# DIAZ

> District Court, D. New Jersey · July 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11415866

## Case

- **Full name:** Carmen Diaz v. City of Vineland, Vineland Police Department, Kenneth A. Farmer, John Doe I-V and/or XYZ, Corporations, jointly, severally, and in the alternative
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS
CARMEN DIAZ,
Civil Action
Plaintiff, No, 24-283 (&MW-EAP)
v.
CITY OF VINELAND, VINELAND OPINION
POLICE DEPARTMENT, KENNETH A,
FARMER, John Doe I-V and/or XYZ,
Corporations, jointly, severally, and in the
alternative,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
MICHAEL J. MACKLER, ESQ.
GOLDBERG, MACKLER, SAYEGH, MINTZ,
PFEFFER, BONCHI & GILL, PC
1030 ATLANTIC AVENUE
ATLANTIC CITY, NJ 08401
Attorney for Plaintiff

JOSEPH D. CLIFFORD, ESQ.
WILLIAM F. COOK, ESQ.
RYAN KELLY, ESQ.
BROWN & CONNERY
360 HADDON AVENUE
WESTMONT, NJ 08108
Attorneys for Defendants

WILLIAMS, District Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Carmen Diaz (“Plaintiff’) brings this action against Defendants City of Vineland
(the “City”), the Vineland Police Department (“VPD”), and Vineland Police Officer Kenneth
Farmer (“Officer Farmer’) (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting claims arising from Officer
Farmer’s use of force during the officers’ response to a domestic disturbance at Plaintiff's residence
on March 22, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Farmer violated her rights wonder the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as
the New Jersey Constitution and New Jersey common law. Plaintiff further asserts municipal
liability claims against the City and VPD arising from the same incident. (Compl., Dkt, No, 1,)
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
CMS"), (Dkt. No. 54.) Plaintiff opposes the motion (Dkt. No, 55), and Defendants have filed a
reply. (Dkt. No. 58.} The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, including the body-
worn camera recordings, deposition testimony, expert reports, and statements of material facts
submitted pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1, the Court decides
the motion without oral argument.
The central issue presented is whether Officer Farmer violated the Fourth Amendment
when, during an active struggle with an emotionally disturbed person whom he was attempting to
control, he moved Plaintiff away after Plaintiff tried to intervene in the encounter. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court concludes that, viewmg the evidence in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff and considering the encounter in its totality, Officer Farmer’s use of force was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. Even assuming a constitutional violation could be found,
Officer Farmer would nevertheless be entitled to qualified tmmunity because Plaintiff has

identified no clearly established law that would have placed every reasonable officer on notice that
such conduct violated the Fourth Amendment under the circumstances presented here.
For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be
GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
a. The March 22, 2023 Domestic Disturbance
On the evening of March 22, 2023, at approximately 11:17 p.m., Vineland Police Officers
Kenneth Farmer and Heitel Mora were dispatched to 220 West Plum Street in Vineland, New
Jersey, in response to a report of an emotionally disturbed person (“EDP”). According to the
Computer Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) report, the caller reported that an individual at the residence
was arguing with her boyfriend, cutting herself with a knife, and threatening suicide. (Defs.’
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“DSUMP”) ¥ 1, Dkt. No. 54-2; Cook Cert., Ex. D-1,)
When Officers Farmer and Mora arrived, they found the front door standing open.
(DSUME ¥ 2.) After announcing themselves as police officers and receiving no response, they
entered the residence to investigate the reported emergency. Ud. Jf 3-4.) Inside, the officers
observed broken glass scattered across the floor and puncture marks in a bedroom door that they
believed may have been caused by a knife. (/d. § 5.) Consistent with those observations, Officer
Farmer briefly drew his department-issued conducted energy device (“CED”) while assessing
whether an immediate threat existed but reholstered it once he determined no imminent threat was
present in the area immediately before him. Ud. 9 7 (citing Farmer Police Report, Cook Cert., Ex.
D-3).)
The officers first encountered Plaintiff Carmen Diaz, who informed Officer Mora that her
daughter, Eugenia Diaz, suffered from mental health issues and had caused the damage to the

