# GROHS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · July 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11415869

## Case

- **Full name:** Steven Grohs, et al. v. Crystal Raupp, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

STEVEN GROHS, et al.,
Case No. 25–cv–00637–ESK–EAP
Plaintiffs,

v.
OPINION
CRYSTAL RAUPP, et al.,
Defendants.
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
Pro se plaintiffs Steven Grohs and Joseph Walls challenge the
constitutionality of their conditions of confinement under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment. They bring this action against New Jersey
Department of Corrections (NJDOC) officials Crystal Raupp and P. McGill1 in
their individual capacities. While defendants seek dismissal of this action for
failure to state a claim and qualified immunity (Motion to Dismiss) (ECF No. 14),
plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to compel defendants to repair certain conditions
of their confinement (Motion for Preliminary Injunction) (ECF No. 23 (Prelim.
Inj. Mot.)). Because plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that defendants
deliberately denied them adequate access to hot showers, laundry services, and
air conditioning, the Motion to Dismiss is granted, and the amended complaint is
dismissed without prejudice. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied as
moot.

1 Defendants refer to McGill as Nah. They indicate that Nah is formally known
as McGill. (ECF No. 14–1 p. 1; ECF No. 18 p. 1.)
I. BACKGROUND
On January 21, 2025, plaintiffs commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. (ECF No. 1.) I granted
their applications to proceed in forma pauperis and permitted most of the claims
asserted in their initial complaint to proceed past screening. (ECF Nos. 3, 5.)
On October 16, 2025, defendants sought to dismiss the initial complaint, but
their motion was administratively terminated. (ECF Nos. 11, 14.) On
October 24, 2025, plaintiffs filed the amended complaint. (See generally ECF
No. 12 (Am. Compl.).)
The amended complaint asserts that plaintiffs are civilly committed
residents at the Special Treatment Unit (STU) in Avenel, New Jersey. (Id.
¶¶ 3–5.) They reside in the West Housing Unit of the STU’s Main building.
(Id. ¶¶ 12, 74.) Grohs, who was admitted to the STU in 2011,2 suffers from a
shattered vertebra, tennis elbow, arthritic toe and methicillin-resistant
staphylocuccus aureus. (Id. ¶¶ 51–55.) Walls, who was admitted to the STU
in 2005, suffers from arthritic knees, asthma and high blood pressure. (Id.
¶¶ 63, 64.)
Plaintiffs’ grievances against defendants fall into three categories. First,
they allege that the showers in their housing unit sometimes produce cold
water. (Id. ¶¶ 33–72.) The push-button controls in the showers do not allow
residents to adjust the unpredictable water temperature. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 43.)
Despite defendants responding to plaintiffs’ grievances that the hot water has
been repaired, the issue is ongoing. (Id. ¶¶ 56–61, 65–72.)
Next, plaintiffs assert that their laundry facility violates state
requirements and do not consistently provide clean and dry clothes. (Id.

2 Grohs is a repeat filer who has commenced several lawsuits against the DOC
and various state officials in this District.
¶¶ 73–103.) Grohs alleges that his clothes were returned damp on January 4
and January 7, 2025, and that a lockdown caused his clothing to remain
unwashed for several days. (Id. ¶¶ 93, 95, 96.) Walls alleges that over a six-
month period, he repeatedly lacked clean kitchen-work clothing. (Id. ¶ 102.)
Although the North and West Housing Units share a laundry facility, and only
one of the three dryers available to 81 residents is operational, the North
Housing Unit residents do not experience any of these hardship. (Id. ¶¶ 75,
78.) Defendants are aware of these issues but have not taken any remedial
action. (Id. ¶ 75.) Instead, several new dryers were installed in different
housing units. (Id. ¶ 85.) Because residents can keep only two plastic
hangers and eight days’ worth of clothing in their rooms, plaintiffs claim they
“have no definitive way to dry their wet clothing” or “to maintain a reasonable
degree of hygiene.” (Id. ¶¶ 27, 76, 82, 86.)
