# SWAFFORD

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · August 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414623

## Case

- **Full name:** Jeff Swafford v. Mr. Greenfield, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIE DIVISION
JEFF SWAFFORD, )
)
Plaintiff ) NO. 1:25-CV-00218
)
VS. ) RICHARD A, LANZILLO
) Chief United States Magistrate Judge
MR. GREENFIELD, et al., )
) MEMORANDUM OPINION ON
Defendants ) DEFENDANTS GREENFIELD AND
) FAIR'S MOTION TO DISMISS
) AMENDED COMPLAINT
)
) ECF NO. 41
)

Defendants Greenfield and Fair have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs second
Amended Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons explained below,
the motion will be granted.!

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Jeff Swafford (“Swafford”), a former inmate at the Crawford County
Correctional Facility (“CCCF”’), commenced this pro se civil rights action on July 14,
2025. ECF No. 1. Due to filing deficiencies, Swafford’s Complaint was not filed until
November 24, 2025. ECF No. 8. The Complaint named CCCF Warden Greenfield
(“Greenfield”), CCCF Deputy Warden Fair (“Fair”), and Prime Care Medical as
Defendants. Defendants Greenfield and Fair moved to dismiss the Complaint on

1 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge in these
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

April 27, 2026. See ECF Nos. 27, 28. On that same date, the Court dismissed this
action as to Prime Care Medical based on Swafford’s withdrawal of claims against it.
See ECF No. 29.

On May 1, 2026, the Court ordered Swafford to file a response to Defendants
Greenfield and Fair’s motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to file an amended
complaint. See ECF No. 31. On May 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to
File an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 32. Swafford’s motion stated that unidentified
Crawford County Jail staff members, not Warden Greenfield or Deputy Fair, gave
certain of his personal belongings to his sister without his consent. Jd. On June 4,
2026, Swafford filed an Amended Complaint consisting of these four sentences:

I, Jeff Swafford, am accusing the Crawford County Jail and
staff, not specifically Warden Greenfield or Deputy Fair,
for handing out my personal belongings (apartment keys)
without my consent. They violated my rights as a prisoner,
by breaking there (sic) own rule. These actions
subsequently left me homeless, living in a homeless
shelter. I don't know how to amend this complaint any
further.
ECF No. 36.

On June 25, 2026, Swafford filed a second Amended Complaint, alleging as
follows:
1. On or about the last 2 weeks of March, 2023, or the first
2 weeks of April, 2023, (I don’t know the exact date) a
correction officer at the Crawford County Jail, I will call
“John Doe,” because I truly don’t know the identity of
this man, because I was incarcerated. This said “John
Doe’, willingly did give out my personal property (a set
of my apartment keys) without my consent.

2. These actions eventually led me to homelessness, after
I got out of jail. I ended up in St. James Home. It lisa
homeless shelter in Meadville, PA
3. These actions violated my rights as a prisoner, by giving
out my personal belongings without my consent. They,
meaning, Crawford County Jail, broke there (sic) own
rule
4. I am suing Crawford County Jail for Fifty Thousand
Dollars total.
ECF No. 38.
Defendants Greenfield and Fair have moved to dismiss the second Amended
Complaint. ECF No. 41. They argue that the second Amended Complaint, like the
original Complaint and first Amended Complaint, fails to state a claim under any
theory of liability against either Defendant. ECF No. 42. The Court agrees and will
therefore dismiss the second Amended Complaint. Furthermore, because any further
attempt by Swafford to amend would be futile, the Court will dismiss this action with
prejudice.
II]. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests
the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.
1993). As with the prior motions to dismiss, in deciding the instant motion, the Court
accepts as true the Amended Complaint’s factual allegations and examines them in
a light most favorable to Swafford. See id.; U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281
F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). But the Court is “not compelled to accept unsupported
conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Cal.
Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (8d Cir. 2004); McTernan v.
City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (8d Cir. 2009). In making its determination under
Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on
the merits; the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (citing 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, a
complaint should only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Finally, because Swafford is proceeding pro se, his second Amended Complaint
must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the Court can reasonably read his
Amended Complaint to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it will
do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor
syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); U.S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley,
414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969).

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
To support a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege facts to
support that each defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived the
plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See
Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (38d Cir. 1995); Shuman v. Penn
Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 “does not confer any
substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred.” Williams v. Pennsylvania Hum. Relations Comm’n, 870 F.3d
294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (8d
Cir. 2014)).
Swafford alleges that an unnamed staff member at CCCF (not Greenfield or
Fair) gave his apartment keys to an unauthorized third party. ECF No. 38, §1.
Without explanation, he further alleges that this action left him homeless and living
ina homeless shelter. Jd., 42. As a threshold matter, these allegations fail to support
the deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution or other federal law. See
Spencer v. Bush, 543 Fed. Appx. 209, 213 (8d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n unauthorized
intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation
of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”
(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984))); Shakur v. Coelho, 421 Fed.
Appx. 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (explaining that the Pennsylvania Tort
Claims Act provides an adequate remedy for a willful deprivation of property).

Because Swafford has a state law remedy for his lost property under state conversion
or replevin law or the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act, any Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim is foreclosed.?

Furthermore, Swafford’s allegations at best support an inference that an
unnamed prison staff member negligently or intentionally released his apartment
keys. Such conduct does not support a violation of the Constitution under any
substantive theory. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (negligence of
federal agents resulting in property loss to plaintiff not constitutional deprivation).
Any potential constitutional claim also fails because the causal connection between
the alleged unauthorized release of Swafford’s keys and his later homelessness 1s too
attenuated to support a viable claim under any federal theory of liability. See e.g.,
Bad. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (plaintiff
must show that the defendant “through its deliberate conduct... was ‘moving force’
behind injury alleged”); Woods v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., No. CV 24-0058, 2026
WL 883810, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2026) (“Allegations fail the ‘fairly direct’ element
if they are ‘too attenuated’ to show a ‘direct causal connection’ between the action and
the harm.”).

In addition to failing to support a deprivation of a right secured under federal
law, the second Amended Complaint also fails to support the personal involvement of
Greenfield or Fair. Under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts to demonstrate the

2 To the extent Swafford may have a claim under Pennsylvania state law, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over such claim.

personal involvement of each named defendant in the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). The facts alleged must show that each
defendant's own conduct—not the conduct of others—caused or contributed to the
constitutional harm. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. A supervisor’s liability under § 1983
cannot be based on his title or position alone. S.A. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No.
1:24-CV-00343-SPB-RAL, 2025 WL 4303808, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2025), report
and recommendation adopted, No. CV 24-348, 2026 WL 465743 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 18,
2026). Although a supervisor's liability may arise from his adoption of a policy that
caused the plaintiffs constitutional harm or his knowledge of and acquiescence in a
subordinate’s misconduct, id., Swafford has alleged no facts to support either theory
of liability against Greenfield or Fair. In fact, his second Amended Complaint
specifically alleges that the unnamed CCCF staff member who released his keys did

so contrary to prison policy and rules.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because Swafford’s second Amended Complaint fails to allege facts to support
a violation of the Constitution or other federal law or the personal involvement of
either Defendant, the Court will grant Defendants Greenfield and Fair’s motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 41). Furthermore, based on his repeated failure to allege a viable
claim against Greenfield and Fair, his acknowledgment that neither participated in
the unauthorized release of his apartment keys, and because the facts alleged and his
submissions demonstrate that any further attempt to amend his pleading to state a

claim would be futile, the Court will dismiss this action with prejudice. A separate
order will follow.

Dated this 4th day of August, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

RICHARD A. LANZILLO C
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414623. Public record. Not legal advice.