bedroom door. As Officers Farmer and Mora continued toward the rear of the residence to
investigate, they heard movement and voices coming from the kitchen and adjoining bedrooms.
Ud. 7-8.)
b. The Officers’ Response to the Escalating Disturbance
The situation rapidly escalated after the officers entered the rear portion of the residence.
Officer Mora encountered Marcelino Santiago, who was asleep in a bedroom adjoining the kitchen.
After awakening, Santiago—appearing intoxicated—became argumentative and repeatedly
questioned why the officers had entered the residence, requiring Mora to direct his attention toward
Santiago while attempting to explain the officers’ presence. Ud. J 8.)
At approximately the same time, Officer Parmer encountered Eugenia Diaz near the
kitchen. The body-worn camera recordings depict Eugenia emerging from the rear of the residence
screaming at Officer Farmer and refusing his repeated attempts to identtfy himself and determine
whether she needed assistance. As Officer Farmer attempted to calm the situation, Eugenia
continued yelling, repeatedly directed racial slurs toward him, advanced into his personal space,
and intentionally chest-bumped him. (/d. □□ 6-8.)
Following the chest bump, Officer Farmer advised Eugenia that she was being detained
and attempted to take her into custody. By that point, however, Officer Mora remained occupied
with Santiago, who was moving toward the officers while Officer Farmer attempted to control
Eugenia. Mora began assisting Officer Farmer only after first directing Santiago to stay back and
then helped restrain Eugenia as she resisted the officers’ efforts to handcuff her. During the ensuing
struggle, Eugenia pulled away from the officers’ control, continued resisting, and kicked broken
glass across the kitchen floor, ultimately injuring herself in the process. She also kicked Officer
Mora as the officers attempted to secure her in handcuffs. Ud. Meanwhile, Santiago can be

seen approaching Mora and Farmer while they are engaged with Eugenia. It is apparent that before
Plaintiff entered the immediate encounter with Officer Farmer, the circumstances confronting the
responding officers included a reported suicidal EDP believed to have possessed a knife, a
residence containing broken glass and apparent knife damage, an actively resisting and
increasingly combative subject, and a second civilian whose conduct required Officer Mora’s
attention while Officer Parmer attempted to effectuate Eugenia’s arrest. The events that followed—
including Plaintiff’s interaction with Officer Farmer—occurred during that ongoing effort to bring
Eugenia under control.
c. Plaintiff’s Physical Intervention
As Officer Farmer attempted to detain Eugenia, Plaintiff walked from the front portion of
the residence into the kitchen area where the encounter was unfolding. The body-worn camera
recordings depict Plaintiff approaching Officer Farmer while he remained engaged with Eugenia
and standing near both individuals as Officer Farmer continued his efforts to control Eugenia and
place her in handcuffs. (DSUMF {[ 6; Cook Cert., Exs. D-2, D-10.)
The parties disagree about certain aspects of Plaintiff’s conduct during these events.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff physically interfered with Officer Farmer’s attempt to arrest
Eugenia by approaching Officer Farmer from his right side, placing her hands on him, and
attempting to move him away from Eugenia. (DSUMEF 4 7, 11; Farmer Police Report; Cook Cert.,
Ex, D-7, Internal Affairs Investigation Report at 23.) Plamtiff, by contrast, maintains that she did
not pose a threat to Officer Farmer and did not intentionally obstruct the arrest. (PL.’s Response to
DSUME (“RUMP”) §f 7, 11; Garrels Rep. at 29, 40-42, Dkt. No. 55-6.) Regardless of Plaintiff’s
motivation, the body-worn camera recordings depict Plaintiff repeatedly tapping Officer Farmer
while he was simultaneously attempting to restrain Eugenia.

At the same time, Officer Mora was engaged in assisting with Eugenia and monitoring
Santiago, who had left the room he was in and moved toward the kitchen area where the officers,
Bugenia, and Plaintiff were. As Officer Farmer continued attempting to secure Eugenia, he directed
Plaintiff to “Move” while extending his arm toward Plaintiff. The encounter was instantaneous
with the command and appears almost incidental. Officer Farmer, with a single fleeting motion,
physically displaces Plaintiff away from the immediate area of arrest, then Plaintiff fell to the
kitchen floor. The officers then continued their efforts to restrain Eugenia, who remained actively
resistant before she was ultimately placed in handcuffs. (DSUMF 4 6-8; Cook Cert., Exs. D-2, D-
10.)
Following the arrest, emergency medical assistance was requested for Plaintiff. Plaintiff
was never arrested or charged with any offense arising from the incident. Eugenia, by contrast,
was charged with, among other offenses, aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer and
resisting arrest. (DSUMEF 8.)
d. Plaintiff’s Injuries
Plaintiff was transported from the residence to Inspira Medical Center for evaluation and
treatment. Imaging performed shortly after her arrival revealed a subcapital fracture of the right
femoral neck. Plaintiff subsequently underwent surgical repair of the fracture and participated in
both inpatient rehabilitation and outpatient physical therapy. (Anapolle Rep. at 1-2, Dkt. No. 55-
7; Garrels Rep. at 16.)
Plaintiff's orthopedic expert, Dr. David Anapolle, opines that Plaintiff sustained a displaced
fracture of the right hip, together with additional lumbar injuries, and that those injuries were
causally related to the March 22, 2023 incident. (Anapolle Rep. at 3-4.) Defendants do not dispute,
for purposes of the present motion, that Plaintiff suffered significant injuries as a result of her fall.

