# Gilliam

> District Court, S.D. Texas · July 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11415963

## Case

- **Full name:** Jayce Gilliam v. Seth Nagel, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** July 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 31, 2026
HOUSTON DIVISION
JAYCE GILLIAM, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § Civil Action No. H-25-6327
§
. SETH NAGEL, et. al., §
§
Defendants. §
§
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Original Complaint (Document No. 11). Having considered the motion,
submissions, and applicable law, the Court determines that the motion should be
granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a matter involving alleged Constitutional violations. On July 13,.2024,
Plaintiff Jayce Gilliam (“Plaintiff’) was on a walk while open carrying arifleona_ □
sling and concealed carrying a handgun. After receiving multiple 911 calls,
Defendants Deputy Seth Nagel and Sergeant Ron Naumann (collectively “Individual
Defendants”) arrived on scene. Ultimately, Plaintiff was arrested for violating Tex.
Penal Code 42.01(a)(8), disorderly conduct. Plaintiff spent a total of thirteen hours
in jail. □

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, pursuant to federal
question jurisdiction, bringing several § 1983 claims against the Individual
Defendants and several § 1983 claims against Defendant Fayette County (the
“County”) under a Monell liability theory. On March 30, 2026, the Individual
Defendants and the County (collectively “Defendants”) moved jointly to dismiss
Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’ On
April 7, 2026, Plaintiff responded in opposition.”
Tl. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces
does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands more than . . . ‘labels
and conclusions.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[t]he

! See Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Complaint,
Document No. 11 at 1.
2 See Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
Document No. 13 at 1. .

>

‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (Sth Cir.
2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464,
467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive the motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
“Conversely, ‘when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . .. be exposed at the point
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Cuvillier

v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (Sth Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).
I. LAW & ANALYSIS
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims, contending that each fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In response, Plaintiff contends that
his claims against both the Individual Defendants and the County are sufficiently
pled. The Court will consider, in turn, Defendants’ motion as it relates to the
Individual Defendants and the County.
A. Individual Defendants
The Individual Defendants contend, in relevant part, that they “are entitled to
qualified immunity for all of Plaintiff Gilliam’s claims.” In response, Plaintiff

3 Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, Document
No. 11 at 11.

contends that “Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because their
actions violated clearly established law and were unreasonable, objectively, or even
subjectively unreasonable.”
When government officials are sued for a Constitutional violation under
Section 1983, they may assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Porter

v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 612 (Sth Cir. 2004). “Qualified
immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from
[civil] liability ‘unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Glenn v.
City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (Sth Cir. 2001) (quoting Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d
274, 276 (Sth Cir. 1995)). The defense of qualified immunity provides ample room
for mistaken judgments on the government actors’ part and protects “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Estate of Davis ex rel.
McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 380 (Sth Cir. 2005) (quoting
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Qualified immunity is “immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237
(2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

4 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Document
No. 13 at 5.

Once qualified immunity is asserted, therefore, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate the defense does not apply. See McClendon v. City of
Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002). This burden requires the plaintiff to
allege sufficient facts showing that: (1) the defendants violated a clearly established
constitutional right; and (2) the defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable
under the circumstances. Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 537 (5th Cir. 2004).
This inquiry also requires a court to “ask whether the law so clearly and
unambiguously prohibited his conduct that every reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates the law.” Morgan v. Swanson, 696 F.3d
359, 370 (Sth Cir. 2011). “In other words, existing precedent must have placed the

statutory or constitutional question confronted by the official beyond debate.”
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
Here, the Individual Defendants have asserted qualified immunity.°
Accordingly, it is now the plaintiff's burden to establish that the Individual
Defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable and violated a clearly established
constitutional right. See Collins, 382 F.3d at 537. Plaintiff contends that the

> Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Complaint, Document
No. 11 at 11.

Individual Defendants violated his Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.°
As such, Plaintiff contends that the following clearly established rights were
violated: (1)”[t]he right to carry firearms openly in Texas was clearly established[;]”
(2)“[t]he right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly
established[;] and (3)“[t]he right to be free from excessive force was clearly
established[.]”” Having reviewed the facts in this matter, the Court finds that it need

not address whether or not a clearly established right was violated because Plaintiff
has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that the Individual Defendants’ actions

were objectively unreasonable.
Outside of the conclusory allegations about “what reasonable officer[s] would
have known”, Plaintiff's only argument directly relating to reasonableness is that
“Tw]hen Defendants arrived on scene, the La Grange Police Chief was already on

scene and did not have his gun drawn. Was the chief unreasonable, or were the much

younger Defendants? If an experienced law man like the police chief felt it was
unreasonable . . . how is it reasonable for Defendants?” The Court rejects this
argument and finds that one officer’s subjective belief that drawing his weapon was