Lastly, plaintiffs take issue with defendants not repairing the air
conditioning during the summer of 2025. (Id. ¶¶ 104–131.) Grohs alleges
that in June 2025, his room reached 84 degrees Fahrenheit for 21 days. (Id.
¶ 124.) Walls similarly alleges that his room reached 83 degrees Fahrenheit
for 16 days. (Id. ¶ 128.) Both allege sleep disruption, lethargy, and impaired
participation in treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 126, 127.) The extreme heat and high
humidity has caused black mold to grow in a number of rooms, slippery floors
and stairs railings, water dripping from walls, and foggy windows. (Id. ¶¶ 118,
119.)
II. MOTION TO DISMISS
Although the Court preliminary reviewed plaintiffs’ claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (ECF No. 5), that analysis did not determine whether their
allegations would survive a properly supported motion to dismiss filed by a
defendant after service. See Richardson v. Cascade Skating Rink, No. 19–
08935, 2020 WL 7383188, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2020) (“[T]his Court recognizes
[a] § 1915(e) screening determination is a preliminary and interlocutory
holding, subject to revision at any time prior to entry of final judgment.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(6), when deciding
a motion to dismiss, a court accepts all well-pled facts as true, construes the
complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, and determines “whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Under [Rule] 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a
‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, the plaintiff’s claims must be facially
plausible, meaning that the well-pled facts “allow[ ] the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 678. The allegations must be “more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider
only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record,
as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are
based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir.
2010).
A plaintiff’s pleading obligation is to set forth “a short and plain statement
of the claim,” which “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (second alteration
in original). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must “take
note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, it should
identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, when there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Connelly v. Lane
Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “[A] complaint’s
allegations of historical fact continue to enjoy a highly favorable standard of
review at the motion-to-dismiss stage of proceedings.” Id. at 790.
A. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiffs argue that their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional rights have been violated by the STU’s conditions. Eighth
Amendment claims challenge cruel and unusual prison conditions. Grohs v.
Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 283 (D.N.J. 2013). “In such … cases, ‘a prison
official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an
inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’” Id. (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). “Thus the mental element is a
subjective one: deliberate indifference.” Id. “And a deprivation that is
sufficiently ‘serious’ is a denial of a ‘minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). “That generally implies
that prison officials must provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care, and must institute reasonable safety-measures.” Id. “To fall short of
that standard is to exceed the proper bounds of punishment.” Id.
Plaintiffs are not prison inmates. Rather, they are confined pursuant to
a civil order of commitment. “Certainly, it is true as a general matter that
persons involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment
and better conditions of confinement than are persons who are being criminally
punished.” Id. “[T]he state has no less of a duty to provide civilly committed
persons with adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and safety
measures.” Id. “[B]ecause civil commitment is not punishment, the
hardships of civil confinement cannot be punitive; they must “bear some
reasonable relation to the [nonpunitive] purpose for which persons are
committed.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250,
265 (2001)). “When analyzing conditions of civil commitment, some judges in
this District have continued to rely on Eighth Amendment “deliberate
indifference” standards, either alone, by analogy, or in combination with other
factors.” Id. at 284. But other judges find that “it is the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Eighth, that is most applicable.” Grohs v. Santiago, No.
13–03877, 2014 WL 4657116, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2014).
“In certain contexts … case law has analyzed conditions of confinement …
under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Yatauro, 984
F. Supp. 2d at 283. “That analysis requires a court to weigh an individual’s
liberty interests against the relevant interests of the state” under the “standard
of reasonable ‘professional judgment.’” Id. In other words, “[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment requires that committed persons not be subjected to conditions
that amount to punishment, or exceed the proper bounds of professional
discretion.” Santiago, 2014 WL 4657116, at *3. The “‘professional judgment’
standard applies to ‘professional decisionmakers,’ defined as ‘person[s]
competent, whether by education, training or experience, to make the
particular decision at issue.’” Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 283 (alteration in
original) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.30 (1982)); see Shaw
by Strain v. Stackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1147 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying to a claim
that personnel of a state mental institution had failed to protect a patient from
assault the professional judgment standard analysis to the institution’s
superintendent, program coordinator, unit manager, resident supervisor, and
recreation director but the deliberate indifference standard to residential
service aids and nonprofessionals who lacked decision-making authority).