Rather, the parties’ dispute centers on whether Officer Farmer’s use of force under the
circumstances violated Plaintiff’s constitutional or state-law rights.
e. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action on January 17, 2024, by filing a Complaint against the
City of Vineland, the Vineland Police Department, Officer Kenneth Farmer, and fictitious
defendants, alleging violations of “the Federal Constitution, New Jersey Constitution, and
statutory and common laws of the State of New Jersey” (Count I); a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C,
§§ 1983 and 1988 (Count ID); a Monell! claim (Count II]); and a vicarious liability claim (Count
TV) arising from the events of March 22, 2023, (Compl., Dkt. No. £.)
Following the close of discovery, Defendants City of Vineland, the Vineland Police
Department, and Officer Farmer moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. (Defs.’ MSJ.) In support of their motion, Defendants submitted, among other things,
the body-worn camera recordings from Officers Farmer and Mora, the officers’ police reports,
deposition testimony, the Internal Affairs investigation, and the expert report of Michael J¢. Lynch.
(Dkt. Nos, 54-2 through 54-12.)
Plaintiff opposes the motion, relying on the body-worn camera recordings, deposition
testimony, the expert report of police practices expert James Garrels, and the orthopedic expert
report of Dr. David Anapolle. (P1.’s Opp.; Garrels Rep.; Anapolie Rep.) Defendants thereafter filed
areply in further support of their motion. (Defs.’ Reply.)
The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

1 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc, Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

IW. LEGALSTANDARD
a. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson vy. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The moving party bears the mitial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met
that burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts” and instead “must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. vy. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S,
574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Where,
as here, the record includes video evidence of the events in question, the Court ordinarily views
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. However, the Court need not adopt a
version of events that is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe i.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S, 372, 380 (2007), Instead, when a video recording “quite
clearly contradicts the version of the story told by” the nonmoving party, the Court should view
the facts “in the light depicted by the videotape.” Jd. at 378-81; see also El v. City of Pittsburgh,
975 K.3d 327, 336 (3d Cir, 2020) (applying Scott and relying on body-worn camera footage at
summary judgment).

b. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force
Claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force during an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other seizure are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness
standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 395 (1989). The inquiry is “whether the officers’
actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” /d. at 397, Because “|t}he test of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application,” courts must carefully evaluate “the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”
Id. at 396.
Objective reasonableness is assessed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” /d. 'The analysis “must embody allowance
for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments——in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.” Jd, at 396-97. Accordingly, the Court must consider the totality of the
circumstances confronting the officer at the time force was used. Santini v. F uentes, 795 F.3d 410,
417 (3d Ci. 2015).
In addition to the factors identified in Graham, the Third Circuit has instructed courts to
consider other relevant circumstances, including “the possibility that the persons subject to the
police action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the action
takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and
the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time.” Sharrar v. Felsing,
128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199
(3d Cir. 2007); see also El, 975 F.3d at 336-37 (reaffirming the continued relevance of the Sharrar

factors). No single factor is dispositive; rather, the Court must evaluate the officer’s conduct
considering the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the moment force was
employed. Santini, 795 F.3d at 417; Graham, 490 U.S, at 396 (“Not every push or shove, even if
it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, ... violates the Fourth
Amendment.”).
c. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary
functions “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)), Qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably,” Jd,
In determining whether qualified immunity applies, courts consider two questions:
(1) whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish the violation of
a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the
challenged conduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Courts may address these questions
in either order. Pearson, 555 U.S, at 236.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that clearly established law “must not be
defined at a high level of generality.” Waite v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017). Instead, the inquiry
“must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Thus,
although a case directly on point is not invariably required, existing precedent must have placed
the constitutional question “beyond debate.” White, 580 U.S. at 79 (quotation omitted).

