be based on rates prevailing in the community for

similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.”).
“Courts in the Eastern District have recently awarded hourly rates ranging from $300 to $450 for
partners, $200 to $325 for senior associates, $100 to $200 for junior associates, and $70 to $100
for legal support staff in FLSA cases.” Ortega v. Champagne Room BK, Inc, No. 21 CV 1125,
2026 WL 2018473, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2026) (quoting Yunganaula v. D.P. Grp. Gen.
Contractors/Devs. Inc., No. 21 CV 2015, 2023 WL 2707024, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2023));
see also Quispe v. Stone & Tile Inc., 583 F. Supp. 3d 372, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (“In this district,
law firm partners in FLSA cases generally receive between $300 and $450 per hour.”).
Counsel’s hourly rates far exceed those ordinarily charged in this district for
similar matters. In this case, plaintiff’s counsel C.K. Lee seeks an hourly rate of $1,600 for his

own work. (Lee Decl., Ex. E at 1.) He also seeks hourly rates of $900 for eighth-year associate
Rony Guldmann, $800 for seventh-year associate James Jackson, $450 for law clerks Lucie Ma
and Ashlesha Vaidya, and $325 for paralegals Ulysses Kim and Shane Leible. (Id.) These rates
are unreasonably high. See, e.g., Garcia v. 120 MP, LLC, No. 18 CV 6408, 2020 WL 2319126,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2020) (approving hourly rates of $350 for Mr. Lee, $300 for associates,
and $200 for paralegals); Hristova v. 3321 Astoria, Inc., No. 17 CV 1633, 2018 WL 11697234,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018) (approving hourly rates of $375 for Mr. Lee, $200 for associates,
and $100 for paralegal); Alvarez v. 894 Pizza Corp., No. 14 CV 6011, 2016 WL 4536574, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4540817 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 30, 2016) (approving hourly rates of $400 for Mr. Lee and $80 for paralegals). Therefore, I
will reduce the hourly rates as follows: $400 for Mr. Lee, $300 for Rony Guldmann and James
Jackson, $200 for Lucie Ma and Ashlesha Vaidya, and $100 for Ulysses Kim and Shane Leibl.
The court next looks to the reasonableness of the number of hours billed. “Courts

examine the contemporaneous time records to exclude what appears to be excessive or
unnecessary hours and with a view to the value of the work product of the specific expenditures
to the client’s case.” Morales v. Los Cafetales Rest. Corp., No. 21 CV 1868, 2023 WL 7684775,
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8021460 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2023). The submitted billing
records show that each attorney, law clerk, or paralegal spent the following amount of time on
this case: C.K. Lee, 1.5 hours; Rony Guldmann, 20.4 hours; James Jackson, 15.2 hours; Lucie
Ma, 54.5 hours; Ashlesha Vaidya, 26.9 hours; Ulysses Kim, 1 hour; and Shane Leible, 4.6 hours.
(Lee Decl., Ex. E.) Having reviewed the records, I find 124.1 hours to be excessive for this
relatively straightforward employment action, notwithstanding defendants’ lack of cooperation

with discovery. “In lieu of making minute adjustments to individual timekeeping entries, a court
may make across-the-board percentage cuts in the number of hours claimed, as a practical means
of trimming the fat from a fee application.” Garcia v. 120 MP, LLC, No. 18 CV 6408, 2020 WL
2319126, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2020). The court therefore reduces the total hours billed by
plaintiff’s counsel by twenty percent. Based on the foregoing adjustments, the court awards
plaintiff $22,496 in attorney’s fees, calculated as follows:
Timekeeper Adjusted Hourly Rate Hours Billed Total Fees
C.K. Lee $400 1.5 $600
Rony Guldmann $300 20.4 $6,120
James Jackson $300 15.2 $4,560
Lucie Ma $200 54.5 $10,900
Ashlesha Vaidya $200 26.9 $5,380
Ulysses Kim $100 1 $100
Shane Leibl $100 4.6 $460
Sum Total $28,120
Less 20% Across-the-
Board Reduction $22,496
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's motion for default judgment is granted
in part and denied in part. Plaintiff's WTPA claims are dismissed without prejudice for lack of
standing. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment, jointly and severally, against
defendants Pop A Lock New York Inc., Automotive Locksmith Supply Inc., All City Services &
Dispatch Inc., Carl Napolitano, Nicholas Napolitano, and Jennifer Cannizzaro. The Court
awards plaintiff $2,220 in unpaid overtime wages, $2,220 in liquidated damages, $1,000 in
compensatory damages, $1,000 in punitive damages, and $22,496 in attorney’s fees, for a total of
$28,936. Plaintiff is additionally awarded post-judgment interest, to be calculated from the date
the Clerk of the Court enters judgment in this action until the date of payment, using the federal
rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Plaintiff is directed to serve a copy of this Order and the
forthcoming Judgment on defendants by regular mail at their last known addresses and note such
service on the docket.
SO ORDERED.

ROBERT M. LEVY
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
August 10, 2026
25

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11416436. Public record. Not legal advice.