“A central issue, then, is whether the conditions of confinement cross the
line that separates institutional administration from punishment.” Santiago,
2014 WL 4657116, at *4. “A court must decide whether the disability is
imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some
other legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 538–39 (1979)). “Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on
the part of the detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn
on whether [it has] an alternative purpose … and whether it appears excessive
in relation to that purpose.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S.
at 538–39.) “Thus, if a particular condition or restriction … is reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more,
amount to ‘punishment.’” Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39).
“Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court may permissibly infer that the
purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not be
constitutionally inflicted upon [civilly committed inmates].” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39. In other words, the plaintiff must
“show that the defendants acted in a manner evincing ‘a reckless disregard of a
known risk of harm.’” Carson v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., No. 16–05163, 2019
WL 2137364, at *4 (D.N.J. May 16, 2019) (quoting Stokes v. Lanigan, No. 12–
01478, 2012 WL 4662487, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2012)). “This requires a
showing of more than mere negligence.” Id.
1. Hot Water
“The adequacy, or not, of hot water has not given rise to a specialized
jurisprudence with respect to civilly committed persons.” Yatauro, 984 F.
Supp. 2d at 287 (“[T]here is little or no case law on claims on inadequate hot
water” in the civil commitment context and “Eighth Amendment criminal cases
must be applied with care in this context.”). “There is some surface plausibility
that … hot water bears no relation to the legitimate purpose of confining the
residents at” the STU. Id. at 285–86 (“The New Jersey Sexually Violent
Predator’s Act, under which [plaintiffs] are detained, has two fundamental
purposes: to protect the public from dangerous predators and to treat sex
offenders who are, by definition, suffering from a mental abnormality.”) Id.
Yet “[t]here is also some authority for considering adequate hot water as a
reasonable condition of confinement.” Id. “That is particularly true when
inadequate hot water is combined with other factors affecting health and
safety.” Id. “Certainly a complete failure to take steps to prevent a plaintiff
with a medical condition from being daily doused with cold water would
plausibly give rise to such a claim.” Id. at 288.
Here, plaintiffs argue that “one cannot get any reasonable length of time
of hot water” when showering in their housing unit. (Am. Compl. ¶ 43.)
While Grohs alleges that cold showers have contributed to him “suffering from
reoccurring and debilitating back, shoulder, and foot pain, … difficulty walking
correctly, and … severe pain when attempting to sleep” (id. ¶ 62), Walls does
not assert how cold showers have affected him (see id. ¶¶ 63–72). Plaintiffs
submitted several grievances about the hot water issue, noting that only a
limited number of showers are useable. (Id. ¶ 36.) Defendants responded to
these grievances, advising plaintiffs that maintenance either repaired the issue
or were in the process of doing so. (Id. ¶¶ 57–60; 65–72). The amended
complaint does not specify whether this issue is ongoing. (See generally Am.
Compl.) But, the fact that defendants were responsive to plaintiffs’ grievances
and took measures to correct the issue demonstrates that defendants neither
departed from acceptable professional judgment standards nor acted
deliberately indifferent to the situation. See Brooks v. Camden Cnty. Jail, No.
17–00975, 2018 WL 747374, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2018). Since “the mere fact
that the water in a jail cell was cold on isolated occasions during a discrete
period of time, without more, is not sufficient to rise to the level of a
constitutional violation,” I find that plaintiffs fail to state an Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment claims for lack of hot water. Id.
2. Laundry Services
Absent proof that inadequate laundry services were provided to inmates
specifically to punish them, laundry services are not considered a basic
constitutional right. Carson, 2019 WL 2137364, at *4; Liles v. Camden Cnty.
Dep’t of Corr., 225 F. Supp. 2d 450, 461 (D.N.J. 2002). Particularly when
alternative laundry options, such as hand washing and air drying, are available
and “no disease or injury, nor any mental illness as a result of the laundry
conditions” is asserted, courts will not find isolated or short-lived laundry
disruptions to rise to a requite hardship level. Carson, 2019 WL 2137364, *4.