10

These principles have particular force in Fourth Amendment excessive force cases, where
“it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply
to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Mullenix vy. Luna, 377 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quotation
omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reversed denials of qualified immunity
where lower courts relied on generalized excessive-force principles rather than precedent
addressing materially similar circumstances, See Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104-06 018); |
City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12-13 (2021); Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5-
8 (2021). The dispositive inquiry is whether existing precedent gave the officer “fair notice” that
the challenged conduct was unlawful under the particular circumstances confronting him, Kisela,
584 U.S. at 104,
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim largely examines Officer Farmer’s interaction with
Plaintiff in isolation. However, the Fourth Amendment requires the Court to evaluate the objective
reasonableness of an officer’s use of force in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting
the officer at the moment force was employed. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Those circumstances
included an ongoing struggle with an actively resisting emotionally disturbed person, the presence
of multiple emotionally charged civilians inside a confined residence, and the fact that the second
responding officer was simultaneously occupied addressing another escalating confrontation while
assisting in the effort to secure Eugenia Diaz. When viewed in that broader context, the Court
concludes. that Officer Farmer’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, Moreover, even assuming a constitutional violation could be found, Officer Farmer
would independently be entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff has identified no clearly

lf

established law that would have placed every reasonable officer on notice that the conduct at issue
violated the Fourth Amendment under the particular circumstances presented here.
a, The Body-Worn Camera Recordings Govern the Court’s Factual Analysis to
the Extent They Plainly Depict the Encounter
As a threshold matter, the parties dispute certain aspects of the events leading to Plaintiffs
fall, including the nature of Plaintiff’s interaction with Officer Farmer and whether Plaintiff’s
conduct justified the force used against her. Because the encounter was captured on the body-worn
cameras worn by Officers Farmer and Mora, the Court begins by determining what facts are
established by those recordings before turning to the constitutional analysis.
Ordinarily, at summary judgment, the Court must accept the nonmovant’s version of the
facts and draw all reasonabie inferences in her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, That principle,
however, does not require a court to adopt a factual account that is “blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. Rather, where video
evidence “quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by” a party, a court should view
the facts “in the light depicted by the videotape.” Id. at 378-81. The Third Circuit has repeatedly
applied Scoff in cases involving body-worn camera footage, recognizing that objective video
evidence may resolve factual disputes where the recordings clearly depict the events at issue. See
El, 975 F.3d at 336-37; Williams v. City of York, 967 F.3d 252, 259-60 Gd Cir, 2020).
Here, the body-worn camera recordings do not resolve every factual disagreement between
the parties. For example, the recordings do not definitively establish Plaintiff’s subjective intent in
approaching Officer Farmer, nor do they resolve whether Plaintiff acted out of concer for her
daughter or with any intent to obstruct the officers. However, the recordings do plainly depict
several facts that are central to the Court’s analysis. They show that, immediately before Officer
Farmer pushed Plaintiff, he was actively attempting to arrest Eugenia after she had repeatedly

12

screamed at him, advanced toward him, and physically chest-bumped him, The recordings further
depict Plaintiff approaching Officer Farmer while that struggle remained ongoing, repeatedly
tapping his forearm as he attempted to control Eugenia, and remaining within the immediate area
of the arrest as Officer Farmer simultaneously attempted to restrain Kugenia and monitor the
rapidly evolving situation. The recordings likewise show that Officer Mora’s attention was divided
between assisting with Eugenia’s arrest and addressing Marcelino Santiago, who had approached
the officers during the encounter, leaving Officer Farmer to contend simultaneously with Eugenia’s
continued resistance and Plaintiff’s physical engagement. Finally, the recordings depict Officer
Farmer directing Plaintiff to “Move” immediately before using a single push to create separation
between Plaintiff and the ongoing arrest, after which the officers continued their efforts to restrain
Rugenia,
To be sure, the parties offer competing interpretations of what those events signify. Plaintiff
contends that she posed no threat and did not interfere with Officer Farmer’s efforts. (See Pl.’s
Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (““SSUMP”) 4 45.) Defendants contend that
Plaintiff physically interfered with an active arrest and created an immediate officer-safety
concern. (DSUMF 15.) Those competing characterizations present the ultimate legal question
before the Court. But they do not alter what the recordings themselves depict. Accordingly, the
Court accepts Plaintiff’s version of the facts except where it is plainly contradicted by the body-
worn camera recordings. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380-81; El, 975 F.3d at 336-37.

