# VALDIVIA

> District Court, D. New Jersey · July 24, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414618

## Case

- **Full name:** Rosa Valdivia v. Gladibel Medina, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** July 24, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ROSA VALDIVIA,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-3901 (GC) (JBD)
v.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
GLADIBEL MEDINA, et al.,
Defendants.
CASTNER, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff Rosa Valdivia’s revised
Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP). (ECF No. 16.) For the reasons set forth below,
and other good cause shown, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) is DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint and IFP Application on May 6, 2025.
(ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On May 18, 2025, Plaintiff submitted an Amended Complaint, which is the
operative pleading before the Court.1 (ECF No. 4.) The Court denied Plaintiff’s initial IFP
Application as incomplete on August 28, 2025, (ECF No. 14), and Plaintiff submitted an amended
IFP Application on September 12, 2025, (ECF No. 16).

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed several additional documents on the docket. (See,
e.g., ECF Nos. 9-13, 15.) However, Plaintiff does not state how these filings relate to the claims
asserted in the Amended Complaint or if they are intended to supplement the Amended Complaint.
Construing them liberally, they do not appear to clarify the factual basis of Plaintiff’s asserted
claims.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint includes seven paragraphs of facts purporting to assert
various claims against Defendants Dr. Gladibel Medina, Saint Peter’s University Hospital, the
Dorothy B. Hersh Child Protection Center, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (DCPP), DCPP official Annemarie Mueller, prosecutor Dana Morton, Elizabeth
Gutierrez, and John Does 1-10. (ECF No. 4 at 4-5.) Plaintiff states that, on or about August 25,

2020, Dr. Medina conducted a “forensic child abuse evaluation” of Plaintiff’s minor child without
obtaining lawful joint parental consent and prepared a report accordingly. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff
alleges that Dr. Medina’s report relied solely on “partial” information provided by DCPP and failed
to include exculpatory family history, domestic violence orders, and certain differential diagnoses.
(Id.) Plaintiff also contends that she was “denied [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)]
accommodations during these proceedings despite prior documentation and repeated requests.”
(Id.) She further alleges that her “pro se rights were systematically denied or obstructed by State
actors” and that prior records from DCPP investigations conducted in 2017 were “reopened and
weaponized” against her. (Id. at 4-5.) Because of these events, Plaintiff purportedly suffered

reputational harm, emotional distress, family separation, and economic hardship. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, First
Amendment, Title II of the ADA, Article I of the New Jersey Constitution, and the New Jersey
Civil Rights Act. (Id. at 5.) She seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, costs, interest, and other relief the Court deems just and proper. (Id.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. In Forma Pauperis
To avoid paying the filing fee for a civil case in this district, a litigant may apply to proceed
in forma pauperis. In considering applications to proceed IFP, the Court engages in a two-step
analysis. Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). A court need not complete each
step, nor must a court complete these steps in a specific order. See Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655,
660 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] court has the authority to dismiss a case ‘at any time,’ 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2), regardless of the status of a filing fee; that is, a court has the discretion to consider the
merits of a case and evaluate an IFP application in either order or even simultaneously.”).

First, the Court determines whether the plaintiff is eligible to proceed under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a). Id. Under section 1915(a), a plaintiff’s application must “state the facts concerning his
or her poverty with some degree of particularity, definiteness or certainty.” Simon v. Mercer Cnty.
Comm. Coll., Civ. No. 10-5505, 2011 WL 551196, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb 9, 2011) (citing United States
ex rel. Roberts v. Pennsylvania, 312 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Pa. 1969)).
Second, the Court determines whether the Complaint should be dismissed as frivolous or
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); Green v. Izod Corp. Office & Head-Quarters,
Civ. No. 22-06380, 2024 WL 1809859, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2024) (citing Deutsch v. United

States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)) (“To guard against potential ‘abuse’ of ‘cost-free access
to the federal courts,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) empowers district courts to dismiss an IFP complaint
if, among other things, the action is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to comply with the proper
pleading standards.”). “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [(‘Rule’)] 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120,
122 (3d Cir. 2012).
“[A] court may dismiss an in forma pauperis claim as frivolous if, after considering the
contending equities, the court determines that the claim is: (1) of little or no weight, value, or
importance; (2) not worthy of serious attention; or (3) trivial.” Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1082.
B. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim
Although courts construe pro se pleadings less stringently than formal pleadings drafted by

attorneys, pro se litigants are still required to “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support
a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “[A] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
C. Rule 8 – Pleading Requirements

Rule 8 sets forth general rules of pleading requirements and requires (1) “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” (2) “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and (3) allegations that are “simple, concise, and
direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (a)(2), (d)(1). The allegations in the complaint must not be “so
undeveloped that [they do] not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is
contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). Even
pro se litigants must “comply with the basic pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).” Purisima v. City
of Philadelphia, 738 F. App’x 106, 107 (3d Cir. 2018).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court exercises its discretion to review the merits of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
before it decides whether to grant the IFP application. Brown, 941 F.3d at 660; see also Schwager
v. Norristown State Hosp., Civ. No. 23-3866, 2023 WL 8458236, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2023)
(screening the complaint before addressing the IFP application).

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. First, Plaintiff engages in impermissible group pleading. A group pleading “is a
complaint that ‘fails to specify which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions,
or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.’” Foulke v. Twp. of Chery Hill, Civ. No.
23-02543, 2024 WL 3568841, at *7 (D.N.J. July 29, 2024) (quoting Morales v. New Jersey, Civ.
No. 21-11548, 2023 WL 5003891, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2023)); see also Innovative Cosm.
Concepts, LLC v. Brown Packaging, Inc., Civ. No. 18-5939, 2020 WL 7048577, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr.
28, 2020) (describing group pleadings as those in which “it is ‘virtually impossible to know which
allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief’”).