6 See Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendants ” Motion to Dismiss,
Document No. 13 at 18.
7 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Document
No. 13 at 18.
8 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Document
No. 13 at 15-16, 19.

unnecessary does not establish that the other two officers’ decisions to draw their

weapons were objectively unreasonable.’ Furthermore, the Court notes the facts in
this matter, including that several 911 calls had been made about a man with a rifle
and that Plaintiff was, at the time the Individual Defendants arrived on scene,
suspected of violating Texas Penal Code § 42.01(a)(8).!°
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly
allege that the Individual Defendants’ actions, throughout any portion of the
interaction with Plaintiff, were objectively unreasonable in light of the relevant facts
and applicable law.!! Considering this finding, and the Fifth Circuit’s clear guidance
requiring a Plaintiff to show objectively unreasonable actions to overcome qualified
immunity, the Court finds that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity and that the motion to dismiss, with respect to the Individual Defendants,

° The Court notes that it has inquired as to “whether the law so clearly and
unambiguously prohibited his conduct that every reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates the law.” Morgan v. Swanson, 696 F.3d 359, 370 (Sth Cir. 2011).
Based on the clear guidance of the Fifth Circuit in Morgan, the Court finds that one
officer’s actions are insufficient to establish objective unreasonableness.
10 See Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Complaint,
Document No. 11, Exhibit 3 (/st 91] Call), Exhibit 4 (2nd 911 Call); see also Tex. Penal
Code § 42.01(a)(8) (Making it an offence to intentionally or knowingly “display[] a firearm
or other deadly weapon in a public place in a manner calculated to alarm.”).
!! The Court further notes that, to the extent Plaintiff brings claims connected to his
arrest, neither of the Individual Defendants in this matter were the arresting officers.

should be granted. The Court will now consider the pending motion to dismiss as it
relates to the County.

B. The County Defendant
The County moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Monell liability claim, contending
that it has not been plausibly pled.'? In response, Plaintiff contends that he has
sufficiently pled a Monell liability claim for failure to train and failure to supervise.!?
Generally, to successfully bring a Monell liability claim for failure to train or
supervise “[a] plaintiff must show that (1) the municipality’s training policy or
procedure was inadequate; (2) the inadequate training policy was a ‘moving force’
in causing violation of the plaintiffs rights; and (3) the municipality was deliberately
indifferent in adopting its training policy. Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536,
544 (Sth Cir. 2010); Goodman v. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 395 (Sth Cir.2009)
(applying the same test to claims for the failure to supervise). “To establish
deliberate indifference, ‘a plaintiff usually must demonstrate a pattern of violations
and that the inadequacy of the training is obvious and obviously likely to result in a

12 Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Original Complaint,
Document No. 11 at 17.
\3 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Document
No. 13 at 19-21.

constitutional violation.”” Goodman, 571 F.3d at 395 (citing Cousins v. Small, 325
F.3d 627, 637 (5th Cir. 2003).
Here, the County contends, in relevant part, that Plaintiff has failed to plead a

pattern of violations, and thus, failed to adequately plead a Monell claim for failure
to supervise or failure to train.'4 In response, Plaintiff contends that “[w]hile
Defendants argue that Plaintiff must allege a pattern of similar violations, this
requirement is not absolute at the pleading stage when other facts support deliberate
indifference.”'!> The Court notes that Plaintiff cites no authority to support this
contention. In contrast, the Court notes that the Fifth Circuit does require a showing
of prior incidents. See Munajj v. City of Fredericksburg, No. 25-50353, 2026 WL
897005 at *4 (Sth Cir. Apr. 1, 2026) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of
plaintiffs case when plaintiff failed to “‘cite sufficiently numerous prior
incidents[.]’” (citing Verastique v. City of Dallas, 106 F.4th 427, 452 (Sth Cir.
2024))). Based on the foregoing, and the clear guidance of the Fifth Circuit that a
plaintiff must identify sufficient prior incidents, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to identify any prior incidents sufficiently similar to the current matter, and
thus, finds that the County’s motion should be granted as to Plaintiff's Monell claim.

4 See Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Complaint,
Document No. 11 at 20.
15 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Document
No. 13 at 21. .

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original
Complaint (Document No. 11) is GRANTED. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants are hereby
DISMISSED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this BO day of July, 2026.

United States District Judge

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11415963. Public record. Not legal advice.