13

b. Officer Farmer’s Use of Force Was Objectively Reasonable Under the Totality
of the Circumstances.
i. Plaintiff’s subjective motivation does not alter the Fourth Amendment
inquiry.
Before addressing the circumstances confronting Officer Farmer, the Court first addresses
Plaintiff’s contention that she was not attempting to interfere with Officer Farmer’s efforts to
control the situation.
The Supreme Court has made clear that excessive force claims are evaluated under an
objective standard that is “without regard to [the officer’s] underlying intent or motivation.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Accordingly, the relevant question is not why Plaintiff was tapping
Officer Farmer, but what a reasonable officer in Officer Farmer’s position could objectively
perceive while attempting to arrest an actively resisting individual during a rapidly unfolding
confrontation. See id, at 396-97, Thus, although Plaintiff’s motive may have been protective rather
than aggressive, her subjective intent does not control the constitutional analysis.
ii. The totality of the circumstances confronting Officer Farmer justified the
limited use of force.
Considering the circumstances confronting Officer Farmer at the moment force was
employed, the Court concludes that his conduct was objectively reasonable.
Unlike many excessive force cases involving force used on a suspect after he or she has
been secured, this case arose amid an ongoing attempt to arrest an emotionaily disturbed individual
who was actively resisting police officers. Immediately before the challenged use of force, Eugenia
had repeatedly screamed at Officer Farmer, advanced toward him, intentionally chest-bumped him,
and continued resisting his efforts to detain her. Officer Farmer was therefore not interacting with
Plaintiff in a controlled environment; he was actively attempting to complete a lawful arrest while
simultaneously maintaining contro! of an increasingly volatile situation.

14

The circumstances confronting Officer Farmer were further complicated by the presence
of multiple individuals inside the residence. While Officer Farmer attempted to restrain Eugenia,
Officer Mora was simultaneously occupied addressing Marcelino Santiago, whose escalating
conduct required police attention even as Mora attempted to assist with Eugenia’s arrest. At the
same time, Plaintiff approached Officer Farmer and made repeated physical contact with him while
he remained engaged with Eugenia. Whether Plaintiff intended to protect her daughter or simply
calm the situation, a reasonable officer in Officer Farmer’s position was not required to distinguish
with precision between benign conduct and interference with an arrest while he was actively
attempting to control a resisting subject. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
The physical environment likewise bears directly on the reasonableness analysis. The
encounter occurred inside a confined kitchen immediately after officers entered a residence in
response to a report that an emotionally disturbed individual had threatened suicide with a knife.
Upon entering the residence, the officers observed puncture marks in a bedroom door consistent
with knife damage and broken glass scattered across portions of the floor. Although Plaintiff
emphasizes that she herself was unarmed, the Fourth Amendment requires the Court to evaluate
the circumstances confronting Officer Farmer as a whole, not to isolate any single fact. See Santini,
795 E.3d at 417 (holding the infringement on the plaintiff’s rights was robust where the officers
“orabbed, tackled, punched, kicked, and pepper sprayed” him, despite the “scene that the officers
were confronted with [being] peaceful at the time of the .. . interaction, and there [being] many
officers at the scene.”). Here, at the moment force was used, Officer Farmer remained engaged in
a physical struggle with an actively resisting individual in a confined space containing multiple
civilians whose conduct demanded his attention. Indeed, the body-worn camera recording clearly
depicts that Officer Farmer’s attention was on Eugenia and not Plaintiff during the encounter,

15

These circumstances correspond closely with the considerations the Third Circuit
identified in Sharrar. The encounter occurred while Officer Farmer was effecting an arrest; the
individual being arrested had already demonstrated violent and combative behavior; officers had
reason to believe a knife had recently been present inside the residence; and Officer Farmer was
required to contend simultaneously with multiple individuals in a rapidly evolving situation. See
Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 822. Of particular significance here is the final Sharrar factor—the “number
of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time.” /d. This was not a one-on-
one interaction between Officer Farmer and Plaintiff. Rather, Officer Farmer was simultaneously
attempting to restrain Eugenia while Plaintiff’s tapping was distracting him from the task of arrest
and Officer Mora divided his attention between assisting with Eugenia and monitoring Santiago.
The Fourth Amendment requires the Court to evaluate Officer Farmer’s actions against that
complete factual backdrop.
Finally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned courts against second-guessing split-
second decisions made during tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving encounters. Graham, 490
U.S. at 396-97. Here, Officer Farmer was required to decide, within seconds, how best to maintain
control of an actively resisting EDP while another individual was distracting him during the arrest
and yet another civilian demanded police attention nearby. Viewing those circumstances
objectively, the Court cannot conclude that the Fourth Amendment required Officer Farmer to
delay effectuating Eugenia’s arrest or attempt to determine Plaintiff's subjective intentions before
taking reasonable steps to create separation between Plaintiff and attempt to regain control of
Eugenia.