Here, Plaintiff asserts claims against “Defendants” broadly but does not attribute specific
conduct to any Defendant except for Dr. Medina. (See ECF No. 4 at 4-5.) As a result, the Court
cannot determine which of Plaintiff’s factual allegations support which claims for relief against
which Defendants. This fails to satisfy Rule 8, and therefore Plaintiff fails to state a claim against
Saint Peter’s University Hospital, Dorothy B. Hersh Child Protection Center, DCPP, Annemarie
Mueller, Dana Morton, and Elizabeth Gutierrez. See Shine v. County of Montgomery, Civ. No. 23-
1952, 2023 WL 7190480, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2023) (“[A] pro se complaint must conform with
the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which ‘demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation’ or ‘naked assertions’ that are
devoid of ‘factual enhancement’”).
Second, Plaintiff’s factual allegations as to Dr. Medina fail to state a claim. The extent of
Plaintiff’s allegations about Dr. Medina are as follows:
On or about August 25, 2020, Dr. Medina conducted a forensic
evaluation of Plaintiff’s minor child without obtaining lawful, joint
parental consent, in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 and related
standards. Dr. Medina’s report failed to include relevant differential
diagnoses, including BECC/BESS findings. She relied solely on
partial DCPP submissions and omitted exculpatory family history
and DV orders.

(ECF No. 4 at 4.)2 Even drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor as the Court must, the Court
cannot discern a viable claim against Dr. Medina from these allegations. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“provides private citizens with a means to redress violations of federal law” committed by state
actors. Woodyard v. County of Essex, 514 F. App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2013). “[T]he basic cause
of action requires that a § 1983 plaintiff prove two essential elements: (1) that the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct
deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011).

2 The Court also notes that Plaintiff alleges the forensic evaluation underlying her
constitutional claims occurred on or about August 25, 2020. (ECF No. 4 at 4.) Claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act are subject to New Jersey’s two-year
statute of limitations on personal injury actions and thus may be time-barred. See Dique v. N.J.
State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that Dr. Medina was acting under color of state law, and
therefore any claim against Dr. Medina pursuant to section 1983 must fail.3 See Am. Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“[The] under-color-of-state-law element of Section
1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”
(citation modified)); Amig v. County of Juniata, 432 F. Supp. 3d 481, 486 (M.D. Pa. 2020)

(“Generally, § 1983 mandates that claims may only be brought against state actors, not private
entities.”). Moreover, Plaintiff does not state how Dr. Medina purportedly deprived Plaintiff of
her constitutional rights.4 (See ECF No. 4 at 4-5.) The Court infers that Plaintiff alleges that Dr.
Medina violated her Fourth Amendment rights by “orchestrating an unauthorized medical seizure
of her child.” (Id. at 4.) But even assuming Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support this claim,
a Fourth Amendment child-seizure claim “belongs only to the child, not to the parent, although a
parent has standing to assert it on the child’s behalf.” Voorhis v. Digangi, Civ. No. 23-66, 2024
WL 4479831, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2024) (citation modified). There is no indication here that
Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of any child, and even if Plaintiff did purport to do so, a non-

attorney parent “must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or her child.”
Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991). Because
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, she cannot pursue a Fourth Amendment child-seizure claim on behalf
of her minor child against Dr. Medina.

3 Similarly, Title II of the ADA authorizes suits only against public entities, not individuals.
See Matthews v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 613 F. App’x 163, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2015).
4 Although Plaintiff also asserts First Amendment and Title II ADA claims against
Defendants broadly, the Amended Complaint alleges no facts from which the Court could
reasonably infer either claim as to Dr. Medina.
The Court further infers from Plaintiff’s assertions that Plaintiff brings a Fourteenth
Amendment claim against Dr. Medina because Dr. Medina allegedly used “biased expert reports”
and “suppress[ed] exculpatory evidence” in the preparation of her forensic evaluation report. (ECF
No. 4 at 5.) But to state a claim for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) she was deprived of an individual interest included within the Fourteenth

Amendment’s protection of “life, liberty, or property,” and (2) the procedures available to her did
not provide “due process of law.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir.
2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff alleges only that Dr.
Medina’s purportedly biased report deprived Plaintiff of “life, liberty, and property” without due
process. (ECF No. 4 at 5.) This is a mere recitation of the elements of a procedural due process
claim and is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Battle v. Marchese, Civ. No. 23-666,
2025 WL 1710538, at *7 (M.D. Pa. May 27, 2025) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (stating that a
procedural due process claim requires “a specific identification of the interest [the p]laintiff was
deprived of,” rather than “just a generic statement that [she] was deprived of an interest”).

Because Plaintiff fails to state a federal claim over which this Court has original
jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction at this early stage over
Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims. See Obuskovic v. Wood, 761 F. App’x 144, 148-49 (3d Cir.
2019) (“[The Court] has discretion to ‘decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
. . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’”
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3))); Francisco v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No. 23-22775, 2024 WL
4117394, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2024) (“[T]he district court must decline to decide the pendent
state law claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties
provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”).
IV. ORDER
For the reasons a above, and other good cause shown,
IT IS on this day of July, 2026 ORDERED as follows:
1. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) is DISMISSED without prejudice,
2. The Clerk’s Office is directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of this Memorandum Order
and CLOSE this case.
3. Plaintiff may have this case reopened if, within thirty (30) days of the date of the
entry of this Memorandum Order, Plaintiff files an amended complaint that cures
the deficiencies set forth herein. Failure to file an amended complaint within that
time will render the dismissal with prejudice or final. See Hoffman v. Nordic Nats.,
Ine,, 837 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir, 2016) (When that 30-day period expired, the
District Court’s decision became final.”),

U UF kp States DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11414618. Public record. Not legal advice.