The amended complaint does not state how or in what fashion defendants
were or became responsible for the laundry in the unit. See Davis v. Yates, No.
15–06943, 2016 WL 5508809, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2016) (finding that the
allegation that the defendants were aware of issues were too general to hold
defendants personally liable). Nor are there allegations of how defendants
personally promulgated or implemented a policy or practice denying plaintiffs
and other residents laundry services. See id. Although Grohs alleges that his
medical condition prevents him from hand-washing his clothing, he identifies
no resulting injury rising to the level of a constitutional violation. (Id. ¶¶ 97–
99.) Beyond Walls asserting that he was forced to wear dirty clothes to his
kitchen shift, he asserts that he “experienced the same or similar laundry
services as described and as suffered by … Grohs.” (Id. ¶ 103.) These
allegations do not sufficiently describe whether defendants imposed such
conditions to punish plaintiffs or to cause them any sufficiently serious harm.
To the extent plaintiffs take issue with new dryers being installed in other
housing units, “it is not for the Court to question the wisdom of the” STU as to
why they replaced the laundry machines in one section but not the other. See
Carson, 2019 WL 2137364, at *4 (noting that the DOC and its employees have
“a valid, legitimate government interest in operating the STU and its laundry
facilities in a reasonable and economical fashion”). While damp or dirty
clothing may cause discomfort, “the Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable
prisons’” or places of confinement. Liles, 225 F.Supp.2d at 461. Because
alternative means of laundering or drying clothing remain available, plaintiffs
allege no requisite hardship that amount to a constitutional deprivation.
3. Air Conditioning
When conditions of extreme heat contribute to unsanitary conditions
harming a plaintiff’s health and safety, courts may find that a plaintiff
sufficiently pleaded a constitutional violation claim. Grohs v. Lanigan, No.
16–07083, 2019 WL 1500621, at *11 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2019). But the
Constitution does not confer a categorical right to air conditioning. See id.
Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether heat, considering its intensity, duration,
ventilation, available mitigation, and effects on health, creates an objectively
serious risk and whether officials impose or disregard that risk in a
constitutionally culpable manner. See Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,
1294–98 (11th Cir. 2004).
I recognize that discomfort, lethargy, and sleep disruption caused by
summer heat may be unpleasant. But plaintiffs have not pleaded facts
showing either an objectively severe condition or a subjectively culpable state
of mind. Alleging that defendants are aware of this issue merely indicate
awareness of a maintenance problem. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 117.) Plaintiffs do
not specify whether defendants received a complaint concerning a serious
medical or safety threat related to the heat or that defendants intentionally
refused to take reasonable corrective measures. Furthermore, the amended
complaint does not allege facts about fans, water, showers, out-of-cell time, or
other measures from which it could be plausibly inferred that the conditions,
considered as a whole, were extreme and punitive.
B. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that the amended complaint should be dismissed
because they are protected by qualified immunity. Of note, “the defense of
qualified immunity is available only for damages claims – not for claims
requesting prospective injunctive relief.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455
F.3d 225, 244 (3d Cir. 2006). “Thus, a qualified immunity defense would have
no impact on plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief.” Davis, 2016 WL 5508809,
at *8.
“Qualified immunity protects government officials … from liability for
damages as long as their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231, (2009)). “It does not matter whether the error relates to the law, the facts,
or some mixture of the two.” Id. “As long as an official reasonably believes
that his or her conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield
the official from liability.” Id. “Because qualified immunity is an immunity
from suit, and not just a defense to liability, it is effectively lost if a case
erroneously proceeds to trial.” Id. at 287. Thus, “it is desirable to resolve the
question of qualified immunity as early as possible, ideally at the motion to
dismiss stage.” Id.
“Immunity does not extend to all officers who engage in necessary official
acts.” Id. at 286. “Rather, officers’ individual immunity from suit under
Section 1983 is predicated on ‘a considered inquiry into the immunity
historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests
behind it.’” Id. (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 29 (1991)). “Officials who
seek exemption from personal liability have the burden of showing that such an
exemption is justified by overriding considerations of public policy, and the
Court has recognized a category of ‘qualified’ immunity that avoids
unnecessarily extending the scope of the traditional concept of absolute
immunity.” Id. (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)).