16

Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that Officer
Farmer’s decision to use limited physical force to move Plaintiff away from the ongoing arrest was
objectively reasonable.
ii. The force employed was proportionate to the circumstances confronting
Officer Farmer.
The nature and degree of force employed further support the conclusion that Officer Farmer
acted reasonably. The body-worn camera recordings depict Officer Farmer issuing the command
“Move” immediately before physically creating separation between Plaintiff and the ongoing
arrest, The force was brief, directed solely toward moving Plaintiff away from the immediate
struggle, and ceased immediately, The recordings make clear that after the smgle motion no force
is used toward Plaintiff. In contrast to the cases relied on by Plaintiff, here, Plaintiff was not subject
to repeated strikes, shoves, punches, kicks, or any continued application of force against Plaintiff
after she was separated from Officer Farmer and Eugenia. See Santini, 795 F.3d at 417.
The Court does not minimize the seriousness of Plaintiff’s injuries. The record establishes
that Plaintiff sustained a fractured hip requiring surgery and subsequent rehabilitation. Those
injuries are significant, and nothing in this Opinion should be read to diminish their severity or
suggest that the Court is unsympathetic to the extent of Plaintiff’s injuries. However, the Fourth
Amendment inquiry examines the objective reasonableness of the force used—not the extent of
the resulting injury, no matter how unfortunate. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, A use of force
that is objectively reasonable when employed does not become constitutionally excessive solely
because an unforeseen injury proves more severe than anticipated. See County of Los Angeles v.
Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 427-28 (2017) (explaining that Fourth Amendment liability turns on
whether the force itself was unreasonable). Here, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that
Officer Farmer employed a single, brief application of force for the immediate purpose of creating

17

space while completing an active arrest. Under the circumstances confronting him, that level of
force was proportional to the legitimate governmental interests at stake.
iv. Plaintiff’s remaining arguments do not create a genuine dispute of
material fact.
Plaintiff raises several additional arguments that, even when viewed in the light most
favorable to her, do not alter the Court’s conclusion.
First, Plaintiff argues that Officer Farmer provided no meaningful warning before pushing
her. While the body-worn camera recordings indicate that Officer Farmer’s command to “Move”
occurred immediately before the push, the Fourth Amendment does not impose a categorical
requirement that officers provide advance verbal warnings before using reasonable force. Whether
additional warnings are feasible depends upon the circumstances confronting the officer. See
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, Given the rapidly evolving nature of the encounter, the absence of
an earlier warning does not render Officer Farmer’s conduct objectively unreasonable, particularly
here where Eugenia continued to struggle.
Second, Plaintiff emphasizes that Officer Farmer knew she was unarmed and that she was
not suspected of committing a crime. Those facts are relevant and the Court has considered them.
They do not, however, resolve the constitutional inquiry. The relevant question is not whether
Plaintiff herself posed an independent criminal threat, but whether a reasonable officer could use
limited force to remove a third party who physically engaged the officer during an active struggle
with a resisting EDP. Under the circumstances presented here, the Court concludes that he could.
Third, Plaintiff relies heavily on her age, size, and physical condition. Those characteristics
understandably bear upon the unfortunate severity of Plaintiff’s injuries. They do not, however,
change the objective circumstances confronting Officer Parmer when force was used. The Fourth

18

Amendment required Officer Farmer to respond to events as they unfolded in real time, not with
the benefit of hindsight after Piaintiff’s injuries became known. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Fourth, Plaintiff disputes whether Officer Farmer reasonably believed weapons remained
accessible within the kitchen. Even assuming Plaintiff is correct that Officer Farmer knew Plaintiff
herself was not armed, the Court need not determine whether concern over accessible weapons
independently justified the force employed, As discussed above, the undisputed circumstances—
including Eugenia’s active resistance, Plaintiff's physical engagement with Officer Farmer, the
confined environment, and the presence of muitiple civilians-—provided an objectively reasonable
basis for Officer Farmer to create physical separation and maintain control of the encounter.
Finally, Plaintiff relies on the opinions of her police practices expert, Glenn Gatrels, that
Officer Farmer’s conduct violated accepted police practices and the New Jersey Attorney General’s
Use of Force Policy. Expert testimony regarding police practices may assist a jury in understanding
law enforcement standards, but it cannot alter the governing Fourth Amendment inquiry, which
remains an objective legal question committed to the Court. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279,
295-96 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is governed by the
Constitution rather than departmental policies). Because the material facts depicted in the body-
worh camera recordings are not genuinely disputed, Mr. Gatreis’s differing opinion regarding the
reasonableness of Officer Farmer’s conduct does not preclude summary judgment.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Officer Farmer’s use of force violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court therefore
concludes that Defendants are entitled fo summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

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c. Even If Officer Farmer Violated the 'ourth Amendment, He Is Entitled to
Qualified Immunity.
Even assuming, arguendo, that a reasonable jury could conclude Officer Farmer’s use of
force violated the Fourth Amendment-—-which the Court concludes it could not—Officer Farmer
would nevertheless be entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established on March 22, 2023.
i. The clearly established inquiry must be undertaken with specificity.
As discussed above, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)). Although a plaintiff need not identify a prior case involving identical facts, existing
precedent must have placed the constitutional question confronting the officer “beyond debate.”
White, 580 U.S, at 79 (quotation omitted).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower courts not to define clearly established
law “at a high level of generality.” Jd. Rather, the inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
201 (2001). That requirement carries particular force in Fourth Amendment excessive force cases,
where “the result depends very much on the facts of each case.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quotation
omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reversed denials of qualified immunity
where lower courts relied upon generalized excessive-force principles rather than precedent
addressing materially similar circumstances. See Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104-06; City of Tahlequah,
595 U.S. at 12-13; Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5-8.
The relevant inquiry here, therefore, is not whether it was clearly established that officers
may not use excessive force in the abstract. The question is whether, in March 2023, it was clearly

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established that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment by physically moving aside a third party
who physically engaged the officer while the officer was attempting to effectuate an arrest.
i. Plaintiff identifies no controlling authority placing the constitutional
question beyond debate.
Plaintiff has identified no Supreme Court or Third Circuit decision—and the Court has
located none--holding that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment under circumstances
materially similar to those presented here. Nor has Plaintiff identified a robust consensus of
persuasive authority establishing that such conduct was unconstitutional. See District of Columbia
v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63-64 (2018) (explaining that clearly established law ordinarily requires
either controlling authority or a robust consensus of persuasive cases). Indeed, the authorities upon
which Plaintiff principally relies underscore why qualified immunity applies.
In Santini ». Fuentes, the Third Circuit concluded that factual disputes precluded summary
judgment where officers allegedly used force against an individual after the circumstances had
stabilized and the plaintiff was not physically engaged in an ongoing arrest. 795 F.3d at 420-24.
Likewise, in El v. City of Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit emphasized that the plaintiff was not
confronting officers during the sort of “few tense and dangerous seconds” that characterize rapidly
unfolding police encounters. 975 F.3d at 337. Neither decision addressed an officer’s use of force
against a third party who physically engaged the officer during an active struggle with a resisting
arrestee while officers simultaneously managed multiple unfolding confrontations,
Nor do Plaintiff's remaining authorities clearly establish the unlawfulness of Officer
Farmer’s conduct, Rather, they generally involve force applied after suspects had been secured,
force materially greater than that employed here, or circumstances lacking the rapidly evolving
and multi-person dynamics confronting Officer Farmer. See, e.g., Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483,
497-98 (3d Cir, 2006) (denying qualified immunity where officers tackled and pepper-sprayed an

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unarmed, compliant minor who was not resisting, posed no immediate threat, and was not
physically interfering with an ongoing arrest); cf Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104-06 (emphasizing that
materially distinguishable precedent cannot clearly establish the law for qualified immunity
purposes). Simply put, Plaintiff has cited no authority placing “beyond debate” that Officer
Farmer’s conduct under these particular circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. White,
580 U.S. at 79,
iti At a minimum, reasonable officers could disagree regarding the
lawfulness of Officer Farmer’s conduct.
Even assuming Officer Farmer misjudged the amount of force necessary to create space
between Plaintiff while he arrested Eugenia, qualified immunity protects officers who make
reasonable mistakes while performing their duties in uncertain and rapidly evolving circumstances.
See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, the doctrine
provides officers with “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open
legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).
Here, Officer Farmer confronted an actively resisting emotionally disturbed individual who
had already physically confronted him; Plaintiff then physically engaged Officer Farmer while he
attempted to complete the arrest; Officer Mora simultaneously divided his attention between
assisting with the arrest and monitoring Santiago; and the encounter unfolded in a confined
environment over the course of only a few seconds. Under those citcumstances, even if another
officer might have responded differently, it cannot be said that every reasonable officer would have
understood that using a single push to create separation with a third party who was intervening
during an arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. See Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S, at. 7-8; City of
Tahlequah, 595 U.S. at 12-13,