When assessing a government official’s qualified immunity claims, a court
must decide whether (1) “the official’s conduct violated a constitutional or
federal right”; and (2) “the right at issue was “clearly established.” Id. at 287
(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244
(holding that these two prongs may be analyzed in either order). “Whether
conduct violates a constitutional right …. is a matter of applying case law to the
facts alleged.” Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 287. “Whether such a
constitutional violation is ‘clearly established’” is a question of whether it is
“sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.” Id. (quoting Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159
(3d Cir. 2012)). “That is to say, the right the official is alleged to have violated
must have been ‘clearly established’ in a particularized way and the court must
define the right with the appropriate level of specificity.” Id. (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “Even if there is no
precedent directly on point, … an action may still violate a clearly established
right where a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional
law applies with ‘obvious clarity’ to the specific conduct in question.” Id.
As presently pleaded, defendants are protected by qualified immunity.
For the reasons discussed above, the amended complaint does not plausibly
allege that defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right.
III. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION3
“A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary remedy’ that should be
granted only in limited circumstances.” Id. at 288 (quoting Am. Tel. and Tel.
Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426–27 (3d
Cir.1994)). “In ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court must
consider: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at a final
hearing; (2) the extent to which the plaintiff is being irreparably harmed by the
conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which the defendant will suffer
irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) the public
interest.” Id. An injunction should be issued “only if the plaintiff has
produced evidence sufficient to convince the court that all four factors favor the
relief.” Id. at 288–89.
Plaintiffs seek an order requiring defendants to repair and/or replace their
housing unit’s air-conditioning system. (Prelim. Inj. Mot. p. 3.) Plaintiffs
argue that since April 2025, “there has been one problem after another” with
the air-conditioning and that the “temperature of [their] rooms has been
inhumanely excessive.” (Id.) As recent as April 2026, their rooms have
exceeded 80 degrees Fahrenheit. (Id. pp. 4, 14, 18.) One day after Grohs
requested that the STU’s administration service the air-conditioning system, A.
Gangi, an administrator not named in this action, stated that the STU was
aware of what needed to be done. (Id. p. 15.) On April 17, 2026, plaintiffs

3 Although I granted plaintiffs’ request for an extension to file a reply in further
support of the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 28), I have discretion to rule
on a motion without awaiting a reply brief. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.
Roggio, 19-6330, 2024 WL 4800723, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2024). Because the moving
and opposition briefs provide a sufficient basis to resolve the Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction, the order granting plaintiffs’ extension request is vacated.
again complained of the temperature of their rooms, (Id. pp. 15, 18.) On the
same day, Gangi advised them that the air-conditioning will be turned once the
weather is more consistent and the cold season has passed. (Id.) Yet,
plaintiffs assert that the issue persists, and that they have difficulty sleeping,
headaches, a loss of energy, and an inability to participate meaningfully in
therapy. (Id. pp. 16, 19.)
In opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 26),
defendants submit the certification of John Falvey, the NJDOC’s director of
legal services. (ECF No. 26–1). Falvey certifies that the STU’s air
conditioning has been operating since late April 2026. (Id. ¶ 12.) On May 15,
2026, maintenance measured the temperature in plaintiffs’ housing unit and
found temperatures ranging from 69 to 72.5 degrees Fahrenheit, consistent
with temperatures in the STU’s other units. (Id. ¶ 10.)
Since the record reflects that the air-conditioning has since been turned
on, I find that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction to be moot. (Id. ¶¶ 10,
12.) Plaintiffs’ complained-of condition no longer exists. Thus, plaintiffs
cannot show a presently threatened injury, much less one that is imminent and
irreparable. The possibility that the system could malfunction in the future is
insufficient. Should materially different conditions arise, plaintiffs may
pursue relief based on an appropriate evidentiary record. But plaintiffs are
cautioned that absent a showing of deliberate indifference, they will not succeed
on the merits of such a claim. See Lanigan, 2019 WL 1500621, at *11;
Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1294–98.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and
the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. An appropriate order
accompanies this opinion.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: July 27, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11415869. Public record. Not legal advice.