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Accordingly, even assuming Plaintiff could establish a constitutional violation, Officer
Farmer would independently be entitled to qualified immunity because the law did not clearly
establish that his conduct was unconstitutional under the circumstances confronting him on March
22, 2023, Summary judgment in Officer Farmer’s favor is therefore warranted on this independent
basis.
d. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims Fail as a Matter of Law.
i. Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails.
Plaintiff also asserts claims against the City of Vineland and the Vineland Police
Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Farmer’s conduct resulted from
unconstitutional policies, customs, or failures to train. (Compl. at 4, Ff 2-4.)
A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, municipal liability attaches only — -
where execution of an official policy or custom causes the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id.
at 694. Moreover, where no constitutional violation has occurred, there can be no municipal
liability under § 1983 predicated upon the challenged conduct. City of Los Angeles y. Heller, 475
U.S. 796, 799 (1986), Mulholland y. Gov't Cnty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013).
Because the Court concludes that Officer Farmer did not violate Plaintiff's Fourth
Amendment rights, Plaintiff's Monell claim necessarily fails. Even assuming otherwise, Plaintiff
has produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that any official policy,
longstanding custom, or deliberately indifferent failure to train was the moving force behind the
challenged use of force. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S, 378, 388-
89 (1989); Forrest vy. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105-07 (3d Cir. 2019).?

2 Plaintiff concedes that her Monell claim fails as a matter of law, (See Opp. at 10-11.)
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Accordingly, summary judgment will be entered in favor of the municipal defendants on
Plaintiff's § 1983 municipal liability claim.
it, Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Vineland and the Vineland Police
Department fail.
For the same reasons, Plaintiff's claims against the City of Vineland cannot survive
summary judgment. Additionally, the Vineland Police Department is not a separate entity subject
to suit under § 1983 apart from the municipality itself. Under New Jersey law, a municipal police
department is merely an administrative arm of the municipality. See Bonenberger v, Plymouth
Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997); Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 F. App’x 272, 278 Gd
Cir, 2004). Accordingly, summary judgment will also be entered in favor of the City of Vineland
and the Vineland Police Department.

. iti, Plaintiff’s remaining claims likewise fail.
Plaintiff also asserts Defendants violated the New Jersey Constitution, together with state-
law claims sounding in negligence. Those claims likewise cannot survive summary judgment.
Plaintiff acknowledges that the Court’s determination concerning her excessive force claim
and the application of qualified immunity are dispositive of her claim for violation of the New
Jersey Constitution. (Pl’s Opp. Br. at 10-11.) “The New Jersey Civil Rights Act ((NJCRA’) was
modeled after 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and creates a private cause of action for violations of civil rights
secured under the New Jersey Constitutions.” Trafton y. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417,
443 (D.N.J. 2011), The NJCRA is interpreted analogously to § 1983 in cases alleging excessive
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 443-44; Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 NL.
202, 216 (2014). Because Plaintiff has failed to establish a constitutional violation under the Fourth
Amendment, her parallel NJCRA claim fails for the same reasons.

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Plaintiff’s negligence claim fares no better. The New Fersey Tort Claims Act immunizes
public employees from liability for discretionary law-enforcement decisions except as otherwise
provided by statute. See N.J.S.A. 59:3-3; Bombace v. City of Newark, 125 N.J, 361, 372-73 (1991).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that “[tthe same standard of objective reasonableness that
applies in Section 1983 actions also governs questions of good faith arising under the Tort Claims
Act.” Trafton, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 443 (quoting Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 387
(2000)). Thus, “if the alleged tort and alleged constitutional violation arise out of the same conduct,
and the Court concludes that no constitutional violation occurred because the public employee’s
actions were objectively reasonable,” as here, “the NITCA’s good faith provision applies and bars
prosecution of the tort claim.” fd. at 445.
To the extent Plaintiff asserts derivative state-law claims against the City of Vineland, those
claims likewise fail because Officer Farmer committed no underlying tort and because Plaintiff
has identified no independent basis for municipal liability under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act,
See N.IS.A. 59:2-2(a); Velez v. City of Jersey City, 180 N.J. 284, 290-91 (2004).
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all remaining state-law
claims.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt, No. 54)
will be GRANTED in its entirety. Judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants City of
Vineland, the Vineland Police Department, and Officer Kenneth A. Farmer on all counts of the
Compiaint. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11415866. Public record. Not legal advice.